STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, Petitioner, and DUVAL COUNTY/CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Intervenor, vs. Case No. 14 2799RP DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Respondent. _______________________________/ BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA , Petitioner, and DUVAL COUNTY/CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Intervenor, vs. Case No. 14 2800RP DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE , Respondent. _______________________________/ FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, ALACHUA COUNTY, BAY COUNTY, BREVARD COUNTY, CHARLOTTE COUNTY, COLLIER COUNTY, ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLAGLER COUNTY, HERNANDO COUNTY, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, LAKE COUNTY, LEE COUNTY, LEON Petitioners, and DUVAL COUNTY/CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Intervenor, vs. Case No. 14 2801RP DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Respondent. _______________________________/ ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Petitioner, and DUVAL COUNTY/CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Intervenor, vs. Case No. 14 4512RP DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Respondent. _______________________________/ FINAL ORDER Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was held in this case on November 12 and 13, 2014, in Tallahassee, Florida , before W. David Watkins, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. APPEARANCES For All Petitioner s and Intevenors Except Broward , Orange , and Volusia Counties : Gregory T. Stewart, Esquire Carly J. Schrader, Esquire Nabors, Giblin and Nic k erson, P.A. 1500 Mahan Drive, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 For Petitioner, County of Volusia: Mary G. Jolley, Esquire 123 West Indiana Avenue , Room 301 Deland, Florida 32720 For Petitioner, Orange County: Scott Shevenell, Esquire Orange County AttorneyÓs Office 201 South Rosalind Avenue, 3rd Floor Orlando, Florida 32801 For Petitioner, Broward County: Adam M. Katzman, Esquire Governmental Center, Suite 423 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 For Petitioner, Bay County: Terrell K. Arline, Esquire Bay County AttorneyÓs Office 840 West 11th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 2336 (Co Counsel for Petitioner Bay County) For Petitioner, Hillsborough County: Stephen M. Todd, Esquire Hillsborough County AttorneyÓs Office Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 1110 (Co Counsel for Petitioner Hillsborough County) For Respondent: Brian D. Berkowitz, General Counsel Michael J. Wheeler, Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 3100 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES This is a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes , 1 / to the Proposed Rules of the Department of Juvenile Justice (ÐDepartmentÑ or ÐDJJÑ) 63G 1.011, 63G 1.013, 63G 1.016, and 63G 1.017 (the ÐProposed RulesÑ). The main issue in this case is whether the Proposed Rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in that the Proposed Rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, section 985.686, Florida Statutes ; are vague ; and/or are arbitrary and capricious. Petit ioners also argue that the Proposed Rules impose regulatory costs that could be addressed by the adoption of a less costly alternative. Finally, Petitioners assert that the Proposed Rules apply an invalid interpretation of the General Appropriations Act ( ÐGAAÑ) for Fiscal Year (ÐFYÑ) 2014 15 by interpreting the GAA as a modification to substantive law, contrary to the Constitution of the State of Florida. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Twenty seven c ounties and the Florida Association of Counties (the Challengers) have filed p etitions challenging the Proposed Rules. The p etitioning c ounties include : Alachua County ; Bay County ; Brevard County ; Broward County ; Charlotte County ; Collier County ; Escambia County ; Flagler County ; Hernando County ; Hillsborough County ; Lake County ; Lee County ; Leon County ; Manatee County ; Martin County ; Nassau County ; Okaloosa County ; Orange County ; Palm Beach County ; Pinellas County ; Santa Rosa County ; St. Johns County ; St. Lucie County ; Sarasota County ; Walton County ; and Volusia Coun ty. Duval County/City of Jacksonville filed a Petition to Intervene, which was granted. At the final hearing, the Challengers Ó exhibits 1 92 were admitted in evidence , including the deposition transcripts of witnesses Jason Welty, Fred Schuknecht , Vickie Harris, the Honorable Judge Terrill J. LaRue (expert), and Minnora Bishop. Excerpts of the testimony of Mr. Welty and Mr. Schuknecht were published during the hearing. In addition, Petitioners presented the testimony of James Alexander Kelly, Fr ank A. Orlando (expert), Richard Edward Herring (expert), and Mark Greenwald. At the outset of the hearing the ChallengersÓ Request for Official Recognition of two Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Orders and two First District Court of Appeal op inions was granted. Department E xhibits 1 and 3 were admitted, including the deposition of Bonnie Rogers. The Department also presented the testimony of