STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
JAMES WERGELES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 10-2422
)
TREGATE EAST CONDOMINIUM )
ASS'N, INC., )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case on September 30, 2010, in Sarasota, Florida, before Patricia M. Hart, a duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, who presided in Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: James Wergeles, pro se
Post Office Box 346 Sarasota, Florida 34230
For Respondent: Cable B. Poag, Esquire
C. Todd Chapman, Esquire
Law Offices of Kevin T. Wells, P.A. 1800 Second Street, Suite 803
Sarasota, Florida 34236
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Section 760.20, et seq., Florida Statutes (2009).1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
James Wergeles filed a housing discrimination complaint against Tregate East Condominium Association ("Association") with respect to events occurring in or about September 2009. On or about March 23, 2010, the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") notified Mr. Wergeles that it had completed an investigation of his complaint and that it had determined that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred." Mr. Wergeles filed a Petition for Relief with the FCHR, and the FCHR transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge.
Pursuant to notice, the final hearing was held on September 30, 2010. Mr. Wergeles testified in his own behalf and presented the testimony of Mary Guarnella, Martin Shuart, Todd Palmer Lingo, Caroline Cuniff, Charles Marchione, Albert
Frost, and Pauline Olivia Schultz; Petitioner's Exhibits 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31 through 33, 40, 54, 56, 59, 62, and 63 were offered and received into evidence. The Association presented the testimony of Mary Guarnella, Martin Shuart, Todd Palmer
Lingo, and Charles Marchione; Respondent's Exhibits 1, 2, 5, 6,
9, 12 through 16, 19, 23, and 24 were offered and received into evidence. Mr. Wergeles also testified in his own behalf on rebuttal. At the request of the Respondent, the Recommended Order in James Wergeles v. Tregate East Condo Association, DOAH Case No. 09-4204 (DOAH April 15, 2010), was officially recognized.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Association made an ore tenus Motion for Final Order of Dismissal on the grounds that Mr. Wergeles had failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of handicap. The motion was denied pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2010). The Division of Administrative Hearings does not have final order authority in this case, and the Association failed to establish that there were no disputed issues of material fact, a showing which is necessary to support an order to relinquish jurisdiction pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2010). The Association also filed on September 24, 2010, a Demand for Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to
Section 120.595, and, at the conclusion of the final hearing, it made on ore tenus Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. A ruling on this motion has been made in a separate order entered this date.
No transcript of the proceeding was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.2 The parties timely filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made:
Mr. Wergeles is a 61-year-old man who, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, resided in Unit 223 of the Tregate East Condominium development.
The Tregate East Condominium development contains
62 units and two elevators and is governed by the Association.
The unit in which Mr. Wergeles resided at the times pertinent to this proceeding was located on the second floor of one of the two apartment buildings comprising the Tregate East Condominium development.
At one time, Mr. Wergeles was the co-owner of Unit 223 of the Tregate East Condominium with Janice Scudder. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, however, he lived in the apartment pursuant to an agreement with Ms. Scudder that he would pay her one-half of expenses, including one-half of the mortgage, one-half of the condominium fees, and one-half of the utilities.
At the times pertinent to this proceeding, a group of ladies played cards in the condominium clubhouse on Friday nights. The easiest route to the clubhouse bathrooms, which were accessed by doors on the outside of the clubhouse wall, was through a side door of the clubhouse, which was adjacent to the bathrooms. The side door locked automatically, and, once outside, a person could re-enter the clubhouse by the side door only by entering a code on a key pad that was old and worn. Although there was a light attached to the corner of the clubhouse, the light did not illuminate the area around the side door or the bathrooms. Because it was very difficult to see the numbers on the key pad, the ladies left the side door open whenever someone needed to use the restroom, which caused concern because of the lack of security.
To remedy this situation, Lingo Electric, Inc. ("Lingo Electric"), installed a light above the side door of the condominium clubhouse on August 26, 2009, at the request of the Association. The purpose of the light was to provide illumination in the area of the side door and the clubhouse bathrooms.
