vs. ) Case No. 98-4177
Respondent. )
This cause came on for formal hearing on June 16, 1999, in Crestview, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated Administrative Law Judge,
Suzanne F. Hood.
For Petitioner: C. Thomas Holland, Esquire
Martha L. Nebelsiek, Esquire Department of Environmental
The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
By letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent Department of Environmental Protection (Respondent) denied the application of Petitioner Rene Labado, d/b/a Soap Opera Laundry and Drycleaners (Petitioner) to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program pursuant to Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes, and
Rule 62-781, Florida Administrative Code. On or about August 21, 1998, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to challenge the denial of her application. Respondent referred this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 24, 1998.
On September 29, 1998, the Division of Administrative Hearings issued an Initial Order. The parties filed a Response to Initial Order on October 13, 1998.
On October 14, 1998, the undersigned issued a Notice of Hearing, scheduling the case for formal hearing on February 2, 1999. However, the parties filed an Agreed Motion for Continuance on January 20, 1999. The undersigned issued a subsequent order rescheduling the hearing for April 14, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, the parties filed a Motion for Continuance. By order dated April 1, 1999, the undersigned rescheduled the hearing for June 16, 1999.
During the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of one witness and offered Exhibits numbered P1 through P6, which were accepted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered P7 is a letter from a member of the Florida House of Representatives,
which purports to explain the legislative intent of Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered P7 is not admissible as evidence of legislative intent. See Security Feed and Seed Co. v. Lee, 189 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1939)(Testimony of members of the state Senate is of doubtful verity if at all admissible to show what was intended by particular statute;
McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811
(Fla. 4th DCA 1979)(Affidavit from member of legislature stating his view of what legislature intended by statutory provision was not admissible evidence to demonstrate legislative intent).
Respondent presented the testimony of three witnesses.
Respondent's Exhibits numbered R1 through R12 and R15 through R17 were accepted into evidence.
A Transcript of the proceeding was filed on July 20, 1999. An order dated August 10, 1999, granted Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties filed their proposed orders on August 30, 1999.
Petitioner and her husband, Lynn Labado, bought the Soap Opera Laundry and Drycleaners as an on-going business in 1984. Since that time, they have operated the business, without interruption, at the same location in a shopping center owned by a third party.
Petitioner's drycleaning machine is located in a storage room with the hatch opening through the front wall of the storage room and the body of the machine enclosed in the storage room.
Petitioner purchased and installed a new drycleaning machine in 1995. The new machine has a tank capacity of
46 gallons.
Petitioner may have subjectively believed that the new machine met all statutory requirements. However, there is no evidence that she attempted to contact Respondent to determine whether the new machine was in compliance with existing law.
In 1994, the Florida Legislature created a program to clean-up properties contaminated with drycleaning solvents, i.e. perchloroethylene. The program is funded, in part, by a tax on gross receipts of drycleaning sales and a per-gallon tax on perchloroethylene imported or produced in the state of Florida. Petitioner paid these taxes at all times material hereto.
The 1994 Florida Legislature gave Respondent the duty to establish a registration program for drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. Respondent was required to use reasonable efforts to identify and notify drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities of the registration requirement. All existing facilities were required to register with Respondent by June 30, 1995.
Initially, Respondent secured a list of facilities identified as perchloroethylene users from its Division of Air
Resources Management. Respondent's air resource management division was an excellent source from which to identify drycleaning facilities because a federal program under Title V of the Clean Air Act required all perchloroethylene users to obtain an air permit.
Respondent then contacted the Department of Revenue seeking the identity of facilities that paid taxes on gross receipts of drycleaning sales and taxes on production or importation of perchloroethylene. The Department of Revenue provided Respondent with a short list of laundries which used laundry soaps and solvents. However, the Department of Revenue invoked a legal privilege preventing complete disclosure of the requested information.
Next, Respondent contacted the Florida Drycleaning Coalition for assistance in ascertaining the names of drycleaning facilities in the state. The coalition membership includes individual drycleaners, wholesale suppliers of perchloroethylene and other drycleaning solvents and supplies, and owners of real property that own drycleaners or have drycleaners located on their property.
The Florida Drycleaning Coalition provided Respondent with information from wholesale suppliers regarding the identification of their customers who were perchloroethylene users. Finally, Respondent contacted two of the suppliers
directly for additional information concerning drycleaning facilities.
Respondent eventually compiled a list containing approximately 1700 names of drycleaning facilities and wholesale suppliers. Between 50 and 100 drycleaning establishments were not included in the list because they did not have an air permit, they were not members of the Florida Drycleaning Coalition, or they purchased their perchloroethylene from an out-of-state supplier. Nevertheless, Respondent's efforts to identify all drycleaning facilities in the state were reasonable.
