STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA LAND ) COMPANY; INDIGO DEVELOPMENT ) GROUP, INC.; INDIGO GROUP, ) INC.; INDIGO GROUP, LTD.; ) PATRICIA LAGONI; SEAVIEW )

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; ) LEROY E. FOLSOM; JAMES S. ) and JOAN W. WHITESIDE; ) SUSAN SPEAR ROOT; SUSAN R. ) GRAHAM; CHAPMAN J. ROOT, II; ) DANIEL P. S. PAUL; and )

AVA AND RUFUS, INC., )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-0870RP

)

ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER )

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, )

)

Respondent. )

) SAMUEL P. BELL, III and )

ANN MOORMAN-REEVES, )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-0871RP

)

ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER )

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in these cases on April 1, 2 and 9, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida, before Donald

R. Alexander, the assigned Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Frank E. Matthews, Esquire

97-0870RP T. Kent Wetherall, II, Esquire

Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6526

For Petitioners: Kevin X. Crowley, Esquire 97-0871RP Carol A. Forthman, Esquire

131 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1507

For Respondent: William H. Congdon, Esquire

Nancy B. Barnard, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in these cases is whether proposed amendments to Rules 40C-4.041, 40C-4.051, 40C-4.091, 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.033, 40C-41.043, 40C-41.051, and 40C-41.063, and the

related revisions to the Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as alleged by petitioners.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Case No. 97-0870RP began on February 21, 1997, when petitioners, Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company and other similarly situated landowners, filed a petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of various revisions in Chapters 40C-4 and 40C-41, Florida Administrative Code, being proposed for adoption by respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District. The rules generally establish the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek Hydrological Basins in Volusia County, Florida, and

create more stringent standards for development within those basins. Case No. 97-0871RP, which involves an almost identical claim, was initiated on February 24, 1997, by petitioners, Samuel

P. Bell, III and Ann Moorman-Reeves, who also own property in the affected area.

After being reviewed for legal sufficiency, the two cases were assigned to the undersigned on February 27, 1997. By notice of hearing dated February 28, 1997, the cases were consolidated for hearing purposes and scheduled for final hearing on March 18 and 19, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. By agreement of the parties, the cases were continued to April 1, 2 and 9, 1997, at the same location.

On March 20, 1997, the Association of Florida Community Developers filed a motion to intervene in these proceedings. After a standing objection was lodged by respondent, the undersigned conditionally allowed the prospective intervenor to participate in this proceeding and reserved ruling on the standing issue subject to proof of standing at final hearing.

At final hearing, petitioners in Case No. 97-0870RP presented the testimony of Dr. Harvey H. Harper, III, a professional engineer and accepted as an expert in the areas of stormwater management, water quality and chemistry, hydrology, water management permitting, and water resources engineering; Dr. Jay H. Exum, accepted as an expert in the area of environmental permitting; J. Steven Godley, a biologist and accepted as an

expert in the areas of wetland assessment, environmental permitting, wildlife biology and ecology, and wetlands biology and ecology; and Richard Prioletti, a planner and accepted as an expert in the area of urban planning. Also, they offered petitioners’ exhibits 1-3, 5, 6a, 6b, 9, 10, 13b, 14b, 16b,

17a-g, 21a and b, 23a-c, 24a, 25, 30 and 31. All exhibits were received in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Patrick M. Frost, assistant director of the department of resource management and accepted as an expert in the areas of wetlands ecology, wildlife ecology and water management permitting; Jeffrey C. Elledge, director of the resource managment department and accepted as an expert in the areas of stormwater management, water quality, hydrology, water management permitting, and water resources engineering; Lorne K. Malo, an environmental specialist and accepted as an expert in wildlife ecology; Dr. Joseph M. Shaefer, an associate professor of wildlife and ecology at the University of Florida and accepted as an expert in wildlife ecology; and Glenn C. Lowe, Jr., director of environmental management and accepted as an expert in the areas of wetlands ecology, wildlife ecology, and water management permitting. Also, it offered respondent's exhibits 1, 4-7, 9-12,

13-19, 21, 23-25, 26b, 32a and b, 34-37, 41-49, 53, 54 and 56.

All exhibits were received in evidence. In addition, joint exhibits 1 and 2 were received in evidence. Finally, on May 2, 1997, respondent late-filed the deposition of Jeffrey Jones,

planning director for the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council.

The transcript of hearing (six volumes) was filed on May 5, 1997. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the parties on May 22, 1997, and they have been considered by the undersigned in the preparation of this Order. Related to these filings is a pending motion to strike a portion of respondent’s proposed order. That motion is dealt with in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:

1. Background

   
   

   1. Petitioners in Case No. 97-0870RP, Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company; Indigo Development Group, Inc.; Indigo Group, Inc.; Indigo Group, Ltd.; Patricia Lagoni, as Trustee of Trust Nos.

      IDI-1, IDI-2 IDI-3 and IDI-4; Seaview Development Corporation; LeRoy E. Folsom; James S. Whiteside, Jr. and Joan W. Whiteside; Susan Spear Root; Susan R. Graham and Chapman J. Root, II, Trustees of the Chapman S. Root 1982 Living Trust; Daniel P. S. Paul, individually and as trustee of the Daniel P. S. Paul Charitable Remainder Trust; and Ava and Rufus, Inc. (petitioners), own real property within an area which will be affected by certain rules proposed by respondent, St. Johns River Water Management District (District). The District is authorized

      to adopt rules pursuant to Chapters 120 and 373, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in Case No. 97-0871RP, Samuel P. Bell, III and Anne Moorman-Reeves (petitioners), also own real property within an area affected by the proposed rules. Both groups of petitioners are substantially affected persons and thus have standing to inititate these rule challenges.

   2. Intervenor, Association of Florida Community Developers, Inc. (AFCD), is a not-for-profit corporation comprised of forty members, primarily developers. Its mission is to promote programs that encourage economic growth in Florida "through the responsible development of large-scale residential communities." Of its forty members, seven own property within the boundaries of the District and regularly apply for permits from the District for the development of large-scale residential or mixed-use developments and five regularly apply for permits on behalf of land owners. Only one member, however, Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company (Consolidated-Tomoka), which is already a party in Case No. 97-0870RP, owns property within the area affected by the proposed hydrologic basins. For the reasons cited in the Conclusions of Law, AFCD lacks standing to participate in this proceeding.

   3. The development of the proposed rules was formally initiated by the District in May 1994. At that time, the District began investigating the need for criteria including delineation of new hydrolgic basins, a recharge standard, water

      quality criteria, erosion and sediment control, a standard to limit drawdowns in wetlands, a special zone for the protection of habitat, and local government notification.

   4. After notice of rule development was published in October 1995, and several workshops were held, on January 17, 1997, the District published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly of its intention to make certain revisions to Rules 40C- 4.041, 40C-4.051, 40C-4.091, 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.033, 40C-41.043, 40C-41.051, and 41C-41.063, and related revisions to portions of a document known as the Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters (Handbook). On February 12, 1997, by a 5 to 3 vote, the District’s Governing Board formally proposed to adopt those rules, with two amendments. In broad terms, the new rules create two geographic areas of special concern and impose more stringent permitting standards and criteria for systems within those areas.

   5. Claiming that the proposed rules were invalid on a number of grounds, petitioners in Case Nos. 97-0870RP and 97- 0871RP initiated these proceedings by filing petitions on February 21 and 24, 1997, respectively. In petitions which include almost every statutory ground for invalidating a rule under Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1996), petitioners have first contended that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 41.023, 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5(1), 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 18.1 and Appendix K, are invalid

      because they exceed the District’s grant of rulemaking authority. They also contend that Rules 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d), and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4, and 18.1, are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law implemented. They next contend that Rules 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C- 41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-4.041(2)(b), 40C-41.051(2), 40C-

      41.063(6)(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.2 and 11.5.4, are not supported by competent substantial evidence. They allege further that Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-

      41.023, 40C-41.051(2), and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook

      
      

      Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3,

      
      

      11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b) and 40C- 41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1, are invalid because their alternative lower cost proposal substantially accomplishes the statutory objectives purportedly being implemented through the proposed rules and revisions. Finally, petitioners assert that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4(d) are invalid because they fail to establish adequate standards to guide, and vest unbridled discretion in, the District. As a corollary to these claims and in the event they prevail on any issue, petitioners have requested attorney’s fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, on the theory the

      District’s actions were not substantially justified and there are no special circumstances which would make an award to petitioners unjust.

