STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND ) PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ) DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ) AND TOBACCO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

) CDN SOUTHERN INVESTMENTS, INC., ) d/b/a SOUTHERN NIGHTS, )

)

Respondent. )

Case No. 01-1675

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

A formal hearing in this cause was held before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Orlando, Florida, on June 28, 2001.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Kenneth W. Gieseking, Esquire

Department of Business and Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

For Respondent: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire

Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman

Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 11

Whether the Respondent, or its agents, servants or employees, did unlawfully sell a controlled substance, to wit: powder cocaine, on the licensed premises, in violation of Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, on the following dates: July 14, 20, August 4, 12, 19, 25 and September 10,

1999.

Count 3

Whether the Respondent, or its agents, servants or employees, did unlawfully sell a controlled substance, to wit: powder cocaine, on the licensed premises on

July 28, 1999, in violation of

Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

Count 5, 9 and 10 Whether the Respondent, or its agent,

servants or employee, did unlawfully sell a controlled substance, to wit: methylenediozymethamphetamine, on the licensed premises, in violation of Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, on the following dates: August 10, 25 and

September 1, 1999.

Whether Respondent permitted another on the licensed premises to sell a controlled substance, in violation of Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This cause came for hearing pursuant to an Eleven-Count Administrative Action, dated February 11, 2000, alleging unlawful selling of controlled substances, on the licensed premises. Respondent denied the allegations and filed a Request

for Hearing, dated February 23, 2000. This matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing on April 30, 2001. A hearing date was set and discovery ensued.

The hearing was held on June 28, 2001. Petitioner presented the testimony of Special Agents Gregory Vincent Alberti, Melissa Jo Winfred, and former agent Nicholas Collura of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Agent Collura is now employed by The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). Petitioner also offered three exhibits, which were received in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Denny Johns, registered agent, president, and one of the principal owners of CDN-Southern Investment, Inc.

Respondent offered four exhibits, which were received in evidence. Petitioner then put on the rebuttal testimony of Agent Collura.

The Transcript of the hearing was filed on July 20, 2001. On motion of Petitioner, an Order extending the time for filing a proposed recommended order until August 20, 2001, was entered. The parties timely filed their post-hearing submittals on August 20, 2001, and they have been given careful consideration in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all time relevant and material to this proceeding, Respondent, CDN Southern Investments, Inc., d/b/a Southern

   Nights, held license number 58-00375, series 4COP, which authorizes it to sell alcoholic beverages at retail at the licensed premises of Southern Nights, located in Orange County, Florida. Respondent has been in continuous operation at 375 South Bumby Avenue, Orlando, Florida since October 1987.

2. At the times material to this action, Denny Johns was the registered agent, president and one of the principal owners of Respondent's corporation.

3. On May 18, 1999, Petitioner initiated an investigation of the licensed premises, Southern Nights, based on a complaint regarding narcotics activity. It was decided that one or two special agents from Petitioner's Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco would enter the licensed premises in an undercover capacity, appearing to be a patron, make observations, and attempt to purchase illegal substances for money while on the premises. During each of the encounters described below, the transactions were made in the early morning hours of the day following the actual day the Agent entered the premises, and that each entry was made around 11:30 p.m.

4. On July 13, 1999, Special Agent Melissa Jo Winfred entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agent made contact with, and requested to purchase cocaine from Kert (later identified as Kert W. Reynolds), a patron of the licensed premises. Agent Winfred purchased twenty dollars of a

   white powder, which appeared to be cocaine, from Kert. The purchase was made near the rear bar and the dance floor of the licensed premises.

5. On July 20, 1999, Special Agents Winfred and Nicholas Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with, and requested to purchase cocaine from Kert, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises, while seated at the bar. Kert returned to the bar and exchanged a white substance, which appeared to be cocaine, for twenty dollars with Agent Winfred.

