vs. ) Case No. 00-3846
Respondent. )
This cause came on for formal proceeding before P. Michael Ruff, duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Final Hearing was conducted in this matter on November 28, 2000, in Pensacola, Florida. The following appearances were entered:
For Petitioner: R. John Westberry, Esquire
Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501
Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C. 1400 South Trust Tower
The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was terminated from his employment by the
Respondent based on discrimination because of his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
This cause arose upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) by the Petitioner, Walter Lee Tate (Petitioner). The Petitioner claims that his former employer, Mold-EX L.L.C., discriminated against him because of his race by terminating him in December of 1998. The charge pended before the Commission for more than 180-days without any investigation being concluded or any finding made by the agency. Consequently, the Petitioner requested a proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Respondent denied, through its answer, that the termination was racially motivated.
Ultimately, the cause came on for formal hearing before the undersigned Administrative Law Judge on November 28, 2000. The Petitioner's exhibits one through six were admitted into evidence at the hearing, as were the Respondent's exhibits one through ten. The parties elected to file Proposed Recommended Orders and, subsequent to the hearing, agreed upon an extension of that briefing schedule, such that Proposed Recommended Orders were timely filed on January 30, 2001.
The Petitioner is an African-American male. He was employed at times pertinent hereto until his termination, by the Respondent Mold-Ex, L.L.C. The Respondent is a manufacturing company located in Milton, Florida, which operates a manufacturing facility and operation on a multi-shift basis, engaged in the manufacturing of various plastic and rubber products, particularly automotive-related parts. The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent on September 8, 1989, as a press operator. He also worked as a machine operator for about four months and was promoted to Second Shift Supervisor in the injection department. This is an injection molding operation which molds plastic and rubber parts. The Petitioner was a Second Shift Supervisor in that department for eight and one- half years. The Petitioner reported to Jerry Decker, who was his supervisor. The Petitioner is an employee and the Respondent company is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
The Petitioner's duties included monitoring overall operation of the machinery, training, new employees, setting up machines and jobs, completing attendance reports and holding employee meetings. As many as twenty-three employees were supervised by him on the second shift. The Petitioner was the
only black supervisor at Mold-Ex. The Petitioner was terminated from his employment on December 4, 1998. He was told by
Mr. Decker, his supervisor, that he was being terminated because the company was "down-sizing" or reducing positions and the number of employees due to financial difficulties. The Petitioner elected to contest this by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, claiming that he was harmed because he was discharged because of his race.
Beginning in early 1998, the corporate parent company which owned Mold-Ex, L.L.C., was experiencing significant financial difficulties. This resulted in part from the "reservoir seal project" which involved a contract for a certain part that the Respondent was to manufacture for the Delphi Division of General Motors Corporation. There were difficulties in manufacturing the reservoir seal successfully, it was difficult to manufacture and required extra labor. It was termed by the Respondent's president as a "real disaster" which caused serious financial drain on the company. The company had a great deal of difficulty in successfully manufacturing the part to the correct specifications and lost much revenue due to unfilled orders and/or improperly manufactured parts which had to be replaced. Additionally, and related to these difficulties, the parent company was having great difficulty meeting its debt service obligations. In fact, the parent
company never actually recovered from the financial difficulties from 1998, such that ultimately the Respondent was sold to another corporation. These financial difficulties throughout 1998 resulted, by the fall of that year, in the parent corporation putting significant pressure on the Respondent's management in Milton to reduce costs substantially, including labor costs. The Respondent considered and implemented several ideas for cutting costs, including restructuring the supervision of the operation and otherwise seeking to reduce labor costs.