2. The Proposed Rules Generally

   
   

   1. The proposed rules affect two geographic areas within the District designated as the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basins. The former basin is located almost entirely in the northeastern portion of Volusia County and covers some 150 square miles. The latter basin is located in the southeastern portion of Volusia County and covers 94 square miles. Together, the two basins make up more than twenty percent of Volusia County, and they include parts of the Cities of Daytona Beach, Ormond Beach, and Port Orange. Although the Tomoka and Spruce Creek Rivers, which flow through the basins, were designated Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) on July 11, 1991, on balance, the water quality of both basins can only be characterized as fair.

   2. The Halifax River is a large estuarine system that lies north of the Indian River Lagoon and south of the Matanzas and Tolomato systems and parallel to the Atlantic Ocean. The Tomoka River Basin is at the northern end of the Halifax River, while the Spruce Creek Basin is at the southern end. The Halifax River connects with the Atlantic Ocean in only one place, Ponce Inlet, which is between the proposed basins. Because of this single connection, the estuary is a very low energy system due to

      minimal wave action, and the system is dependent on the basins that drain into the Halifax River. Thus, the water resources and the integrated components of habitat of the proposed basins are critical to the overall health and biological diversity for the entire region.

   3. The District regulates and controls the management and storage of surface waters through its Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) program, which has district-wide application. There are two types of permits relevant to these proceedings: stormwater and ERPs. The former permit is designed for smaller residential or commercial developments and primarily protects against the adverse impacts of stormwater runoff on water quality. An ERP is required for larger systems and covers a broad range of issues including water quality, water quantity, and biological concerns.

   4. Criteria for the issuance of individual and conceptual approval permits for systems which meet certain thresholds are found in Chapter 40C-4, Florida Administrative Code, while additional standards and criteria (over and above those found in Chapter 40C-4) for systems within specified designated areas of special concern are found in Chapter 40C-41, Florida Administrative Code. Such areas of special concern contain more stringent regulatory criteria, and they are designed to address specific problems in given areas where high quality resources need special protection, or rapid development adversely affects

   the water resources. In addition, by Rule 40C-4.091, the District has adopted and incorporated by reference a document known as the "Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters" (Handbook) which "provides applicants, potential applicants, and others who are interested, with information regarding the permitting program for the regulation of surface water management systems under Chapters 40C-4, 40C-40, 40C-41, and 40C-400, F.A.C." This controversy involves a challenge, on numerous grounds, to proposed revisions to all or parts of three rules in Chapter 40C-4, six rules in Chapter 40C-41, and a number of related revisions in the Handbook.

   1. Chapter 40C-4 and the Handbook

      
      

      10. Proposed Rules 40C-4.041(2) and 40C-4.043(1), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1 and 11.0, establish the new basins and make them subject to the provisions of Chapters 40C-4 and 40C-41 and the Handbook. The proposed basins are made up of smaller drainage basins associated with the tributaries to the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. Besides the two new basins, the District has already established at least five other areas of special concern (basins) within its boundaries.

      1. Under current Chapter 40C-4, an ERP is required for the construction, alteration, operation, maintenance, abandonment, or removal of a surface water management system which serves projects with a total land area of 40 or more acres, provides for the placement of 12 or more acres of impervious surface, or has

         any wetland impact. Smaller projects need only obtain a stormwater permit from the District. By proposed amendments to Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b)3., 6. and (g), and Sections 3.3.1(c) and

         (f) and 11.0(e) of the Handbook, these thresholds within the two basins are reduced to 10 acres and 2 acres, respectively. Thus, if the revisions become effective, some projects which now qualify for stormwater permits will require a general ERP. It follows that any projects not exceeding these thresholds are exempt from permitting requirements.

      2. New provisions relative to exemptions from the permitting thresholds are found in Rule 40C-4.051(7) while the legal description of the two basins is found in Rule 40C- 4.091(1)(a) and Appendix K of the Handbook. Exempted from the permitting thresholds are those systems which meet the conditions for exemption set forth in subsection (2) of the rule, and systems "which consist of public road shoulder paving, outside the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone, which do not result in the creation of additional traffic lanes, and systems which consist of public turn lane construction outside the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone."

      3. In addition, related revisions to Sections 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1 of the Handbook add four special basin "standards and design criteria" to the current District requirements. These are extra permitting standards that must be met in addition to standards contained in the District’s

         ERP rules. Three of the criteria are engineering related while the fourth creates a Riparian Habitat Protection Zone (RHPZ) along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. The same criteria now apply in the Econlockhatchee River and Wekiva River Hydrologic Basins, two other designated areas of special concern.

      4. Section 11.5.1 imposes a new "recharge standard" which requires ERP permittees to retain within the Most Effective Recharge Area (MERA) three inches of runoff from the directly connected impervious surface area. MERAs are defined as areas with Type A soils. There is no requirement under existing rules that stormwater and ERP permittees retain runoff for recharge purposes.

      5. Current standards require that a system not cause a net reduction in flood storage within a 10-year floodplain. Under proposed Section 11.5.2 of the Handbook, a system within the basins must not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain.

      6. The proposed stormwater management standard in Section

         
         

         1. prohibits the use of certain stormwater treatment methodologies, such as the use of detention with filtration systems, based upon the size of the system. Current District rules contain no such size-based restrictions.

      7. In Section 11.5.4, the District proposes to establish RHPZs along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. These RHPZs extend a minimum of 275, 320 or 550 feet landward from the

         waterward edge of the wetlands adjacent to the defined portions of each watercourse. For example, if the adjacent wetlands extend 400 feet landward of the water’s edge in an area where the rule defines an RHPZ width as 550 feet, 150 feet of uplands landward of the landward extent of the wetlands would be included in the RHPZ at that site. The RHPZ also includes a minimum 50- foot upland component.

      8. The RHPZ standard also provides that development within a designated RHPZ is presumed to adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species in the RHPZ. An applicant may rebut this presumption, however, by demonstrating that the "overall merits" of the proposed development offset the adverse impacts.

   2. Chapter 40C-41

   
   

   1. Existing Chapter 40C-41 designates five geographic areas of special concern and establishes additional criteria and standards for systems constructed within those areas. By amendments to Rules 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023(5), 40C-41.033 and 40C-41.043(1), the District proposes to add the Tomoka River and

      Spruce Creek Hydrologic Basins as new geographic areas of special concern. By changes to Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), the District has also proposed to codify the previously described recharge standard, 100-year floodplain standard, stormwater management standards and RHPZ as special requirements for systems constructed within the basins.

   2. As specific authority for adopting the proposed rules, the District has cited, in varying combinations, Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.118, 373.171, 373.406, 373.413, 373.415, 373.416, 373.418, and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes. It also cites, in various combinations, Sections 120.54(8), 373.046, 373.118, 373.409, 373.413, 373.4135, 373.414, 373.415, 373.416, 373.421(2)-(6), 373.426, and 373.429, Florida Statutes, as the laws being implemented.

3. Do the Rules Exceed the Agency’s Grant of Rulemaking Authority?

   1. Petitioners first contend that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023 and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K exceed the agency’s grant of rulemaking authority. The challenged rules and sections generally fall into two broad categories: (1) the establishment of the new basins and their legal descriptions, and (2) the establishment of new basin criteria. Proposed Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011 and 40C-

      41.023(5), and Sections 3.3.1, 11.0(e), 11.5 and Appendix K, fall into the first category while Rule 40C-41.063(6) and Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1 fall into the latter.

   2. In adopting the rules and sections pertaining to the new basins and their respective boundaries, the District has relied upon Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.171, 373.415, 373.418, and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, as

      the specific authority for adopting the rules. In adopting the new basin criteria, the District relies upon Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.171, 373.415, 373.418 and

      373.421(2), Florida Statutes, as the specific authority.