Respondent sent registered letters to everyone on its master list in April 1994. The letter included an interim registration form. It provided information about the statutory registration requirements and gave a brief description of the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
Petitioner did not receive one of the April 1994 letters because her name was not on the master mailing list. Petitioner did not belong to the Florida Drycleaning Coalition. She always purchased drycleaning solvent from suppliers in Mobile, Alabama.
The 1995 Florida Legislature amended the statutory requirements for drycleaning facilities. Section 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), stated as follows in pertinent part:
Owners or operators of drycleaning facilities shall by January 1, 1997, install dikes or other containment structures around each machine or item of equipment in which
solvents were used and around any area in which solvents or waste-containing solvents were stored. Such dikes or containment structures shall be capable of containing 110 percent of the capacity of each such machine and each such storage area. To the extent practicable, each owner or operator of a drycleaning facility shall seal or otherwise render impervious those portions of all dikes' floor surfaces upon which any drycleaning solvents may leak, spill, or otherwise be released.
In August 1995, Respondent mailed each facility on the mailing list a copy of a Fall 1995 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document advised each facility about the registration requirement (then past due). It also gave notice about a workshop for a proposed rule to implement the program.
In 1995, Respondent conducted several workshops
through-out the state in conjunction with the Florida Drycleaners Coalition. The workshops provided information to the public on the drycleaning solvent clean-up rule. The workshops included information regarding secondary containment requirements.
Additionally, an industry periodical addressed the requirements for secondary containment.
In January 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility on the mailing list a copy of a January 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document provided information related to the status of the proposed rule, payment of registration fees, and third party liability insurance. The January 1996 advisory also referenced future guidance that Respondent would provide on secondary containment requirements.
In March 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility on its mailing list a copy of a March 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This March 1996 notice provided information pertaining to the status of the proposed rule, payment of registration fees, and third liability insurance. It also referenced a general program information document and guidelines for compliance with secondary containment, which accompanied the March 1996 advisory.
The general program information document included detailed information describing secondary containment requirements. The document advised drycleaners that the deadline for installing secondary containment was January 1, 1997.
The Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program rule
(Rule 62-781, Florida Administrative Code) became effective on March 13, 1996.
In July 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility a copy of a July 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. Included with the advisory was a detailed memorandum entitled, "What you need to know about . . . Secondary Containment Requirements for Drycleaning Facilities."
In December 1996, Respondent mailed each registered facility a copy of a December 1996 Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Update. This document provided information pertinent to the drycleaning solvent clean-up rule, applications to the
Drycleaning Cleanup Solution Program, and requirements for secondary containment.
Except for the initial April 1994 letter, all advisories referenced and described Respondent's "fax-on-demand" system. Some of the notices included the telephone numbers of Respondent's staff.
The "fax-on-demand" system consisted of a toll-free number which drycleaners could use to obtain updated program information. Drycleaners could use the system to request facsimile copies of registration forms, copies of the rule, and copies of the guidelines for secondary containment.
Respondent's statutorily required efforts to notify all drycleaners about the registration requirement by certified mail were reasonable. Respondent was not required by statute or rule to provide drycleaners with individual notice of the secondary containment requirements by mail or otherwise. Respondent undertook this responsibility, as to the registered facilities on its master mailing list, and as to the public via the "fax-on- demand" system, in an effort to provide good customer relations and to help drycleaners comply with the law.
Petitioner did not receive any of the above-referenced notices from Respondent because she was not on the master mailing list. There is no evidence that she was aware of the "fax-on- demand" system.
By December 1996, Respondent was aware of the drycleaning industry's concerns about the secondary containment requirements. Specifically, industry members represented to Respondent that vendors of secondary containment equipment would be unable to complete work by January 1, 1997.
In response to industry concerns, Respondent's Director of the Division of Waste Management issued a memorandum dated December 13, 1996, relative to the January 1, 1997, secondary containment deadline. The memorandum was directed to the division's district managers. The memorandum stated as follows, in pertinent part:
The statute has been in effect since October 1995; so drycleaner owners and operators have had sufficient notice of the requirement. In addition, drycleaning owners and operators have been reminded of the deadline by notices mailed to each registered drycleaning facility. The Department does not have authority to extend this deadline.
Drycleaning facility owners missing the deadline are subject to enforcement.
However, due to the apparent shortage of vendors and installation contractors . . . Directors of District Management may wish to consider exercising a short term deferral of enforcement action. In determining whether to make such a deferral, the following conditions should be considered:
The facility owner or operator should demonstrate that the facility began operations prior to January 1, 1996. Facilities that began operation after that date were required to have secondary when operation commenced.
