STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE )
AND TREASURER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 94-5460
)
ALAN DAVID COTTRILL, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
A hearing in the above-styled case was held pursuant to notice by Stephen
Dean, assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on August 1, 2, and 3, 1995, in Jacksonville, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Allen R. Moayad, Esquire
Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
For Respondent: Jed Berman, Esquire
Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30
Winter Park, Florida 32790 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue is whether the Respondent committed the acts alleged in the administrative complaint contrary to Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On September 8, 1994, The Department of Insurance, the Petitioner, filed a twelve count administrative complaint against Alan David Cottrill, the Respondent, alleging multiple violations of Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. The Respondent requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner referred the case on October 10, 1994, to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the formal hearing. The case was initially noticed for hearing on March 16, 1995, but Respondent requested a continuance and the case was rescheduled to April 25, 1995. Thereafter, both parties requested a continuance and the case was reset for August 1-3, 1995.
The hearing was conducted as scheduled. The Petitioner presented the testimony of Lloyd Register, IV; Cassie Reimer; Rosa Coleman; Dennis Hurlburt; Curtis Newton; Andrew Voshell; Alan D. Cottrill; Linda Palmer; and Brice Green.
The Respondent presented the testimony of Alan D. Cottrill and Susan Graves.
The Petitioner introduced 21 documentary exhibits (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 21), and the Respondent introduced one documentary exhibit (Respondent's Exhibit 1).
The transcript of the hearing was filed on September 11, 1995. The Respondent subsequently requested a delay in his filing post hearing brief until October 23, 1995, and the Department requested a delay in filing its post hearing briefs until November 21, 1995. The Petitioner filed its post hearing brief and proposed findings on November 21, 1995, and Respondent filed his post hearing brief and proposed findings on November 27, 1995, without objection.
The proposed findings of both parties were read and considered. The Appendix to this Order states which of their proposed findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the time of the hearing, and at all times relevant to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, Alan David Cottrill was licensed as a general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agent by the Department of Insurance.
The Department of Insurance regulates general lines-property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agents pursuant to Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes.
Lloyd Register, III, and his son, Lloyd Register, IV, operate directly or indirectly a number of insurance agencies specializing in the sale of nonstandard insurance. These agencies generally employ an agent, who is an officer of a separate corporation in which one or both of the Registers is also an officer; and the Registers own a controlling interest in the corporation or otherwise have the capacity to terminate each corporation.
Alan David Cottrill started his employment with Cash Register of Arlington, Inc. in July, 1992. He was designated as the primary agent at Cash Register of Jacksonville, Inc. at the end of July, 1992, at which time he was president of the corporation. In February of 1993, he became vice president and president of Cash Register of Westside, Inc. In March of 1993, the Mr. Cottrill was again employed by Cash Register of Arlington, Inc., and was an officer of that corporation and primary agent of that insurance agency. He was the primary agent and general manager of Cash Register of Palatka, Inc., from November of 1993 until October of 1994. From February of 1993 until October of 1994, Mr. Cottrill was general manager of all Cash Register Offices in Jacksonville and Orange Park, Florida. The Respondent was again employed full time by Cash Register of Westside, Inc. in March of 1994, and became the primary agent for that agency in May of 1994.
All of the Cash Register Auto Insurance agencies with which the Respondent was employed, as indicated in Paragraph 4, above, were insurance agencies regulated under the laws of Florida. Lloyd Register, IV, was an officer and director of the foregoing Cash Register Auto Insurance agencies.
Colonial Touring Association, Inc., is an automobile club providing accidental death and dismemberment as an ancillary product.
COUNT I, II, and III
The Petitioner did not present any evidence on the allegations of Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, IX, and X in the Administrative Complaint.
COUNT IV
Cassie Reimer contacted Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc., at 203 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida, on January 8, 1993, regarding the purchase of automobile insurance.
At the time Ms. Reimer purchased insurance from Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc., the Respondent admitted he was the manager of the Orange Park office.
The application executed by Ms. Reimer indicates that the Agency's name is "Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jax, Inc., 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, FL 32216," and the agent's number is 8009.
Prior to going the Orange Park office of Cash Register Auto Insurance, Ms. Reimer had called and had obtained a quote for liability, collision, and personal injury protection for her automobile. Ms. Reimer advised the individual with whom she spoke on the phone that she wanted the minimum coverages necessary to satisfy the lien-holder of her automobile loan and the Florida law. Based upon the quote which she received, she went to the Orange Park office of Cash Register Auto Insurance.
When Ms. Reimer arrived at the office, she was assisted by Andrew Voshell, who she knew as "Andy" and who helped her fill out the insurance applications (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 & 2) for liability, collision, and personal injury protection from American Union Insurance Company. Mr. Voshell helped her fill out the premium financing agreement, accepted a down payment in the amount of $83 from Ms. Reimer, and presented Ms. Reimer an application which she executed for Colonial Automobile Club which included additional insurance for accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) which cost $80.
The transaction was memorialized in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (the premium financing agreement), Petitioner's Exhibit 4 (cash receipt from Voshell), Petitioner's Exhibit 5 (Colonial Touring Association, Inc. designation of beneficiary), and Petitioner's Exhibit 6 (confirmation of coverage).
The Confirmation of Coverage form (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) indicates that there were $2,000, $1,000, $500, and $250 deductibles for bodily injury; and that ADD coverage from Colonial was optional and cost $80. Ms. Reimer signed each of the spaces on the Confirmation of Coverage, indicating she had read and understood the policy.
The Premium Financing Agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) indicates that the total amount financed was $551, which included the $80 premium for Colonial Touring Association (CTA) for ADD and the $471 premium for American Union (AIB) for property damage and personal injury protection.
Ms. Reimer was not advised by Mr. Voshell that she was purchasing an optional automobile club membership, and that the cost thereof was being added to her premiums and financed.
Andrew Voshell was not a licensed agent at the time he dealt with Ms. Reimer. It was Mr. Voshell who acted as the agent presenting the applications and obtaining Ms. Reimer's signature and accepting payment from her; however, Alan David Cottrill knew about the transaction because he signed Ms. Reimer's applications outside her presence.
COUNT V
On December 10, 1992, Curtis Newton bought automobile insurance at the University Boulevard office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jacksonville, Inc. The Respondent was employed at that office as the primary agent at that time.
Mr. Newton called the office and obtained a quote for the minimum liability and PIP coverage required by law. The Respondent completed most of Mr. Newton's application for insurance while speaking with him on the telephone.
Because Mr. Newton wanted to finance the premiums, the Respondent included an auto club membership with ADD coverage in the quote.
When Mr. Newton came to the agency, he dealt with Linda Palmer, an unlicensed individual, exclusively. Ms. Palmer worked at the office from September, 1992 until August, 1993 under the supervision of the Respondent. Ms. Palmer did not hold a license to transact any type of insurance business during her employment with Cash Register Auto Insurance. The Respondent permitted Ms. Palmer to take applications and receive money. The Respondent required that Ms. Palmer explain to the customer the Confirmation of Coverages form which the customer signed. This was the only explanation provided to customers of the insurance they were buying, and constituted an explanation of policies.
Mr. Newton advised Ms. Palmer that he did not want to join an auto club and did not want ADD coverage. Ms. Palmer crossed off the ADD coverage on the Premium Financing Agreement; however, she had Mr. Newton execute the Coverage Confirmation which indicated $4,000 coverage for ADD, but which did not state a premium amount. There is no place under ADD to indicate "no coverage" as there is for the other optional coverages. Mr. Newton also executed a designation of beneficiary form for Auto Accidental Death Coverage, and paid a down payment of $91 to Ms. Palmer. Ms. Palmer did not advise Mr. Newton that he had executed the paperwork for ADD coverage.
Ms. Palmer was required by Respondent to sell auto club and ADD coverage. The inclusion of the forms for auto club and ADD coverage was intentional.
The premium financing agreement was for the amount of the liability and PIP coverage, $256, and this coverage was provided. However, the premium financing agreement indicates the down payment was $51, not $91. There is no evidence that Mr. Newton was provided with ADD coverage, which he did not want, but the $40 difference between the $51 down payment and the $91 which Mr. Newton tendered to Ms. Palmer was not refunded to Mr. Newton. There was no evidence that Mr. Newton ever made demand for this overpayment.