      
      

   3. For the reasons given in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Order, the challenged rules and sections exceed the District’s rulemaking authority and are thus an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

4. Do the Rules Enlarge the Specific Provisions of Law Implemented?

   1. Petitioners next allege that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and

      
      

      (d) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law implemented. Paragraph (6)(a) of the rule and Sections 11.5.1 and 18.1 propose to adopt the recharge standard while paragraph (6)(d) and Section

      1. establish the new RHPZs.

      
      

   2. The law being implemented for both standards is Sections 373.413, 373.414, 373.416 and 373.426, Florida Statutes. Section 373.413 provides that the District "may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that the construction or alteration" of a system "will not be harmful to the water resources of the district." Similarly, Section 373.416 authorizes the District to require permits on reasonable conditions necessary to assure that the operation and maintenance of the system "will not be harmful to the water

      resources of the district." Section 373.414 authorizes the District to require applicants to provide "reasonable assurance" that state water quality standards will not be violated.

      Finally, Section 373.426 protects "the water resources of the district" from improper abandonment or removal of surface water management systems.

   3. The statutes being implemented do not refer to a recharge standard or RHPZ. Neither do they refer to any "particular" program or duty which would authorize these rules. Therefore, Rule 40C-063(6)(a) and (d) and Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 enlarge the law being implemented and thus are invalid.

5. Are the Rules Arbitrary and Capricious?

   
   

   1. Petitioners next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C- 41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4,

      1. and Appendix K are arbitrary and capricious. These rules and sections pertain to the proposed basin designation and boundaries, threshold revisions, and exemptions. A determination as to whether the rules and sections are supported by fact and logic is set forth below below.

         1. Basins

            
            

   2. The establishment of two new hydrologic basins is based on the District’s concern to protect the water resources within these areas from the affects of growth, new homes and related

      infrastructure being built in the area. That is to say, additional resource protections are necessary in the proposed basins due to development pressure. While the parties have sharply disagreed over the extent, if any, of development pressure, it is noted that the coastal areas of Volusia County to the east of the proposed basins are already intensely developed. It can be reasonably expected that the population pressure in those areas will lead to increased development in the proposed basins. In addition, there has already been significant permitting activity in the proposed basins, and the number of binding wetland determinations issued by the District (for future five-year periods of time) indicate future development.

   3. It is true, as petitioners assert, that Volusia County’s population grew only 8.7 percent from 1990-1995, or less than the statewide average growth rate of 9.7 percent for the same time period, and that its growth rate is less than many other counties within the District. The evidence shows, however, that by the year 2010, Volusia County’s population is expected to increase by 115,530 people, not an insignificant number.

   4. At the same time, there is a concentration of numerous Floridan aquifer wellfields within or adjacent to the new basins. Increased water withdrawals from those wellfields will cause adverse impacts. The coastal communities of Volusia County, who are the primary users of water, project an increase in the need for water by the year 2010 of between 60 percent to 100 percent.

   5. Finally, development leads to compacted soils, an increase in impervious surfaces and a loss of habitat for aquatic and wetland dependent species. These result in increased runoff rates, with related higher volumes and rates of stormwater runoff. Also, they cause the introduction of stormwater pollutants such as fuels, oils, heavy metals, fertilizers and pesticide into the water. The establishment of new basins addresses these concerns.

   6. Given these considerations, it is found that the designation of the basins as areas of special concern is not without logic or reason. The fact that the basin boundaries had not been separately drawn, or used for planning purposes, by the District prior to May 1994 does not detract from this finding. Therefore, Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011 and 40C-41.023, and Handbook Sections 3.3.1 (c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5 and Appendix K are not arbitrary or capricous.

      1. Recharge standard

         
         

   7. Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Section 11.5.1 of the Handbook require in part that "[p]rojects, or portions of projects, in the Most Effective Recharge Areas must retain three

      1. inches of runoff from the directly connected impervious area within the Most Effective Recharge Area of the project." In addition, Section 18.1 contains a list of Type A soils for Flagler and Volusia Counties to determine whether a proposed project is in the Most Effective Recharge Area. Petitioners

         contend there is no rational basis for imposing this more stringent permitting criterion.

   8. In response to this objection, the District established that the proposed basins are within an area of recharge for the Floridan aquifer. Rainfall is the sole source of freshwater recharge for the Floridan and surficial aquifer systems. In other words, rainfall percolates into the ground and recharges the surficial aquifer which in turn recharges the Floridan aquifer.

   9. As noted earlier, the coastal communities of Volusia County have projected an increase of at least 60 percent in the need for water by the year 2010. While there is no direct evidential correlation between water supply demand and population growth, it can be reasonably inferred that the population increase of more than 115,000 persons by the year 2010 will likewise increase the demand for water.

   10. As water withdrawals from existing wellfields increase, saltwater intrusion can reasonably be expected to occur in greater proportions. Saltwater intrusion has the effect of contaminating the Floridan aquifer and lowering the surficial aquifer, both of which impact wetland communities and the base flow of streams. To the extent that recharge is diminished, the problems associated with those water withdrawals will be exacerbated.

   11. Type A soil, to which the recharge standard applies,

       has the highest infiltration rate. When impervious surfaces (over Type A soils) are directly connected to a stormwater pond, the rainfall will have an opportunity to percolate into the soil.

   12. Through the use of recognized "curve" numbers and historical rainfall data in the vicinity of the proposed basins, the District established that the retention of three inches of runoff in Type A soils should result in post-development recharge approximating pre-development recharge.

   13. In view of the above, and the fact that existing ERP, OFW and management of storage of stormwater requirements are not sufficient to provide for equivalent retention of stormwater for recharge purposes, the recharge standard has a rational basis. Therefore, Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1 and

       18.1 are not arbitrary and capricious.

       
       

       1. Floodplain storage criteria

          
          

   14. Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Handbook Section 11.5.2 establish new floodplain storage criteria for systems in the two basins or any of their tributaries. More specifically, they provide that a system "may not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain" of the two basins. Currently, this "no net reduction" standard applies only to development within the 10-year floodplain.

   15. The parties agree that flooding has occurred within the boundaries of the new basins. Two factors which affect flooding are excessive runoff and inadequate floodplain storage. The size

       of a project and the amount of impervious surface are directly related to the amount of runoff generated. The amount of runoff affects flooding conditions in downstream areas.

   16. The District also established that fill results in the loss of floodplain storage. The loss of floodplain storage in one area will increase flood elevations in other areas, both upstream and downstream from where the loss of floodplain storage occurs. Compensating storage provides storage volume to make up for the fill that is placed in the floodplain.

   17. The new standard requires that systems within the basins must not cause a net reduction in flood storage within the 100-year floodplain. Thus, if an applicant proposes to construct a system which reduces the floodplain’s storage capacity, the applicant will be required to compensate for the lost storage capacity, thereby preventing an increase in flood elevation.

       Even petitioners’ expert witness Harper agreed that the rule’s objective is a "worthwhile goal."

   18. Given these considerations, it is found that the floodplain storage standard is supported by logic and reason, and Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Handbook Section 11.5.2 are not arbitrary and capricious.

       1. Stormwater management standard

          
          

   19. Proposed Rule 40C-41.063(6)(c) and Handbook Section

       
       

       1. provide generally that when constructing new stormwater management systems which serve drainage areas in excess of 10

          acres, an applicant cannot use detention with filtration as the sole stormwater methodology. They also provide that when retention systems are not feasible due to limited percolation capacity, "wet detention treatment or other treatment demonstrated to be equivalent to retention or wet detention . . . must be used." Under current standards, applicants may choose the type and location of stormwater treatment ponds. Thus, instead of locating a detention pond in an area of high filtration, an applicant can choose to locate the detention in an area of low filtration thereby discharging the stormwater to surface waters.

   20. The evidence shows that detention with filtration systems fail after a relatively short period of time because pollutants clog the filters that remove them. Once filters clog, water does not filter and the pond does not function as designed. Malfunctioning detention with filtration systems can cause localized water quality violations. The new standard curtails the use of detention with filtration.

