STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

LANEY MCGRATH,

Petitioner,

vs.

ST. LUCIE VILLAGE PARKLIFE, LLC ET AL.,

Respondents.

/

Case No. 20-3437

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G.

Van Laningham, Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), for final hearing by Zoom teleconference on September 30, 2020.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Laney H. McGrath, pro se

11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317

Indiantown, Florida 34956

For Respondents: Teresa Schenk, pro se

St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, religion, or disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In a Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) on or around February 19, 2020, Petitioner Laney McGrath (“McGrath”) alleged that Respondents St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC (“Parklife”); D.R.S. Realty Company; Teresa Schenk;

Madeline Marrero; and William Marrero had engaged in unlawful housing discrimination based on race, religion, or disability. FCHR investigated McGrath’s claims and, on July 22, 2020, issued a Determination (No Cause), finding that reasonable cause did not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. Thereafter, McGrath filed a Petition for Relief, which FCHR transmitted to DOAH on July 31, 2020.

The final hearing took place on September 30, 2020. McGrath testified on her own behalf and called one other witness, Kassandra Rosa. Respondents presented several witnesses: Teresa Schenk, Madeline Marrero, and William Marrero. Respondents’ Exhibits A through F were admitted into evidence as well.

The final hearing was recorded but not transcribed. Proposed recommended orders were due on October 12, 2020. Each party submitted correspondence, which has been considered.

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the official statute law of the State of Florida refer to Florida Statutes 2020.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Parklife is the owner of a mobile home community known as St. Lucie Mobile Village (the “Village”), which comprises approximately 220 homes. For the last 21 years, McGrath has leased a lot in the Village, upon which her double-wide mobile home sits. She is a white woman, approximately 60 years

   
   

   old, who claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other unspecified anxiety disorders, and to be a practicing Jehovah’s Witness.

2. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination brought under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). McGrath alleges that Parklife has discriminated against her in several ways, which can be classified as selective enforcement, disparate treatment, and retaliation. Specifically, McGrath alleges that Parklife required her to upgrade the skirting around, and also to re-level, her home, while excusing other (predominately Hispanic) residents, whose homes were in comparable condition, from making similar improvements. McGrath alleges that Parklife issued warnings to her for violating the “two vehicle” rule, while allowing other (predominately Hispanic) residents to keep three or more cars on their lots. She alleges that Parklife permitted Hispanic residents to shoot off fireworks and make noise in violation of park rules, depriving her of the peaceful enjoyment of her premises. Finally, McGrath alleges that Parklife commenced a retaliatory eviction proceeding against her for being a whistle blower.

3. McGrath does not dispute that her home needed new skirting and to be leveled, and she admits having violated the two vehicle rule. She claims, nevertheless, that Parklife took action against her on the basis of her race (white), religion (Jehovah’s Witness), disability (PTSD), or some combination of these, as shown by its more lenient treatment of residents outside the protected categories.

4. McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim of housing discrimination. That is, if McGrath were able to prove the facts she has alleged, she would be entitled to relief. She failed, however, to present sufficient, persuasive evidence in support of the charges.

5. It is not that there is no evidence behind McGrath’s claims. She and her witness, Kassandra Rosa, testified that other residents have violated park rules regarding skirting, leveling, and allowable vehicles––seemingly without consequence. To determine whether the circumstances of these other

   
   

   residents were truly comparable to McGrath’s, however, so as to conclude that she was singled out for different treatment, requires more information than the evidence affords. Taken together, McGraths’s testimony and that of Ms. Rosa was simply too vague and lacking in relevant detail to support findings of disparate treatment or selective enforcement on the basis of race, religion, or handicap. Indeed, the persuasive evidence fails to establish that Parklife declined to take appropriate action with regard to similarly-situated violators, or that it otherwise condoned, or acquiesced to, the rulebreaking of such residents. At most, the evidence shows that other residents violated the same rules as McGrath––not that they got off scot-free, which is a different matter.

