STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
RON ROSS MEARDY, d/b/a AUTO ) LIQUIDATION CENTER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 99-3064
)
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings by its designated Administrative Law Judge, Ella Jane P. Davis, held a disputed-fact hearing in the above-styled case on
January 31, 2001, in St. Augustine, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Ron Ross Meardy, pro se
Post Office Box 1853
St. Augustine, Florida 32085
For Respondent: Charles Catanzaro, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
What, if any, is Petitioner's tax liability to the State of Florida, after any legitimate tax credits are applied, for June 1998 through December 1998?
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about July 20, 1999. The abeyance, continuance, and discovery history is documented in the case file and need not be reiterated here.
At the disputed-fact hearing held on January 31, 2001, the Department of Revenue (DOR) presented the oral testimony of Thelmesia Whitfield and had DOR Exhibits 1 through 7 admitted in evidence. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and had Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 3 admitted in evidence. (The admission of Exhibit P-2 at TR-152, is not reflected in the table of contents for the Transcript.)
A Transcript was filed on February 22, 2001. The parties had agreed to file their Proposed Recommended Orders on or before thirty days following the date on which the Transcript was filed with the Division, which with an intervening weekend would have been March 26, 2001. Petitioner's proposal was filed March 29, 2001. Respondent's proposal was filed March 27, 2001. Both proposals having been late-filed, and no motion to strike either proposal having been made, both proposals have been considered in their entirety.
FINDINGS OF FACT
During the period of June 1998 through September 1998, Petitioner Ron Ross Meardy operated a used car lot from a
location in Duval County, Florida, to wit: 1400 Mayport Road, Atlantic Beach, Florida, 32233-3440.
Mr. Meardy conducted business through a sole proprietorship named Auto Liquidation Center (ALC).
Mr. Meardy's business included both retail sales and wholesale sales of motor vehicles.
Between June 1998 and December 1998, Mr. Meardy was a registered dealer with DOR. Mr. Meardy's sales tax registration number was 26-02-151942-23/4, which registration number pertains to the Mayport location in Duval County, Florida.
Mr. Meardy filed State of Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, standard form DR-15, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees.
Mr. Meardy also filed State of Florida Solid Waste returns, standard form DR-15SW, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees.
In September 1998, Mr. Meardy opened a car lot in
St. Augustine, St. John's County, Florida and closed the Duval County car lot.
Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15 (sales tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998.
Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15SW (waste tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998.
Mr. Meardy asserted that he did not know that his employees had made a lot of bad loans or failed to file tax returns for June 1998 through September 1998.
Mr. Meardy admitted that from September to December 1998, he deliberately filed no tax returns. First, he claimed he did not file returns because there were no taxable sales made in that period. Then, he asserted that he did not file because, in an unrelated matter, the Florida Attorney General's Office, investigating several businesses "run" by him, held necessary business documents from October 27, 1998 until December 11, 1998 (+/- 45 days).
Mr. Meardy's credible testimony that he did not have his business records from October 27, 1998 to December 1998 was unrefuted.
As a result of Mr. Meardy's not having filed any DR-15 and DR-15SW forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998, DOR filed a sales and solid waste tax warrant against him dated March 30, 1999, for $11,937.86. As permitted by law, this audit/warrant merely estimated Mr. Meardy's liability.
Mr. Meardy did not then file formal tax returns, file a formal request for an alleged credit (DR-95 form), or provide DOR access to his business records so that DOR could make an
accurate assessment/audit/warrant for any tax, penalty, interest, and/or credit. Instead, he timely-filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on May 28, 1999.
The Petition for Administrative Hearing, dated May 21 and filed May 28, 1999, was the first written expression by which Petitioner alerted DOR that he was seeking a tax credit due to repossessions he claimed to have made on defaulted loans. The Petition only stated that DOR "owes ALC money due to repossession credits." The Petition does not contain all of the information required by rule or by the standard credit claim form DR-95B.
Petitioner had, in the past, applied for credit for tax paid on repossessed items by attaching the DR-95B form to his monthly tax returns (P-3). He maintained he had relied on his employees for this function.
Petitioner's credible testimony that the Attorney General again held some of his documents from the end of May 1999, until September 30, 1999 (+/-five months), due to an unrelated matter, was unrefuted.