   21. The evidence further shows that the Tomoka River has moderately elevated levels of nitrogen and elevated levels of total phosphorus. The water quality in Spruce Creek is similar with even higher levels of total phosphorus. Because detention with filtration systems is an ineffective way to remove nitrogen, dissolved phosphorus, and dissolved metals, the receiving water bodies will be improved if the less effective detention of

       filtration systems is eliminated. The new standard will achieve this goal. Even petitioners’ expert witness Harper acknowledged that the detention with filtration method is a poor stormwater management technique.

   22. Based upon the foregoing considerations, it is found that the stormwater management standard is based on logic and reason, and Rule 40C-41.063(6)(c) and Handbook Section 11.5.3 are not arbitrary and capricious, as alleged by petitioners.

       1. Riparian Habitat Protection Zone

          
          

   23. Proposed Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section

       
       

       1. establish an RHPZ along the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek. These new zones provide additional protection over and above that provided under the existing ERP program. As noted earlier, these zones extend a minimum of 275, 320, or 550 feet landward from the waterward edge of the wetlands adjacent to the defined portions of each water course, and they include a minimum 50-foot upland component. The rule and section presume that certain activities within the zones will "adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species provided by (the) Zone," and to overcome this presumption, an applicant must demonstrate "that the overall merits of the proposed plan of development, including mitigation as described in section 12.3 . . . provide a degree of resource protection . . which offsets adverse effects of the proposed system on the uplands and wetlands within the Zone." Finally, the rule and

       section provide that "[s]ome reasonable use of the land within the Protection Zone can be allowed."

   24. The record contains sharply conflicting testimony regarding the logic and reason for the zones, and the parties have devoted substantial portions of their proposed findings of fact to address this issue. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive evidence, and this evidence is embodied in the findings below.

   25. To begin with, similar RHPZs already exist in the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva River Hydrologic Basins, two other geographic areas of special concern. Like the existing RHPZs, the purpose of the new RHPZs is to protect the riparian wetland and upland areas which are necessary to sustain viable populations of aquatic or wetland dependent species.

   26. The Tomoka River and Spruce Creek systems are important and critical for the wildlife and overall ecology of eastern Volusia and Flagler Counties. The riparian habitat along the two systems consist of estuarine saltwater marsh, forested wetlands, including cypress and hardwood, freshwater marsh, hammocks, flatwoods, and sandhills. Aquatic and wetland dependent species need a combination of these riparian habitats for feeding, breeding, and nesting. These species are an integral component of the water resources.

       
       

   27. There is a critical relationship among the biotic

       components of the water resources such as the living plants and animals. Interdependent relationships exist between all of these components, and if one component is not present, the overall balance and health of the water resource is adversely impacted.

       Similarly, the entire food chain is impacted by the loss of an aquatic or wetland dependent species from the aquatic or wetland system.

   28. The proposed RHPZ widths are based on, and related to, the spatial needs of species rather than a specific width of wetlands and uplands. Spatial requirement is the area an animal needs to perform all of its life functions, such as foraging, breeding, denning, and nesting, without harassment or any kind of detriment in order to maintain a viable population. All experts agree that, in order to sustain a viable population, 50 to 500 individuals must be maintained. Current ERP rules do not provide for this degree of protection for these spatial requirements.

   29. Spatial requirement is determined by two methods. One method is to determine the distance for which a species is sensitive to disturbance when it is feeding or nesting. For example, if a species is intolerant to humans and would require a distance of 200 feet away from humans, then that would be the spatial requirement of that species. A second method is to determine a species’ home range requirement. Home range is the area within which a species moves in order to obtain requirements to help sustain life, such as food. For those species for which

       no data in the literature exists regarding spatial requirements, a technique known as "guilding" is used to group species based upon their nesting and feeding zones.

   30. The proposed 550-foot RHPZ width addresses the spatial needs for a majority of aquatic and wetland dependent species in cypress and hardwood swamps. In the salt marshes, the 320-foot width satisfies the spatial needs of a majority of the species. Where the river narrows and the canopy covers the riverbed, there is a uniform habitat not separated by the water body. Therefore, a 275-foot RHPZ straddling the river provides the 550-foot width necessary to maintain viable populations.

   31. Under current rules, in order to reduce or eliminate wetland impacts, an applicant may propose a buffer with a minimum width of 15 feet and an average width of 25 feet between the wetland and the system being proposed in order to address the secondary impacts to the habitat of wetlands. This buffer essentially acts as a cushion around the wetlands to protect the wetland habitat from adjacent wetland development. If the wetland is used by a listed species, then additional measures may be required in order to protect the nesting, denning or critical feeding habitat of that species in the wetland. Listed species, however, do not include all aquatic and wetland dependent species, and they include only those that are classified as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern.

   32. The new 50-foot upland component will be applied in

       areas where the wetlands extend beyond the appropriate 550, 320 and 275-foot widths. This extension is necessary and appropriate because the existing rules are designed to protect the intrinsic value of wetland habitat. They do not, however, include protection of the intrinsic value of upland habitat, which is used, for example, by frogs and turtles. In addition, existing rules do not protect upland foraging areas or wildlife corridors except for those limited areas needed for ingress and egress to the nest from the wetland. Finally, most aquatic and wetland dependent species are not a listed species, and thus they receive no upland habitat protection under existing ERP rules. In contrast, the new rule provides protection for spatial needs of all aquatic and wetland dependent species and their use of uplands for foraging, breeding, and nesting.

   33. While there are some flaws in the analyses used by the District to justify the zones, collectively there is sufficient credible and persuasive evidence found in the Center for Wetlands Study, the 1990 East Central Florida Regional Planning Council report, detailed ground and air investigations, the District’s regulatory experience, and its permitting experience with basin rules in the Wekiva and Econlockhatchee Basins, which have similar RHPZ dimensions, to support a finding that the rule and section are based on logic and reason. Therefore, Rule 40C- 41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4 are not arbitrary or capricious.

       1. Exemptions

       
       

   34. Proposed revisions to Rules 40C-4.051(7) and 40C- 41.051(2) exempt from permitting requirements projects which are less than 10 acres in size and of less than 2 acres of impervious surface. Also exempted are single family dwelling units not a part of a larger common plan of development or sale, public road shoulder paving, and systems that qualify for a noticed general permit. In their objection, petitioners have contended that there is no rational basis for exempting these activities, and that in proposing the rules, the District failed to consider the cumulative impacts of these exempt activities.

   35. In responding to these objections, the District established that exempt projects are not expected to comprise a large number of permit applications for the basins. Accordingly, such projects will not individually or cumulatively significantly exacerbate flooding problems. From a water quantity standpoint, exempt projects will have a relatively minimal impact, while water quality standards will be preserved through the stormwater permitting program. As to fish and wildlife issues, exempted projects will likewise have a relatively minimal impact.

   36. With respect to exemptions for public road shoulder paving, single family dwelling units, and systems that qualify for a noticed general permit, these projects are so small that they are not likely to have a significant adverse impact, either individually or cumulatively.

   37. Economic considerations regarding hardships played a role in the District’s decision to exempt projects under the 10- acre threshold. More specifically, criteria designed for larger parcels of land cannot be reasonably applied to small, subthreshold projects without the property owner enduring difficulty and severe hardship. Thus, the 10-acre threshold was chosen as a balance between water resource protection and providing flexibility in project sizes to accomplish project development. Because smaller projects will not need to meet the 25-year, 24-hour water quantity ERP attenuation requirement, land will be saved, and the project designer will have more flexibility when designing a project that is exempted from ERP thresholds. Finally, the District’s stated purpose of not placing an unnecessary burden on citizens attempting to develop small projects is a sound, rational basis for creating the exemptions. Accordingly, Rules 40C-4.051(7) and 40C-41.051(2) are founded on logic and reason, and they are not arbitrary and capricious.

6. Are the Rules Supported by Competent Substantial Evidence?

   
   

   1. As a corollary to the arbitrary and capricious allegation, petitioners further contend that proposed Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 41.023, 40C-41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(6)(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are not supported by competent

      substantial evidence. In other words, they contend that the underlying factual predicate for the foregoing rules is unreliable, undependable, or untrustworthy.

   2. For the reasons cited in the findings in paragraphs 28-

      
      

      63 it is found that the factual underpinning for Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b), 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C- 4.023, 40C-41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(a), (b) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K is sufficiently reliable, dependable and trustworthy so as to constitute competent substantial evidential support for their proposed adoption.