The light installed by Lingo Electric was a 70 watt high pressure sodium photo cell light with a clear plastic lens, and it had a sensor that caused the light to come on only at
night. The light was not, and could not be, shielded because a cover would cause the plastic lens to melt.
The light was located about 50 feet from Mr. Wergeles' apartment. Although the light did not shine directly into
Mr. Wergeles' bedroom window, the amount of illumination coming through the bedroom window increased after the light was installed, even when the vertical blinds on the bedroom window were closed. The amount of illumination coming into the apartment's lanai, which was essentially a balcony that extended a few feet out from his apartment, also increased after the light was installed. This increased illumination disrupted
Mr. Wergeles' sleep.
Early on the morning of August 27, 2009, Mr. Wergeles left a voice mail message at the offices of the Association's attorneys, Kevin T. Wells, P.A., requesting that the Association remove the light.
In a letter dated August 28, 2009, David C. Meyer, Esquire, of the Kevin T. Wells, P.A. law firm, wrote to
Mr. Wergeles on behalf of the Association and notified him that his verbal request that the light be removed was rejected.
In a letter dated August 30, 2009, directed to the President of the Association and sent by certified mail, Mr. Wergeles stated:
As you are aware a floodlight was installed over the Clubroom side door by Lingo Electric on August 26. 2009. This light is defused and is shining directly into my bedroom and lanai. I am asking Tregate East Condominium Association, Inc. to block all light that is coming in my bedroom and lanai from this floodlight. I have had serious problems sleeping for many years that are directly related to my disability.[3] As you are aware I am disabled and this light coming in my bedroom and lanai are exacerbating my sleeping problem. There is a security light almost directly above this floodlight that covers the entire area. The floodlight that is over the clubroom side door is defused and multiplies the light that is emitted from it. Your immediate attention to the resolution to this situation would be greatly appreciated.[4]
At some point subsequent to Mr. Wergeles' request that the light be blocked from his window and lanai, the Association, through its attorney, requested that Mr. Wergeles provide detailed information regarding his medical condition from his treating physician, and he was asked to sign a release so that the Association could obtain his medical records.
In response to the Association's request, Mr. Wergeles provided a letter dated September 24, 2009, from "Scott B. Elsbree," written on the letterhead of Gulf Coast Medical Specialists, PLLC, and directed to "To Whom It May Concern." The letter stated in pertinent part:
Mr. Wergeles has been under my care since October 2006. He is physically disabled, and he has severe sleep problems. He requires a healthy and appropriate sleep
environment, away from loud noises and bright lights. Any accommodation you can make in that regard would be greatly appreciated.[5]
The letter contained no designation identifying Mr. Elsbree as a licensed health care professional, and his name did not appear on the letterhead of Gulf Coast Medical Specialists, PLLC.
Mr. Wergeles also provided the Association with a letter confirming that he had received Social Security disability benefits since January 2000.
On September 14, 2009, a code enforcement officer employed by Sarasota County, Florida, issued a Notice of Code Violation and Order to Correct Violation, in which the Association was ordered to correct all exterior lighting to ensure that it was "concealed behind an opaque surface and recessed within an opaque housing" such that "it shall not be visible from any street right-of-way or adjacent properties."6 The Order directed the Association to correct any violations on or before October 14, 2009.
Sometime between September 14, 2009, and October 14, 2009, when the Sarasota County code enforcement officer inspected the Tregate East Condominium property, Lingo Electric removed the original light from over the side door of the clubhouse and replaced it with one conforming to the Sarasota County Code.7
According to Mr. Wergeles, he had problems sleeping before the light over the side door of the clubhouse was installed, and the light made these problems worse. He related that he felt terrible because of the lack of sleep, was clumsy, and had migraine headaches and stomach problems. Mr. Wergeles described his sleeping problems as severe from the time the light was installed until it was removed and replaced with a shaded light.
Mr. Wergeles vacated Unit 223 of the Tregate East Condominium development on or about November 6, 2009.