Had the Respondent handled Mr. Newton's application, the Respondent would have known that Mr. Newton did not desire ADD coverage, and that the down payment tendered was excessive and inconsistent with the insurance being provided and the amount being financed.
In filling out the applications, explaining the forms, and accepting the money from Mr. Newton, Ms. Palmer engaged in activities restricted to agents with the knowledge and consent of the Respondent.
COUNT VI and VII
The Department did not present any evidence regarding Counts VI and
VII.
COUNT VIII
On October 22, 1992, Rosa Coleman bought automobile insurance at the
3796 Blanding Boulevard office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Westside, Inc. from the Respondent who was employed at that office at that time. Ms. Coleman advised the Respondent that she wanted the minimum required coverages.
Ms. Coleman came into the office on her lunch hour and executed an application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) for bodily injury, property damage, and PIP insurance to Union American Insurance Company. Ms. Coleman executed various forms, among which were a Confirmation of Coverage form and Designation of Beneficiary form which indicated she was obtaining auto club and ADD coverage. The Respondent did not explain that there was a separate charge for auto club membership which included the ADD coverage, or that she did not have to have this coverage.
The total insurance premium for the liability and PIP coverage was
$291 and the charge for the auto club was $30, for a total of $321. The handwriting makes it difficult to read the two amounts; however, the ADD was for
$3,000, and the premium was $10 per thousand of coverage. The receipt indicates the Respondent received $40 down payment. The remainder of the premium was financed by Ms. Coleman with Equity Premium, Inc.
The application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) the receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) and designation of beneficiary form (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) indicate that insurance company was Cash Register Auto Insurance, 5631 University Blvd. West, Jacksonville, FL 32216. Although the Respondent was not the agent for the Blanding Boulevard office at the time Ms. Coleman purchased her insurance, the Respondent, who personally sold Ms. Coleman her insurance, was the primary agent for the agency listed on the application and receipt which she received from the Respondent.
COUNT IX AND X
The Department did not present any evidence on these two counts.
COUNT XI
On or about December 22, 1993, Dennis Hurlburt went into the Palatka office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Putnam County, Inc., in Palatka, Florida, and purchased liability and PIP on his truck. At that time, the Respondent was the primary agent in the Palatka office. (Volume III, Page 345, line 19.)
Mr. Hurlburt completed an application for property damage and PIP insurance from Security Insurance Company of Hartford with the assistance of Andrew Voshell, an unlicensed employee of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Putnam County, Inc. in Palatka, Florida, who was under the supervision of the Respondent.
Mr. Hurlburt's premium for the coverages he applied for was $229, and he paid Andrew Voshell $75. Mr. Hurlburt financed the balance of the premiums which included PIP, property damage, automobile club, and ADD. Mr. Voshell receipted for the down payment, and signed Respondent's name on Mr. Hurlburt's application as brokering agent.
The Respondent denied that he was aware of Mr. Voshell's actions; however, he was primary agent in that office during the time in question and is charged with the supervision of the office. Money was received and receipted for by Mr. Voshell, who the Respondent admits was authorized to see customers, review applications, make deposits, and keep books. At this time, the Respondent was also actively engaged as primary agent in another office. Based upon the record as a whole and credibility of the various witnesses, the Respondent's denial is rejected.
GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Most purchasers of nonstandard automobile insurance who finance their premiums do not complete payment of the premiums; whereupon, the finance company notifies the insurance company which cancels the insurance and cancels the commission earned by the selling agent after deducting for the coverage provided. By selling the auto club memberships, which included ADD coverage, the agent receives 90 percent of the premium which protects the agent against the loss of unearned premiums charged back by insurance companies. It is for this reason that the owners and management of Cash Register had the employees of their outlets include auto club memberships in insurance contracts, particularly those with premium financing. In those cases in which a customer declines auto club membership, the Cash Register agencies refuse to finance premiums, or increase the charges for financing.
The Respondent and his employees sell between 80-140 automobile insurance policies per month. The average premium has increased over time, but varied between $250 and $550 for the counts presented. The Respondent receives a commission between 15 and 17.5 percent on automobile insurance.
The commission for an auto club ADD contract is 90 percent which means that the agency receives $54 of a $60 premium. This is a "guaranteed" commission because there is no refund on the auto club membership, and this permits the agency to risk the loss of unearned commission which occurs when an insured defaults on his or her premium financing agreement.
The customers made a down payment, which was received by the agency, and the balance of the amount owed was financed by the customer.
According to the premium financing contract, the down payment was subtracted from that total due for PIP, property damage, and ADD insurance; and the balance due was financed. Under the terms of the contract, the customer financed a portion of the ADD coverage.
In actuality, the down payment was applied first to the auto club membership, which included ADD coverage, and only PIP and property damage
coverages were financed. The contract for the premium financing and the explanations of what was being financed do not accurately reflect this reality.
Government Employees Insurance Company markets its automobile insurance through the mail, and sends applications to the customers through the mail, which are subsequently executed by the agent when returned by the customer by mail.
Prior to October 12, 1993, the Department had no rule proscribing the practice of unlicensed persons giving quotes on behalf of a licensed agent.
The Department has no rule defining "solicit" and "procure" with respect to the sale of insurance. The Department has no rule which requires an agent sign an application in the presence of the insured.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter presented herein, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The Department has the responsibility and authority to regulate general lines agents and to discipline its licensees pursuant to Chapter 626 and 631, Florida Statutes.
The Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations against the Respondent contained in the Administrative Complaint.
The Respondent is personally liable and accountable pursuant to Section 626.734, Florida Statutes, for the wrongful acts, misconduct, or violations of the Florida Insurance Code committed by himself or others under his direct supervision and control.
Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, requires that all applications for insurance policies disclose the name and license identification number of the agent at the time the coverage is bound or the premium is quoted.
Section 626.611(5), Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful for a licensed agent to make a willful misrepresentation by any means of any insurance policy or willful deception with regard to any policy, and Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful for a licensed agency to engage in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under his license or appointment.
An automobile club is defined by Section 627.8405(2), Florida Statutes, as a legal entity which, in consideration of dues, assessments, or periodic payments of money, promises its members or subscribers to assist them in matters relating to ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle.
Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, prohibited in 1993 a premium finance company from financing the cost of membership in an automobile club or an accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policy sold in combination with a personal injury protection only policy. It was not until November 10, 1993 that the statute was amended to preclude financing the cost of membership in an automobile club or an accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policy sold in combination with a personal injury protection and property damage only policy.
Section 626.041(2), Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful for any unlicensed person to solicit or procure applications for insurance; to receive or receipt money from persons to be transmitted to an insurer for a policy; to represent himself as an agent of any insurer, or negotiate, effect, procure, receive, deliver or forward an insurance contract to an insurer.
Section 626.112(1), Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful for any person to act as, advertise, or hold himself out to be an insurance agent, customer representative, solicitor, or adjuster unless he is currently licensed and appoint as such.
Rule 4-222.050, Florida Administrative Code, makes it unlawful after October 12, 1993, for an unlicensed person to take applications for insurance, to give quotes in an agent's office to persons calling or coming into the office and asking for a quote, or to receive premiums at the agent's office, unless those acts are done on a basis incidental to the employee's main duties.
Rule 4-222.060, Florida Administrative Code, makes it unlawful after October 12, 1993, for any unlicensed person to compare insurance products, advise as to insurance needs, interpret policies or coverages, bind coverage for new or existing customers, or solicit the sale of insurance, or to engage in substantive discussions of insurance products.
Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, makes it grounds for discretionary revocation or suspension for a licensee to knowingly aid a person to violate the code or rules.
In the Count IV, Mr. Voshell violated Section 626.041(2) and 626.112(1), Florida Statutes, by helping Ms. Reimer fill out applications for insurance and receiving money from her. The Respondent is responsible for the conduct of his employee. The Respondent admits that Mr. Voshell was authorized to see customers, review applications, make deposits, and keep books. If these were Mr. Voshell's duties, the assistance rendered Ms. Reimer was not incidental to his duties, but an integral part of them.