7. Do Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4(d) Vest Unbridled Discretion in, and Contain Inadequate Standards to Guide, the District?

   1. Petitioners next argue that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d) and Section 11.5.4(d) of the Handbook are invalid because they fail to establish adequate standards to guide the agency’s determination, and they vest unbridled discretion in the District to make certain determinations. A contention made in the initial petitions that the same rule and section are vague has presumably been abandoned since this ground is not cited in the prehearing stipulation or petitioners’ proposed orders.

   2. Subparagraph (6)(d)1. of the challenged rule and paragraph (a) of the section specify that, for those development activities which involve the "construction, alteration,

      operation, maintenance, removal, and abandonment of a system" within the RHPZ, an applicant "must provide reasonable assurance" that the system "will not adversely affect the abundance, diversity, food sources or habitat (including its use to satisfy nesting, breeding, and resting needs) of aquatic or wetland dependent species." In subparagraph (6)(d)2. and paragraph (b) of the rule and section, it is "presumed" that the following activities will "adversely affect the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species provided by the Zone: construction of buildings, golf courses, impoundments, roads, canals, ditches, swales, and any land clearing which results in the creation of a system."

   3. Under subparagraph (d)4. and paragraph (d) of the rule and section, the presumption may be satisfied by an applicant demonstrating that

      the overall merits of the proposed plan of development, including mitigation as described in section 12.3, Applicant’s Handbook: Management and Storage of Surface Waters, provide a degree of resource protection to these types of fish and wildlife which offsets adverse effects of the proposed system on the uplands and wetlands within the zone. Some reasonable use of the land within the protection zone can be allowed under this section.

   4. Therefore, the presumption can be rebutted through considerations of subparagraph 6(d)4. and paragraph (d). As explained by the District, the term "overall merits" means that, in the review of the permit application, all of the impacts of

      the site plan to the surface water resource by the construction of the system will be reviewed. In other words, the District will review the "overall merits" of a system by balancing any detrimental impacts within the RHPZ with beneficial environmental aspects of the plan. The goal, of course, is to achieve a project design whose merits allow a development to proceed and also protect the beneficial functions of the RHPZ. For example, in areas of the development that are not proposed for development, the applicant can provide an ecological benefit by restoring or enhancing functions to a portion of the RHPZ. Where there are areas outside the RHPZ that would add further beneficial functions to aquatic or wetland dependent species, those areas could be set aside and incorporated into an overall protection plan that would be part of the site plan.

   5. The District will apply the new "overall merits" standard in a permitting scenario similar to the manner in which the current Wekiva and Econlockhatchee River Basin standards are now being applied. In those hydrologic basins, similar standards, including the "overall merits" criterion, have been applied by the District for a number of years without difficulty, and numerous activities have been authorized within their respective RHPZs. In fact, District records show that only two permits for activities within those basins have ever been denied, while more than 560 permits have been issued since the establishment of the two basins.

   6. Further assistance and clarification are found in the mitigation provisions in section 12.3 of the Handbook, which contains fifteen pages of guidance. Both the rule and section specifically provide that "mitigation as described in section 12.3" may be utilized by an applicant in meeting this standard. This provision enables an applicant to offset adverse impacts to the abundance, food sources, and habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species within the RHPZ by proposing mitigation alternatives described therein.

   7. Petitioners contend that these mitigation alternatives are impractical since they do not allow for mitigating upland impacts and that section 12.3 now applies only to the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva River Basins. However, the District established that the use of the techniques described in Section

      12.3 will be extended to the two new basins. As to the mitigation of upland impacts, Section 12.3.2.2(d) specifically refers to upland preservation as a mitigation option. It is also noteworthy that petitioners’ expert witness Exum conceded that he has utilized, without difficulty or misunderstanding, the same provisions when processing applications for permits in the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva Basins. Therefore, there are adequate standards within the rule and section to guide the District’s determination of the "overall merits" of an applicant’s proposed development plan. Likewise, that portion of the rule and section do not vest unbridled discretion in the District to determine

      whether an applicant has rebutted the presumption created by the standard.

   8. Petitioners next contend that the provision in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d)4. and Section 11.5.4(d) which allows an applicant to make "some reasonable use of the land within the Protection Zone" contains inadequate standards and places unbridled discretion in the District. This provision, however, is found to be reasonably specific, given the fact that the amount of development which can be permitted can only be determined on a case-by-case basis after the District considers the specific nature of the unique characteristics of the site, including the proposed development, and the type of water resources that are adversely affected by the development. To establish a fixed percentage of development that would be

      permissible would be arbitrary. Moreover, the same provision has been fairly applied for a number of years in two other basins, and petitioners’ experts have successfully dealt with this issue without difficulty. Therefore, this portion of the rule and section contains adequate standards and does not vest unbridled discretion in the District.

   9. Finally, petitioners contend that the same rule and section vest unbridled discretion in the District to determine what is an "aquatic or wetland dependent species." The evidence shows, however, that petitioners’ witnesses Exum and Godly were aware of the meaning of this term of art, and they had a common

      understanding of its meaning. Further detail or definition of the term is unnecessary. Therefore, that portion of the rule and section does not vest unbridled discretion in the District.

8. Whether Petitioners’ Lower Cost Proposal Substantially Meets the Statutory Objectives Being Implemented?

1. The District prepared a Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs (SERC) for the proposed rules, as required by Sections 120.54(3)(b)1. and 120.541, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). A summary of the SERC was published with the proposed rules on January 17, 1997, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On February 6, 1997, Consolidated-Tomoka, but no other petitioners, timely submitted to the District a good faith, lower cost, regulatory alternative to the proposed rules. The District rejected this alternative proposal and provided a statement of its reasons for doing so. The parties have stipulated that the alternative would impose less regulatory costs on petitioners than are imposed by the proposed threshold revisions, recharge standard, floodplain storage criteria, stormwater management standard, and Riparian Wildlife Habitat Zone.

2. Consolidated-Tomoka, joined in by all other petitioners, next contend that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b) and 40C- 41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, and 18.1, are invalid because the alternative cost proposal substantially accomplishes the statutory objectives purportedly being implemented through the

   proposed rules. More specifically, they contend that the current District rules, along with the existing OFW designation of Spruce Creek and the Tomoka River, already provide adequate protection to the water quality and quantity within the proposed basins, and thus the existing rules accomplish the same statutory objectives at a lower cost to petitioners.

3. The proposed revisions to Rule 40C-041(2)(b) and Section 3.3.1(c) and (f) provide that non-exempt systems within the two new basins will be subject to the threshold revisions contained in the rule and section. Thus, they will bring into the ERP regulatory framework projects that now otherwise require only a stormwater permit under Chapter 40C-42. These projects now contribute to flooding and will continue to do so in the future absent a rule change. Because petitioners proposed alternative (of adopting no rule) does nothing to address the flooding caused by these projects, it does not substantially accomplish the statutory objective of protecting water resources.

4. The statutory objective of the proposed recharge standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and Sections 11.5.1 and 18.1 is to protect the District’s water resources by replacing groundwater withdrawn from the Floridan aquifer for public consumption with potable freshwater from rainfall. The evidence supports a finding that a need for recharge exists, and petitioners’ own expert agreed that recharge is necessary to maintain groundwater supplies. The alternative that no rule be

   adopted does not advance the statutory goal of protecting water resources.

5. The statutory objective being implemented by the proposed floodplain storage standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(b) and Section 11.5.2 is the protection of water resources by reducing flooding. Under current conditions, flooding problems occur, and existing rules only address floodplain storage for the 10-year floodplain. The new criterion will prevent a decrease in floodplain storage in the 100-year floodplain. This in turn removes the loss of floodplain storage as a cause of flooding, thereby accomplishing the statutory goal. The new standard will ensure that future development will maintain more floodplain storage than is maintained under existing rules and thus create less future flooding potential. The proposal that no standard be adopted does not accomplish this objective.