6. On July 27, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with Stewart, a bartender for the licensed premises (later identified as Stewart W. Bush). Agent Collura requested to purchase cocaine from Stewart. Agent Collura gave Stewart twenty dollars. Stewart then placed a closed matchbook in front of Agent Collura containing a plastic bag filled with a white powder substance, which later appeared to be cocaine.

7. On August 3, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact and requested to purchase cocaine from Bruce (later identified as Bruce Wayne Lear, Jr.), a patron of the licensed premises. This conversation took place at the bar of the licensed premises. Bruce exchanged a white powder substance

   with Agent Collura for twenty dollars. Agent Collura testified that he "field tested" the substance, once outside the licensed premises, the results of the field test are unknown.

8. Relative to the August 3, 1999, incident, the testimony of the Agents was inconsistent concerning any involvement of Stewart Bush. Agent Collura testified that he asked Stewart Bush for Drugs and he introduced him to Bruce Lear, a aforementioned patron of the licensed premises. Agent Winfred, who was with Collura on this occasion, could not recall with any certainty who the bartender was that night nor any specific involvement of Stewart Bush. The case report and the officer's case investigative entries, prepared by Agent Winfred and reviewed for accuracy by Agent Collura, do not reference any involvement by Stewart Bush or even that he was there that night. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to link Stewart Bush with any alleged drug activity on the night of August 3, 1999.

9. On August 5, 1999, Petitioner's Agents visited Respondent's premises in an undercover capacity but neither purchased nor observed any sales of alleged controlled substances. Agent Winfred was on the premises of Respondent on this date and sought to inquire of a bartender, other than Stewart Bush, about drugs. The bartender gave her the response, "Do not ask me that."

10. On August 10, 1999, Agent Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agent made contact with, and requested to purchase "beans" (referring to methylenedioxymethamphetamine, hereinafter, MDMA) from Bruce, a patron of the licensed premises. The conversation took place at the bar of the licensed premises. Bruce left the licensed premises and returned with two pills. Bruce exchanged the pills to Agent Collura for fifty dollars.

11. On August 12, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with, and requested to purchase cocaine from Kert, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises. Kert exchanged three bags of a white substance, which appeared to be cocaine, for fifty dollars with Agent Winfred.

12. On August 18, 1999, Agents Winfred and Greenlee entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with, and requested to purchase drugs from "Patrick," a patron of the licensed premises. "Patrick" sold a white powder substance to the Agents near the bathrooms of the licensed premises. "Patrick" was never further identified.

13. On August 24, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with, and requested to purchase drugs from Kert, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises. The Agents

    purchased a white powder substance from Kert. The transaction between the Agents and Kert took place at the bar of the licensed premises.

14. On August 25, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The Agents made contact with, and requested to purchase drugs from Bruce, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises. Agent Collura purchased one pill for twenty-five dollars from Bruce.

15. On August 31, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. Agent Collura requested MDMA and purchased two pills from Bruce, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises.

16. On September 9, 1999, Agent Winfred entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. Agent Winfred purchased twenty dollars of a white powder substance from Kert, the aforementioned patron of the licensed premises. The transaction took place at the main bar of the licensed premises.

17. On September 21, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The purpose for the visit was in order to identify persons from whom the Agents purchased drugs.

18. On September 28, 1999, Agents Winfred and Collura entered the licensed premises in an undercover capacity. The purpose of the visit was in order to identify persons from whom

    the Agents purchased drugs. The persons who previously sold substances suspected to be illegal drugs to the undercover agents on the licensed premises were placed under arrest. The disposition of those charges is unknown.

19. Petitioner presented no evidence, other than uncorroborated hearsay, that a controlled substance was sold or purchased within the licensed premises on July 13, 20, 27; August 3, 10, 12, 18, 24, 25, 31; or September 9, 1999.

20. No evidence was presented that Kert Reynolds, Brue W. Lear, Jr., or "Patrick" were agents, servants, or employees of Respondent.