The Respondent admits he signed Ms. Reimer's application outside her presence. See Respondent's Proposed Finding Paragraph 20. The Respondent's assertion that he was unaware Mr. Voshell was acting as an agent is not credible. The Respondent violated Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by permitting Mr. Voshell to violate the statutes regarding unlicensed agents.
Further regarding Count IV, the application reveals that agency's address is that of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jax, Inc., 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, FL 32216, and the agent's number is 8009. Ms. Reimer purchased insurance from Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc. on Blanding Boulevard. These are two widely separated locations, two different agencies, and two different corporations. Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, provides that all applications for insurance disclose the name and license identification number of the agent at the time the coverage is bound or the premium is quoted. The Respondent violated this provision of statute, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
In January 1993, Section 627.8405, prohibited financing premiums for auto clubs and ADD with PIP only polices. Ms. Reimer's financed the auto club membership with PIP plus property damage coverage which was not prohibited.
Regarding Count V, Ms. Palmer violated Sections 626.112(1) and 626.041(2), Florida Statutes, by filing out the application for Mr. Newton, accepting and receipting for money from him. The Respondent violated Section 626.734, Florida Statutes, being personally responsible for Ms. Palmer's acts, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes.
In addition, the Respondent violated Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by including the ADD coverage, Mr. Newton specifically rejected and which was crossed off the application, and by not providing Mr. Newton a prompt refund of moneys which he had paid for that coverage. This transaction demonstrates why the statutes require the direct involvement of agents in writing contracts for insurance. These violations of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, require revocation of the Respondent's license.
Regarding Count VIII, the Respondent did not explain to Ms. Coleman that auto club membership with ADD coverage was a separate option which was not required. The Respondent included this option without explanation and justified his action on the basis that he was providing the coverage with the lowest possible down payment for a customer. This explanation does not excuse his failure to fully explain the policy and the options to the customer. This failure to explain the inclusion of optional auto club membership and ADD coverage constitutes violations of Subsections 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, which require revocation of the Respondent's license.
Further regarding Count VIII, the application reveals that agency's address is that of Cash Register Auto Insurance, 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, FL 32216, and the agent's number is 8009. The transaction took place at the office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Westside, Inc. on Blanding Boulevard. Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, provides that all applications for insurance disclose the name and license identification number of the agent at the time the coverage is bound or the premium is quoted. Although the Respondent was not the agent for the Blanding Boulevard office, he was the agent for the office designated on the forms provided the customer to whom he personally sold insurance at the Blanding Office. The Respondent violated this provision of statute, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
Regarding Count XI, the events occurred in December 1993, Mr. Voshell's acts were contrary to Rule 4-222.060, Florida Administrative Code, which makes it unlawful after October 12, 1993, for any unlicensed person to compare insurance products, advise as to insurance needs, interpret policies or coverages, bind coverage for new or existing customers, or solicit the sale of insurance, or to engage in substantive discussions of insurance products. Such conduct was further contrary to Rule 4-222.050, Florida Administrative Code, which makes it unlawful for an unlicensed person to take applications for insurance, to give quotes in an agent's office to persons calling of coming into the office and asking for a quote, or to receive premiums at the agent's office, unless those acts are done on a basis incidental to the employee's main duties.
The Respondent was personally responsible for his employee, Mr. Voshell, and is in violation of Section 626.734, Florida Statutes, for the wrongful acts, misconduct, or violations of the Florida Insurance Code committed by himself or others under is direct supervision and control. The Respondent's conduct constituted knowingly aiding another person to violate the insurance code contrary to Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes.
Further, the ADD and auto club membership were included in the premium financing agreement in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, which after November, 1993, prohibited a premium finance company from financing the cost of membership in an automobile club or an accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policy sold in combination with a personal injury protection and property damage only policy. By transacting business with a premium financing company operating contrary to the code, the Respondent is in violation of Section 626.734, Florida Statutes. The Respondent can be penalized for these violations pursuant to Section 626.621(2) and (12), Florida Statutes.
Section 626.621, Florida Statutes, provides that the Department may revoke or suspend a license where it is shown that a license has violated the insurance code or the Department's rules, or aided another to violated the code or the Department's rules. Section 626.681, Florida Statutes, provides that the Department may impose an administrative fine of $500 if it finds that one or more grounds exist for the suspension or revocation of any license issued under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and up to $2,500 if the violation is wilful.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is,
RECOMMENDED:
That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V, and
That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count VIII, and
That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count IV, and
That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent or impose a fine of $2,500 for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V, and
That the Department revoke the license of the Respondent or impose a fine of $2,500 for violation of Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count XI, and
That the Department impose a $2,500 fine for Respondent's violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, by including ADD coverage in a premium financing agreement as alleged in Count XI, and
That the Department impose a $500 fine for violation of Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Counts IV, and
That the Department impose a $500 fine for violation of Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Counts VIII.
DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.
STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1996.
APPENDIX CASE NO. 94-5460
Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states where their findings were adopted or why they were rejected:
Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings
Paragraph 1,2 Paragraph 1
Paragraphs 3-10 Paragraph 4
Paragraph 11 Paragraph 5
Paragraphs 12,13 Paragraph 6
Paragraph 14,15 Paragraph 14
Paragraphs 16,17 Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18 Paragraph 6
Paragraph 19 Irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraph 20 Paragraph 8
Paragraph 22,23 Paragraph 11
Paragraph 24 Paragraph 15
Paragraph 25 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 26 Paragraph 12
Paragraphs 27,28 Paragraphs 12,13,15
Paragraph 29 Paragraph 16
Paragraph 30 Subsumed by paragraph 15. (S-15.) Paragraph 31,32 Paragraph 28
Paragraph 33 Paragraph 29
Paragraph 34 Unnecessary.
Paragraph 35 Paragraph 31
Paragraph 36 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 37 Paragraph 31
Paragraph 38 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 39,1st sent. Paragraph 30
Paragraph 39,remainder Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 40 Contrary to better evidence.
Paragraph 41 Paragraph 33
Paragraphs 42,43 Paragraph 34
Paragraphs 44-47 Paragraph 35
Paragraph 48 Paragraph 18
Paragraph 49 Subsumed in Paragraph 19.
Paragraph 50 Subsumed in Paragraph 22.
Paragraph 51 Paragraph 21
Paragraphs 52-55,57 Paragraph 24
Paragraph 56 Paragraph 22
Paragraph 57 Subsumed in Paragraph 24.
Paragraphs 58,59 Paragraph 21
Paragraph 60 Paragraph 22
Paragraphs 61,63,64 Unnecessary.
Paragraph 62 Subsumed in Paragraph 23.
Paragraph 65 Subsumed in Paragraph 36.
Paragraphs 66,67 Paragraph 38
Paragraph 68 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 69 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 70 Paragraph 39
Paragraph 71 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 72 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 73 Subsumed in Paragraph 33.
Paragraph 74 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 75 Paragraph 37
Respondent's Recommended Order Findings
Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2 Paragraph 1
Paragraph 3 Irrelevant as to time. Paragraph 4 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraph 17.
Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraph 7.
Paragraph 9 Paragraphs 8,11
Paragraph 10 Paragraph 9
Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 8.
Paragraph 12 Subsumed in Paragraph 11.
Paragraph 13 Subsumed in Paragraph 13 and second application is irrelevant.
Paragraph 14 Subsumed in Paragraph 14.
Paragraph 15 Contrary to Reimer's testimony: Vol I, pg 118. Paragraph 16 Subsumed in Paragraph 14.
Paragraph 17 Subsumed in Paragraph 13.
Paragraph 18 Subsumed in Paragraph 14.
Paragraph 19 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 20 Paragraph 20
Paragraph 21,22 Contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 23 Paragraph 18
Paragraph 24 Subsumed in Paragraph 19.
Paragraph 25 Paragraph 19
Paragraphs 26,27 Subsumed in Paragraphs 20,21.
Paragraphs 28,29 Subsumed in Paragraph 22.
Paragraph 30 Subsumed in Paragraph 24.
Paragraph 31 Rejected because Respondent's failure to perform the acts required of the agent lead to his mistaken belief.