In September of 1998, the Respondent employed an excess of people over those needed to operate efficiently. At that time the Respondent employed approximately three-hundred workers. Because there was an excess of employees and, therefore, payroll expense, a hiring freeze was instituted. This resulted in a steady reduction of employees through not filling positions that were voluntarily vacated by employees leaving the company, as reflected in the Respondent's Exhibit 10 in evidence. The overall operating officer of the Milton facility, Vice President Ettelson, established in his testimony that in late November of 1998, the hiring freeze resulted in a reduced head count which saved the company substantial amounts of money. Thus, by the end of 1998, the company employed only approximately 280 persons instead of the 300 who were employed
in September of 1998. By April of 1999, the employment roster was down to approximately two hundred and fifty persons.
The Respondent additionally restructured supervision in order to save money and to operate more efficiently, in terms of simply more effective manufacture and filling of orders, as well as in the saving of personnel and related expenses. This restructuring involved combining supervisory positions and re- allocating duties, such that one plant superintendent was placed in charge of all of the operations on the second shift rather than having approximately three supervisors overseeing the individual business units operating on the second shift. The Petitioner was a Second Shift Supervisor whose position was eliminated in this restructuring. His duties were distributed among Mr. Don Brumley, who was a long-experienced employee who was re-hired out of retirement and who became the Second Shift Plant Superintendent; an employee in the injection and molding department, referred to as a "lead-employee" and also to certain individuals on the first shift. The restructuring resulted in a savings of approximately $40,000.00 as to salaries by eliminating three positions and selecting Mr. Brumley as the plant superintendent for the second shift.
The re-structuring concentrated on the second shift because the other two shifts required the management personnel that were currently in place. On the first shift, various
improvement projects and process development efforts required more intense, active supervision and supervisory personnel that were already in place. On the second shift, because no improvement projects were being conducted, the differences in activity between the second and first shift allowed the company to supervise that entire shift, as to all departments, by placing a strong effective plant superintendent in charge of that entire shift; eliminating three supervisory positions for a substantial savings in expenses. On the third shift, no re- structuring occurred because it was only a small operation of approximately twenty-five employees. The highest management personnel present for that shift was already a lead person in the mixing department and a supervisor in the injection molding department. Additionally, the company management recognized a strong need for a superintendent such as Mr. Brumley who had a record of implementing better disciplinary measures and who could ensure consistency and efficiency of operation in all of the operating departments on the second shift.
The re-structuring effort resulted in a change in the reporting system or "chain of command" as well. Prior to re- structuring, three managers, one for each of the three business units (profile extrusion, molding, and reinforced hose), reported directly to Vice President Ettelson. Below these three managers were the supervisors in charge in each individual
department within the three business units. For example, in the molding department where the Petitioner worked as Injection Molding Supervisor on the second shift, supervisors in injection molding on the first and third shifts as well as a first shift supervisor in the trim department, for a total of four supervisors, reported directly to molding manager Jerry Decker. Four supervisors reported to the Reinforced Hose Manager, Sidney Hood. Two supervisors reported to Profile Extrusion Manager Steve Wieczorek. Those three managers reported to Vice President Ettelson.
After the re-structuring, supervisors remained in place on the first and third shifts, but on the second shift no supervisors remained who would be reporting to the department managers Decker, Hood and Wieczorek. Instead, Don Brumley, re- hired from retirement as the second shift plant superintendent, reported directly to Vice President Ettelson. Don Brumley was therefore in charge of all three business units during the second shift. His duties were much more substantial than the Petitioner's. He managed approximately 60 people while the Petitioner had managed approximately 20 to 23 people.
Mr. Brumley had more administrative duties than did the Petitioner. He had hiring and firing authority that the Petitioner did not have and had the responsibility for adherence to company policy on the entire second shift rather than in only
one department. Molding Manager, Jerry Decker, established that the re-structuring organization functioned effectively. It resulted in the elimination of the Petitioner's position on or about December 4, 1998. Additionally, two white males in supervisory roles were terminated by the Respondent because of the re-structuring.