21. In regard to the incident on July 27, 1999, involving a transaction with the bartender, Stewart w. Bush, Respondent proved that Stewart Bush was an employee of longstanding who had acknowledged in writing Respondent's no-drug policy upon being hired in 1990 and who had been repeatedly trained at four-month intervals in the responsible vendor training program. He was dismissed immediately upon Respondent's learning of the charge against him. Respondent proved evidence that Stewart Bush upon his initial hiring in 1990 signed a statement acknowledging that he read and understood the policies of Respondent including that as a condition of employment:

    5. I will not possess, use, sell, or allow the usage or sale of any unlawful drug in my place of employment. If I witness or

    suspect any such unlawful activity, I will immediately notify my supervisor.

    
    

22. Stewart Bush further received responsible vendor training, which included the subject of controlled substances and on which he received a passing score, in September of 1998. At such time he again executed a similar acknowledgment of Respondent's no-drug policy. He had also been certified as having completed a responsible vendor training program effective May 5, 1993. Further, the testimony of Respondent's president, Denny Johns, proved that Stewart Bush had received constant responsible vendor training approximately every four months concerning the prohibition against sale of tobacco products or alcohol to minors and the no drug policy, which all employees and managers were required to attend.

23. Respondent, since at least 1993, through and including the period covered by the Administrative Action, has placed itself within the ambit of Florida's Responsible Vendor Act, Section 561.701, Florida Statutes, by providing the Act's requisite training to its staff and obtaining the Act's concomitant protections. Although Petitioner's Agents did not observe the events described in these facts, the evidence indicates that Respondent employed security guards, issued trespass warnings, utilized off-duty Orlando Police Department officers for security and actively endeavored to police its

    establishment to prevent unlawful sales of controlled substances.

24. Respondent was not lacking in due diligence in the management and supervision of its licensed premises.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

25. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter this proceeding and the parties thereto, pursuant to Section 120.59 and Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

26. Petitioner bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996). In an administrative proceeding seeking to impose penalties against the holder of business license, Petitioner is required to prove the allegations of the administrative complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Pic N' Save Central Florida, Inc. v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 601 So. 2d

245, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) and Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987). This heightened standard is justified by the "gravity and magnitude" of the proceeding and because such a proceeding implicates "the loss of livelihood, an elevated standard is necessary to protect the rights and interests if the accused." Ferris v. Turlington, supra at 294-

295. Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard

of evidence beyond the mere preponderance but less than beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases. Smith v.

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 522 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

1. In Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th

   
   

   DCA 1983), the court held that:

   
   

   . . . [C]lear and convincing evidence requires the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

   
   

2. Section 561.29, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent

   
   

   part:

   
   

   1. The division is given full power and authority to revoke or suspend the license of any person holding a license under the Beverage Law, when it is determined or found by the division upon sufficient cause appearing of:

      
      

      1. Violation by the license of his or her or its agents, officers, servants, or employees, on the licensed premises, or elsewhere while in the scope of employment, of any of the laws of this state or of the United States, . . . or permitting another on the licensed premises to violate any of the laws of this state or of the United States.

   * * *

   (3) The division may impose a civil penalty against a licensee for any violation mentioned in the Beverage Law, or any rule issued pursuant thereto, not to exceed

   $1,000 for violations arising out of a single transaction. . . .

   
   

3. Subsection 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, states in pertinent parts:

   Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance. . . .

   
   

4. An alcoholic beverage licensee's responsibility for illegal acts committed by others on the licensed premises have been will established in a number of cases. See Pauline v. Lee,

   147 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962); G & B of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, Division of Beverages, 371

   So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Lash, Inc. v. State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, 411 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); Taylor v. State Beverage Department, 194 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA) cert. den., 201 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1967); Woodbury v.