Paragraph 32 Paragraph 22
Paragraphs 33-35 Irrelevant.
Paragraphs 36,37 Paragraph 27
Paragraph 38 Paragraph 28
Paragraph 39 True, but Respondent was the agent who dealt with Coleman and was directly responsible for his own acts.
Paragraph 40 Subsumed in Paragraph 30.
Paragraph 41 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraphs 42,43 Subsumed in Paragraph 30.
Paragraphs 44,45 Irrelevant.
Paragraphs 46,47 Paragraph 32
Paragraph 48 Paragraph 33
Paragraph 49 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraphs 50-52 Irrelevant.
Paragraphs 53,54 Paragraphs 34,35
Paragraph 55 Rejected as contrary to better evidence. Paragraph 56 Subsumed in various paragraphs.
Paragraph 57,58 Paragraph 36
Paragraph 59-69 Irrelevant or not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 70 Rejected as contrary to better evidence.
Paragraph 71 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 72 Not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 73,74 Rejected as contrary to better evidence.
Paragraph 75-79 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 80 While true, the fact asserted is contrary to the financing paper work. This is part of the misleading activities by Respondent and his employees.
Paragraph 81-84 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 85 Recites Hearing Officer's ruling. Paragraph 86,87 Not necessary to resolution of the issues. Paragraph 88,89 Irrelevant.
Paragraphs 90,92 Paragraphs 43,44
Paragraphs 91 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 93,94 Paragraph 45
COPIES FURNISHED:
Allen R. Moayad, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0333
Jed Berman, Esquire Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, FL 32790
Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner
Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance
The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
THE TREASURER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
IN THE MATTER OF:
ALAN DAVID COTTRILL CASE NO. 94-5460
/
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came on before the undersigned Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, for consideration and final agency action. On September 8 1994, an Administrative Complaint was filed charging Respondent with violation of various provisions of Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. Respondent timely requested a formal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The hearing was held pursuant to notice by Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer for the Division of Administrative Hearings, on August 1, 2, and 3, 1995, in Jacksonville, Florida.
After consideration of the evidence, argument and testimony presented at hearing the Hearing Officer issued his Recommended Order (attached as Exhibit A). The Hearing Officer recommended that a Final Order be entered revoking the license of the Respondent for violation of section 626.611(5) Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V; revoking the license of the Respondent for violation of section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count VIII; for violation of section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count IV; revoking the license of the Respondent or imposing a fine of $2,500 for violation of section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count V; revoking the license of the Respondent or imposing a fine of $2,500 for violation of section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by aiding others to act as agents as alleged in Count XI; imposing a $2,500 fine for Respondent's violation of section 627.8405, Florida Statutes, by including ADD coverage in a premium financing agreement as alleged in Count XI; imposing a $500 fine for violation of section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Count IV; and imposing a $500 find for violation of section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, for improperly identifying the agency's address as alleged in Count VIII.
Respondent timely submitted exceptions to the proposed order.
Respondent's first exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 9 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
At the time Ms. Reimer purchased insurance from Cash Register Auto Insurance of
Orange Park, Inc., the Respondent admitted he was the manager of the Orange Park Office.
Respondent contends:
Respondent was not the manager of the Orange Park office on January 8, 1993, instead he was the vice president of the corporation.
On page 347 of the hearing transcript, Respondent testifies that he managed the Orange Park office from February or March of 1993 to October 1994. However, on page 407 of the hearing transcript Respondent admitted to being the primary agent for the January 8, 1993, transaction with Ms. Reimer. In terms of vicarious liability, this is the equivalent of being the manager of the agency, even if Respondent did not formally hold the title of manager. As primary agent, Respondent was in fact acting in a supervisory role over Mr. Voshell, and was responsible for his actions. Section 626.592(5), Florida Statutes, provides:
(5) The primary agent in an unincorporated agency, or the primary agent in an incorporated agency in which no officer, director, or stockholder is an agent, shall be responsible and accountable for the acts of salaried employees under his direct supervision and control, while acting on behalf of the agency. Nothing in this section shall be construed to render any person criminally liable or subject to any disciplinary proceedings for any act unless such person personally committed or knew or should have known of such act and of the facts constituting a violation of this chapter.
Given that there is competent substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that Respondent was the primary agent responsible at the Orange Park Cash Register Agency office location on January 8, 1993, the issue of whether or not he was manager at that location is not material. Respondent's first exception is accepted, but qualified as outlined above.
Respondent's second exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 10 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
The application executed by Ms. Reimer indicates that the Agency's name is Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jax, Inc., 5631 University Blvd. W. Jacksonville, FL 32216,
and the agent's number is 8009. Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to the allegations of Count IV of the administrative complaint, and thus is a due process violation.
However, the finding is relevant to the extent that it bolsters the vicarious liability of Respondent for the deceptive practice that induced the transaction memorialized in the application document. Further, it supports the contention that Respondent violated section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, and consequently is accountable pursuant to section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
Accountability pursuant to section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, is alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Specifically, the application was admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Respondent's second exception is therefore rejected.
Respondent's third exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 16 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Ms. Reimer was not advised by Mr. Voshell that she was purchasing an optional automobile club membership, and that the cost thereof was being added to her premiums and financed.
Respondent contends:
The finding is ambiguous. There is no requirement for a customer to be orally advised of his or her insurance purchases. Ms. Reimer signed the confirmation of coverages which fully advises her of her purchases, and since an insured's signature on an insurance application constitutes knowledge of its contents, she is held to have knowledge of the purchase of a motor club membership as a matter of law. Vasquez v. Bankers Insurance Company, 502 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1987).
However, the record indicates that Ms. Reimer requested the minimum coverages necessary to satisfy Florida law and the holder of the lien on the vehicle to be insured. In response to that request, the unlicensed agent, Andrew Voshell, gave Ms. Reimer an application package that contained an application for additional coverages beyond those requested. To omit orally telling Ms. Reimer that she was not being given what she asked for is blatantly deceitful and a violation of section 626.9541(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes, which prohibits misrepresentation of the terms of an insurance policy through omission or otherwise. Such behavior is also an outrageous abuse of trust and thus would constitute a grounds to revoke an insurance agent license pursuant to section 626.6215(5)(k), Florida Statutes, as well as paragraphs (c) and (j) of that same subsection.
The case cited by Respondent, Vasquez v. Banker Ins. Co., 502 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1987), is not at all on point. The issue in that case was whether an insured's signature on an insurance application constituted a knowing rejection of uninsured motorist coverage absent evidence that she was tricked into signing the application. That case is distinguishable in that it was not a disciplinary action against an agent, it was an action to determine the liability of an insurer. Further, the decision in that case was premised upon the absence of evidence that the agent tricked the insured into signing the form. In the present case, the agent gave an insured an application containing coverages that the insured had indicated she did not want. Because Ms. Reimer misplaced her
trust in the agent to give her what she asked for, the agent tricked her into signing an application that was inconsistent with her request.
The finding is clearly material, because it demonstrates a material omission by the Mr. Voshell which constituted a deceptive practice in violation of provisions of the Florida insurance Code specified above.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Specifically, at page 119 of the hearing transcript, Cassie Reimer testified that Andrew Voshell did not explain the auto club application (Exhibit 5) to her. Therefore, Respondent's third exception is rejected.
Respondent's fourth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 17 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Andrew Voshell was not a licensed agent at the time he dealt with Ms. Reimer. It was Mr. Voshell who acted as the agent presenting the applications and obtaining Ms. Reimer's signature and accepting payment from her; however, Alan David Cottrill knew about the transaction because he signed Ms. Reimer's applications outside her presence.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant, because unlicensed insurance personnel were not prohibited from the activity performed by Mr. Voshell until October 12, 1993.
