vs. ) Case No. 96-5776
Respondent. )
A formal hearing was held in this matter before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by Administrative Law Judge Daniel M. Kilbride, on April 16, 1997, in Melbourne, Florida.
Krasny and Dettmer, P.A. Post Office Box 428
Whether Respondent discriminated against Polly Leggitt on the basis of her handicap, violating Sections 760.23(1), (2) and (7)(a), Florida Statutes (1992).
If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
Whether Florida Commission on Human Relations’ failure to conclude its investigation within one year requires dismissal of the complaint/charge; and
Whether Florida Commission on Human Relations’ delay has prejudiced the Respondent and whether the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of violation of the statute of limitations or laches.
Polly Leggitt filed a complaint for discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Petitioner) on February 3, 1993. Pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, she alleged that Regency Place Apartments (Respondent) unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of handicap (blindness) by refusing to rent her an apartment.
Petitioner investigated Leggitt’s allegations, and its Executive Director issued a “Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of An Administrative Charge” on August 28, 1996, finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. Thereafter, Respondent requested the matter be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to conduct a formal proceeding. Petitioner referred this matter to DOAH to conduct a final hearing. The parties submitted
a Prehearing Stipulation which was filed on April 10, 1997. A formal hearing was held on April 16, 1997, in Melbourne, Florida.
At the formal hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Polly Leggitt, and Frances Leggitt and offered the deposition testimony of Christine Puchalski. Petitioner offered into evidence eight exhibits, which were admitted into evidence.
Respondent presented the testimony of Robert Stitzel and Carole Naylor. Respondent offered into evidence four exhibits, which were admitted into evidence.
Respondent argued at the formal hearing that the two-year statute of limitations barred this action from proceeding. In addition, because the Petitioner did not complete its investigation within one year, Respondent contends this requires dismissal of the administrative charge. These issues are resolved in the conclusions of law which follow.
A transcript of the proceedings was filed on May 5, 1997. At the request of the parties, the time for filing post hearing submissions was set for more than ten days following the filing of the transcript. Consequently, the parties waived the requirement that a recommended order be rendered within thirty days after they file the transcript. Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner filed its proposals on May 28, 1997. Respondent filed its proposals on May 22, 1997.
Subsequent to the filing of the post hearing proposals, Petitioner submitted the deposition of Polly Leggitt, taken on
April 14, 1997, and sought to have it considered as part of the Petitioner’s Case in Chief. Respondent filed its Objection to Notice of Filing or Motion to Strike, dated June 10, 1997.
Petitioner filed a Response to the objection and motion, dated June 23, 1997. Respondent’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Rule 60Q-2.024, Florida Administrative Code. Two months following the close of the evidence, Petitioner now seeks to offer testimony in support of an award of quantifiable damages for matters that were discussed in a deposition taken prior to the formal hearing but not introduced at the formal hearing. Unless a party specifically seeks, and is granted, the right to submit additional evidence following the completion of its case in chief, it is wholly improper that evidence not offered or admitted at the time of the formal hearing is offered for the first time after the close of all the evidence. This a violation of Respondent’s due process rights. Cf. Department of Environmental Protection vs. Department of Management Services, Division of Administrative Hearings, 667 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Section 90.403, Florida Statutes; Rules 60Q-2.024, 60Q- 2.026, 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, the contents of the deposition of Polly Leggitt, taken on April 14, 1997, will not be considered in this order.
Petitioner is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30,
Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, Petitioner may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes on behalf of the aggrieved party.
On February 3, 1993, Leggitt filed a complaint with the Petitioner, and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint names Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her.
On March 24, 1993, the Petitioner notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days the Petitioner would investigate the complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The Notice further provided that a final administrative disposition of the complaint would be completed within one year (on or about February 3, 1994).
A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued by document dated and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Property Administrator; Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, Owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the complaint.
Respondent was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments in Melbourne, Florida, at all times relevant.