However, at no time did Petitioner ever file a formal request for credit (form DR-95B) or any tax returns for the period at issue in this proceeding.
Only during the course of discovery in the instant proceeding, which discovery Petitioner resisted by every legal
means, did it become clear that Petitioner was claiming a tax credit from his May 1998 sales tax return, and that the credit he sought was in excess of the tax he had paid by way of his May 1998 tax return. Only during the discovery process herein did Petitioner provide DOR with any information concerning repossession and default amounts that he was claiming. He did this by producing a "database" (DOR-4). It is unclear from the evidence at hearing when this information was provided, but the date Petitioner claims in his Proposed Findings of Fact to have first produced DOR-4 is February 10, 2000.
Petitioner also claims to have given someone at DOR a computer disc with his supporting information, but no DOR witness confirmed this. Petitioner produced no such disc at hearing.
Exhibit DOR-4 did not provide the vehicle registration number as part of the property description, the date the sales and use tax was paid, the purchase price less trade-in, the purchase price less cash down, or the actual date of repossession. A copy of each invoice supporting each repossession was not attached. Petitioner did not submit any tax return with DOR-4.
Petitioner admits that DOR-4 does not contain all of the information required by the tax credit claim form, DR-95B.
DOR revised its assessment once, based on the information Petitioner was required to produce in this proceeding. DOR revised its assessment a second time as a result of the information Mr. Meardy provided in the course of his deposition taken January 19, 2001, approximately a week-and- a-half before final hearing.
As agreed-to within the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the revised assessment figure in this case is now limited to
$2626.31 sales tax, $1313.40 penalty, and $75.35 interest, for a total of $4735.56, as of January 31, 2001.
If the foregoing base amounts are, in fact, owed, penalties and interest continue to accrue, pursuant to statute.
In making the final audit/assessment/warrant, DOR's Auditor IV, Thelmesia Whitfield, used original materials supplied by Petitioner. From these, she took the actual amounts Petitioner had listed on his dated invoices and other original records as the tax he collected for June 1998 through December 1998. She then calculated the sales tax due, but not remitted, for that period. In so doing, she determined that no additional taxes were due for the months of August 1998 through December 1998. She also concluded that for Petitioner's sales in June and July 1998, a penalty should be assessed at the legal rate of 10% per month on a cumulative basis up to 50% and interest
should be assessed at the legal rate of 12% per year or 1% per month on the cumulative balance that is due.
Petitioner's solid waste fee liability was calculated by Ms. Whitfield on the basis of the dated sales invoices provided by Petitioner where he had charged fees for tire and battery disposal. Ms. Whitfield's calculations did not include transactions without invoices or other original records. She noted that on several transactions Petitioner had collected more solid waste tax than was required, and she concluded that once collected, those amounts should be remitted to DOR unless they had been refunded to the customer. She calculated local option taxes at the applicable rate for Duval County.
Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations do not reflect credits for the repossessions shown on DOR-4, because no state tax returns were filed from June through December 1998, because all the necessary information had not been provided, and because she believed the information on DOR-4 had been provided beyond the period available to claim repossession credits, which is 13 months after the repossession takes place.
Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations also do not include credits for worthless accounts orally claimed by Petitioner in the course of his January 19, 2001, deposition or which he urges that she extrapolate from DOR-4, because Petitioner did not also
provide either federal tax returns or equivalent financial statements as required by law.
Because Petitioner was asking for a refund of more than he said he had paid, and because the sales he was referencing took place before the period being audited,
Ms. Whitfield had no way to verify that the amount of sales tax actually had been paid. Therefore, Ms. Whitfield only used DOR-4 where there was a question as to whether a sale had taken place at all. Although DOR-4 is merely a summary, because it was produced by Petitioner and listed sales dates, she used it only as his admission that certain questionable sales had, in fact, taken place.
Accordingly, it is found that DOR has not relied on estimations based on prior sales outside the time frame audited, but has made its final assessment (DOR Composite Exhibit 3) upon reasonable documentation provided by Petitioner, which documentation he represented as being accurate to the best of his ability. It is further found that DOR applied defineable legal standards.