However, Respondent misunderstands the significance of the adoption of 4- 222.040, Florida Administrative Code, effective October 12, 1993. Prior to October 12, 1993, unlicensed persons could not accept applications for insurance at all. Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, (1993) prohibits any person from acting as an insurance agent without a license. In section 626.031, Florida Statutes (1993), Agent is defined to include general lines agent. Section 626.041(2), Florida Statutes (1993) provides in pertinent part:
(2) With respect to any such insurances, no person shall, unless licensed as an agent:
Solicit insurance or procure applications therefor;
In this state receive or receipt for any money on account of or for any insurer, or receive or receipt for money from other persons to be transmitted to any insurer for a policy, contract, or certificate of insurance or any renewal thereof although such policy, certificate, or contract is not signed by him as agent or representative of the insurer;
Directly or indirectly represent himself to be an agent of any insurer or as an agent, to collect or forward any insurance premium, or to solicit, negotiate, effect, procure, receive, deliver, or forward, directly or indirectly, any insurance contract or renewal thereof or any endorsement relating to an insurance contract, or attempt to effect the same, of property or insurable business activities or interests, located in this state;
In this state engage or hold himself out as
engaging in the business of analyzing or abstracting insurance policies or of counseling or advising or giving opinions (other than as a licensed attorney at law) relative to insurance or insurance contracts, for fee, commission, or other compensation, other than as a salaried bonafide
full-time employee so counseling and advising his employer relative to the insurance interests of the employer and of the subsidiaries or business affiliates of the employer;
In anywise directly or indirectly make or cause to be made, or attempt to make or cause to be made, any contract of insurance for or on account of any insurer; . .
This clearly incorporates activities of Mr. Voshell. The subsequent adoption of 4-222.040, Florida Administrative Code, has no significance in this case.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's fourth exception is rejected.
Respondent's fifth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 21 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
When Mr. Newton came to the agency, he dealt with Linda Palmer, an unlicensed individual, exclusively. Ms. Palmer worked at the office from September, 1992 until August, 1993 under the supervision of the Respondent. Ms. Palmer did not hold a license to transact any type of insurance business during her employment with Cash Register Auto Insurance.
The Respondent permitted Ms. Palmer to take applications and receive money. The Respondent required that Ms. Palmer explain to the customer the Confirmation of Coverages form which the customer signed. This was the only explanation
provided to customers of the insurance they were buying, and constituted an explanation of policies.
Respondent contends:
All findings except the first two sentences are irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence. In addition, respondent was denied the opportunity to impeach Linda Palmer by evidence of her reputation for truth and veracity. Transcript, Vo.IV, pages 515 and 516.
However, as explained above, the use of unlicensed personnel to act as agents is relevant to this case.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Specifically, at page 468 of the hearing transcript, Ms. Palmer testified that she was not a licensed agent. At page 469 of the hearing transcript, Ms. Palmer testified that Respondent permitted her to take applications and explain coverages. Therefore, Respondent's fifth exception is rejected.
Respondent's sixth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 22 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Mr. Newton advised Ms. Palmer that he did not want to join
an auto club and did not want ADD coverage. Ms. Palmer crossed off the ADD coverage on the Premium Financing Agreement; however, she had Mr. Newton execute the Coverage Confirmation which indicated $4,000 coverage for ADD, but which did not state a premium amount. There is no place under ADD to indicate no coverage as there is for the other optional coverages. Mr. Newton also executed a designation of beneficiary form for Auto Accidental Death Coverage, and paid a down payment of $91 to Ms. Palmer. Ms. Palmer did not advise Mr. Newton that he had executed the paperwork for ADD coverage.
Respondent contends:
The last sentence is irrelevant and ambiguous. See exception to l6.
However, the last sentence is both relevant and clear. Ms. Palmer did not tell Mr. Newton that he had executed paperwork for ADD coverage despite Mr.
Newton specifically telling her that he did not want ADD coverage. This issue is discussed fully in the response to the third exception.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's sixth exception is rejected.
Respondent's seventh exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 23 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Ms. Palmer was required by Respondent to sell auto club and ADD coverage. The inclusion of the forms for auto club and ADD coverage was intentional.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to Count V of the administrative complaint, and thus is a due process violation.
However, the Hearing Officer's finding is relevant to Count V of the Administrative Complaint by demonstrating the accountability of Respondent for the acts of Ms. Palmer. The finding also demonstrates the willfulness of the violation.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Specifically, on page 478-481 of the hearing transcript, Linda Palmer testified that Respondent required her to sell auto club and ADD coverage. Therefore, Respondent's seventh exception is rejected.
Respondent's eighth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 24 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
The premium financing agreement was for the amount of the liability and PIP coverage, $256, and this coverage was provided. However, the premium financing agreement indicates the down payment was $51, not $91. There is no evidence that Mr. Newton was provided with ADD coverage,
which he did not want, but the $40 difference between the
$541 down payment and the $91 which Mr. Newton tendered
to Ms. Palmer was not refunded to Mr. Newton. There was no evidence that Mr. Newton ever made demand for this overpayment.
Respondent contends:
Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is evidence that Mr. Newton was provided with ADD coverage.
Respondent is correct; Petitioner's Exhibit 17 is evidence bat Mr. Newton was provided with ADD coverage.
However, there is competent substantial evidence in the record that Mr.
Newton told Ms. Palmer he did not want ADD coverage. Specifically, Mr. Newton's testimony at page 223 of the hearing transcript supports this.
Whether or not the coverage was provided is not material. The coverage was sold to Mr. Newton despite his assertion to the agent that he did not want ADD coverage. Respondent's eighth exception is accepted as qualified above.
Respondent's ninth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 25 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Had the Respondent handled Mr. Newton's application, the Respondent would have known that Mr. Newton did not desire ADD coverage, and that the down payment tendered was excessive and inconsistent with the insurance being provided and the amount being financed.
Respondent contends:
Respondent admits the mistake in handling Mr. Newton's application, although Mr. Newton contributed to the mistake by paying the $91 down payment and signing
petitioner's Exhibits 17 and 18.
Respondent does not contend that there is not competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. The finding is not inconsistent with Respondent's assertion that Mr. Newton contributed to his being sold a product he did not want. Deception generally relies on the vulnerabilities of those deceived. Had Mr. Newton carefully read each document he signed rather than trusting the integrity of the agent with whom he dealt, he might not have become a victim. This fact, however, is not material to the determination as to whether the Insurance Code has been violated. Therefore, Respondent's ninth exception is rejected.
Respondent's tenth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 26 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
In filling out the applications, explaining the forms, and accepting the money from Mr. Newton, Ms. Palmer engaged in activities restricted to agents with the knowledge and consent of the Respondent.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant, because unlicensed personnel were not prohibited from the activity performed by Mr. Voshell until October 12, 1993.
However, as explained in the response to exception number 4, Respondent is misconstruing the significance of the effective date of Rule 4-222.040, Florida Statutes.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record that Mr. Voshell and Ms. Palmer filled out the applications, explained forms, and accepted money.
Therefore, Respondent's tenth exception is rejected.
Respondent's eleventh exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 29 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Ms. Coleman came into the office on her lunch hour and executed an application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) for bodily injury, property damage, and PIP insurance to Union American Insurance Company. Ms. Coleman executed various forms, among which were a Confirmation of Coverage form and Designation of Beneficiary form which indicated she was obtaining auto club and ADD coverage. The Respondent
did not explain that there was a separate charge for auto club membership which included the ADD coverage, or that she did not have to have this coverage.
Respondent contends:
The separate charge for Ms. Coleman's auto membership and the disclosure of the purchase is contained in her signed premium finance agreement, petitioner's Exhibit 9, her signed confirmation of coverages, petitioner's Exhibit 10, and her Colonial Touring contract, petitioner's Exhibit 11. These establish as a matter of law her knowledge of the purchase and separate charge. Vasquez, supra.
The adequacy of the disclosure and the applicability of the Vasquez case are discussed above in response to Respondent's third exception.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's eleventh exception is rejected.
Respondent's twelfth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 3l in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
The application (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) the receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) and designation of beneficiary form (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) indicate that insurance company was Cash Register Auto Insurance, 5631 University Blvd.
West, Jacksonville, Florida 32216. Although the Respondent was not the agent for the Blanding Boulevard office at the time Ms. Coleman purchased her insurance, the Respondent,
who personally sold Ms. Coleman her insurance, was the primary agent for the agency listed on the application and receipt which she received from the Respondent.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to count VIII of the administrative complaint, and is a due process violation.