Respondent hired Frank Cutrona as manager of Regency Place Apartments and was the manager during the relevant period.
Respondent hired Carole Naylor as a clerical worker and gave her the title of Property Administrator.
On September 9, 1992, Regency Place Apartments located in Melbourne, Florida, responded to a letter of inquiry from Polly Leggitt, and offered certain apartments for rent.
The letter of September 9, 1992, was signed by Frank Cutrona and his wife (resident managers) offered a $100.00 discount, and invited Leggitt to visit the complex. At that time, Leggitt was a resident of Richardson Apartments located in Fort Myers, Florida. Leggitt indicated that she wanted to leave that area and move to Brevard County, Florida.
On or about October 11 or 12, 1992, Leggitt visited the apartment complex and was shown an upstairs one-bedroom apartment, by a woman who she did not identify. Leggitt did not advise the woman that she had a disability, and Leggitt did not have a seeing-eye dog with her at that time.
Leggitt found that the price and location of the apartments were suitable to her needs. Leggitt wanted to move to Regency Place because the apartments were accessible to all that was important to her. She used a guide dog at the time to help her with traffic. There was a veterinary clinic nearby; a light
to cross the street; a bus stop so that she could get the mall; and a bank and grocery store directly across the street.
Leggitt did not contact the apartment complex again until after Christmas of 1992, at which time she called and spoke to a person she believed was Frank Cutrona, the apartment manager.
Leggitt was sent an application which she filled out and returned sometime after January 8, 1993. On the application she noted in the place where it requested information about automobiles, “None- (legally blind - no license)”.
The application form requested information regarding pet ownership and indicated that there would be a separate application for pets. She wrote in the application that she had a guide dog, and that federal and state laws prohibited discrimination by charging a fee for guide dogs.
The application stated that she was self-employed and obtained $281.34 per month in Social Security disability income. In the application, she stated “Mom pays rental and ut’s” (presumably utilities).
The proposed monthly rental for a one-bedroom apartment was $380 per month, plus utilities.
Leggitt sent a deposit and application fee on or about January 11, 1993.
No specific amount of contribution towards Leggitt’s income was shown for her mother on the application.
By letter dated January 18, 1993, Leggitt’s application was declined, citing the unavailability of the kind and location of the apartment which she desired and insufficient income to qualify. The letter was signed by Carole Naylor, “Property Administrator.” The original cashiers check for the deposit was also returned.
Subsequent conversations took place between Leggitt and Frank Cutrona regarding her ability to pay and whether or not her mother’s income could be considered for credit requirements. Leggitt asked him to speak to her mother. Leggitt stated that she did not submit any information regarding her mother being a
co-signer. Polly testified “[t]hey told me they would send her an application.”
Christine Puchalski testified that she knew Leggitt as a resident of the apartment complex where she was a resident manager. In response to an inquiry by an unknown person calling on behalf of Regency Place Apartments, Puchalski stated that she did not go into any details other than that Leggitt paid her rent on time, that she did not have any returned checks, and there were no problems with Leggitt’s tenancy.
By letter of January 28, 1993, Leggitt was advised that her application was not approved, stating that “We require the
tenant/occupant to have sufficient income to qualify. Your mother living out of state, and not occupying the apartment would preclude her income from being part of the calculation.” This letter was signed by Carole Naylor, Property Administrator.
Leggitt acknowledged that her application was not very specific as to income and that there were times that her mother paid rent directly to the apartment complex and sometimes she sent the sum directly to her.
Following the rejection of her application, Leggitt moved to Titusville, Florida, to an apartment that was not accessible for her handicap. This apartment was on a very dangerous road, with no reliable public transportation and three miles to the grocery store. She had to buy a bicycle and risk her life on the dangerous road leading to the apartment, to buy groceries. She lived there eight-and-a-half months before moving to Merritt Island, Florida.
Regency Apartments, containing 219 units, was built by Robert Stitzel in 1983 and owned by him until it was sold on April 30, 1993, to a third party corporation. The contract to sell the property had been executed in December, 1992.