Mr. Wergeles stated that the only relief he requested as a result of his complaint against the Association was a "fair shake." He did not claim any quantifiable damages arising out of his complaint of discrimination on the basis of handicap.
In addition to the complaint in the instant case, Mr. Wergeles filed discrimination complaints against the Association with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or the FCHR in 2006, 2007, and 2009. In all
four complaints, Mr. Wergeles alleged, among other things, that the Association had discriminated against him on the basis of handicap.8
Summary and findings of ultimate fact
The creditable evidence presented by Mr. Wergeles was insufficient to support a finding of fact that he was
handicapped at the times pertinent to this proceeding. In his testimony, Mr. Wergeles stated only that he was disabled. He provided no further explanation, referring instead to the letter from Mr. Elsbree and to the letter from the Social Security Administrative affirming that he had received disability payments since January 2000.
The letter from Mr. Elsbree contained no information about his medical credentials or the nature of the care he provided to Mr. Wergeles. In addition, even assuming that
Mr. Elsbree was a licensed physician who had treated
Mr. Wergeles for a medical condition, there is no information in the letter from which it can be determined that Mr. Wergeles had a "handicap" for purposes of sustaining a claim of discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act. The letter stated only that Mr. Wergeles "is physically disabled," a statement that provides no indication of the nature of
Mr. Wergeles' medical condition or the manner in which it substantially limited a major life activity.9 Furthermore, although Mr. Elsbree asserted that Mr. Wergeles had "severe sleep problems," the sleep problems were described as a condition from which Mr. Wergeles suffered in addition to his disability.10
The letter from the Social Security Administration affirming that Mr. Wergeles received disability benefits does
not include any information beyond the mere fact that he was found eligible for disability benefits. It, therefore, provides no more basis for determining the nature and extent of
Mr. Wergeles' asserted disability than Mr. Elsbree's letter stating that Mr. Wergeles "is physically disabled."
Even assuming that the evidence presented by
Mr. Wergeles was sufficient to support a finding of fact that he was handicapped, he failed to present sufficient credible evidence to support a finding of fact that the Association, or any member of the Board of Directors, knew or should have known that he was disabled. The only creditable evidence Mr. Wergeles presented on this point established merely that, prior to filing the complaint at issue in the instant case, he filed complaints against the Association in 2006, 2007, and 2009 alleging that it had discriminated against him on the basis of, among other things, a handicap. Mr. Wergeles did not present any evidence establishing that the Association conceded that he was handicapped with respect to any of these complaints or that there had been a final administrative or judicial adjudication that he was handicapped.
Because Mr. Wergeles failed to present any creditable evidence establishing that he was handicapped, he failed to establish that the accommodation he requested of the
Association, removal of the light over the side door of the clubhouse, was necessary.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties thereto pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2010).
Although Mr. Wergeles filed his discrimination complaint with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, the matter was transmitted to the FCHR for investigation. At the conclusion of its investigation, the FCHR notified Mr. Wergeles that it had determined there was no cause to believe that a discriminatory practice had occurred.
Mr. Wergeles subsequently filed a petition for an administrative hearing pursuant to the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections
760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
The substantive provisions of the Florida Fair Housing Act are virtually identical to the substantive provisions of the Federal Fair Housing Act, which is found at Title 42,
Sections 3601 through 3619, United States Code, and the same analysis is applied to both acts by the federal courts and the courts of Florida. See Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1299
n. 9 (11th Cir. 2002); Dornbach v. Holley, 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)("The Florida Legislature essentially codified
the Federal [Fair Housing] Act [Amendments of 1988] when it enacted the Florida Fair Housing Act"; "the application of the FHAA by the federal courts [is] instructive and persuasive" in the application of the Florida Fair Housing Act."). This case will, therefore, be analyzed pursuant to the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Section 760.34, Florida Statutes, provided in pertinent part:
(4) If, within 180 days after a complaint is filed with the commission or within
180 days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (3), the commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with ss. 760.20-760.37, the person aggrieved may commence a civil action in any appropriate court against the respondent named in the complaint or petition for an administrative determination pursuant to s. 760.35 to enforce the rights granted or protected by ss. 760.20-760.37. .
