STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by Administrative Law Judge William J. Kendrick, held a hearing in the above-styled case on September 3, 2004, in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: William R. Waters, Jr., Esquire

Pearson & Waters, P.A. 703 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32303

For Respondent: Ronald A. Labasky, Esquire

Landers & Parsons, P.A.

310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues noticed for hearing were the amount and manner of payment of the parental award, the amount owing for attorney's fees and costs, and the amount owing for past expenses.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

At the hearing held on September 3, 2004, Natasha Ransom; William R. Waters, Jr., Esquire; and Donald Hinkle, Esquire, testified on behalf of Petitioner, and Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 were received into evidence. Respondent called Mary Love, Esquire, and Kenney Shipley, as witnesses, but offered no exhibits.

The transcript of the hearing was filed September 20, 2004, and the parties were accorded 10 days from that date to file proposed orders or written argument. The parties elected to file a proposed order or a post-hearing memorandum, and they have been duly considered.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Case history

1. On June 12, 2003, Natasha Ransom, on behalf of and as parent and natural guardian of Ajah Amiracle Nelson (Ajah), a minor, filed a petition (claim), pro se, with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for compensation under the

   Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).

2. DOAH served the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA) with a copy of the claim on June 13, 2003, and by letter of February 9, 2004, following a number of extensions of time to complete its review of the claim,1 NICA gave notice to Petitioner that it agreed Ajah suffered a birth-related neurological injury and offered to provide Plan benefits. Specifically, the letter provided:

   Dear Mrs. Ransom:

   
   

   Pursuant to Section 766.305(3), Florida Statutes, the Association agrees that Ajah Amiracle Nelson suffered a birth-related neurological injury as defined in Section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes. A copy of Dr. Duchowny's medical evaluation and

   Dr. Willis' medical record review are attached.

   
   

   We are prepared to provide medical benefits as specified in Section 766.31(1)(a), and are willing to offer the full $100,000 to be used for the purchase of a home, transportation or other expenses associated with these purchases, as provided in Section 766.31(1)(b).

   
   

   We have enclosed an original Stipulation and Joint Petition for Compensation. Please review the form and call us if you have any questions. Once you have signed the form,

   return it to us and we will file it with the Division of Administrative Hearings.

   
   

   Sincerely,

   
   

   Kenney Shipley Executive Director

   
   

3. Ms. Ransom did not respond to NICA's letter of February 9, 2004, so by letter of February 27, 2004, NICA requested that Ms. Ransom "[p]lease contact us as to your plans

   in regard to this matter." Again Ms. Ransom did not respond, and on March 26, 2004, NICA filed a Motion for Summary Final Order, together with supporting affidavits from Doctors Duchowny and Willis, and requested that a final order be entered "determining that the claim is compensable under the Plan."

4. Ms. Ransom did not respond to NICA's Motion for Summary Final Order. Consequently, by Notice of Hearing dated April 8, 2004, a hearing was scheduled for April 30, 2004, to resolve the following issues

   1. Whether Respondent's proposal to accept the claim as compensable should be approved;

   2. the amount and manner of payment of the parental award, the amount owing for attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing the claim, and the amount owing for past expenses; and, (3) Respondent's Motion for Summary Final Order.

      
      

      Again, nothing was heard from Petitioner until April 26, 2004, when counsel, William R. Waters, Jr., filed a Notice of Appearance on her behalf, as well as a Motion for Continuance of the hearing.2 By Order of April 28, 2004, the Motion for Continuance was granted, and the hearing was re-scheduled for May 19, 2004.

5. At the hearing held on May 19, 2004, the parties agreed that the claim was compensable, and NICA's Motion for Summary Final Order was granted. The results of that hearing were documented by Order of May 20, 2004, as follows:

   This cause came on to be heard on Respondent's Motion for Summary Final Order, filed March 20, 2004. Also addressed were various matters relating to the status of the case, and Petitioner's desire to amend her petition to raise the issue of notice.

   Consistent with the discussion had with the parties, it is

   
   

   ORDERED that:

   
   

   1. Respondent's Motion for Summary Final Order is granted, and it is resolved that the subject claim is compensable under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan). To be resolved is the award, and whether the physician and hospital complied with the notice provisions of the Plan.

      
      

   2. Petitioner's Amended Petition filed May 13, 2004, is stricken; however,

      Petitioner is accorded leave to file a second amended petition within 14 days of the date of this order, and to raise the issue of notice if she be so advised.[3]

   3. Any amended petition raising the issue of notice together with a copy of this order shall be served by the Petitioner on the participating physician and hospital so they may seek leave, if they be so advised, to

      intervene in this proceeding to advance their own interests.