Petitioner essentially challenges DOR's last assessment/audit/warrant because Ms. Whitfield did not use DOR-4 to assign him a credit or off-set. He seeks to have the undersigned relate, according to his theory of repossession/default credits, DOR's final assessment reflected
in DOR's audit report and work papers (DOR Composite Exhibit 3); DOR-4, Petitioner's "database"; and Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3 so as to determine Petitioner's sales tax and solid waste liability for the June 1998 through December 1998 period, and to thereby assign him a credit against his May 1998 tax return and payment (P-3).
Petitioner's theory is based on his representation that his database (DOR-4) uses the first time he received money from each sale of a vehicle as the date of the sale/transaction, even though his own invoices and other original supporting data which he provided to DOR, showed different dates as the date of each sale. Then, he asserts that where vehicles have been repossessed, or where a sale has not "gone through," or where a loan has been defaulted (presumably even without repossession, of the car, although this is unclear), a credit should be related back to his May 1998, tax return (P-3). His argument and evidence are not persuasive for the following reasons.
At the outset, it is noted that Petitioner's credit claim in excess of $12,000, is more than the tax Petitioner paid in May 1998, as reflected on Exhibit P-3.
Likewise, although Petitioner's invoice used in
Ms. Whitfield's calculations recorded a sale on June 22, 1998, to Lori Armstrong at $1500.00, Petitioner, without any supporting evidence, asserted at hearing that this sale actually
was made on June 23, 1998, and that someone stole $500.00 of the tendered price, so he should pay tax, if at all, on a sale of only $1,000. He had a similar unsupported reason for attempting to reduce, by $100.00, the sales price on another invoice amount for Randy Davis, which invoice Ms. Whitfield had utilized.
Petitioner also claimed, at hearing, again with no supporting evidence, that invoices he had previously produced and which were relied upon by Ms. Whitfield for customers Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois "did not go through," and therefore he should not be liable for sales tax on these invoices. He asserted that since DOR could not find any title at the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) for these customers, the inference must be drawn that those sales never closed and therefore no sales tax on them is owed by him.
Petitioner also claimed at hearing that the Lebourgeois sale had resulted in a repossession.
At hearing, Petitioner admitted liability for a $1,000 sale to a customer Millwater, but claimed that a credit from May 1998 would cover it, without any clear explanation of how this should occur.
Petitioner maintained at hearing, again only because no title in that name had been located at the DHSMV, that an invoice of September 14, 1998, to a customer Wilkerson for $200
meant that the sale to Wilkerson was an out-of-state sale, and therefore no tax was owed.
In his Proposed Findings of Fact, Petitioner does not address theft as an alleged reason he did not collect the full amounts shown on his invoices (see Finding of Fact 35), but he does seek a tax credit for all sales where no title was found at DHSMV and discusses at least the Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois transactions as a source of these alleged "credits," sometimes for months in which he did not file any tax return.
He also addressed customers Varner, Bailey, Little, Wright, Emanual, Lanier, Maynard, Porter, Williams, Arenas, Bays, Beasley, Butt, Carvey, Catlin, Chapman, Clendenin, Cunningham, Forbes, Catina Friend, Gonzalez, Knight, Lloyd, Owens, Strickland, Daniels, Johnson, and McDade, whose names and information (except for Bailey) appear on DOR-4, Petitioner's database, as repossessions or defaulted loans. Bailey appears on DOR-4 but in a different portion of DOR-4. (See Finding of Fact 47).
The two biggest problems with Petitioner's theory are that he submitted no evidence to affirmatively demonstrate that any vehicle was repossessed, and Exhibit P-3 does not allow the undersigned any way of determining which vehicle sales were included in the May 1998 tax paid. Exhibit P-3 does provide information as to the repossessions claimed in May 1998 for
previous months' sales, but it does not itemize or identify May 1998 sales upon which the tax was being paid in that month.
Simply testifying that a repossession or default occurred and that someone entered that information into Petitioner's database (DOR-4) is not competent and credible proof that repossession occurred. In light of Petitioner's testimony that he relied on unreliable and dishonest employees to handle both his sales and tax matters at the Duval County office and without any explanation or documentation of how repossessions or loan defaults were handled from either of his business locations, the undersigned is left with the sense that Petitioner had neither hands-on experience with the listed repossessions nor with the subsequent entries of repossessions and/or loan defaults into his database.