Mr. Schuknecht and Ms. Bishop. A Joint Pre Hearing Stipulation of the parties was filed prior to the final hearing, stipulating to certain facts which are admitted and issues of law on which there is agreement. T o the extent they are relevant t hose admitted facts and issues of law have been in corporated herein. The three volume T ranscript of the final hearing was prepared and filed with DOAH on December 8, 2014. At the request of Petitioners, the time for filing proposed final orders was extended to February 2, 2015. Thereafter, the parties timely submitted Proposed Final Orders, which have been caref ully considered in the preparation of this Final Order. FINDINGS OF FACT I. The Parties 1 . T he Department is the state agency responsible for administering the cost sharing requirements in section 985.686, Florida Statutes, for juvenile detention car e. 2 . The challenging counties are political subdivisions of the State of Florida an d are non fiscally constrained c ounties subject to the cost sharing requirements of section 985.686 . 3 . The challenging counties are substantially affected by the application of Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G 1.010 through 63G 1.018, including the Proposed Rules. It was stipulated that the challenging countiesÓ alleged substantial interests are of the type these proceedings are designed to protect. 4 . Petitioner, Florida Association of Counties (ÐFACÑ), is a statewide association and not for profit corporation organized and existing under c hapter 617 , Florida Statutes , for the purpose of representing county government in F lorida and protecting, promoting, and improvi ng the mutual interests of all c ounties in Florida. 5 . All of the 67 c ounties in Florida are members of FAC, and the Proposed Rules regarding Detention Cost Share affect all c ounties. Of the 67 c ounties in Fl orida, 35 are considered non fiscally constrained, and are billed by the Department for their respective costs of secure detention care, as determined by the Department; 27 of these c ounties are participating alongside FAC in these proceedings. 6 . The su bject matter of these proceedings is clearly within FACÓs scope of interest and activity, and a substantial number of FACÓs members are adversely affected by the Proposed Rules. 7 . The challenging counties, and FAC , participated in the various rulemaking proceedings held by the Department related to the Proposed Rules, including rule hearings held on June 6, 2014 , and August 5, 2014. II. Rule Making 8 . The initial version of the Proposed Rules was issued, and a Rule Development Workshop was held on Marc h 28, 2014. Numerous challenging counties submitted comments on the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the Rule Development Workshop. 9 . On May 15, 2014, the Department published Proposed Rules 63G 1.011, 1.013, 1.016, and 1.017 in the Florida Admini strative Register. I n that N otice , the Department scheduled a hearing on the P roposed Rules for June 6, 2014. 10 . On June 6, 2014, a r ule m aking h earing was held on the Prop osed Rules. Numerous challenging counties submitted comments to the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the hearing. 11 . A s u pplemental rulemaking h earing was held on August 5, 2014. Again, numer ous challenging counties s ubmitted comments regarding the Proposed Rules either prior to, or at the s upplemental r ule making h earing. 12 . On September 5, 2014, the Department advertised its Notice of Change as to the Proposed Rules. Thereafter, all parties to this proceeding timely filed petitions challenging the Proposed Rules. 13 . A statement of estimated regulatory costs (ÐSERCÑ) was not originally prepared by the Department. 14 . In the rulemaking proceedings before the Department , Bay County submitted a good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative. In its proposal, Bay County asserted that the DepartmentÓs own stipulations signed by the agency are competent substantial evidence that the agency has a Ðless costly alternativeÑ to the approach taken in the Proposed Rules, by assessing the costs of all detention days for juveniles on probation status to the s tate, and not the c ounties. 2 / As Bay County noted in the proposal, the Department previously had agreed to assume all of the cost of detention days occurring after a disposition of probation. 15 . Following the June 6, 2014 , hearing, the Department issued a S ERC for the Proposed Rules. Ultimately, the Department rejected the lower cost regulatory alter native proposed by the counties Ðbecause it is inconsistent with the relevant statute (section 985.686, F.S.), fails to subst antially accomplish the statutory objective, and would render the Department unable to continue to operate secure detention.Ñ III. The Implement ed Statute 16 . The Proposed Rules purport to implement section 985.686, which provides that each county is res ponsible for paying the costs of providing detention care Ðfor juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition.Ñ § 985.686(3), Fla. Stat. 17 . The statute establishes a cost sharing system whereby each non fiscally constrained county is required to be individually provided with an estimate of Ðits costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition ,Ñ based on Ðthe prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are resid ents of t hat county, as calculated by the department.