Frank Cutrona had worked for Stitzel between 4 and 6 years. He died on December 26, 1996.
Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Her title “Property
Administrator” appears to be a title only. Her duties were administrative, typing, and bookkeeping. She composed and typed the two letters that were sent to Leggitt, but the contents of the letters were given to her by Cutrona. She had no conversations with Polly Leggitt or Frances Leggitt.
Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Apartments would require income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager.
The proposed rent for a one-bedroom apartment was $380. Therefore, three times that amount equals $1,140.00.
Respondent demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. There was a person who was legally blind. There were amputees and physically challenged people of many different disabilities over the years. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by Cutrona and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency.
It does not appear that Regency Apartments is a legal entity. The owner of the apartment complex at the time of the alleged discrimination was Regency Place, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, which no longer owns the apartment complex.
Frank Cutrona is deceased, and his estate has not been made party to this proceeding.
Cutrona has been described as a caring, disabled man
who was kind and considerate of his tenants with disabilities and made innovative accommodations for their benefit. The specific reasons or motivations for the rejection of the application by Cutrona cannot be clarified because of his death in December, 1996.
Respondent was aware that the complex could not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex or disabilities.
The Petitioner has made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and she suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Respondent based its action solely upon her handicap.
Respondent presented evidence that Regency’s requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt’s mother’s agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt’s income of $281.34, plus her mother’s contribution, would come to $831.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140, thus rendering their income short by $308.66 per month.
The motivation for rejecting the application is recited in those letters which stated that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available, and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify.
There is no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the
part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Apartments, other than conjecture. There is no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it does not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive has been proven.
There is nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt’s legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application.
There is no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents.
Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicates that the sole basis for rejecting her application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Apartments.
Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there is no evidence of any quantifiable damages.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner, Florida Commission on Human Relations, is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995).
If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, Petitioner may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1995).
The Statute provides at Section 760.35(3)(b) (1993):
Administrative hearings shall be conducted pursuant to
s. 120.57(1). The respondent must be served written notice by certified mail. If the hearing officer finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, he shall issue a recommended order to the commission prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including quantifiable damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The commission may adopt, reject, or modify a recommended order only as provided under s. 120.57(1). Judgment for the amount of damages and costs assessed pursuant to a final order by the commission may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof and may be enforced as any other judgment.
Currently before this tribunal is Respondent’s motion to dismiss on two grounds: 1) that Petitioner’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements requires dismissal of the administrative charge; and 2) that Petitioner’s delay has prejudiced Respondent and should result in dismissal of the charge based on laches or violation of the statute of limitations.
Under the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act, “the Secretary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after filing of the complaint . . ., unless it is
impracticable to do so.” 42 U.S.C. Section 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute also provides that if “the Secretary is unable to complete the investigation within 100 days” after complainant files the complaint, the Secretary “shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so.” 42
U.S.C. Section 3610(a)(1)(c). This same provision is found in the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Section 760.34 Florida Statutes (1995) and Rule 60Y-7, Florida Administrative Code.
The Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows:
Section 60Y-7.004(8)(b) If the Commission is unable to complete its investigation within 100 days, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so.
Section 60Y-7.004(b)(10) The Commission will make final administrative disposition of a complaint within one year of the date of receipt of the complaint, unless it is impracticable to do so. If the Commission is unable to do so, it shall notify the complainant and respondent in writing of the reasons for not doing so.” (Emphasis added).
It is undisputed in this case that Petitioner did not file its determination until August 28, 1996, over three years from the time Leggitt filed her complaint and that Petitioner never notified the Respondent that it would be unable to complete the investigation within 100 days as required by statute, nor did it notify Complainant or Respondent in writing why an administrative disposition of a complaint had not been made within one year of receipt of the complaint.