However, this finding is relevant to show the connection between Respondent and insurance transactions with Rosa Coleman. The finding also is relevant to Respondent's accountability under section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, for the violation of 627.4085, Florida Statutes. Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint includes the delegation of accountability under section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's twelfth exception is rejected.
Respondent's thirteenth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 34 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Mr. Hurlburt completed an application for property damage and PIP insurance from Security Insurance Company of Hartford with the assistance of Andrew Voshell, an unlicensed employee of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Putnam County, Inc. in Palatka, Florida, who was under the supervision of the Respondent.
Respondent contends:
The reference to Mr. Voshell as an unlicensed employee is irrelevant. On August 24, 1995 petitioner conceded that it has no rules, etc. relating to the use of unlicensed employees of an insurance agency to complete applications for insurance.
This issue is addressed in the response to fourth exception above. There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the
Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's thirteenth exception is rejected.
Respondent's fourteenth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 36 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
The Respondent denied that he was aware of Mr. Voshell's actions; however, he was primary agent in that office curing the time in question and is charged with the supervision of the office. Money was received and receipted for by
Mr. Voshell, who the Respondent admits was authorized to see customers, review applications, make deposits, and keep books. At this time, the Respondent was also actively engaged as primary agent in another office. Based upon the
record as a whole and credibility of the various witnesses, the Respondent's denial is rejected.
Respondent contends:
Any prohibition against an unlicensed employee at an agency from receiving customer payments was not generally publicized until January-March, 1994 in Vo. 4,
No. 1, The Intercom, referring to DOI Rule 4-222. Further, Susan Graves, who was accepted as an expert on nonstandard insurance agencies (transcript Vo. VI, page 717), as the only expert witness during the hearing, testified that Chapter 4-222, Florida Administrative Code, was not applicable during the time period herein. Transcript Vo. 6, page 753.
This issue is addressed above in response to Respondent's third exception.
Respondent's ignorance of the requirements of section 626.041(2), Florida Statutes (1993), does not excuse him from the duty to comply.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's fourteenth exception is rejected.
Respondent's fifteenth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 37 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Most purchasers of nonstandard automobile insurance who finance their premiums do not complete payment of the premiums; whereupon, the finance company notifies the insurance company which cancels the insurance and cancels the commission earned by the selling agent after deducting for the coverage provided. By selling the auto club memberships, which included ADD coverage, the agent receives
90 percent of the premium which protects the against the loss of unearned premiums charged back by insurance companies. It is for this reason that the owners and management of Cash Register had the employees of their outlets include auto club memberships in insurance contracts, particularly those with premium financing. In those cases in which a customer declines auto club membership, the Cash Register agencies refuse to finance premiums, or increase the charges for financing.
Respondent contends:
The last sentence is incorrect. The evidence established that in those cases in which a customer declines auto club membership, the Cash Register agencies, in accordance with the premium finance companies requirements, offer the customer premium financing with a higher percentage down payment. The charges for financing, i.e. the rate of interest, remains the same.
However, the phrase charges for financing as used by the Hearing Officer need not refer to the interest rate. The language could be read to refer to an increase in the required down payment.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the assertion that a declination of the auto club would result in an increase in the required down payment. The Hearing Officer's finding will be read to represent the increased down payment requirement as reflected in the record. Therefore, Respondent's fifteenth exception is rejected, except as qualified above.
Respondent's sixteenth exception addressed the Finding of Fact Number 42 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
In actuality, the down payment was applied first to the auto club membership, which included ADD coverage, and only PIP and property damage coverages were financed. The contract for the premium financing and the explanations of what was being financed do not accurately reflect this reality.
Respondent contends:
This finding is irrelevant to any counts of the administrative complaint, and is a violation of due process. It is not supported by any evidence.
However, the entry of the cost of the auto club membership on the premium finance agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) which contains a down payment amount equal to the auto club cost on Petitioner's Exhibit 4 supports the Hearing Officer's finding. The finding is relevant in that the adequacy of the explanations given to the prospective insureds is at issue in determining whether material omissions have been made to induce the purchase of insurance, in violation of various provisions set out in the Administrative Complaint.
There is competent substantial evidence in the record in support of the Hearing Officer's finding. Therefore, Respondent's sixteenth exception is rejected.
Respondent's seventeenth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number
56 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Rule 4-222.050, Florida Administrative Code, makes it unlawful after October 12, 1993, for an unlicensed person to take applications for insurance, to give quotes in an agent's office to persons calling or coming into the office and asking for a quote, or to receive premiums at the agent's office, unless those acts are done on a basis incidental to the employee's main duties.
Respondent contends:
On August 25, 1995 petitioner conceded that it had no rules, etc., relating to the use of unlicensed employees of an insurance agency to complete applications for insurance. If petitioner had proffered a rule in accordance with the Hearing Officer's ruling to produce one within 10 days of
the hearing, respondent would have requested and been entitled to an additional hearing to respond. Otherwise he would not have been provided procedural due process of law. However, if this rule is accepted without further hearing, then any prohibition against an unlicensed employee at an agency from taking applications, etc. was not generally publicized until January-March, 1994 in Vo. 4, No. 1, The Intercom, referring to DOI Rule 4-222. Further, Susan Graves, who was accepted as an expert on nonstandard insurance agencies (Transcript Vo. VI, page 717), as the only expert witness during the hearing, testified that Chapter 4-222, Florida Administrative Code, was not applicable during the time period herein. Transcript Vo.
VI, page 753.
The reference to the rule is incorrect, as it relates to lawful activities of unlicensed agency personnel.
The Respondent is correct insofar as he contends that rule 4-222, Florida Administrative Code, was not in effect prior to October 12, 1993. However, Respondent misconstrues the significance of the inapplicability of rule 4-222, Florida Administrative Code, as explained above in response to his fourth exception.
The Hearing Officer's conclusions that the rule makes various activities unlawful to be performed by unlicensed persons is misleading. The rule in actuality allows a very limited exception from the general prohibition which was in effect during all times pertinent to this case. Respondent's seventeenth exception is rejected except to the extent of the clarification above.
Respondent's eighteenth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number 57 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Rule 4-222.060, Florida Administrative Code, makes it unlawful after October 12, 1993, for any unlicensed person to interpret policies or coverages, bind coverage for
new or existing customers, or solicit the sale of insurance, or to engage in substantive discussions of insurance products.
Respondent contends:
On August 25, 1995 petitioner conceded that it had no rules, etc., relating to solicit in respect to the sale of insurance, and the Hearing Officer so found in 45. If petitioner had proffered a rule in accordance with the Hearing Officer's ruling to produce one within 10 days of the hearing, respondent would have requested and
been entitled to an additional hearing to respond. Otherwise, he would not have been provided procedural due process of law. However, if this rule is accepted without further hearing, it is submitted that it was not generally publicized until January-March, 1994 in Vo. 4, No. 1, The Intercom, referring to DOI Rule 4-222. Further,
Susan Graves, who was accepted as an expert on nonstandard insurances (Transcript Vo. VI, page 717), as the only expert
witness during the hearing, testified that Chapter 4-222, Florida Administrative Code, was not applicable during the time period herein. Transcript Vo. VI, page 753.
However, section 626.041(2), Florida Statutes (1993), did not require a rule when it was interpreted in a manner consistent with its literal meaning. It was only when the Department decided to apply agency expertise to apply the statute in a manner which deviated from the literal meaning of the statutory language that a rule became necessary. Section 626.041(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), reads:
With respect to any such insurances, no person shall, unless licensed as an agent:
(a) Solicit insurance or procure applications therefor;
There was no need for a rule reiterating the statute. A mere reiteration of the statutes is prohibited by section 120.545(1) (c), Florida Statutes.
The Hearing Officer acted within the scope of his authority pursuant to rule 60Q-2.026(3), Florida Administrative Code, by not allowing Respondent to inquire of Ms. Palmer's husband with regard to the credibility of the witness. Therefore, Respondent's eighteenth exception is rejected, except that it is noted that the use of the term make by the Hearing Officer is misleading in the same manner as described in the response to the prior exception.