Although Petitioner has made a logical argument for "starting at ground zero" with regard to his May 1998 tax return, without more than is in evidence here, vehicles allegedly sold prior to June 1998 cannot be related to vehicles allegedly repossessed after June 1998 by way of the May 1998 tax return (P-3). (See Findings of Fact 21 and 41.)
The absence of a title of registration in a given individual's name, without more, is not sufficient to infer that a sale was not consummated or that there had been an out-of- state sale. If the buyer had the duty to transfer title,
failure of title proves nothing. If the dealer had the duty to transfer title, Petitioner's failure to transfer title does not automatically translate into a tax credit.
The minimal documentation underlying DOR-4 which Petitioner offered (Exhibits P-1 and P-2), also is not persuasive of Petitioner's theory of the case, including but not limited to his suggestion that DOR is required to regard the sale date as being a date when money allegedly was first received, instead of the dates of sale on his invoices or other underlying documentation.
It seems undisputed that "Ralston Varner" and "Varner Dean" are the same customer, full name "Ralston Dean Varner." Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a receipt showing a payment by Ralston Varner for an "'88 Chevy Caviler" [sic] and is dated May 1, 1998, which is the date Petitioner claims to be the completion of sale date. By Petitioner's theory, sales tax on this purchase should have been included in his May 1998 tax return, entitling him to receive a tax credit upon repossession of this or some other vehicle. This cannot be determined from the tax return (P-3). Exhibit DOR-6 is a composite exhibit concerning a sale to Ralson Varner. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1998, were produced by
Mr. Meardy at his office. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." The first page
of DOR-6 reveals "6-10-98," as the date of the used car order, but pertains to a "1989 Ford T-Bird." The twelfth page, the "Installment Sale Contract-Motor Vehicle," is dated June 10, 1998, and also relates to a 1989 Ford "T-Bird." DOR's final audit refers to a 1989 Ford Thunderbird sold to "Varner Dean," not an '88 Chevy Cavalier, as urged by Petitioner.
Petitioner's Exhibit 2 shows two receipts from Dennis Bailey, one on May 26, 1998 and one on June 2, 1998. Petitioner maintained that the sale in question went through on May 26, 1998, the sales tax was remitted on his May 1998 tax return, and the car was later repossessed. The May 1998 tax return (P-3) does not help decipher this. A Dennis Bailey appears on DOR-4 as of May 26, 1998, in relation to a Ford Taurus, but it is not one of the transactions Petitioner has singled out by the hand- written notations on DOR-4 as being defaulted or repossessed. Exhibit DOR-5 is a composite exhibit concerning the sale to Dennis Bailey which Ms. Whitfield audited. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1999, were produced by Petitioner. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." Exhibit DOR-5, page one, shows "June 2, 1998," as the date of the used car order. DOR-5, page 10, the fourth page following the certification, reveals the date of sale as "6-2-98," as reported
to the DHSMV, both related to a 1988 Taurus. Under these circumstances, Petitioner's view of this sale cannot prevail.
Also, Petitioner admitted that even by his theory and calculations, his May 1998 tax return was "off" by $1,007, and he had been unable to discover the reason (TR-103).
Moreover, the evidence does not clearly establish that DOR-4 was presented to DOR within either 12 or 13 months of all the repossessions in question. (See Findings of Fact 19 and 21- 22.)
Lastly, Petitioner did not present any evidence of refunds to customers of solid waste tax overpayments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding, pursuant to Sections 72.011(1)(a), 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 120.80(14)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2000) sets forth the respective parties' burdens of proof: "In [a taxpayer contest proceeding, DOR's] burden of proof, except as otherwise specifically provided by general law, shall be limited to a showing that an assessment has been made against the taxpayer and the factual and legal grounds upon which [DOR] made the assessment."
DOR has met its initial burden. Therefore, the burden is upon Petitioner to demonstrate some entitlement to change the assessment.