In Mary E. Landes vs. Department of Professional Regulation, 441 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983), the Second District Court of Appeal stated:
However, we agree with the First District that “in absence of a specific legislative authority, civil or criminal statutes of limitations are inapplicable to administrative license revocation proceedings.” Citing Donaldson vs. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 425 So. 2d 145, 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Therefore, the specific statute of limitations cited earlier, that the Legislature limited a cause of action to two years for civil suits does not apply to Petitioner, a state agency.
The Petitioner contends that the time periods provided in the administrative code are “aspirational,” and that it was not required to complete the investigation within one year. Citing federal case law, St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York vs. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1985); Brock vs. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 261-262, 106 S. Ct. 1834, 1839-1840 (1986). Although the Court is not required to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the statute, the Court does have an obligation to determine whether the defendants have suffered substantial prejudice, warranting dismissal or other equitable relief. See, Baumgardner vs. HUD, 960 F. 2d 572, 577-578 (6th Cir. 1992); United States vs. Scully, 1996 WL 278776, at 1 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Florida courts have taken a similar position in licensing discipline cases. See Carter vs. Department of
Professional Regulation, Board of Optometry, 633 So. 2d 3, (Fla. 1994) in which the licensee must show (1) a violation of the time limits set by statute and (2) that the resulting delay may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or the corrections of the action and may have prejudiced the licensee. Respondent, in this case, has established that the Petitioner violated the statutory time limits and that the three-and-one-half year delay in filing Petitioner’s Notice of Probable Cause has caused the proceedings to be impaired and the Respondent extreme prejudice. See City of Panama City vs. Public Employees Relations Commission, 364 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Here, the only witness that can specifically refute any of the testimony given by any of the witnesses of the Florida Human Relations Commission has died, and that testimony cannot be recreated, and consequently the Respondents have been prejudiced in their ability to refute (if necessary) the allegations of discrimination asserted by the Commission. The long delay in the investigation before filing of probable cause materially impaired the fairness of the proceeding in this particular case. The complaint was filed by Leggitt on February 3, 1993. The Petitioner notified the Respondent in March, 1993, that it would be conducting an investigation, and that the investigation would be completed within one year from the date of filing of the complaint by Leggitt. After notification by the Petitioner of the investigation, various pieces of correspondence went back and
forth between the parties as shown in some of the exhibits. However, it was not until three-and-one-half years later, in August 1996, that a probable cause finding was made. In the meantime, not only had the memories of the complainant’s witnesses dimmed, but also there was a substantial loss of testimony by virtue of the death of Frank Cutrona.
Consequently, this case also falls clearly within the doctrine of laches, (1) that there is conduct on the part of the Respondents giving rise to the situation on which the complaint is raised; (2) there is a delay in asserting the Petitioner’s rights with the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the Respondents’ conduct, and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the Respondents that the complainant would assert the right on which she bases her suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the Respondents, resulting from the loss of the witness and one of the Respondents, Frank Cutrona, for his testimony. The Florida Bar vs. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700, 705 (Fla. 1978).
The appropriate action in this is that the Petition should be dismissed.
Assuming, arguendo, that this case is not dismissed because of the delay, the order and burden of proof in a handicap-discrimination case involves the “traditional” standard set forth in McDonnell-Douglass Corporation vs. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 2d, 668 (1973), and Texas Department
of Community Affairs vs. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
67 L.Ed. 2d 207 (1981). That is, the Petitioner has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If they demonstrate the prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the housing provider to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The burden of producing evidence is next placed on the Petitioner to demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual. However, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the Petitioner. See, St. Mary’s Honor Center vs. Hicks, 509 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed. 2d 407, (1993).
“Handicap” is defined in Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (1993), as:
(a) A person has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of major life activities, or he has a record of having, or is regarded as having, such physical or mental
impairment . . .
This definition is essentially the same as the definition in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sections 12101-12213.