   State Beverage Department, 219 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); Golden Dophin #2, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 403 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Charlotte County Lodge v. Department of Business Regulation, 463 So. 2d 1208,

   1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Pic N' Save v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 601 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

   Essentially, these cases stand for the proposition that a licensee is not the absolute insurer of the actions of patrons, but may be held accountable if the licensee knew, should have known, fostered, condoned, or negligently overlooked the illegal activity. These cases generally involve illegal acts by employees or patrons of the licensee, and generally hold that flagrant or persistent conduct must be shown to demonstrate that the licensee should be held responsible for illegal conduct.

5. In Jones v. State Department of Business Regulation,

   
   

   448 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1st. DCA 1984) the court, construing Subsection 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, held:

   This statute deals only with violations by the licensee or his or its officers, servants or employees, which occur on the licensed premises, or elsewhere while in the scope of employment. None of the counts of which the licensee was found guilty involved an agent, servant or employee. . . .

   Neither Section 561.29(1)(a), nor the case law cited in the recommended order supports a finding that Jones, or any of his agents, servants, or employees were guilty of violating that section under the facts.

   
   

6. Subsection 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that hearsay evidence shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding of fact unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. While Agent Winfred testified that all substances purchased were submitted to the FDLE Crime Lab, she conceded that her understanding of what the substances were

   came solely from what FDLE said. No testimony was presented at the hearing which would establish the predicate necessary to admit this testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule.

   Therefore, it cannot support a finding of fact. Durall v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 743 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 4th

   DCA 1999). See also Arnold v. State, 497 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) for the analogous case of a probation revocation proceeding in which hearsay is admissible but must be supported by other competent non-hearsay evidence; therein the court stated, at 1357:

   The only proof that the substance in question was cocaine was in the form of an oral hearsay reference to the results of a laboratory test. While hearsay is admissible in revocation proceedings, proof of a violation must be supported by other competent, non-hearsay, evidence.

   
   

7. In another analogous case of L. R. v. State, 557 So.

   
   

   2d 121, 122 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990) involving an adjudication of delinquency for possession of cocaine, a proceeding with similar evidentiary standards, the Court held:

   At the adjudicatory hearing the sole evidence identifying the substance was the officer's testimony that, based on his past experience, it appeared to be rock cocaine, and that it field tested positive of cocaine. The officer described the procedure for performing the test, but was unable to testify as to the reliability of the test. No laboratory report was introduced, nor was a chemist called to testify. . . . the evidence was

   insufficient. We therefore reverse the adjudication of delinquency and remand with directions to discharge L. R.

   
   

8. Each count of the Administrative Action asserts that Respondent "through its agents(s), servant(s), or employee(s), to wit:" Kert Reynolds, Bruce Lear, Stewart Bush, or Patrick Ehlert, sold controlled substances while on the licensed premises contrary to Subsection 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes. There was no evidence that Kert Reynolds, Bruce Lear or Patrick Ehlert were employees or agents or servants of Respondent. Out of fifteen visits to the premises of Respondent in an undercover capacity, Agent Collura made a purchase on July 27, 1999, from an employee, Stewart, but the August 5, 1999, visit was Agent Winfred's only attempt to buy drugs from an employee and she was unequivocally turned down. At no other time was an employee of Respondent implicated in an alleged drug transaction in July, August, or September 1999.

9. No corroborating evidence exists relative to the nature of the substances purchased as alleged in Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Consequently, such charges must be dismissed. In regard to the substance purchased as alleged in Counts 4 and 6, there was testimony that the substance was "field tested" but there was no testimony as to whether such field test yielded a positive or negative result. Consequently,

   Counts 4 and 6 of the Administrative Action must likewise be dismissed.

10. Relative to Count 8 of the Administrative Action, Agent Collura asserted that prior to the substance being sent to the FDLE Crime Lab, he "Valtoxed" it and it was positive for cocaine. No evidence was presented concerning the reliability of the Valtox test performed, nor was any scientific proof presented to substantiate Agent Collura's non-expert statement. See Cabral v. State, 550 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989).