Ñ § 985.686(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). 18 . Each county must pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. At the end of the state fiscal year, Ð[a]ny difference between the estimated costs and actual costs shall be reconciled.Ñ Id . 19 . The Department is responsible for administering the cost sharing requirements and is authorized to adopt rules as set forth in section 985.686(11). 20 . In general, the Proposed Rules provide definitions including for pre and postdisposition, provide for calculating the estimated costs, for monthly reporting, and for annual reconciliation. Specific changes will be discussed in detail below. The complete text of the Challenged Rules, showing the proposed amendments (in strike through and underlined format) is attached hereto as Appendix A. IV. The Prior Rule Challenge 21 . On July 16, 2006, the Department promulgated Florida A dministrative Code Rules 63G 1.002, 63G 1.004, 63G 1.007, and 63G 1.008, among others, setting forth the definitions and procedures for calculating the costs as between the s tate and the various c ounties. These rules were repealed as of July 6, 2010 , and in their place, the Departmen t adopted r ules 63G 1.011, 63G 1.013, 63G 1.016, and 63G 1.017. Although the previous rules defined Ðfinal court disposition,Ñ for purposes of determining the c ountiesÓ responsibility for providing the costs of secure detention, the 2010 rules replaced this with a definition of Ðcommitment,Ñ so that the s tate was only responsible for days occurring after a disposition of commitment. This had the effect of transf erring the responsibility for tens of thousands of days of detention from the s tate to the c ounties. In addition, the 2010 rules failed to provide a process by which the c ounties were only charged their respective actual costs of secure detention. 22 . I n 2012, several c ounties challenged r ules 63G 1.011, 63G 1.013, 63G 1.016, and 63G 1.017 as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because these rules replaced the statutory dividing line for the costs of secure detention with Ðcommitment,Ñ and because the rules r esulted in the overcharging of c ounties for their respective actual costs of secure detention. On July 17, 2012, a Final Order was issued by the undersigned which agreed with the c ounties and found that the rules were an invalid ex ercise of delegated legislative authority. Okalo osa Cnty . , et al. v. DepÓt of Juv . Just . , DOAH Case No. 12 0891RX ( Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012). On June 5, 2013 , this ruling was affirmed on appeal. Dep Ó t of Juv . Just . v. Okaloosa Cnty . , 113 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Ð2012 Rule ChallengeÑ). V. The DepartmentÓs Response to the 2012 Rule Challenge 23 . No changes to the DepartmentÓs practices were made after the Rule Challenge Final Order was released in 2012. Rather , changes were not made until af ter the Rule Challenge decision was affirmed on appeal in June 2013. Shortly after the opinion was released by the First District Court of Appeal , the Department modified its policies and practices to conform with its interpretation of the requirements of that opinion, and informed the c ounties that Ðall days for youth in detenti on with a current placement of p robation or commitment belong to the state.Ñ At this time, the Department determined that Ðby their nature all VOPs [violations of probation] are a ttached to charges that have a qualified disposition and thus are a state pay.Ñ 24 . In response to the a ppellate c ourt decision , the Department im plemented and published to the c ounties its interpretation that the c ounties were only responsible for detention days occurring prior to a final court disposition, and were not responsible for detention days occurring after a juvenile has been sentenced to commitment or probation, or is waiting for release after a dismissal of the charge. A statement to this effect was developed by the Department with input from multiple staff, and was to be a Ðclear bright lineÑ setting Ðclear parametersÑ and a Ðfinal determinationÑ that the Department could share with those outside the ag ency. However, no rules were developed by the Department at this time. 25 . In July 2013, the Department revised its estimate to the c ounties for Fiscal Year (ÐFYÑ) 2013 14 from what had been issued ( previously ) . This revised estimate incorporated the De partmentÓs analysis that included in the stateÓs responsibility any detention days for youth in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges again st the youth had been dismissed. The revised estimate also excluded th ese days from the co llective responsibility of the c ounties , including detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. 