6. The proposed stormwater management standard in Rule 40C-41.063(6)(d)(c) and Section 11.5.3 implements the District’s statutory objective of protecting the water resources by

   minimizing the impact of malfunctioning detention with filtration systems on the OFWs in the proposed basins that receive discharges from such systems. Existing regulations allow systems within the proposed basins to utilize detention with filtration systems. Petitioners’ proposal does not prevent this from occurring or address the statutory objective of the law being implemented. Therefore, it is not an appropriate alternative.

7. Finally, as to the RHPZ standard in Rule 40C- 41.063(6)(d) and Section 11.5.4, petitioners contend that the District’s current buffer requirements are sufficient to protect upland habitat utilized by wetland dependent species. They also contend that the establishment of the RHPZ exceeds the District’s delegated legislative authority and thus there is no statutory objective to be implemented. Finally, they argue that the establishment of the RHPZ will not lead to any significant enhancement of the water quality in Spruce Creek or the Tomoka River.

8. As to this proposed standard, the District’s statutory objective is to protect water resources from harm. Aquatic or wetland dependent species are, of course, an integral component of the water resources. If urbanization pressures continue, the two basins will lose valuable habitat for aquatic or wetland species. Current ERP rules do not provide for the protection of the spatial requirements of aquatic and wetland dependent species, such as habitat and food sources, in order to maintain viable populations. Indeed, the current buffer merely provides a cushion to the wetland from the upland development, and it is not designed to maintain nesting habitat for those species.

   Moreover, current rules only protect the uplands for species that are listed and that use uplands for nesting and denning.

   Unlisted species receive no protection, and even listed species are not provided habitat necessary to maintain other life

   functions such as foraging. Therefore, a no-rule alternative does not substantially accomplish the statutory objective of preventing harm to water resources, including the aquatic or wetland dependent species.

9. As noted in paragraph 23, the proposed standard exceeds the District's rulemaking authority. For the reasons cited in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Order, however, this does not mean that the rule cannot substantially accomplish the statutory objective. Therefore, the contention that the prior determination of invalidity mandates a similar determination here is without merit. Finally, as to the contention that the new standard will not lead to any significant enhancement of the water quality, the evidence shows that the standard is not intended to enhance water quality in the streams, and thus the argument is irrelevant.

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

11. As to the burden of proof in a proceeding involving a challenge to a proposed rule, the parties agree that the District has the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that the rule is valid. They disagree, however, as to which party has the initial burden of producing evidence. Section 120.56(2) governs the burden of proof issue and provides, in part, as follows:

    The petition (initiating the proceeding) shall state with particularity the objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised. The agency then has the burden to prove that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised.

12. Prior to the effective date of Chapter 96-159, Laws of Florida, which substantially revised Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, a party challenging a proposed rule had both the initial burden of producing evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that its allegations were correct. This logical allocation of burdens has long been recognized by the courts. See, e. g., Agrico Chemical Co. v. State, Dep’t of Envir. Reg., 365 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)("the burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule"); Dravo Basic Materials Co., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Trans., 602 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1992)("party challenging the rule must prove its invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence").

13. This allocation of burdens remains the same for challenges to existing rules and agency statements defined as a rule. See Section 120.56(3) and (4), Florida Statutes. (Supp. 1996). Subsection (2), however, reverses years of precedent, and now provides that, in a case in which a proposed rule is being challenged, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests upon the agency to prove "that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections

    raised."

    
    

14. In the instant cases, counting the separate rules and sections being challenged on various statutory grounds, petitioners have raised sixty-seven objections to the proposed rules and sections. In addition, as to some objections, petitioners raise multiple arguments. Under petitioners’ theory, respondent has the initial burden of production in disproving these sixty-seven objections. Because an agency is now potentially liable for attorney’s fees and costs if the challenger prevails on any issue, agency counsel would be less than prudent if he or she did not vigorously attempt to disprove all objections, regardless of their facial merit. This is especially true in a rule challenge case where, because of requirements that it be heard on an expedited basis, the use of discovery and motion practice to ferret out unmeritorious claims becomes more difficult. Then, too, at hearing and without notice to opposing counsel, a challenger may decide not to pursue all objections in its petition. Given these considerations, it seems burdensome and time-consuming to require an agency to carry the initial burden of disproving all allegations, good or bad, cited in the initial petition. Absent an agreement by the parties, the better and more efficient practice is to place the burden of production on the challenger, and to then require the agency to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the validity of the proposed rules, as mandated by the statute.

15. Citing numerous statutory grounds, petitioners contend that the proposed rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). That term is defined as follows:

    1. "Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one of the following applies:

       
       

       1. The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

          
          

       2. The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

          
          

       3. The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

          
          

       4. The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency;

          
          

       5. The rule is arbitrary or capricious;

          
          

       6. The rule is not supported by competent substantial evidence;

          
          

       7. The rule imposes regulatory costs on the regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives.

    
    

    A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An agency may

    adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than the particular powers and duties conferred by the same statute.

    The language found in the last paragraph of Section 120.52(8) is also found in Section 120.536(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

16. Petitioners first contend that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023 and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, ll.5.3, ll.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are invalid because they exceed the District’s grant of rulemaking authority. These rules and sections establish the new basins and threshold criteria.

17. Under Section 120.52(8)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), a rule is invalid if "the agency exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1." Further clarification as to this statutory ground is found in the last paragraph of Section 120.52(8) and Section 120.536(1). The new standard is intended to curtail the practice of agencies implying a statutory basis for their proposed rules from statutory provisions which describe the powers or functions of the agency or which set forth general

    legislative intent. Thus, an agency must now point to more specific statutory language directing the agency to adopt rules to address a particular issue. At the same time, however, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature did not intend that minutely detailed statutes in areas of complex regulation must be enacted before implementing agency rules are authorized.

18. In seeking to have the rules invalidated because the agency has exceeded its rulemaking authority, petitioners rely upon two broad grounds. First, they point to Section 373.0693(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows:

    (b) No subdistrict or basin in the St. Johns River Water Management District other than established by this act shall become effective until approved by the Legislature.

    
    

    Because the Tomoka River and Spruce Creek Basins (or subdistricts) have never been approved by the legislature, as required by the foregoing statute, petitioners contend that the rules exceed the District’s rulemaking authority. Alternatively, they assert that none of the statutory provisions cited by the District as specific authority for the proposed rules authorize the District to adopt these basins or the basin-specific criteria within the unapproved basins. Finally, as a corollary to these arguments, petitioners contend that, under the rationale of McDonald v. Dep’t of Prof. Reg., 582 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), an agency of the executive branch may not formulate an evidentiary presumption, and thus the presumption in Rule 40C-

    41.063(6)(d)2. and Section 11.5.4(b) that any activity in an RHPZ adversely affects the abundance, food sources, or habitat of aquatic or wetland dependent species is beyond the District’s rulemaking authority. As to this latter contention, however, it was not specifically pled in the initial petitions nor identified in this manner as an issue in the parties’ prehearing stipulation. For this reason, the issue has been treated as untimely and disregarded. See, e. g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Principal Nursing Services, Inc., 650 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(grounds for invalidating rule must be identified in initial petition and prehearing stipulation).

19. As to the contention that Section 373.0693(1)(b) bars the instant rulemaking until the two basins are legislatively approved, paragraph (1)(b) was engrafted onto that section by Section 3 of Chapter 76-243, Laws of Florida. This law implemented the taxing authority granted to the water management districts by constitutional amendment in 1976. Basins, as that term is used in Section 373.0693, are under the control of a basin board which may levy taxes to finance "basin functions" such as engineering plans, secondary water control facilities plans, the annual basin budget, and basin and district works within the basin. Nothing in a basin board’s statutory authority includes rulemaking or regulatory permitting. It logically follows that Section 373.0693 basins are not regulatory in nature, but rather they are taxing units for the implementation

    of operational basin functions funded through basin taxes levied as a portion of a district’s millage cap. See Section 373.503(3)(a), Forida Statutes.

20. The foregoing reasoning is supported by the fact that the legislature itself has recognized a distinction between basins delineated for regulatory purposes and basins created for taxing purposes. For example, in 1988 the legislature abolished the District’s only taxing basin board, the Oklawaha River Basin. Chapter 88-242, Laws of Florida. When it did so, it expressly stated in Section 26 that ". . . any recognition of the Oklawaha River Basin or an Oklawaha River hydrologic basin for regulatory purposes shall be unaffected" by such abolishment.