11. From the evidence, Respondent exercised due diligence in the training of its employees and in the management and supervision of its premises. In Pandolfi v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 698 So. 2d 596, 597 (Fla.

    5th DCA 1997), rev. den. 705 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1997) it was noted that "appellants' had a twelve-year violation-free record which indicated a conscientious and diligent effort to operate [their] establishment in conformity with the beverage laws." Respondent has the same twelve-year violation-free record which also indicates a similar conscientious and diligent effort to operate in conformity with beverage laws.

12. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So.

    
    

    2d 1277, 1283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) held that only repeated and flagrant violations by employees allow an inference that such violations had been fostered, condoned, or negligently

    overlooked by the licensee. The court defined "flagrant" as meaning "glaring, notorious, scandalous" or "flaming into notice." In the instant matter all of the alleged sales of controlled substances were hand-to-hand transactions executed in a manner not easily observable or distinguishable as a drug transaction. Indeed, there was no testimony that any of the alleged transactions were "glaring" or "flaming into notice" so as to meet the requisite "flagrant" standard of Heifetz v.

    Department of Business Regulation, supra at 1283. The licensee

    
    

    was found to have taken "'responsible precautions' to prevent illegal activity on the premises." Such reasonable precautions included "the hiring of an off-duty policeman to be present in the lounge to prevent illegal conduct and the giving of instructions to the managers, as well as the employees, regarding the prevention of drug sales." Heifetz, supra. The precautions taken by Respondent were reasonable.

13. In Pic N' Save, supra, at 256 the court concluded that

    
    

    proof of a licensee's negligent training or lack of diligence in supervising its employees requires clear and convincing evidence of more than the fact that certain illegal sales occurred. The court held:

    The imposition of personal responsibility on the licensee for illegal sales by its employees requires . . . proof of minimum standards of conduct, wither by adopted rules, communicated agency policy or

    expert testimony, against which the licensee's alleged misconduct can be judged. Otherwise, determining when a licensee is to be held responsible for employee misconduct will become simply a matter of personal opinion held by a hearing officer or the Division on a case by case basis without any firm standard for uniformity and application or enforcement.

    
    

14. In the instant matter, no evidence was presented by Petitioner as to the standard which Respondent must meet or the minimum standards of conduct required. However, Respondent presented testimony that it had complied with the requirements of Florida's Responsible Vendor Act, Section 561.701, Florida Statutes.

15. In Pic N' Save v. Department of Business Regulation, supra at 250, the court held:

    Thus, while an employee may violate the beverage law in making illegal sales of alcoholic beverages to minors, the licensee's culpable responsibility therefore is measured in terms of its own intentional wrong doing or its negligence and lack of diligence in training and supervising its employees regarding illegal sales. This limitation on the licensee's liability is consistent with the notion, also long recognized by the courts of this state, that one's license to engage in an occupation is not to be taken away except for misconduct personal to the licensee.

    
    

    The court went on to state at 255:

    
    

    It would appear from the language of the order that anything less than one-hundred- percent compliance with the law by a licensee's employees is sufficient to

    support a finding of culpability against the licensee, but that conclusion would make the licensee absolutely responsible for the acts of its employees and thus would be inconsistent with the law previously discussed.

    
    

16. There is insufficient evidence that Respondent actually or constructively permitted anyone to conduct illegal drug activities on its premises.

17. Under the clear and convincing standard or, indeed, under any standard, Petitioner's evidence has wholly failed to establish any violations.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

It is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Action in this matter.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2001.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Capt. German Garzon Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

400 West Robinson Street, Room 709 North Tower, Hurston Building Orlando, Florida 32801

Kenneth W. Gieseking, Esquire Department of Business and

Professional Regulation Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood,

Purnell & Hoffman Post Office Box 551

Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551

Richard Turner, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages

and Tobacco

Department of Business and Professional Regulation

Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and

Professional Regulation Northwood Centre

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 01-001675

Orders for Case No: 01-001675