The Petitioner maintained that one of those terminated white individuals, Dan Lowery, had been out of work seven months with tuberculosis and was permanently disabled and, therefore, was terminated because he was not qualified to perform his job duties. However, the Human Resources coordinator, Nick Bores, the person with probably the most knowledge and insight concerning Mr. Lowery's employment capabilities, established in a credible fashion that Mr. Lowery had indeed been on leave for a few months due to his illness but returned to his employment duties with a full clearance from his physician to perform all of his duties. This testimony was corroborated by that of molding manager Jerry Decker and Vice President David Ettelson and is accepted.
The Petitioner also contended in his testimony, in essence, that racially discriminatory motivation for his termination existed as shown by two incidents. One incident in 1997 involved an employee who had been disciplined in some way by the Petitioner, who then purportedly placed a "swastika"
symbol on the Petitioner's car in the parking lot. The Petitioner asserts that the employee was not disciplined for that act, which he contends was indicative of racially discriminatory animus toward him by the Respondent's management. In fact, however, the Respondent did not discipline that employee because, upon questioning, he denied the conduct. The Respondent had no independent proof that he was guilty of the act.
The Petitioner himself was not disciplined on an occasion when he was accused of sexual harassment by a female employee, because he denied it and the Respondent had no independent proof that he was guilty of the alleged conduct. Moreover, at about the same time as the "swastika incident" the Petitioner received a written commendation, signed by CEO Thomas Henry and Vice President Ettelson. These facts, considered together, tend to show lack of racial animus by the company management.
The other incident described by the Petitioner related to management reaction to observing an employee under the Petitioner's charge failing to wear safety goggles.
Mr. Ettelson purportedly told the Petitioner he would "kick his butt" if his employees again failed to wear protective goggles. This statement, if made, may be coarse or harsh, but was not shown to be other than an isolated occurrence. Moreover, it
does not evince a racially discriminatory motive or attitude on the part of an employment-related decision-maker.
The Petitioner maintained that his replacement, Don Brumley, was not qualified for the position created by the re- structuring and that his "lead man," Eddie Byers, was the only person in the department who could have performed the duties that the Petitioner had performed. This testimony, however, is rebutted by the testimony of witnesses Decker, Ettelson and Thomas Henry, the CEO of the company. Their testimony establishes that Mr. Brumley was well-qualified to assume management of the entire second shift operations as Plant Superintendent which included the scope of the Petitioner's job but included other substantial duties and responsibilities as well. In fact, with the exception of being retired for approximately one year, Mr. Brumley worked for the Respondent since 1963 and was the company's first employee after it was founded by Mr. Henry, his father and Mr. Henry's brother. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Brumley functioned as Compression Molding Manager, which was a position above the Petitioner's position level in the hierarchy of the company and at the same level as the Petitioner's former supervisor, Jerry Decker. In fact,
Mr. Brumley, at one time, had a supervisory role over the Petitioner. The Petitioner's experience was limited to one department during his tenure with the company. Mr. Brumley,
however, had worked in all departments in his 36 years with the Respondent. Mr. Brumley knew the operations of the company very well and bringing him back to the company to function as the Second Shift Plant Superintendent, with his skills and experience, saved the company substantial expenses by allowing it to avoid the necessity of retaining other employees.
Additionally, Mr. Brumley had a reputation as a strict disciplinarian and Mr. Ettelson and the company management felt that stricter discipline was required for the operations on the second shift.
When the Petitioner was terminated he was offered a severance package of four weeks' pay at the time of termination, but elected not to accept that offer. He was not offered a different employment position with the Respondent because no suitable options, in terms of his skills and qualifications and in relation to his salary level, were available with the company at that time.
The Petitioner was earning $7.80 per hour, at the time of his termination and his annual salary, without overtime, was
$16,234.00. During 1998, which was his best year in terms of income, he earned approximately $27,000.00 when overtime was added to his regular salary. The Petitioner earned a total of
$13,175.72, in 1999 and earned $3,117.00 in unemployment compensation in 1999. He earned $7,513.51, when employed by
Britt Landrum Temporaries, Inc., in 1999, and earned $1,608.01 when employed by Interim Services, Inc., in 1999. Additionally, he was employed by Transport Leasing Contract, Inc., in 1999 and earned $937.20 with that employer. Since approximately January 2000, the Petitioner has been working at the Waterfront Mission and earned $6.50 per hour, and then in September 2000, was raised to $7.00 per hour.