DOR contends that Petitioner owes Florida sales tax for his sale of motor vehicles for the period of June 1998 through July 1998, because he failed to file a State of Florida Sales and Use Tax Return, standard form DR-15, for each month and failed to remit tax due on those retail sales; that Petitioner's failure to pay sales tax for sales concluded from June 1998 through July 1998 obligates him on continuing penalties and interest which continue to accrue; and that Petitioner owes solid waste fees for the tires and batteries included with his retail sales of motor vehicles.
Petitioner contends that due to the mistakes and misdeeds of his employees, repossessed items not being properly recorded, and the repetitive requests for original documents by the Attorney General on an unrelated matter and those documents being returned in a "scrambled" condition, Petitioner was unable to file the standard sales tax forms timely, the final audit assessment did not consider repossessions appropriately, and Petitioner's request for a credit off-set should be considered to be timely.
Petitioner offered no legal precedent upon which he is not responsible for the tax because of his employees' theft, errors, or omissions.
Petitioner, as a sole proprietor and as the registered tax payer-dealer, is responsible for the errors and omissions of his employees for purposes of his tax debt. Section 212.06(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), defines "dealer" for purposes of determining rights and responsibilities under Chapter 212, as follows:
The term "dealer" . . . mean[s] every person
. . . who sells at retail or who offers for sale at retail . . . tangible personal property.
Petitioner offered no legal precedent by which the time for filing a tax return, for seeking a tax credit, or for claiming a default may be tolled due to possession of one's business records for another case by another arm of government.
That Petitioner may have been the subject of an independent investigation, moved his place of business, or experienced employee turnover does not excuse his failure to file sales and use tax or solid waste tax returns for the months of June through December 1998.
Neither the Petition for Administrative Hearing, filed March 28, 1999, nor DOR-4, produced in the course of discovery for the instant proceeding on or about February 10, 2000,
contained all of the information required by law for claiming a credit because they do not reveal the dates of repossession and were unaccompanied by tax returns by which credit calculations could be made. These items can only be considered incomplete and untimely credit requests.
Florida sales tax on the full retail sales price is due from dealers at the moment of sale. Section 212.06(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). Florida sales tax on the full retail sales price is due from dealers selling tangible personal property "on a credit sale, installment sale, or sale made on any kind of deferred payment plan . . . in the same manner as a cash sale." Section 212.06(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). See also Brunswick Corporation v. Kirk, 204 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1967).
Petitioner asserts that two of the transactions DOR included in its assessment as taxable in the month of June 1998, actually occurred in May 1998, and were paid with May's return, to wit: Ralston Dean Varner, May 1, 1998, and Dennis Bailey, May 26, 1998. He did not establish this premise.
The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the moment of sale to Varner was June 10, 1998, and the moment of sale to Dennis Bailey was June 2, 1998. Sales tax is to be remitted to DOR no later than the twentieth day of the month following the month in which the sale took place. Section 212.15(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Since Petitioner did not
file a return in July 1998, he cannot be presumed to have remitted to DOR any sales tax for the transactions he executed in June 1998.
Petitioner's sales tax return for May 1998, does not identify or itemize the transactions included therein, so it is impossible to apply Petitioner's theory of the case as to Varner, Bailey, or any other customer.
Section 212.17(2), Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
A dealer who has paid the tax imposed by this chapter on intangible personal property sold under a retained title, conditional sale, or similar contract, or under a contract wherein the dealer retains a security interest in the property pursuant to Chapter 679, may take credit or obtain a refund for the tax paid by the dealer on the unpaid balance due him or her when he or she repossesses (with or without judicial process) the property within 12 months following the month in which the property was repossessed.
See also Rule 12A-1.012(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, "Refund or credit must be claimed within 12 months following the month in which the property was repossessed."
Section 212.17(2), Florida Statutes (1997), and Rule 12A-1.012(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, are the sole means to apply for a credit for tax paid on the sale of property subsequently repossessed.
The statute allows a dealer thirteen months to claim a credit. The credit may be claimed either in the month an item
is repossessed or within the 12 months thereafter. For purposes of the matter at bar, the statute identifies three specific elements: the tax must have been paid; the credit must be claimed within 12 months following the month of repossession; and the property was actually repossessed.