      
      

   4. In due course, a hearing will be scheduled to address the award and, if necessary, the issue of notice.

   
   

6. Petitioner elected to file a Second Amended Petition, wherein she again averred that she was not provided adequate pre- delivery notice by the participating physician or hospital and served a copy of the petition on the participating physician and hospital.4 Neither the participating physician nor the hospital requested leave to intervene, so a hearing was scheduled for September 3, 2004, to resolve the following issues:

   1. The amount and manner of payment of the parental award, the amount owing for attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing the claim, and the amount owing for past expenses, and, if the parties fail to agree that the notice provisions of the Plan were satisfied, (2) Whether notice was accorded the patient, as contemplated by Section 766.316, Florida Statutes, or whether the failure to give notice was excused because the patient had an emergency medical condition, as defined by Section 395.002(8)(b), Florida Statutes, or the giving of notice was not practicable.

      
      

      Subsequently, by Stipulation dated August 16, 2004, the parties agreed that the participating physician and hospital complied with the notice provisions of the Plan, so the only issues that remained to resolve at hearing related to the award.

      Findings related to the parental award and past expenses

      
      

7. On September 23, 2004, following the conclusion of the hearing related to the award, the parties filed a Stipulation and Joint Petition for Compensation of Claim (Stipulation), wherein they agreed the claim was compensable, resolved the issues related to the parental award and past expenses, and agreed that the administrative law judge retain jurisdiction to resolve the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Notably, the Stipulation was, in all material respects, identical to the stipulation that had been mailed to Ms. Ransom on February 9, 2004, and, consequently, contained an incomplete sentence at paragraph 10a, which created an ambiguity.5 The Stipulation also failed to include a provision for periodic payment of the parental award that had been discussed at hearing.

8. Counsel were advised of the ambiguity and omission, and on September 28, 2004, they filed an Amendment to Stipulation and Joint Petition for Compensation of Claim (Amendment to Stipulation), that addressed the periodic payment and resolved the ambiguity. Thereafter, on October 14, 2004, the parties filed a Second Amendment to Stipulation and Joint Petition for Compensation of Claim (Second Amendment to Stipulation), that corrected a scrivener's error in paragraph 10b of the

   Stipulation. As for the parental award and past expenses, the parties' Stipulation, as amended, provided:

   10. The Claimant and the Association hereby agree as follows:

   
   

   1. The Claimant shall receive from the Association One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) to be used for the purchase of a home, transportation or expenses related to these purchases. The Claimant requests that payments be made as previously stated and if requested, a periodic payment be paid by the Association in a sum to be subsequently established and agreed upon and approved by the Administrative Law Judge.

      
      

   2. The Association will pay all benefits, past and future, as authorized by Section 766.31, Florida Statutes. Payment of past benefits under Section 766.31(1)(a), Fla. Stat., shall be subject to the provisions of Paragraph 18 of this Stipulation. (Emphasis added to denote amended provisions.)

   
   

   The stipulation further provided, with regard to past expenses, as follows:

   18. In order for the Association to carry out its responsibility as provided in this Stipulation, the Claimant shall provide within thirty (30) days of the date of approval of this Stipulation, the following:

   
   

   a) A complete list (with copies of invoices and names and addresses of providers) of all known past expenses under Section 766.31(1)(a), Fla. Stat., for which the Claimant seeks reimbursement in accordance with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation. The Association is relying upon the timely submission of such claims and to the extent that any such claims for past expenses are not submitted within the afore- described time period, the Claimant shall have intentionally and knowingly forever waived and relinquished her right to submit any such claims for payment to the Association . . . .

   
   

9. The parties' Stipulation, Amendment to Stipulation, and

   Second Amendment to Stipulation were approved by Final Order on October 25, 2004. Consequently, the issues related to the parental award and past expenses have been resolved, and need not be further addressed. Nevertheless, insofar as it may be relevant to the claim for attorney's fees and costs, a few observations are appropriate. First, with regard to past expenses, the only proof Petitioner offered at hearing was a letter of August 23, 2004, from the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) claiming a lien for Medicaid benefits AHCA provided to Ajah. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2; Transcript, page 64 and 65) That letter provided, as follows:

   The Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Third Party Liability Unit, is responsible for recouping payments made by third parties for medical services rendered to beneficiaries of medical assistance. Your office must make payment to the Agency within sixty days after receipt of settlement proceeds. Checks should be made payable to the Agency for Health Care Administration.