21. The legislature has used the term "basin" as a planning or regulatory concept distinct from taxing basins that would be subject to Section 373.0693. For example, the term "drainage basin" is defined as a subdivision of a watershed for both regulatory and surface water improvement planning purposes. See Sections 373.403(9); 373.414(8); and 373.453(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The legislature has also recognized the District restoration needs for the Lake Apopka and Lake Jesup basins as a planning or regulatory designation. See Section 373.461(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If there were no distinction between a drainage basin designated for planning or regulatory purposes and a basin created for taxing purposes under Section 373.0693, then the references to drainage basins for planning or regulatory

    programs would be ineffectual absent legislative approval under Section 373.0693(1)(b). Therefore, it is concluded that legislative approval of the two new basins or subdistricts under Section 373.0693(1)(b) as a prerequisite to the adoption of the rules is not required.

22. Petitioners further contend that none of the statutes cited as the source of rulemaking authority authorize the District to adopt the proposed rules. As authority for rulemaking, respondent has cited Sections 120.54(8), 373.044, 373.046(4), 373.113, 373.118, 373.171, 373.406, 373.413, 373.415, 373.416, 373.418 and 373.421(2), Florida Statutes.

23. Under the new law, a "grant of rulemaking is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is required." Therefore, a grant of rulemaking authority alone, without more, is insufficient. The agency must also point to a statutory provision which the rules "implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted by (that) statute." Put another way, a general grant of rulemaking authority allows an agency to adopt a rule only when relied upon in conjunction with a specific provision of law to be implemented that grants "particular powers and duties."

24. In these two cases, a number of statutes grant the District the general power to adopt rules. For example, Sections

    373.044 and 373.113 are general grants of authority for the District to adopt "reasonable rules" which are consistent with

    law, and such "regulations as may be reasonably necessary" to carry out its duties. Therefore, the portion of Sections 120.52(8) and 120.536(1) which requires that a "grant of rulemaking authority is necessary" has been satisfied.

25. To satisfy the second part of the test, the District relies upon Sections 373.413, 373.416 and 373.418(3) as the statutes detailing the particular powers and duties which the proposed rules implement. The first two statutes authorize the District to "require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions" to assure that all systems will comply with Chapter

    373 and other rules "and will not be harmful to the water resources of the district." The latter statute authorizes the District to adopt rules "necessary to implement the provisions of this part" and which are "consistent with state water policy and shall not allow harm to water resources or be contrary to the policy set forth in s. 373.016."

26. The District argues that the foregoing statutes, and especially Sections 373.413(1) and 373.416(1), set forth a specific power and duty, that is, "to make sure that surface water management systems are not harmful to the water resources of the district." But the new law no longer sanctions the concept that a statement of legislative policy or purpose coupled with a broad grant of rulemaking authority constitute sufficient authorization for agency rulemaking. Rather, the law now contemplates that rules must implement statutes which describe

    more specific programs. Indeed, the new law uses the term "particular powers and duties," and this clearly implies that the specific law to be implemented must detail "particular" powers and duties, and not just "general" ones, in order to support rulemaking. Therefore, the issue here is whether the District's duty in Sections 373.413(1) and 373.416(1) to require permits and impose conditions which "will not be harmful to the water resources of the district" is a "particular" duty or simply a statement of general intent or policy. The undersigned concludes that the language is merely a general, nonspecific description of the agency's duties, and it espouses a statement of legislative policy or purpose rather than "particular" programs and duties.

    Thus, it cannot be relied upon to adopt rules which create new geographic areas of special concern and threshold requirements within those basins. This being so, it is concluded that Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023 and 40C-41.063(a)-(d),

    and Handbook Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the District has exceeded its rulemaking authority.

27. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned has considered respondent's argument that it is impractical for the legislature to enact detailed standards, rather than broad policies, for the exercise of police powers. To hold otherwise, it argues, would mean that the legislature would be forced to

    remain in perpetual session to address fluid conditions and enact minutely detailed statutes in areas of complex regulation before implementing agency rules are authorized. These contentions, however, while logical and compelling, were presumably considered by the legislature before it enacted Chapter 96-159, Laws of Florida. Therefore, even though the proposed rules are not arbitrary or capricious, are supported by competent and substantial evidence, and substantially accomplish the statutory objectives, they are procedurally flawed because they lack the underlying statutory detail now required under the new law.

28. Petitioners next contend that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law implemented in violation of Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

29. The undersigned has previously determined that, as to certain rules and sections, including those being challenged under this statutory ground, the District exceeded its rulemaking authority because the laws being implemented did not contain the "particular duties and powers" necessary to support rulemaking. Because the challenged rule and sections create new programs and duties beyond those specifically authorized by the law being implemented, it is concluded that Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 are invalid because they enlarge the specific provisions of law being implemented in

    violation of Section 120.52(8)(c).

    
    

30. Petitioners next claim that the rules and sections pertaining to the proposed basin designations and boundaries, threshold revisions and exemptions are arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). An arbitrary decision "is one not supported by facts or logic" while a capricious action "is one which is taken without thought or reason." Agrico Chemical Co. at 763. Another court has held that "if an administrative decision is justifiable under any analysis that a reasonable person would use to reach a decision of similar importance, it would seem that the decision is neither arbitrary or capricious." Dravo at 634, n. 3. For the reasons cited in findings of fact 28-63, it is concluded that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b), 40C-5.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.051(2) and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4, 18.1 and Appendix K are based on logic and reason and they are not arbitrary and capricious.

31. Petitioners have also alleged that Rule 40C- 41.063(6)(d) and Handbook Section 11.5.4(d), which establish an RHPZ, are invalid on the ground they fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions and vest unbridled discretion in the agency as proscribed by Section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). More specifically, they allege that inadequate standards exist to guide the agency’s determination as

    to the amount of development that will be permitted in the RHPZ or the overall merits of an applicant’s plan of development.

    They also contend that the rule and section vest unbridled discretion in the District to determine whether a presumption has been rebutted, what constitutes reasonable use of the land, how much is reasonable use of land, and what is an aquatic or wetland dependent species.

32. In judging the merits of this claim, it is noted that the sufficiency of a rule’s standards and guidelines "may depend on the subject matter dealt with and the degree of difficulty involved in articulating finite standards." Cole Vision Corp. v. Dep’t of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 688 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Thus, it may not be possible for the District to adopt rules "in such excruciating detail that every potential circumstance arising in the (permitting of systems) will be expressly addressed." Id. at 410.

33. For the reasons cited in findings of fact 67-74, the challenged rule and section contain adequate standards to guide the District’s discretion, and they do not vest unbridled discretion in the District. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned recognizes the complexity of the subject matter of the rules, and the fact that the District cannot be expected to adopt rules in "excruciating detail" so as to recognize every potential circumstance that might arise. Cole Vision Corp. at

410. This being so, the contention that the rule and section

violate Section 120.52(8)(d) has been rejected.

1. Next, petitioners contend that Rules 40C-4.051(7), 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.011, 40C-41.023, 40C-41.041(2)(b), 40C- 41.051(2), 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.2, and 11.5.4 are not supported by competent substantial evidence, and thus they violate Section 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

2. The term "competent substantial evidence" is not defined in the law. Further, the Final Bill Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Chapter 96-159 prepared on June 14, 1997, by the Staff of the House Committee on Streamlining Governmental Regulations, of which the undersigned has taken official recognition, offers no insight into the meaning or legislative intent of the term. Case law instructs us, however, that in the context of the standard of judicial review of agency action, competent substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Agrico at 763. See also DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957). This definition has been slightly modified to exclude unreliable, undependable or untrustworthy evidence. Fla. Rate Conf. v. Fla. R.R. & P.U. Comm., 108 So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1959). Based on the definition found in DeGroot and Agrico, as modified in the Fla. Rate Conference decision, petitioners urge that, in the context of a rule challenge, the application of the competent substantial evidence standard

   requires the agency to demonstrate that the underlying factual predicate for the proposed rules is based upon reliable and trustworthy evidence. In this vein, they contend that the evidence supporting the challenged rules does not meet this standard.