6. As for the eviction proceeding, which was pending in county court at the time of the final hearing, there is insufficient evidence (if any) to support McGrath’s contention that Parklife is retaliating against her or using the legal process as a pretext for unlawfully depriving her of a dwelling in violation of the Act. In terms of timing, Parklife initiated the eviction proceeding before it became aware that McGrath had filed a complaint of housing discrimination, which tends to undermine the assertion that the eviction was brought to retaliate against McGrath for exercising her rights under the Act.

7. More important is that Parklife has articulated and proved nondiscriminatory grounds for seeking to terminate McGrath’s lease. Residents have complained to the Village’s management that McGrath has harassed her neighbors at various times, in various ways. While there is insufficient nonhearsay evidence in the instant record for the undersigned to make findings as to whether McGrath did, in fact, harass other residents in violation of park rules, Parklife proved by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence that it was on notice of such alleged misconduct on McGrath’s part. The fact that Parklife had such notice is sufficient to show that its bringing an action to evict McGrath was not merely a pretext for

   
   

   unlawful discrimination against her. Of course, the question of whether Parklife is entitled to terminate McGrath’s tenancy is one that need not, and cannot, be decided in this proceeding.

8. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that McGrath has failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that Parklife or any of the Respondents, jointly or severally, committed an unlawful housing practice.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

9. DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

10. Under the Act, it is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing. Section 760.23, Florida Statutes, prohibits the following acts and practices, among others:

    1. It is unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion.

       
       

    2. It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion.

       
       

11. With respect to retaliation, section 760.37 provides as follows:

    It is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise of, or on account of her or his having exercised, or on account of her or his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise of any right granted under ss. 760.20-760.37. This section may be enforced by appropriate administrative or civil action.

    
    

12. Section 760.23 is patterned after section 804 of the federal Fair Housing Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Accordingly, the same legal analysis applies to each, see, e.g., Philippeaux v. Apartment Investment and Management Co., 598 Fed. Appx. 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2015), and the decisions of federal courts interpreting and applying the analogous federal laws provide persuasive guidance in determining whether a violation of the Act has occurred. See Dornbach v. Holley, 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

13. The burden of proving that Parklife engaged in unlawful housing discrimination belongs to McGrath. See, e.g., Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).

14. In cases involving a claim of housing discrimination, the complainant has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Generally speaking, a prima facie case comprises circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, such as proof that the charged party treated persons outside of the protected class, who were otherwise similarly situated, more favorably than the complainant was treated.1 Failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination ends the inquiry. See Ratliff v. State, 666 So. 2d 1008, 1012 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), aff’d, 679 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1996) (citing Arnold v. Burger Queen Sys., Inc., 509 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)).

15. If, however, the complainant sufficiently establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the charged party to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the charged party satisfies this burden, then the complainant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason asserted by the charged party

    
    

    1 Alternatively, the complainant's burden may be satisfied with direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121,

    105 S. Ct. 613, 621, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination" inasmuch as "[t]he shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.'").

    
    

    is, in fact, merely a pretext for discrimination. See Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.

    denied, 513 U.S. 808, 115 S. Ct. 56, 130 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1994) (“Fair housing discrimination cases are subject to the three-part test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).”); Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of HUD, on behalf of Herron v. Blackwell,

    908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990) (“We agree with the ALJ that the three- part burden of proof test developed in McDonnell Douglas [for claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act] governs in this case [involving a claim of discrimination in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act].”).

16. As mentioned above, McGrath’s allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim under the Act. See, e.g., Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016); Wells v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc., 390 Fed. Appx. 956 (11th Cir. 2010). McGrath simply failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Parklife or the other Respondents treated similarly-situated residents outside of the relevant protected classifications more favorably than McGrath was treated, and she likewise offered no persuasive, direct evidence of discriminatory intent. McGrath failed, further, to prove that the facially legitimate grounds for which Parklife is seeking to evict her are merely a pretext for discrimination or unlawful retaliation.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Parklife not liable for housing discrimination and awarding McGrath no relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2020.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

Laney H. McGrath

11500 Southwest Kanner Highway, Lot 317

Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed)

Teresa Schenk

St. Lucie Village Parklife, LLC 11500 Southwest Kanner Highway Indiantown, Florida 34956 (eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 20-003437

Orders for Case No: 20-003437