   
   

   We request that you review the Agency's rights under Sections 409.901 and 409.910, Florida Statutes.

   
   

   Enclosed is a revised summary of claims paid on behalf of the above captioned medical services received on and subsequent to the date of the accident. Please contact this office prior to settlement for an updated amount.

   
   

   Here, it should not be subject to serious debate that the lien neither represents a medical expense Ms. Ransom is obligated to pay nor an expense otherwise recoverable in this proceeding. See

   § 766.31(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat; Transcript, page 60. Second, with regard to the parental award, it is noted that, but for the provision regarding the periodic payment, which consumed little

   more than a ten-minute discussion at hearing, the award is the same as that contained in the proposed stipulation submitted to Ms. Ransom on February 9, 2004.

   Findings related to attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the filing of the claim

   
   

10. To support the claim for attorney's fees, Petitioner offered the Pre-bill Worksheet (timesheet) of Pearson & Waters,

    P.A. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), which reflects a total of 37 hours dedicated to the case. According to the timesheet, 36.5 hours were dedicated to the case by Mr. Waters, for which Petitioner requests an hourly rate of $225.00 (a total of $8,212.50) and

    one-half hour was dedicated to the case by Mr. Waters' partner, Fred Pearson, for which Petitioner also requests an hourly rate of $225.00 (a total of $112.50), for a total award of $8,325.00.

11. Petitioner generally described the services for which compensation was sought through Mr. Waters' testimony, where he observed that Ms. Ransom sought his assistance to decide whether to pursue a malpractice case or NICA benefits; to resolve questions concerning medical bills, what benefits she was entitled to receive, how those benefits would be paid, and how to evaluate medically necessary treatment for her child as time went on; and, if she moved out of state, how that would be handled by NICA. (Transcript, pages 25-28) Petitioner's proposed order also suggested that she "was entitled to legal counsel to assist her in finalizing and forming the parameters of an award" to preserve her continued eligibility for other state and federal aid, including Medicaid and housing assistance benefits. In response, NICA opposed any fee award, being of the view that the

    services rendered and the time spent were unnecessary to resolve the claim. Under the facts of this case, but for time that may have been spent formulating a parental award that preserved Ms. Ransom's state and federal aid, as well as time spent to recover past expenses, NICA's view has merit.

12. To calculate a reasonable attorney's fee, the first step is to determine the number of hours reasonably expended pursuing the claim. See Standard Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985); Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 633 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Notably, while counsel may have expended 37 hours representing Ms. Ransom, it is, "[u]nder the 'hour-setting' portion of the lodestar computation, . . . important to distinguish between 'hours actually worked' versus 'hours reasonably expended.'" Carreras, 633 So. 2d at 1110.

    . . . "Hours actually worked" is not the issue. The objective instead is for the trier of fact

    
    

    to determine the number of hours reasonably expended in providing the service. 'Reasonably expended' means the time that ordinarily would be spent by lawyers in the community to resolve this particular type of dispute. It is not necessarily the number of hours actually expended by counsel in the case. Rather,

    the court must consider the number of hours that should reasonably have been expended in that particular case. The court is not required to accept the hours stated by counsel.

    
    

    In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d 333-34 (emphasis in original). The trier of fact

    must determine a reasonable time allowance for the work performed—which allowance may be less than the number of hours actually worked. Such a reduction does not reflect a judgment that the hours were not worked, but instead reflects a determination that a fair hourly allowance is lower than the time put in.

    
    

    Id. at 1110. Moreover, only time incurred pursuing the claim is compensable, not time incurred exploring civil remedies or opportunities to avoid Plan exclusivity, such as lack of notice. Carreras, 633 So. 2d at 1109. Additionally, block billing, the practice of recording the gross number of hours each day for multiple tasks, as practiced by Petitioner's counsel, makes it difficult to identify time that may have been associated with pursuing the claim, as opposed to some unrelated activity, and may result in a reduction in hours. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150 ("Inadequate documentation may result in a reduction in the number of hours claimed . . . ."); Lubkey v. Compuvac Systems, Inc., 857 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)("[T]he party seeking fees has the burden to allocate them to the issues for which fees are awardable or to show that the issues were so intertwined that allocation is not feasible.") Finally, a fee award must be supported with expert testimony, and cannot be based entirely on the testimony of the claimant's attorney. Palmetto Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Day, 512 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Fitzgerald v. State of Florida, 756 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). See Nants v. Griffin, 783 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)("To support a fee award, there must be evidence detailing the services performed and expert testimony as to the

    reasonableness of the fee . . . . Expert testimony is required to determine both the reasonableness of the hours and a reasonable hourly rate.")