26 . At the time of the 2012 Rule Challenge, several c ounties had pending administrative challenges to the DepartmentÓs reconciliations for FYs 2009 10, 2010 11, and 2011 12. In September 2013, the Department issued recalculations of its final reconciliation statements to the c ounties for FYs 2009 10, 2010 11 , and 2011 12. T he recalculations were based upon the DepartmentÓs revised policies and practices and included in the stateÓs responsibility any detention days for youths in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges against the yo uth had been dismissed, and similarly excluded detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. This resulted in large overpayments from the non fiscally constrained c ounties to the s tate for these fiscal years. These recalculations were n ot merely an internal exe rcise, but rather were intended to notify the c ounties what they had overpaid for the fiscal years at issue , and were published and made available to the c ounties and public at large on the DepartmentÓs website. 27 . In December 20 13, the Department entered into stipulations of facts and procedure to resolve three separate administrative proceedings related to final reconciliation amounts for FYs 2009 10, 2010 11 , and 2011 12. Those stipulations of facts and procedure included the following definitions: 27. The parties agree that ÐFinal Court DispositionÑ as contained in section 985.686, Florida Statutes, and based on the decision of the First District Court of Appeal, means a disposition order entered by a court of competent juris diction, including an order sentencing a juvenile to commitment to the Department, or other private or public institution as allowed by law, placing the juvenile on probation, or dismissing the charge. 28. The parties further agree that a ÐPre dispositional DayÑ means any secure detention day occurring prior to the day on which a Final Court Disposition is entered. A pre dispositional day does not include any secure detention day after a juvenile has been sentenced to commitment or placed on probation, or is waiting for release after dismissal of a charge. (PetitionerÓs Ex. 26) 28 . In addition to the above stipulations, t he Department also stipulated to its recalculated amounts for each of these years, resulting in large overpayments from the c ounties . However , the Department refused to provide credits for these overpayment amounts. 29 . In November and December 2013, the Department issued a final reconciliation statement and revised final reconciliation statement to the c ounties for FY 2012 13, which included in the stateÓs responsibility any detention days for youth in detention with a current placement of probation or commitment, or where the charges against the youth had been dismissed , and likewise excluded these days from the collec tive responsibility of the c ounties , including detention days resulting from a new law violation of probation. Under the DepartmentÓs reconciliation statement for FY 2012 13, the c ounties were collectively funding approximately thirty two percent (32%) of the costs of secure juvenile detention. 30 . The Department also submitted its legislative budget request for FY 2014 15 in October 2013. This legislative budget request was based on the DepartmentÓs independent judgment as required by sections 216.011 a nd 216.023, Florida Statutes , 3 / and excluded from the c ountiesÓ collective responsibility all detention days relating to a violation of probation, including for a new substantive law violation. The request provided that Ðthe department may only bill the c ounties for youth whose cases have not had a disposition either to commitment or probation.Ñ The request also notes a shift in the c ountiesÓ collective obligations from 73 percent of the total costs to 32 percent of these costs Ðin order to bring the budg et split in line with the June 2013 ruling by the First District Court of Appeal.Ñ 31 . Under this interpretation, the Department projected a $35.5 million deficiency in its budget for FY 13 14 and request ed an $18.4 million appropriation for detention cos ts from the Legislature. This request was funded in the General Appropriations Act for 2014 15. The Department did not ask for additional funding for past years that had been challenged by the c ounties. At this same time, a projection for the deficit fo r FY 2014 15 was developed by the Department staff based on the same interpretation of the s tateÓs responsibility for detention days. T here was no objection from the DepartmentÓs Secretary or the GovernorÓs Office to this interpretation of the stateÓs res ponsibility . VI. Change in Interpretation Re New Law Violation 32 . Fred Schuknecht, then Chief of Staff of the Department, testified that in response to the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in June 2013, the Department adopted a broad interpretation of the ruling that final court disposition meant commitment , and also included all secure detention days incurred by probationers as post disposition days. This included detention days for youths already on probation who committed new offens es and were then detained as a result of the new offense or because of the violation of probation resulting from the commission of the new offense . 