Petitioner neither filed returns from June 1998 through December 1998, nor paid taxes from June 1998 through September 1998, while taxable sales continued to be made. His testimony and DOR-4 are insufficient to prove he repossessed any of the automobiles sold.
Petitioner asserts that the Petition for Administrative Hearing and/or DOR-4 are applications for a tax credit and that the thirteen-month period relates to one or both of these date(s), tolled by the period his documents were held elsewhere or scrambled. For reasons stated in Conclusions of Law 58-60 and 68-69, this concept is not viable.
Moreover, the requirements of Rule 12A-1.012(2)(c), (d), and (e), implement Section 212.17(2), Florida Statutes, and address credits against tax for sales and repossessions of motor vehicles. These requirements have never been met in whole by Petitioner on either the Petition for Administrative Hearing or DOR-4.
Any other statute providing alternative periods of time to claim a credit for tax paid or providing for tolling of
a claim period asserted by Petitioner have not been shown to apply to this proceeding or in this forum.
A credit is an exception to the general tax law; it is strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority. National Brands Tire Company v. Department of
Revenue, 383 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980), citing Szabo Food Services, Inc. of North Carolina v. Dickinson, 286 So. 2d 529, 530-531 (Fla. 1973) and United States Gypsum Company v.
Green, 110 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1959).
Finally, tax collected is State money at the moment of collection and is due to be remitted to the State on the first day of the month following the month it was collected. Section 212.15(1), Florida Statutes (1997). All money collected as tax must be remitted to DOR. Section 212.15(4), Florida Statutes (1997). "Funds collected from a purchaser under the representation that they are taxes provided for under the state revenue laws are state funds from the moment of collection." Section 213.756, Florida Statutes (1997).
The solid waste fee is composed of two items: the waste tire fee (Section 403.718, Florida Statutes) and the lead- acid battery fee (Section 403.7185, Florida Statutes). DOR administers the respective fees, pursuant to the same procedures used in the administration of the sales tax. Sections 403.718(3)(a) and 403.7185(3)(a), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner collected solid waste fees from his customers but did not remit them to DOR. He presented no evidence that he had refunded any such monies to customers.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
RECOMMENDED:
That the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order finding Petitioner is liable for the amounts as set out in Finding of Fact 24, without any credits or set-offs, and providing for accruing interest and penalties, pursuant to law.
DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2001.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Ron Ross Meardy Post Office Box 1853
St. Augustine, Florida 32085
Charles Catanzaro, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue
204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue
104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jun. 21, 2001 | Final Order filed. |
| May 04, 2001 | Recommended Order issued (hearing held January 31, 2001) CASE CLOSED. |
| May 04, 2001 | Recommended Order cover letter identifying hearing record referred to the Agency sent out. |
| Mar. 29, 2001 | (Petitioner`s) Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Mar. 27, 2001 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Final Order filed. |
| Feb. 23, 2001 | Post-Hearing Order issued. |
| Feb. 22, 2001 | Transcript of Proceedings (1-Volume ) filed. |
| Jan. 31, 2001 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held; see case file for applicable time frames. |
| Jan. 25, 2001 | Deposition (of Ron Ross Meardy) filed. |
| Jan. 25, 2001 | Notice of Filing Deposition Transcript filed. |
| Jan. 12, 2001 | (Joint) Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| Jan. 11, 2001 | Amended Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Jan. 10, 2001 | Notice of Change of Address (Ron Meardy) (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 09, 2001 | (Responses to) Respondent`s Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Jan. 09, 2001 | Notice of Second Service of Answers to Respondent`s Interrogatories filed. |
| Jan. 09, 2001 | Respondent`s Notice of Filing Petitioner`s Answers to Respondent`s Second Set of Interrogatories filed. |
| Jan. 09, 2001 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion for Expedited Discovery (filed via facsimile). |