13. Here, counsel spent at least 12.5 hours, that can be identified from the time sheet, and likely more, on matters associated with a possible civil action or opportunities to avoid Plan exclusivity, that are not recoverable.6 As for the remaining time, which was generally incurred to address

    Ms. Ransom's concerns, it was unnecessary to the resolution of the claim, which, at the time counsel was employed, only required that the manner of payment of the parental award be finalized and any unpaid expenses be identified. See § 766.31(1), Fla. Stat., which specifies the items includable in the award. Notably, no unpaid expenses were identified, and the manner of payment of the parental award was finalized without difficulty. Moreover, any time counsel incurred on the issue of unpaid expenses or finalizing the parental award, was not quantified.7 Finally, Petitioner failed to offer any expert testimony to support the reasonableness of the hours claimed or, stated differently, "the time that ordinarily would be spent by lawyers in the community to resolve this particular type of dispute."8 Carreras, 633 So.

    2d at 1110. Such failure is fatal to Petitioner's claim for an award of attorney's fees.

14. Lastly, Petitioner's counsel incurred certain expenses in his representation of Petitioner for which he seeks recovery. Such expenses are set forth on pages 4 and 5 of the Pre-bill Worksheet of Pearson & Waters, P.A. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1).

    Such costs total $3,243.41, and include a number of claims for "Postage," "FexEx" and "Copying cost," not otherwise explained, totaling $85.95; a claim bearing a date of 6/7/04, for "Copying cost for medical files," totaling $279.50; a claim bearing a date of 7/1/04, for "Review of records by Nurse Sharon P. Hall," totaling $1,200.00; and a claim bearing a date of 7/30/04, for "Copying cost and medical records," totaling $1,677.96.

15. Petitioner's claim for "Postage," "FedEx" and "Copying cost," not otherwise explained, totaling $85.95 is denied. See State, Department of Transportation v. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d 1125, 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)("[P]ostage, long distance calls, fax transmissions, and delivery services are office expenses that should not have been taxed as costs.") Moreover, given the limited issues that remained to resolve the claim, and Petitioner having failed to demonstrate any need for the medical records to resolve such issues, Petitioner's claim for the copying costs, totaling $1,957.46, is denied. Finally, for like reason, Petitioner's claim for Nurse Hall's review of records, totaling

    $1,200.00, is denied, and for the further reason that Petitioner failed to present competent evidence of the services performed by Nurse Hall and the reasonable value of those services. Gray v.

    Bradbury, 668 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)("The prevailing party's burden at an evidentiary costs hearing, to recover an expert witness fee is 'to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.'")

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

16. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, these proceedings. § 766.301, et seq., Fla. Stat.

17. Pertinent to this case, Section 766.31(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that where, as here, a claim for compensation has been approved, "the administrative law judge shall make an award providing compensation for the following items relative to such injury:"

    1. Actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable medical and hospital, habilitative and training, family residential or custodial care, professional residential, and custodial care and service, for medically necessary drugs, special equipment, and facilities, and for related travel. However, such expenses shall not include:

       
       

       1. Expenses for items or services that the infant has received, or is entitled to receive, under the laws of any state or the Federal Government, except to the extent such exclusion may be prohibited by federal law.

       
       

       * * *

       
       

       Expenses included under this paragraph shall be limited to reasonable charges prevailing in the same community for similar treatment of injured persons when such treatment is paid for by the injured person.

       
       

    2. 1. Periodic payments of an award to the parents or legal guardians of the infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury, which award shall not exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion of the administrative law judge, such award may be made in a lump sum.

       
       

       * * *

       
       

    3. Reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the filing of a claim under ss. 766.301-766.316, including reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be subject to the approval and award of the administrative

    law judge. In determining an award for attorney's fees, the administrative law judge shall consider the following factors:

    
    

    1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.

       
       

    2. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

       
       

    3. The time limitations imposed by the claimant or the circumstances.

       
       

    4. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant.

       
       

    5. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing services.

       
       

    6. The contingency or certainty of a fee.

18. Here, the parties have resolved by stipulation the issues related to the parental award and past expenses. Left to resolve were the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in pursing the claim.

19. As the claimant, Petitioner had the burden to demonstrate that the expenses claimed, including attorney's fees, were reasonable. Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)("[T]he burden of proof, apart from statute, is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal.") Here, for reasons appearing in the Findings of Fact, Petitioner failed to sustain her burden.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

ORDERED that Petitioner's claim for expenses incurred in

connection with the filing of a claim, including reasonable attorney's fees, is denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this 25th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

WILLIAM J. KENDRICK

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2004.