Respondent's nineteenth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number 59 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
In the Count IV, Mr. Voshell violated section 626.041(2) and 626.112(I), Florida Statutes, by helping Ms. Reimer fill out applications for insurance and receiving money from her.
The Respondent is responsible for the conduct of his employee. The Respondent admits that Mr. Voshell was authorized to see customers, review applications, make deposits, and keep books. If these were Mr. Voshell's duties, the assistance rendered Ms. Reimer was not incidental to his duties, but an integral part of them.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to Count IV of the administrative complaint, and is a violation of due process. The charges are (1) unlicensed employee soliciting and procuring, for which petitioner has no rules, (2) not offering deductible PIP, to which petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 6 prove otherwise,
selling motor club without informed consent, to which petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 6 prove otherwise, and (4) financing motor club membership.
However, this exception is rejected for reasons expressed in the fourth, seventeenth, and eighteenth exceptions. Therefore, Respondent's nineteenth exception is rejected.
Respondent's twentieth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number 60 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
The Respondent admits he signed Ms. Reimer's application outside her presence. See Respondent's Proposed Finding Paragraph 20. The Respondent's assertion that he was unaware Mr. Voshell was acting as an agent is not credible. The Respondent violated Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes, by permitting Mr. Voshell to violate the statutes regarding unlicensed agent.
Respondent contends:
On August 25, 1995 petitioner conceded that it had no rules, etc., relating to agent's signing of applications, and the Hearing Officer found that even GEICO does applications by mail in 4 43. If petitioner had proffered a rule in accordance with the Hearing Officer's ruling to produce one within 10 days of the hearing, respondent would have requested and been entitled to an additional hearing to respond. Otherwise, he would not have been provided procedural due process of law.
However, this exception is rejected for reasons expressed in the fourth, seventeenth, and eighteenth exceptions. Therefore, Respondent's twentieth exception is rejected.
Respondent's twenty-first exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number
61 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Further regarding Count IV, the application reveals that agency's address is that of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Jax, Inc., 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, Florida 32216, and the agent's number is 8009. Ms. Reimer purchased insurance form Cash Register Auto Insurance of Orange Park, Inc. on Blanding Boulevard. These are two widely separated locations, two different agencies, and two different corporations. Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, provides that all applications for insurance disclose the name and license identification number of the agent at the time the coverage is bound or the premium is quoted. The Respondent violated this provision of statute, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to the allegations of Count IV, and this is a due process violation.
However, a violation of 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, was alleged in Count IV of the Administrative Complaint. Therefore, Respondent's twenty-first exception is rejected.
Respondent's twenty-second exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number
63 and 64 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Regarding Count V, Ms. Palmer violated Sections 626.112(1) and 626.041(2), Florida Statutes, by filing out the application for Mr. Newton, accepting and receipting for money from him. The Respondent violated Section 626.734, Florida Statues, being personally responsible for Ms. Palmer's acts, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes.
In addition, the Respondent violated Section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statues, by including the ADD coverage,
Mr. Newton specifically rejected and which was crossed off the application, and by not providing Mr. Newton a prompt refund of moneys which he had paid for that coverage. This transaction demonstrates why the statutes require the direct involvement of agents in writing contracts for insurance.
These violations of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, require revocation of the Respondent's license.
Respondent contends:
The findings are irrelevant to the allegations of Count V, and this is a due process violation. The charges on this count are (1) unlicensed employee soliciting and procuring,
agent not signing the application when insurance bound,
selling motor club without informed consent, and (4) improperly applying down payment for which respondent concedes that Mr. Newton should have been refunded $40.
However, violations of section 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, are alleged in Count V of the Administrative Complaint. Respondent is accountable under section 626.734, Florida Statutes, for these violations. Respondent's twenty-second exception is therefore rejected.
Respondent's twenty-third exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number
in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Regarding Count VIII, the Respondent did not explain to Ms. Coleman that auto club membership with ADD coverage was a separate option which was not required. The Respondent included this option without explanation and justified his action on the
basis that he was providing the coverage with the lowest possible down payment for a customer. This explanation does not excuse his failure to fully explain the policy
and the options to the customer. This failure to explain the inclusion of optional auto club membership and ADD coverage constitutes violations for Sub sections 626.611(5) and (9), Florida Statutes, which require revocation of the Respondent's license.
Respondent contends:
The finding is disproved by petitioner's Exhibits 10 and 11 Vasquez, supra.
Respondent's twenty-third exception is rejected for reasons set forth in the response to Respondent's third exception.
Respondent's twenty-fourth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number
in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Further regarding Count VIII, the application reveals that agency's address is that of Cash Register Auto Insurance, 5631 University Blvd. W., Jacksonville, Florida 32216,
and the agent's number is 8009. The transaction took place at the office of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Westside, Inc. on Blanding Boulevard. Section 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, provides that all applications for insurance disclose the name and license identification number of the agent at the time the coverage is bound or the premium is quoted. Although the Respondent was not the agent for the Blanding Boulevard office, he was the agent for the office designated on the forms provided the customer to whom he personally sold insurance at the Blanding Office.
The Respondent violated this provision of statute, and may be penalized in accordance with Section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes.
Respondent contends:
The finding is irrelevant to the allegations of Count VIII, and this is a due process violation.
However, Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint alleged that Respondent was accountable under section 626.621(2), Florida Statutes, as concluded by the Hearing Officer. Therefore, Respondent's twenty-fourth exception is rejected.
Respondent's twenty-fifth exception addressed the Conclusion of Law Number 67-69 in the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer's finding reads:
Regarding Count XI, the events occurred in December 1993, Mr. Voshell's acts were contrary to Rule 4-222.060, Florida Administrative Code, which makes it
unlawful after October 12, 1993, for any unlicensed person to compare insurance products, advise as to insurance needs, interpret policies or coverages, bind coverage
for new or existing customers, or solicit the sale of insurance, or to engage in substantive discussions of insurance products. Such conduct was further contrary to Rule 4-220.050, Florida Administrative Code, which makes it unlawful for an unlicensed person to take applications for insurance, to give quotes in an agent's office to persons calling of coming into the office and asking for a quote, or to receive premiums at the agent's office, unless those acts are done on a basis incidental to the employee's main duties.
The Respondent was personally responsible for his employee, Mr. Voshell, and is in violation of Section 626.734, Florida Statutes, for the wrongful acts,
misconduct, or violations of the Florida Insurance Code committed by himself or others under is direct supervision and control. The Respondent's conduct constituted knowingly aiding another person to violate the insurance code contrary to Section 626.621(12), Florida Statutes.
Further, the ADD and auto club membership were included in the premium financing agreement in violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statues, which after November, 1993, prohibited a premium finance company from financing the cost of membership in an automobile club or an accidental death and dismemberment (ADD) policy sold in combination with a personal injury protection and property damage only policy. By transacting business with a premium financing company operating contrary to the code, the Respondent is in violation of Section 626.734, Florida Statutes. The Respondent can be penalized for these violations pursuant to Section 626.621(2) and (12), Florida Statutes.
Respondent contends:
The findings are irrelevant to the allegations of Count XI, and this is a due process violation. The charges on this count are (1) soliciting by unlicensed employee and
(2) forwarding application for agent's signature.
However, in Count XI of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was charged with being accountable pursuant to sections 626.621(2) and (12), Florida Statutes. The Hearing Officer's conclusions are consistent with the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Therefore, Respondent's twenty-fifth exception is rejected.
Therefore, upon careful consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is ORDERED:
The Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer are adopted as clarified above as the Department's Findings of Fact.
The Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Officer are adopted as clarified above as the Department's Conclusions of Law.
The Hearing Officer's recommendation that a Final Order be entered finding the respondent to have violated the provisions of sections 626.611(5) and (9), 626.621(12), 627.8405, and 627.4085(1), Florida Statutes, which revokes Respondent's license and imposes fines of $8,500 against respondent for such violations is adopted in part as the appropriate disposition of this case. The recommendation that an $8,500 fine be imposed in addition to the revocation is rejected. A fine is only authorized as an alternative to suspension or revocation. A fine in addition to revocation cannot be imposed even when multiple violations exit. (Dyer v. Department of Insurance, 585 So.2d 1009 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1991).