The Petitioner concedes that with his qualifications and experience he could obtain employment at more than $7.00 per hour, which he makes at the Waterfront Mission. He chose to work at the Waterfront Mission because that employment is compatible with his calling to be a minister. He desires to have work which is compatible with his duties as a pastor for two churches in the area. He has earned about $375.00 per month as a pastor for his two churches since approximately May 2000.
The Respondent presented evidence by witnesses Ettelson, Decker and Bores, the Human Resources coordinator, all of whom testified that the re-structuring plan, which included the elimination of the Petitioner's position, was for the purpose of serving the above-referenced financial business needs in relation to reducing costs, as the reasons which led to the Petitioner's termination. All testified that the primary goal was reducing costs in order to help the company to survive its business downturn, including the fact, established by
Mr. Henry's testimony, that the United Auto Workers strike of the Delphi Division of General Motors began in the summer of 1998. This caused a loss of approximately one-million dollars per month. That is the reason that the re-structuring was effected which allowed them to bring in a more experienced man, Mr. Brumley, who was qualified to run the entire department at lower costs as the Plant Superintendent on the second shift, rendering the Petitioner's job and position unnecessary. Their testimony that these business reasons were the cause of the re- structuring and the Petitioner's termination is accepted, rather than the Petitioner's contention that the reasons for his termination involved his race.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Section 120.57(1) (2000), Florida Statutes.
Pursuant to Sections 760.01 through 760.11, Florida Statutes, it is unlawful for a Florida employer to discriminate on the basis of race in employment. The Respondent is an employer for purposes of the relevant provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner is an employee. The Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760 Florida Statutes, is patterned after Title VII, U.S.C. (the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The First District Court of Appeal determined in School
Board of Leon County v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) that the legal principles established in the federal anti-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII, as amended, are to be accorded great deference when applying Chapter 760 Florida Statutes. See also School Board of Leon County v.
Weaver, 556 So. 2d 443, 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Therefore, relying on federal court decisions construing Title VII is appropriate when construing cases arising out of Chapter 760 Florida Statutes. Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.,
139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Petitioner in a case such as this has the burden of establishing, by preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A prima facie case requires that the evidence be adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based upon a discriminatory criterion. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 358 (1977). If a prima facie case is established then the employer has the burden to produce evidence articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision at issue. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802;
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-
55 (1981). The Petitioner retains the ultimate burden of persuasion and must persuade the court by demonstrating by a
preponderance of evidence that he was the victim of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
A Petitioner may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination by showing (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; (3) that he and a similarly-situated, non-protected person received dissimilar treatment and (4) that there is sufficient evidence to infer a causal connection between the Petitioner's race and the adverse employment action. Woodbury v. Sear, Roebuck & Co., 901 F.Supp. 160, 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1995). The Petitioner maintained that a white male replaced him. That is not exactly the case, however; the Petitioner's position no longer existed because of the re-structuring of the company and the position that the Petitioner had held, the Second Shift Supervisor for the injection molding department, was eliminated as were all the supervisor positions on the second shift, which also resulted in two white males with comparable supervisory duties also being terminated. The preponderant evidence establishes that the organizational structure of the company, as to this plant, changed with the re-structuring so that a plant superintendent was hired in charge of all the departments on the second shift. Although the injection molding department still had supervisors on other shifts, the Petitioner's burden is
concerned with whether an unprotected person (white) was retained in his own position, which was not the case. Even if it were legally significant that the injection molding supervisors on the first and third shifts who were white were retained, it would only serve to help establish the Petitioner's prima facie case, concerning whether those similarly-situated and outside the protected class, received more favorable treatment. See Moghadam v. Morris, 87 F.Supp. 2d 1255, 1263-64 (N.D. Fla. 2000). The differences in the shift operations described in the above Findings of Fact were not rebutted by the Petitioner and suggest instead that the supervisors on the different shifts were not actually similarly-situated to the Petitioner. The Petitioner did not present evidence that similarly-situated white employees were treated more favorably and therefore his prima facie case fails. All supervisor positions on the second shift, whether occupied by whites or blacks were eliminated. In order to determine whether an employee is similarly-situated, it must be determined whether the employees are involved in the same or similar conduct. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). If similarly situated employees treated more favorably than the Petitioner cannot be identified by the Petitioner then he fails to establish a prima facie case.