| Jan. 08, 2001 | Order Denying Motion for Declaratory Judgment issued. |
| Jan. 08, 2001 | Notice of Filing Revised Warrant and Reduce Liability filed by Respondent. |
| Jan. 08, 2001 | Respondent`s Motion for Expedited Discovery filed. |
| Dec. 26, 2000 | Respondent`s Opposition to Petitioner`s Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed. |
| Dec. 21, 2000 | Respondent`s Notice of Intent to Present Summary Evidence filed. |
| Dec. 21, 2000 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. |
| Dec. 18, 2000 | Petitioner`s Motion for a Declaratory Judgement (or the like) as to ALC Sales Tax Credits (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 11, 2000 | Respondent`s Notice of Unavailability filed. |
| Nov. 15, 2000 | Order of Pre-hearing Instructions issued. |
| Nov. 15, 2000 | Second Notice of Hearing issued (hearing set for January 31, 2001; 9:9:30 a.m.; St. Augustine, FL). |
| Nov. 15, 2000 | Petitioner`s Status Report (filed via facsimile). |
| Nov. 09, 2000 | Respondent`s Status Report filed. |
| Jul. 14, 2000 | Ltr. to R. Meadry from C. Catanzaro In re: documents filed. |
| Jul. 12, 2000 | Order sent out. (parties to advise status by 11/10/2000) |
| Jul. 10, 2000 | Joint Motion to Cancel Hearing and Abate Case to Continue Discovery filed. |
| Jun. 29, 2000 | Notice of Service of Answers to Respondent`s Interrogatories (filed via facsimile) |
| Jun. 15, 2000 | Order on Motions to Compel and for Protective Order sent out. (petitioner shall present, to respondent`s counsel answers to respondent`s first set of interrogatories by June 29, 2000; petitioner`s motion for protective order is denied) |
| Jun. 06, 2000 | ALC`s Response to Respondent`s Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Complete Answers to Interrogatories (filed via facsimile). |
| Jun. 06, 2000 | ALC`s Motion for a Protective Order as to Privacy and Cost of Document Production (filed via facsimile). |
| May 25, 2000 | Respondent`s Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Complete Answers to Interrogatories filed. |
| Mar. 21, 2000 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for August 2, 2000; 10:30 a.m.; St. Augustine, FL) |
| Mar. 21, 2000 | Order of Pre-hearing Instructions sent out. |
| Mar. 21, 2000 | Respondent`s Second Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Feb. 14, 2000 | (Petitioner) Notice of Service of Answers to Respondent`s Interrogatories and Request to Produce filed. |
| Jan. 11, 2000 | Respondent`s Response to Petitioner`s "Compliance" With Order Concerning Discovery and Request for Formal Hearing filed. |
| Jan. 06, 2000 | Order sent out. (petitioner shall serve responses to all Respondent`s outstanding discovery no later than 2/10/00) |
| Dec. 27, 1999 | (Petitioner) Compliance With Order of December 10, 1999 and Motion for Discovery Schedule (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 10, 1999 | Order sent out. (petitioner shall respond to outstanding discovery within 20 days of this order to show cause) |
| Nov. 22, 1999 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Request for Expedited Hearing filed. |
| Nov. 18, 1999 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Request for Expedited Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Nov. 18, 1999 | Respondent`s Second Response to Petitioner`s Motion to Enlarge Time and Request for Expedited Hearing filed. |
| Nov. 15, 1999 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Response to Petitioner`s Motion to Enlarge Time (filed via facsimile). |
| Nov. 15, 1999 | Respondent`s Response to Petitioner`s Motion to Enlarage Time filed. |
| Nov. 12, 1999 | (R. Meardy) Motion to Enlarge Time filed. |
| Oct. 06, 1999 | Respondent`s Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Oct. 06, 1999 | (Respondent) Notice of Serving Interrogatories filed. |
| Aug. 05, 1999 | Order Placing Case in Abeyance sent out. (Parties to advise status by February 25, 2000) |
| Aug. 02, 1999 | Joint Response to Initial Order and Motion to Abate Hearing Scheduling filed. |
| Jul. 23, 1999 | Respondent`s Answer to the Amended Petition filed. |
| Jul. 20, 1999 | Initial Order issued. |
| Jul. 16, 1999 | Agency Action Letter filed. |
| Jul. 16, 1999 | Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing filed. |
| Jul. 16, 1999 | Agency Referral Letter filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jun. 20, 2001 | Agency Final Order | |
| May 04, 2001 | Recommended Order | Failure of proof by Petitioner that he was entitled to a credit against prior taxes paid and that he was entitled to any further reduction of tax assessment for failure to file and pay. |