3. In response to this argument, respondent points out that competent substantial evidence is a standard of review, and not a standard of proof, and thus petitioners’ interpretation is incorrect. Among others, the District cites the case of American Insurance Ass’n v. Dept. of Insurance, 518 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) where the court discussed the term "competent substantial evidence" and concluded that the competent substantial evidence test (in the context of the standard of review) can be met by an agency even though the evidence wholly fails to constitute a preponderance of the evidence. Using this rationale, respondent contends that if the factual determinations made by the agency in this proceeding are supported by any admissible evidence, even if only more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, the competent substantial standard has been satisfied.

4. Petitioners’ interpretation of the term "competent substantial evidence" is accepted as being the most logical and persuasive. In doing so, the undersigned notes that the District has the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule is "supported by competent substantial

   evidence." See Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). To accept the District’s interpretation would mean that the competent substantial evidence standard could be satisfied by less than a preponderance of the evidence, and that this evidential standard of proof, at least in one respect, would be nullified. This being so, it is concluded that, in order to satisfy this standard, the underlying factual predicate for the proposed rules must be based on reliable and trustworthy evidence.

5. For the reasons cited in findings of fact 28-63, it is concluded that the underlying factual predicate for the challenged rules and sections is sufficiently trustworthy, reliable, and dependable so as to constitute competent substantial evidence within the meaning of Section 120.52(8)(f).

6. Finally, petitioners contend that Rules 40C- 4.041(2)(b) and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1. 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and 18.1, violate Section 120.52(8)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996) because the rules and sections impose regulatory costs on petitioners which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives purportedly being implemented through the proposed rules and sections.

7. Under Section 120.54(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), each agency is "encouraged" to prepare a SERC, as provided

   in Section 120.541, Florida Statutes, prior to the adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule other than an emergency rule. Within twenty-one days after publication of a notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, a substantially affected person may file a good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative to the proposed rule which substantially accomplishes the objectives of the law being implemented. The agency may reject the alternative, but if it does, it must give a statement of its reasons for doing so. Here, each of these procedural steps was followed. At this juncture, then, the burden of proof is on the agency to demonstrate that the alternative proposal is either not "less costly," or that the alternative does not "substantially accomplish the statutory objectives" being implemented. Because the parties have stipulated that the alternative proposal is "less costly" on petitioners, only the latter item of proof has been addressed.

8. Here, the statutory objective being implemented is found in Sections 373.413(1) and 373.416(1). Those sections authorize the District to require such permits and impose such conditions so as to assure that all systems "will not be harmful to the water resources of the district." In findings of fact 77- 83, the undersigned has found that petitioners’ no-rule alternative does not substantially accomplish this statutory objective. That is to say, the no-rule alternative does not address the flooding caused by the projects within the new

   basins, replace groundwater withdrawn from the Floridan aquifer, assist in maintaining more floodplain storage, minimize the impact of malfunctioning detention with filtration systems, or provide for the protection of spatial requirements of aquatic and wetland dependent species. These salutary goals substantially accomplish the District’s broad statutory mandate of protecting water resources within its boundaries. Therefore, the contention that Rules 40C-4.041(2)(b) and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-(d), and Handbook Sections 3.3.1(c) and (f), 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4 and

   18.1, violate Section 120.52(8)(f) must fail.

   
   

9. The undersigned recognizes that some of the above rules and sections have already been invalidated on the ground the law being implemented did not sufficiently detail particular powers and duties so as to authorize rulemaking. This does not mean, however, that the same rules and sections do not substantially accomplish the statutory objective being implemented. Sections 120.52(8)(b) and (f) do not run in tandem, and they are not mutually exclusive. While the laws being implemented are admittedly rather broad and open-ended, they clearly enunciate an objective of protecting the District's water resources. The challenged rules and sections unquestionably accomplish this goal.

10. In conjunction with the foregoing claim, the parties have raised the issue of whether a person who did not file an alternative proposal under Section 120.541(1)(a) can later

    challenge the agency's rejection of an alternative proposal under Sections 120.541((1)(c) and 120.52(8)(f). In this case, only Consolidated-Tomoka submitted a good faith, alternative proposal, yet all petitioners have joined in the claim that Section 120.52(8)(f) has been violated.

11. Perhaps through oversight, Section 120.541(1)(c) does not specifically address this issue. It simply provides that no rule shall be declared invalid on this ground unless:

    1. The issue is raised in an administrative proceeding within 1 year after the effective date of the rule; and

       
       

    2. The substantial interests of the person challenging the agency's rejection of, or failure to consider, the lower cost regulatory alternative are materially affected by the rejection; and

       
       

       3.a. The agency has failed to prepare or revise the statement of estimated regulatory costs as required by paragraph (b); or

       
       

       b. The challenge is to the agency's rejection under paragraph (b) of a lower cost regulatory alternative submitted under paragraph (a).

       
       

12. In resolving this issue, reference to Section 120.54(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), is helpful. That section contained similar provisions for challenging an agency rule on the ground that the economic impact statement was deficient or lacking. It specifically limited such challenges to persons who had

    requested preparation of an economic impact statement under subparagraph (b)2. and

    provided the agency with information sufficient to make the agency aware of specific concerns regarding the economic impact of the proposed rule, by either participation in a public workshop, public hearing, or by submission of written comments, regarding the rule.

    
    

    By omitting these limitations in the new law, either through oversight or by design, the legislature is presumed to have intended that any substantially affected person can challenge the SERC so long as he or she meets the requirements of Section 120.541(1)(c). Therefore, all petitioners could properly raise this issue.

13. Also pending is a petition to intervene filed on behalf of the Association of Florida Community Developers, Inc. (AFCD), an organization made up primarily of developers, of which seven of its forty members own property within the District, and five regularly apply for permits within the District for other members. Only one member, however, Consolidated-Tomoka, actually owns property within the area affected by the rules and would be directly affected by the new regulations. While five of its members may regularly apply for permits for landowners within the District, it is the landowners themselves, and not the persons who process the application paperwork on their behalf, who are directly affected by the proposed rules. Since only one of the forty members is substantially affected by the rules, it is concluded that AFCD does not satisfy the standing requirements for an association. Fla. Home Builders Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor

    and Employ. Sec., 412 So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. 1982)("an association must demonstrate that a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are 'substantially affected' by the challenged rule"). This being so, the petition is denied. Parenthetically, it is noted that the only member of the association who is directly affected, Consolidated-Tomoka, is already a party in Case No. 97-0870RP.

14. The parties have stipulated that, in the event petitioners prevail on any issue, the undersigned should retain jurisdiction over these cases upon entry of a Final Order for purposes of determining the propriety and amount of attorney’s fees and costs, if any, to be awarded petitioners. Because petitioners have prevailed on some issues, jurisdiction is retained for the limited purpose of determining whether the agency was substantially justified in proposing the rules or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. See Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).

15. Finally, petitioners' motion to strike a portion of respondent's proposed final order is denied. In addition, because the same findings and conclusions would have been reached without the use of respondent's exhibit 56, petitioners' objection to the receipt in evidence of that exhibit becomes moot.

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is

ORDERED that the petitions for administrative determination of the invalidity of proposed rules are granted in part and Rules 40C-4.091(1)(a), 40C-41.0011, 40C-41.023, and 40C-41.063(6)(a)-

(d), and Sections 11.0(e), 11.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.2, 11.5.3, 11.5.4,

18.1 and Appendix K of the Handbook are determined to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that they violate Section 120.52(8)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). In addition, Rule 40C-41.063(6)(a) and (d) and Handbook Sections 11.5.1, 11.5.4 and 18.1 are determined to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that they violate Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). In all other respects, the petitions are denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

DONALD R. ALEXANDER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (904) 921-6847

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of June, 1997.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Frank E. Matthews, Esquire

T. Kent Wetherall, II, Esquire Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6526

Kevin X. Crowley, Esquire Carol A. Forthman, Esquire

131 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

William H. Congdon, Esquire Nancy B. Barnard, Esquire Post Office Box 1429 Palatka, Florida 32178-1429

V. Carroll Webb, Executive Director

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code The Elliott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 97-000870RP

Orders for Case No: 97-000870RP