ACCORDINGLY, RESPONDENT's licenses as a general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous lines agent are hereby REVOKED.
Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and
Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of March, 1996.
Bill Nelson
Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
STEPHEN F. DEAN
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
JED BERMAN, ESQUIRE
Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30
Winter Park, Florida 32790
ALLEN R. MOAYAD, ESQUIRE
Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
=================================================================
DISTRICT COURT OPINION
=================================================================
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
ALAN DAVID COTTRILL, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.
vs. CASE NO. 96-1231
DOAH CASE NO. 94-5460
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE,
Appellee.
/ Opinion filed December 12, 1996.
An appeal from an order of the Department of Insurance.
Patrick A. Raley of Infantino and Berman, Winter Park, for Appellant.
Kelly A. Cruz, Senior Attorney of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
BENTON, J.
Alan David Cottrill appeals a final order of the Department of Insurance (Department) . The final order adopted the recommended order's findings and conclusions "as clarified," and the recommendation that appellant's license be revoked, while declining to impose fines that the hearing officer recommended. See Dyer v. Department of Ins., 585 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) . We reverse in part and remand for reconsideration of the penalty: Not all of the violations of which appellant was found guilty were alleged in the administrative complaint.
The final order finds appellant guilty of violations of sections 626.611(5) and (9), 626.621(12), 627.4085(1), and 627.8405, Florida Statutes (1993).
Substantial competent evidence supports the determination that appellant violated sections 626.611(5) and (9) and 626.621(12), Florida Statutes (1993). We reject appellant's contention to the contrary, and affirm the final order insofar as it finds appellant violated sections 626.611(5) and (9) and 626.621(12) , Florida Statutes (1993)
To the extent the final order finds appellant guilty of violating sections 627.4085(1) and 627.8405, Florida Statutes (1993), however, it must be reversed. While evidence came in which might well support the recommended order's findings that appellant acted in violation of sections 627.4085(1) and 627.8405, Florida Statutes (1993), the Department never pleaded facts that constituted violations of section 627.4085(1) or 627.8405, Florida Statutes (1993)
Even though the administrative complaint contained references to these statutory provisions, it did not allege any act or omission in violation of either provision. As to these putative violations, the administrative complaint did not afford "reasonable notice to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant" disciplinary action, as required by chapter 96-159, section 26, at 51, Laws of Florida, creating section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1996)(incorporating language from section 120.60(7), Florida Statutes (1993), with minor modifications not relevant here). See Robins v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 162 So.2d 535, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
Predicating disciplinary action against a licensee on conduct never alleged in an administrative complaint or some comparable pleading violates the Administrative Procedure Act. To countenance such a procedure would render nugatory the right to a formal administrative proceeding to contest the allegations of an administrative complaint. See Klein v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 625 So.2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
While we base our decision on the Administrative Procedure Act, we are not unaware that both state and federal constitutions require adequate notice before a citizen's livelihood can be taken away. Hickey v. Wells, 91 So.2d 206 (Fla.
1956); Chrysler v. Department of Professional Regulation, 627 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation, 563 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1991); Celaya v. Department of Professional Regulation, 560 So.2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Sternberg v.
Department of Professional Regulation, 465 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Wray
v. Department of Professional Regulation, 435 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
We reverse the final order insofar as it finds appellant violated sections 627.4085(1) and 627.8405, Florida Statutes (1993), and remand with directions to the Department to take appropriate disciplinary action, predicated solely on the violations both pleaded in the administrative complaint and proven at hearing.
Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation, 592 So.2d 1136, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)("Because we reverse in part the Commission's Final Order, we must remand to the Commission to permit it to reconsider the penalty imposed upon appellant in light of this opinion."); Schepp v. School Bd. of Broward County,
506 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); LaRossa v. Department of Professional Regulation, 474 So.2d 322, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)("Since we have reversed the Commission's finding with regard to subsection (k), we must remand this cause to the Commission for reconsideration of the penalty imposed.")
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.
ERVIN and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Aug. 13, 1997 | Second Amended Final Order filed. |
| Apr. 10, 1997 | Amended Final Order filed. |
| Dec. 13, 1996 | Opinion (from the First DCA) Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded to the agency filed. |
| Mar. 20, 1996 | Final Order filed. |
| Jan. 11, 1996 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held August 1-3, 1995. |
| Nov. 27, 1995 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order (for Hearing Officer signature) filed. |
| Nov. 21, 1995 | Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Oct. 18, 1995 | Order sent out. (Proposed Recommended Order`s due 11/21/95) |
| Oct. 17, 1995 | (Petitioner) Unopposed Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Proposed Recommended Orders filed. |
| Oct. 06, 1995 | Respondent`s Unopposed Motion to Enlarge Time to File Proposed Orders filed. |
| Sep. 07, 1995 | Transcript of Proceedings Volume I through VI filed. |
| Aug. 24, 1995 | Department's Response to Motion to Enforce Order filed. |
| Aug. 23, 1995 | (Respondent) Motion to Enforce Order filed. |
| Aug. 17, 1995 | Motion to Quash Service of Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order; Affidavit; Subpoena Ad Testificandum filed. |
| Aug. 01, 1995 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Aug. 01, 1995 | Petitioner`s Response in Opposition to Respondent`s Motion to Suppress filed. |
| Jul. 31, 1995 | Transcript w/cover letter filed. |
| Jul. 27, 1995 | Respondent`s Motion to Suppress; Respondent`s Notice to Produce at Trial filed. |
| Jul. 26, 1995 | Respondent`s Response to Discovery Order filed. |
| Jul. 18, 1995 | Order sent out. (Dept's. Motion to Shorten Time for Discovery is Granted) |
| Jul. 17, 1995 | (Respondent) Objection to Production at Depositions filed. |
| Jul. 17, 1995 | (Jed Berman) Notice of Taking Deposition(s) filed. |
| Jul. 13, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Hearing filed. |
| Jul. 05, 1995 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion to Dismiss Specific Counts of Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Jun. 29, 1995 | (Petitioner) Certificate of Service of Interrogatories filed. |
| May 25, 1995 | (Respondent) Motion to Dismiss Specific Counts of Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Apr. 11, 1995 | Order Granting Continuance and Amended Notice sent out. (hearing rescheduled for August 1-3, 1995; 10:00am; Jacksonville) |
| Apr. 06, 1995 | (Petitioner) Joint Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Mar. 01, 1995 | Subpoena ad testificandum (10) filed. |
| Feb. 28, 1995 | Order Granting Continuance, Resetting Hearing and Directing the Petitioner to Respond to Respondent`s Motion to Produce sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 4/25/95; 10:00am; Jacksonville) |
| Feb. 24, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Depositions filed. |
| Feb. 22, 1995 | Petitioners` response to motion to compel discovery and motion for continuance filed. |
| Feb. 20, 1995 | Order sent out. (Respondent`s motion is denied) |
| Feb. 16, 1995 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Depositions filed. |
| Feb. 16, 1995 | (Respondent) Motion to Compel Discovery Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Feb. 02, 1995 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion in Opposition to Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Jan. 30, 1995 | (Respondent) Motion in Opposition to Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Nov. 03, 1994 | Notice of Hearing and Order sent out. (hearing set for 3-16-95; 10:00am; Jacksonville) |
| Oct. 21, 1994 | (Petitioner) Response to Initial Order filed. |
| Oct. 14, 1994 | (Respondent) Request for Production filed. |
| Oct. 10, 1994 | Initial Order issued. |
| Sep. 30, 1994 | Agency referral letter; Answer to Administrative Compaint; Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Apr. 08, 1997 | Agency Final Order | |
| Dec. 12, 1996 | Opinion | |
| Mar. 15, 1996 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jan. 11, 1996 | Recommended Order | Department proved that Respondent violated multiple provisions of insurance code in selling non-standard automobile insurance. |
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs GLORIA ANN ELLWOOD, 94-005460 (1994)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs KATHERINE ANN FITZGERALD, 94-005460 (1994)
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs TIMOTHY GENE LEIGH, 94-005460 (1994)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs BRIAN WHITNEY MCDANIEL, 94-005460 (1994)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs ADRIAN MATTHEW JAGDEOSINGH, 94-005460 (1994)