The case of Bisbee vs. Thatcher Glass Manufacturing Company, 3 F.A.L.R. 892-A, 893-A (Florida Commission on Human Relations, 1981), contains a statement that the Commission’s definition of a handicap “tracks the definition of ‘handicapped
individual’ in 29 U.S.C. Section 706(7)(b).” That provision defines an individual with disabilities, as one “who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities. . . .” Examples of major life activities include caring for oneself, walking, sitting, speaking, learning and working. 29 C.F.R., Section 1630.2(1)(1993), as cited in the Brand vs. Florida Power Corporation, 633 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
The Complainant, Polly Leggitt, is clearly a handicapped person under the act.
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 provides in pertinent part:
760.23 --- Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other prohibited practices.
It is unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion.
It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, . . . because of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion.
* * *
(7) It is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of:
(a) That person or renter; . . .
In order for Petitioner to demonstrate a prima facie case under the proof standard set forth above, the Petitioner must demonstrate:
That she is handicapped within the meaning of the above authority and part of a protected class.
That she is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment in question.
That she suffered a loss of housing opportunity under circumstances which lead to an inference that they based the action solely upon her handicap.
Petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case.
If the Petitioner proves a prima facie case of handicap or disability discrimination, the burden to go forward with an articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the housing action taken shifts to the Respondent. Upon such
an articulation being made by the Respondent, the burden to go forward with evidence to show that is a pretext for what really amounts to discrimination shifts back to the Petitioner. Under the St. Mary’s Honor Center decision, supra.; however, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the Petitioner at all times.
Through the testimony of witnesses and letters admitted in evidence, Respondent stated that Leggitt’s application was denied because (1) an upstairs one-bedroom apartment was not available at the time she submitted her written application, and (2) she did not meet the minimum income requirements set by the Respondent.
The burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion then shifted to Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of admissible evidence that Respondent’s articulated reasons were merely pretextual. Petitioner has failed to do so. Petitioner’s proffer of evidence to prove pretext was all hearsay or conjecture. Petitioner’s hearsay evidence does not fall into any of the hearsay exceptions found in Section 90.803, Florida Statutes (1993). Under Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), this hearsay evidence is not sufficient in itself to support findings of fact. Harris vs. Game and Fred Water Fish Commission, 495 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Department of Environmental Protection vs. Department of Management Services, Division of Administrative
Hearings, 667 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Department of Administration, Division of Retirement vs. Porter, 591 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1992). Without the hearsay evidence, Petitioner’s evidence did not prove that Respondent’s articulated reasons for denying Leggitt’s application were pretextual.
Section 760.35(3)(b) Florida Statutes (1993) provides that in the event the administrative law judge determines that a discriminatory act has been committed, it shall recommend to the Commission an order prohibiting or requiring the Respondent to cease and desist its activity, and shall recommend an order finding quantifiable damages.
As for remedies sought by Petitioner, if discriminatory conduct had been proven, by its very nature an injunction will lie only to restrain the commission of a future injury, since it is impossible to prevent what has already occurred. City of Coral Springs vs. Florida Nat’l Properties, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The law only provides injunctive relief for a prospective injury that is more than a remote possibility; it must be so imminent and probable as reasonably to demand preventive action by the court. Id.
Regency Apartments is no longer owned by Robert Stitzel. It would therefore serve no purpose to recommend an injunction “prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice” as provided in the statute.
There has been no evidence submitted by Leggitt of any quantifiable damages which the Commission has authority to levy in such cases. As the Court determined in Laborers’ International Local 478 vs. Burrough, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989) quantifiable damages can be authorized by an administrative agency. However, humiliation, pain and suffering, comfort, and inconvenience are damages which are not quantifiable and may not be awarded through administrative procedures; see also, Broward County vs. John LaRosa, 505 So. 2d 422, (Fla. 1987).
Consequently, had Petitioner proven discrimination, there is no relief afforded by the statute in this particular case.
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter.
RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1997.
Evelyn Davis Golden, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Commission on Human Relations
Ms. Polly Leggitt
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