Although the Petitioner maintained that a white male, Eddie Byers, assumed his duties upon his termination, the evidence does not reflect that that is the case. Rather, his duties were parceled out among several employees, including Byers and Second Shift Plan Superintendent Don Brumley, whose qualifications were superior to the Petitioner's. There is no evidence that Byers was made a supervisor in the place of the Petitioner. Rather, he kept his same job and the Petitioner's duties were parceled out to several employees, including Byers and Brumley. It was thus not established that the Petitioner was replaced by a white male but instead his duties were re- distributed and his position eliminated, due to the re- structuring caused by financial necessity, which included the inclusion of his duties with many other duties served by one man, the employee with 36 years experience, Mr. Brumley. He was rehired to run the entire department because of his superior qualifications.
The Respondent company's burden to show that there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the Petitioner's termination is one of production of evidence, not preponderant proof. The Petitioner must then overcome that production with evidence that the proffered reason for the termination was pretextual. See Robertson v. The Home Depot, 976 F.Supp. 1467, 1473 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Even if an employer such as the
Respondent terminated a petitioner or eliminated his position for excessively harsh reasons, so long as it articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken, and even though it is unfortunate that his position was eliminated, so long as the reason articulated for that employment decision is not for a discriminatory reason envisioned by Title VII, or Chapter 760 Florida Statutes, the Petitioner cannot prevail.
See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, Inc., 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984).
The evidence in this case established that the Respondent was experiencing severe financial pressure and that its corporate parent-company had ordered it to reduce labor costs and to alleviate the perceived disciplinary problems it was experiencing on the second shift. Here the preponderant evidence shows a legitimate, considered decision to eliminate the Petitioner's position that was not based upon the Petitioner's race, as was the situation in Moghadam v. Morris,
supra. A Respondent meets its burden of production to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason by providing evidence that the decision to terminate was based on objective management criteria. See Holifield, supra at 1564. In the case at bar the
financial stress and ineffective management efforts were objective criteria leading to the re-structuring of the second shift that resulted in the elimination of the Petitioner's
position. The Respondent, therefore, met its burden of production of evidence that would allow a conclusion that determination was not motivated by discriminatory animus. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
The Petitioner has the burden to show that the Respondent's reasons were pretextual and that actually intentional discrimination occurred. The Petitioner did not meet that burden. See Arnold v. Burger Queen System, Inc., 509 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1987). Bare allegations of discrimination are insufficient. Woodbury, 901 F.Supp. at 1565. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence that the Respondent was not experiencing the financial difficulties described in the Respondent's evidence. The Petitioner failed to prove that the second shift was not the appropriate shift for supervisory re-structuring. The Petitioner did not prove the disciplinary problems were not occurring on the second shift. Thus the Petitioner did not produce persuasive evidence that would lead to a conclusion that the Respondent's evidence was unworthy of credence. The Petitioner was required to show that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employment decision, or that they were insufficient to motivate the employment decision. See Robertson, 976 F.Supp. at 1475. Thus, the Petitioner's burden to show pretext was not met.
The Respondent had a clearly-established, business need to reduce labor costs quickly, which evidence was not refuted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner suggested that the business was profitable because of the reservoir seal job; however, the evidence also shows that the reservoir seal contract was not actually a profitable job but instead added to the financial strain on the Respondent. The evidence shows that the re-structuring was a race-neutral decision designed to save the company money and enable it to survive during a time of financial stress.