ENDNOTES

1/ In reviewing the claim, NICA requested that Michael Duchowny, M.D., a pediatric neurologist, examine Ajah and review his medical records, and that Donald Willis, M.D., a physician practicing maternal fetal medicine also review Ajah's medical records, and offer their opinions as to whether Ajah suffered a birth-related neurologist injury. Following a current MRI exam (completed January 8, 2004), Dr. Duchowny was of the opinion Ajah had suffered a birth-related neurological injury. Dr. Willis' opinion also supported the conclusion that the claim was compensable.

2/ According to counsel's time record (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), Ms. Ransom first met with counsel on April 12, 2004.

3/ On May 13, 2004, without having requested leave to do so, Petitioner had filed an Amended Petition, wherein she alleged, for the first time, that she was not provided adequate pre- delivery notice by the participating physician or the hospital, and requested that her petition be dismissed for lack of pre- delivery notice. NICA responded to the Amended Petition on

May 17, 2004, and admitted the claim was compensable, suggested dismissal for lack of pre-delivery notice was not appropriate, and requested that the hearing scheduled for May 19, 2004, be continued "to allow the doctor and/or hospital involved to be advised of the ongoing proceeding, to consider their possible intervention and the protection of their rights before this matter proceeds to Final Hearing for determination of notice as provided under the provisions of the NICA plan."

At the hearing of May 19, 2004, noting that notice was a new issue, and that the participating physician and hospital had not been noticed of the issue in the initial petition or served with a copy of the Amended Petition, it was resolved that the Amended Petition be stricken, Petitioner be accorded leave to file a second amended petition to raise the issue of notice, and that if Petitioner elected to file an amended petition, she serve a copy of the petition, as well as a copy of the Order of May 20, 2004, on the participating physician and the hospital.

4/ A copy of Petitioner's Second Amended Petition, as well as a copy of the Order of May 20, 2004, was also served by DOAH on the participating physician and the hospital.

5/ The Stipulation was the same as that submitted to Ms. Ransom on February 9, 2004, except the new Stipulation included (at paragraphs 7 and 8) reference to the Order that resolved the claim was compensable, the parties' agreement that notice was given and an agreement that the administrative law judge retained jurisdiction to resolve the issue of attorney's fees and costs.

6/ Entries of 5/19/04 (3.00 hours), 5/19/04 (.75 hours), 5/19/04 (1.00 hours), 5/20/04 (.50 hours), 6/1/04 (.25 hours), 6/1/04 (1.25 hours), 6/7/04 (4.75 hours), 6/9/04 (.50 hours), and 8/2/04 (.50 hours).

7/ In so concluding, the entries of 5/19/04 for 3.00 hours (which noted "Conferences with client re: ID of past expenses she incurred," among other activities that day) and 7/19/04 for

2.00 hours (which noted "research Medicare requirements and payment options," among other activities that day) have not been overlooked. However, since counsel block-billed his time those days, and did not otherwise identify the time associated with those activities, it is not possible, absent speculation, to ascribe a value to those services.

8/ In so concluding, the testimony of Donald Hinkle, Esquire, who was called as expert by the Petitioner, has not been overlooked. However, Mr. Hinkle's testimony was limited to whether, in his opinion, it was reasonable for an attorney to expend time to review the case "to advise [the client] as to whether proceeding with NICA is a good idea or bad idea [compared with a malpractice action] or at least give the client the option to do that." (Transcript, pages 35 and 36) Mr. Hinkle expressed no opinion as to the reasonableness of the hours expended.

Moreover, while it may be reasonable for the client to consider the relative merits of Plan coverage versus a civil suit, and seek to avoid NICA coverage, attorney time dedicated to those efforts is not compensable. Carerras, supra.

COPIES FURNISHED:

(via certified mail)

William R. Waters, Jr., Esquire Pearson & Waters, P.A.

703 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Ronald A. Labasky, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A.

310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Kenney Shipley, Executive Director Florida Birth-Related Neurological

Injury Compensation Association 1435 Piedmont Drive, East, Suite 101

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Tara Louise Wah, M.D. 1219 Hodges Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Tallahassee Memorial Hospital 1300 Miccosukee Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5054

Ms. Charlene Willoughby Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-75 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3275

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Sections 120.68 and 766.311, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. See Section 766.311, Florida Statutes, and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v.

Carreras, 598 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 03-002213N

Orders for Case No: 03-002213N