The facility owner should have a signed, binding contract, in accordance with Florida
Statutes, which can not [sic] be cancelled or modified without substantial loss, that was executed by January 1, 1997.
The installation shall be completed by April 30, 1997. (Emphasis in original).
The memorandum did not expressly address the issue of whether facilities that met the stated conditions, but did not meet the statutory deadline, would be deemed eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
Respondent selected the April 30, 1997, date because its staff believed that approximately 120 days would be sufficient time for facilities to comply with the secondary containment requirements.
Respondent subsequently took the position that facilities meeting the conditions of the memorandum were in substantial compliance with secondary containment requirements. Respondent determined that such facilities were eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program despite their failure to comply with the January 1, 1997, deadline.
Respondent now admits that it did not have discretion to grant eligibility to facilities after the deadline. Respondent's December 13, 1996, memorandum should only have affected its discretion involving enforcement decisions.
Notwithstanding Respondent's error in implementation of the December 13, 1996, memorandum, Petitioner failed to install secondary containment by the January 1, 1997, deadline.
Moreover, she did not install it by the April 30, 1997, installation deadline described in Respondent's memorandum.
Respondent has never had a policy that the "state of mind" of a facility, or relative diligence of a facility, would suffice to excuse its failure to meet the secondary containment deadline. Respondent has never deemed a facility eligible to participate in the program simply because it did not receive notice that all registered facilities received. Except for cases that fell within the terms of Respondent's December 13, 1996, memorandum, Respondent has never granted an application in circumstances where a facility failed to timely install secondary containment dikes or structures around a drycleaning machine.
In the summer of 1997, the company that owned the property where Petitioner's drycleaning business is located, decided to sell the shopping center. In conjunction with the sale, the shopping center's property management company hired environmental consultants to determine whether Petitioner's business site was contaminated by drycleaning solvent. A soil sample taken at the site in July 1997 indicated that further environmental assessment was warranted.
In September 1997, the environmental consultants hired by the shopping center's property management company performed a subsurface investigation to determine the potential for contamination at Petitioner's business site. The investigation
showed evidence of contamination by drycleaning solvent below the building's slab floor in the vicinity of the drycleaning machine.
Sometime between September and November 1997, Petitioner learned that there was contamination at or around the site. At about the same time, Petitioner learned for the first time of the need to register with Respondent and to install secondary containment. The property management company advised Petitioner to place sealant on the floor and to install a "ridge" around the edge of the floor in the area of the drycleaning machine.
The property management company gave Petitioner a copy of Respondent's registration form. Petitioner also received an application for the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
Petitioner and her husband prepared the application. In response to questions on the application, they indicated that Petitioner had not installed secondary containment around and beneath each machine or item of equipment which used drycleaning solvent. They also indicated that Petitioner had not installed
secondary containment structures around or beneath each area used to store drycleaning solvents or waste which contained drycleaning solvents. The program application indicates that the facility was operating as a drycleaning establishment at that time.
Petitioner signed the registration form and the program application in November 1997. She filed both with Respondent on December 1, 1997.
Petitioner installed a "ridge" on the floor behind the drycleaning machine in the storage room sometime in the fall of 1997. Petitioner applied sealant to the "ridge" and the floor behind the machine. Petitioner did not install any type of containment structure or sealant on the floor in front of the machine in the retail area of the business.
In order for an application to be complete, a site- screening report must accompany it. A registered professional geologist or engineer must certify the report.
In this case, the shopping center's property management company retained Environmental Consulting Technologies, Inc. to perform the site screening in April 1998. The site-screening report was completed in May 1998. It was filed with Respondent on May 29, 1998, together with a copy of Petitioner's original application.
By letter dated August 5, 1998, Respondent denied Petitioner's application. The notice stated that the application was denied for the following reason:
Pursuant to Section 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), by January 1, 1997, secondary containment must be installed around and beneath all items of equipment which utilize dry cleaning solvents. Failure to meet this requirement constitutes gross negligence.
On September 15, 1998, Respondent's compliance inspector visited Petitioner's facility to determine whether it was in compliance with drycleaning program regulation. He subsequently prepared a report of his observations. Among other violations of state and federal laws, the inspector determined that Petitioner's containment structure around the back of the drycleaning machine was inadequate. He concluded that there was no secondary containment at the facility. The report provides as follows, in pertinent part:
This inspection revealed that Soap Opera did not have a metal secondary containment pan around their dry-cleaning unit. However, the floor behind the dry-cleaning unit was sealed. It was later learned that the floors were sealed in November 1997 with Bondcrete sealant. In addition, Soap Opera installed a concrete berm which is approximately one inch high around the back perimeter of the dry- cleaning unit. The berm appeared to be sealed with sealant. An inspection of the front of the machine revealed carpet with no concrete berm. The floor was not sealed.