. .
Section 760.35, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
(3)(a) If the commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with ss. 760.20-
760.37 or has reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred:
* * *
2. The person aggrieved may request administrative relief under chapter 120 within 30 days after receiving notice that the commission has concluded its investigation under s. 760.34.
(b) Administrative hearings shall be conducted pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57(1). The respondent must be served written notice by certified mail. If the administrative law judge finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, he or she shall issue a recommended order to the commission prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including quantifiable damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The commission may adopt, reject, or modify a recommended order only as provided under
s. 120.57(1). Judgment for the amount of damages and costs assessed pursuant to a final order by the commission may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof and may be enforced as any other judgment.
As the person complaining of discrimination in this administrative proceeding, Mr. Wergeles has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against by the Association on the basis of his handicap. See § 760.34(5), Fla. Stat. ("In any proceeding brought pursuant to this section [Section 760.34] or s. 760.35, the burden of proof is on the complainant."); § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. ("Findings of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute, and shall be based on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.").
The preponderance of the evidence standard requires proof by "the greater weight of the evidence," Black's Law
Dictionary 1201 (7th ed. 1999), or evidence that "more likely than not" tends to prove a certain proposition. See Gross v.
Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 289 n.1 (Fla. 2000)(relying on American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)).
In his Petition for Relief, Mr. Wergeles alleged that the Association discriminated against him because of his handicap because it failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation by removing the light installed over the side door of the clubhouse in a timely manner, in violation of
Section 760.23, Florida Statutes, which provided in pertinent part:
It is unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of:
That buyer or renter;
* * *
For purposes of subsections (7) and (8), discrimination includes:
* * *
A refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
There is no dispute that a unit in the Tregate East Condominium development is a "dwelling," as that term is defined in Section 760.22(2)(a), Florida Statutes.
Section 760.22(10), Florida Statutes, defines "to rent" as "to lease, to sublease, to let, and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy premises not owned by the occupant." The greater weight of the evidence presented by Mr. Wergeles establishes that he occupied Unit 223 in the Tregate East Condominium development pursuant to an agreement with Ms. Scudder, the owner of the unit, which permitted
Mr. Wergeles to occupy the premises with Ms. Scudder in exchange for payment of consideration to her.11 Mr. Wergeles was, therefore, a "renter" at the times pertinent to this proceeding and was entitled to the protections provided in Section 760.23(8) and (9), Florida Statutes.
In order to prevail on a claim of discrimination based on handicap under the theory that the Association denied him a reasonable accommodation, Mr. Wergeles must establish that
(1) he suffered from a handicap within the meaning of the Florida Fair Housing Act, (2) the Association knew or should have known that he was handicapped, (3) a reasonable accommodation was necessary to afford him or her an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the Respondent refused to
make the requested accommodation. See Giebler v. M & B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003).
"Handicap" is defined in Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes, as follows:
(a) A person has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, or he or she has a record of having, or is regarded as having, such physical or mental impairment[.]
Based on the findings of fact herein, Mr. Wergeles has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is "handicapped" as defined in Section 760.22(7)(a), Florida Statutes. Additionally, even though Mr. Wergeles conclusively established that he received Social Security disability benefits at the times pertinent to this proceeding, this is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that he was handicapped under the Florida Fair Housing Act. See Horwitz v. L. Stickley, Inc., 20 Fed. Appx. 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2001)(receiving Social Security disability benefits does not establish that person is disabled under Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")); Weiler
v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996)("Because the ADA's determination of disability and a determination under the Social Security disability system diverge significantly in their respective legal standards and statutory intent, determinations made by the Social Security
Administration concerning disability are not dispositive findings for claims arising under the ADA.").12
In addition, based on the findings of fact herein, Mr. Wergeles failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that he was entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the Florida Fair Housing Act. In the absence of proof of the nature and extent of a physical or mental condition and of the manner in such a condition substantially limited a major
life activity, it is a legal impossibility for a person to prove that an accommodation is "necessary to afford him [or her] an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling." Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2008). See
§ 760.22(7), Fla. Stat.