The Respondent adequately explained why the first and third shift supervisors were retained and the restructuring instead focused on second shift operations. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence that can demonstrate that the restructuring, which also resulted in the termination of two white supervisory employees, was pretextual.
The Petitioner suggested that because the Respondent continued to employ injection molding supervisors on the first and third shifts that the Petitioner was singled out for illegal treatment because of his race. Two white supervisors, however, lost their jobs at about the same time as the Petitioner. Additionally, the evidence establishes that different shifts required different operations and different management approaches. On the first shift, project development and other
administrative burdens justified the use of more supervisory personnel. The third shift was a much smaller operation than either the second or first shifts. No upper management was on- site during the third shift, hence the need to retain supervisors. In order to make a valid comparison of the Petitioner's treatment verses non-minority employees, the Petitioner must show that he and those employees are similarly- situated in all respects. Robertson, supra 1467, 1475; Holifield, supra at 1562. He did not do so.
The Petitioner failed to prove that there was any intent to discriminate against him because of his race. The Petitioner attempted to show racial bias by testifying about an incident in which a fellow employee who he had occasion to discipline under his supervision, allegedly placed a swastika symbol on his car. He contends that employee was never disciplined for the matter.
The swastika incident, however, does not permit an inference of intentional race discrimination against the Petitioner nor does it show a continuing pattern of such conduct or condoned atmosphere of racial hostility, as probative of a hostile work environment. The Respondent's Exhibit six, in evidence, indicates that the Respondent indeed investigated the incident concerning the swastika symbol and interrogated the accused employee. The accused employee denied the incident.
The employee was not disciplined because the Respondent had no proof that he had actually committed the act in question. The Petitioner took issue with the Respondent's choice not to discipline that individual for the unproven allegations; however, the Petitioner himself was not disciplined for an incident of alleged sexual harassment concerning a female employee he supervised, after he himself denied the sexual harassment allegations. Further, at approximately the same time as the swastika incident, the Petitioner received a commendatory memorandum from the Respondent signed by both Thomas Henry and David Ettelson, his superiors. This tends to refute the suggestion that the Petitioner was singled out for disparate treatment.
Moreover, the bias of a co-worker, who did not make nor have any influence on the challenged personnel decision in this case, is not probative. There was no evidence whatever that the Respondent condoned the conduct in that incident or did anything to promote it or acquiesce in it, if indeed it occurred. Further, this incident was not referenced in the Charge of Discrimination, which only alleges that a discriminatory termination took place and does not refer to disparate treatment in the course of discipline or disciplinary practices. In Florida the charging party must file the Charge of Discrimination within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory
event. The testimony concerning the swastika incident shows that it occurred in 1997 and the charge was not filed by the Petitioner until 1999. Such events occurring outside the 365- day limitation period for filing a Charge of Discrimination cannot be the subject of the discrimination action. They can, at most, be permitted in evidence to attempt to show a continuing pattern of discriminatory conduct or discriminatory animus or hostile environment, but, as concluded above, this incident does not serve as probative of any inference of intentional race discrimination against the Petitioner, or against members of protected groups in general, by the Respondent. Therefore, the swastika incident testified to by the Petitioner has no probative value in this case.
The Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence of racial bias on the part of the decision-maker David Ettelson. The Petitioner alleged that Ettelson, the decision-maker, threatened to "kick him in the butt." Even if Mr. Ettelson made such a statement, it is a race-neutral statement and does not have any probative value with respect to the alleged intent to discriminate on the basis of race. In fact, Mr. Ettelson was concerned about a laxness in the department in enforcing wearing safety goggles by employees. It is inferred that he felt that the Petitioner, as the supervisor of the employees in question, should be stricter about enforcing such safety discipline on his
shift. It is concluded that was the reason for his comment which, even if unduly harsh or crude, does not evince any racial bias.
Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore,
That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief.
DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001.
R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501
Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C. 1400 South Trust Tower
Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