The specifications for the Multimatic
Princess indicates that the working tank has a volume of 46 gallons. If a spill did occur, a containment structure [metal pan or berm] is not in place to contain at least 110% of the capacity of the machine or item of equipment and waste containers stored behind the drycleaning unit. If a spill did occur, it is very likely that perc or waste perc would not be contained with the current containment system since no secondary containment is installed in front of the unit.
The inspector's September 1998 visit was the first time there was any direct contact between Petitioner and Respondent.
Respondent's compliance inspector visited Petitioner's premises again on December 16, 1998. During the second visit, Respondent's inspector measured the dimensions of the containment structures that were in place around the drycleaning machine.
The measurements revealed that the existing berm had the capacity to contain only a 38.8-gallon spill. That amount is less than
110 percent of the volume of the largest working tank at the facility. It was unlikely that a spill could be contained because there was no secondary containment in front of the drycleaning machine.
On March 22, 1999, Respondent and Petitioner executed a consent order to address Petitioner's deficiencies. Petitioner has installed appropriate secondary containment and is in compliance with the terms and conditions of the consent order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co. Inc., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Section 376.303(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, states as follows:
(1) The Department has the power and the duty to:
* * *
(d) Establish a registration program for drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities.
1. Owners or operators of drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities and real property owners shall jointly register each facility owned and in operation with the department by June 30, 1995, pay initial registration fees by December 31, 1995, and pay annual renewal registration fees by December 31, 1996, and each year thereafter, in accordance with this subsection. If the registration form cannot be jointly submitted, then the applicant shall provide notice of the registration to other interested parties. The department shall establish reasonable requirements for the registration of such facilities. The department shall use reasonable efforts to identify and notify drycleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities of the registration requirement by certified mail, return receipt requested. The department shall provide to the Department of Revenue a copy of each applicant's registration materials, within 30 working days of the receipt of the material. This copy may be in such electronic format as the two agencies mutually designate.
The record here indicates that Respondent made a reasonable effort to identify and notify all drycleaning facilities of the requirement to register with Respondent on or before June 30, 1995. Respondent's efforts included compiling a master mailing list from several sources, which captured the names and addresses of all but 50 to 100 facilities in the state.
In addition to securing a list of drycleaners identified as a perchloroethylene users from its Division of Air Resources Management, Respondent worked closely with the statewide industry association and wholesale suppliers of drycleaning solvent to identify all drycleaners. Additionally, Respondent unsuccessfully attempted to secure information from the Department of Revenue regarding facilities that paid a gross sales receipt tax pursuant to Section 376.70, Florida Statutes, and a tax on production or importation of perchloroethylene pursuant to Section 376.75, Florida Statutes. 1/
After compiling the list, Respondent sent the required notices to all identified facilities by certified mail. Thereafter, Respondent conducted public workshops and continued to provide written updates to registered facilities concerning compliance with the law and the development and eventual adoption of Rules 62-780 and 62-781, Florida Administrative Code. These rules relate to the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program's registration, eligibility, and secondary containment requirements.
Petitioner argues that she had no knowledge of the secondary containment requirements and deadline because Respondent failed to identify her and notify her of the registration requirements. This argument is without merit.
The statutes do not require Respondent to provide individual notice to drycleaning facilities about the secondary
containment requirement and deadline. Publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes provides all citizens with constructive notice of the consequences of their actions. State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991); Ammons v. Okeechobee County, 710 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Petitioner had constructive knowledge about secondary containment requirements since the enactment of Section 376.3078(7), Florida Statutes (1995)(now renumbered as Section 376.3078(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998)). Having exercised reasonable effort to identify and notify all drycleaners about the registration requirement pursuant to Section 376.303(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, Respondent was not responsible for Petitioner's failure to comply with the January 1, 1997, secondary containment deadline.
The Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program was created pursuant to Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). The statute has always excluded facilities from eligibility for participation in the program if the facility was "operated in a grossly negligent manner." Section 376.3078(3)(a)3, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994).
The statute originally defined types of conduct, such as "willful discharge of drycleaning solvents," as "gross negligence in the operation of a drycleaning facility." Section 376.3078(3)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994).