A person is not entitled to an accommodation simply because he or she requests an accommodation. See Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase I Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 2009 WL 691378 at 7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009). Rather, as the court in Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428-429 (7th Cir. 1995) held, "the concept of necessity requires at a minimum the showing that the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability." See also Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2003)("[T]here must be a causal connection between the major life activity that is limited and the
accommodation sought" in order to establish entitlement to a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA.). Based on the findings of fact herein, Mr. Wergeles failed to prove that the removal of the light over the side door of the clubhouse was necessary to ameliorate the effects of a handicap.
Based on the legal principles discussed above, as applied to the findings of fact herein, Mr. Wergeles failed to meet his burden of proving the first three elements of a claim of discrimination on the basis of handicap. Mr. Wergeles, therefore, failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association discriminated against him because of a handicap.
Finally, Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that an administrative law judge may recommend to the FCHR that a discriminatory housing practice be prohibited and that quantifiable damages, including attorney's fees and costs, be awarded. Even had Mr. Wergeles proven that the Association engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, he could be given no equitable relief because he no longer resides in the Tregate East Condominium development, and he neither requested, nor proved entitlement to, an award of quantifiable damages or costs.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by James Wergeles.
DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
PATRICIA M. HART
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2010.
ENDNOTES
1/ All references herein to the Florida Statutes are to the 2009 edition unless indicated otherwise.
2/ Neither party secured the services of a court reporter to transcribe the final hearing. Because the Florida Commission on Human Relations no longer provides a court reporter to preserve the testimony at the final hearing in cases under its jurisdiction, there is no transcript of the proceedings.
3/ The term "disability" was used throughout the final hearing and in Mr. Wergeles' discrimination complaint. The terms "handicap" and "disability" are used interchangeably herein.
4/ Petitioner's Exhibit 32. 5/ Petitioner's Exhibit 56. 6/ Petitioner's Exhibit 62.
7/ Although it is unclear from the testimony and related exhibits the exact date on which the light was removed, this is not a material fact in this proceeding.
8/ The first two discrimination complaints were settled by the parties. The third complaint was the subject of a formal administrative hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in DOAH Case No. 09-4204, and a Recommended Order was entered on April 15, 2010. On June 25, 2010, the FCHR entered a Final Order in DOAH Case No. 09-4204 adopting the Recommended Order in toto and dismissing Mr. Wergeles discrimination complaint against the Association.
9/ Petitioner's Exhibit 56.
10/ Id. ("He is physically disabled, and he has severe sleep problems.")(Emphasis added.)
11/ It is noted that Ms. Scudder did not obtain the prior written approval of the Association's Board of Directors, as required by paragraph 20 of the Amended Declaration of Condominium of Tregate East, to rent one-half of unit 223 to Mr. Wergeles. Mr. Wergeles lived in the apartment with
Ms. Scudder under their agreement for over 10 years, and the Association did not enforce the above-referenced provision during that time. It cannot now assert that Mr. Wergeles is not a "renter" for purposes of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
12/ Legal precedents under the ADA are generally persuasive in assessing handicapped discrimination claims under the Federal Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 573 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003)("Due to the similarities between the statutes, we interpret them in tandem.").
COPIES FURNISHED:
Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk
Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
James Wergeles Post Office Box 346
Sarasota, Florida 34230
C. Todd Chapman, Esquire
The Law Offices of Kevin T. Wells, P.A. 1800 2nd Street, Suite 803
Sarasota, Florida 34236
Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
Jan. 14, 2011 | Agency Final Order | |
Nov. 03, 2010 | Recommended Order | Petitioner failed to prove that he had a handicap; that Respondent knew/should have known had a handicap; or that requested accommodation was necessary. Petition for Relief from housing discrimination should be dismissed. |
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