In 1995, the Legislature enacted requirements related to secondary containment for drycleaning facilities. Section 376.3078(7), Florida Statutes (1995), stated as follows in pertinent part:
Requirement for Drycleaning Facilities-- It is the intent of the Legislature that the following drycleaning solvent containment shall be required of the owners or operators of drycleaning facilities, as follows:
Owners or operators of drycleaning facilities shall by January 1, 1997, install dikes or other containment structures around each machine or item of equipment in which solvents are used and around any area in which solvents or waste-containing solvents are stored. Such dikes or containment structures shall be capable of containing 110 percent of the capacity of each such machine and each such storage area. To the extent practicable, each owner or operator of a drycleaning facility shall seal or otherwise render impervious those portions of all dikes' floor surfaces upon which any drycleaning solvents may leak, spill, or otherwise be released.
* * *
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of this subsection shall constitute gross negligence with regard to determining site eligibility in subsection (3).
Section 376.3078(7), Florida Statutes (1995), did not require an element of "willfullness" in order for the failure to install secondary containment to constitute gross negligence.
In 1998, the Legislature clarified and narrowed the "state of mind" requirement that must be shown to exclude a facility from eligibility under Section 376.3078(3)(c), Florida Statutes. For example, a facility is disqualified for "willfully
discharg[ing]" drycleaning solvent only if it acts "with the knowledge, intent and purpose that the discharge would result in harm to the environment or to public health or result in a violation of the law." Section 376.3078(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
Notwithstanding the narrowing of the "willfulness" requirement in Section 376.3078(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1998), the 1998 Legislature re-numbered and re-enacted the separate subsection imposing secondary containment requirements without adding any language that would suggest a "state of mind" requirement. Section 376.3078(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
The Legislature's failure to include "willfulness" as an element in Section 376.3078(9), Florida Statues (Supp. 1998), when it narrowed the "willfulness" element in Section 376.3078(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), indicates that the secondary containment requirement is to be applied per se, without inquiry into the state of mind or relative diligence of the owners and operators of drycleaning facilities.
In this case, Petitioner failed to timely comply with the secondary containment requirements by January 1, 1997. She is therefore ineligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language set forth in Sections 376.3078(3) and 376.3078(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
Petitioner argues that she should be allowed to participate in the clean-up program because Respondent granted eligibility to other applicants that did not install secondary containment structures by January 1, 1997. This argument is not persuasive.
Respondent's authority is limited by statute. Southern States Utilities v. Florida Public Service Commission, 714 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Respondent does not have authority to extend the secondary containment deadline for Petitioner or any other applicant.
Respondent concedes that the implementation of its December 13, 1996, memorandum erroneously extended the deadline for applicants meeting the following conditions: (a) facilities that had a contract, executed by January 1, 1997, for a vendor to install secondary containment; and (b) facilities that completed the installation of secondary containment by April 1, 1997.
Petitioner did not meet the conditions outlined in Respondent's December 13, 1996, memorandum. Therefore, the denial of Petitioner's application is not inconsistent with Respondent's decisions in cases where those conditions were met.
Here, as in David Kim (Nu-look One Hour Dry Cleaning) v. Department of Environmental Protection, OGC 98-1229 (Final Order, June 6, 1999), incorporating DOAH 98-2678 (Recommended Order, May 4, 1999), Petitioner has not demonstrated that Respondent permitted a drycleaning facility to participate in the
program under circumstances substantially the same as those in the instant case.
At times, equitable estoppel may be applied in administrative proceedings to prevent unjust results. Occidental Chemical Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 501 So. 2d 674 (Fla. DCA 1987). In order to assert a claim of estoppel against Respondent, Petitioner must show the following:
(1) a representation as to some material fact by the party estopped . . . ; (2) reliance upon the representation by the party claiming estoppel; and (3) a change in such party's position caused by his reliance on the representation to his detriment.
Furthermore, the [representation] on which the aggrieved party relied must be one on which he had a right to rely.
Munroe County v. Hemisphere Equity Realty, Inc., 634 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), quoting Calusa Golf, Inc. v. Dade County,
426 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983). The facts of this case will not support Petitioner's estoppel claim.
Likewise, the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be applied to excuse Petitioner's failure to install secondary containment structures by January 1, 1997. Equitable tolling is not appropriately invoked to extend a statutory deadline. See Nu-Look, citing Vantage Healthcare Corporation v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 687 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
SUZANNE F. HOOD
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1999.
1/ Effective July 1, 1998, information from the Department of Revenue relative to gross sales receipts tax and the tax on the production and importation of drycleaning solvent is available to Respondent. Sections 376.70 and 376.75, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
C. Thomas Holland, Esquire
Jeffrey Brown, Esquire Martha L. Nebelsiek, Esquire Department of Environmental
F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental
David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