33 . During the budgeting process for the 2014 15 Fiscal Year, the Department altered its interpretation of the 2012 Rule Challenge decision, and its newly established practice relating to payment for all detention days involving probationers . T he Department now proposes, through the challenged rules, to shift to the c ounties the responsibility for detention da ys occurring after a final court disposition of probation where there is a new law violation. Although the challengers assert that the changed interpretation was driven by the budget proposal submitted by the GovernorÓs Office in January 2014 ( which did n ot utilize the DepartmentÓs prior interpretation ) the Department specifically contends that it did not change its official position on this interpretation until the adoption of the s tate budget by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) in June 2014. 34 . While the Department state d it made its initial broad interpretation because it was Ðunder the gunÑ to issue its cost sharing billing for FY 20 13 20 14 within two weeks of the appellate opinion, the Department continued to assert that interpretation in Sept ember 2013 , when it published recalculations for FYs 20 09 20 10, 20 10 20 11, 20 11 20 12. Further, Mr. Schuknecht concede d that this interpretation had not changed at the time the DepartmentÓs legislative budget request was submitted in October 2013 , or in No vember and December 2013 , when the Department issued the reconciliation and revised reconciliation for FY 20 12 20 13. Likewise, this interpretation formed the basis for the stipulations signed by the c ounties and D epartment in December 2013. At hearing, t estimony established that the DepartmentÓs interpretation that the state was responsible for all days of detention for probationers was formed after frequent discussions on this topic and with input from multiple staff involved in cost shar ing, including M r. Schuknecht (Director of A dministration at that time) , Vickie Harris (Budget D irector), Mark Greenwald ( D irector of Research and P lanning), the Chief of Staff, Deputy Secretary, the legal team, as well as the DepartmentÓs Secretary. 35 . For FY 2014 15, the Executive Office of the Governor proposed a recommended budget which was contrary to the DepartmentÓs initial interpret ation, and included within the c ountiesÓ collective responsibility those detention days for a youth on probation charged with a new s ubstantive law violation. This recommended budget proposed that the c ounties would be responsible for fifty seven percent (57%) of the shared costs of secure detention, and that the s tate would be responsible for forty three percent (43%) . This is in con trast to the thirty two percent (32%) the c ounties were paying under the DepartmentÓs initial interpretation of the Rule Challenge Decision . 36 . The GovernorÓs Office then asked the Department to amend its earlier submitted legislative budget request, to reflect the GovernorÓs budget because it wanted the DepartmentÓs request to match. 37 . Although the GAA for FY 2014 15 incorporated a cost sharing split similar to that included in the GovernorÓs proposal , it differed from the governorÓs budget recommend ation. It was not until June 2014, when the GAA was adopted into law , that the Department asserts it officially changed positions. As stipulated by the parties, there is no language in the GAA for FY 2014 15 setting forth the policy behind the budget spl it for secure detention. 38 . The Proposed Rules differ from the DepartmentÓs initial interpretation of the requirements of the Rule Challenge decision and its earlier established policies and procedures regarding the same as implemented in June 2013 , through at least early 2014. The interpretation set forth in the Proposed Rules result s in a lessened budgetary impact on the state by shifting more detention da ys to the counties . 39 . At hearing, Mr. Schuknecht testified as to the rationale for the Dep artmentÓs changed interpretation regarding the c ountiesÓ responsibility for detention days for a youth on probation charged with a new substantive law violation : Q. If you would, Mr. Schuknecht, please kind of talk about the highlights of that rule, and especially in relationship to the CourtÓs ruling in the previous rule challenge. A. Basically how we got here is, in June of 2013, the First DCA ruled basically supporting the Î DOAHÓs hearing, the final court disposition prior to that. Basical ly we determined the final court decision meant commitment. They said it canÓt be just commitment. So at that time we took the broadest interpretation as well will actually include all probationers as part of the final court disposition and they would be post disposition days. Subsequent to that, in effect, through the GovernorÓs Office as well as the Legislature, as well as ourselves, we realized basically by doing that we are including probationers with new offenses as post disposition cases which , in effect, makes no sense. ItÓs logical that they be pre disposition cases because there is no disposition on those cases with new offenses. Plus probationers would only be in detention because they have new cases. They wouldnÓt be there otherwis e. So, in fact, thatÓs how we Î so thatÓs the main change in the rule, in effect, defining what pre disposition means. 40 . Mr. SchuknechtÓs explanation for the DepartmentÓs changed interpretation is consistent with the explanation given by Jason Welty, the DepartmentÓs previous Chief of Staff, during the June 6, 2014 , Workshop , that Ðthe DepartmentÓs original interpretation was, quite frankly , in error . Ñ VII. Cost of Detention Days for Juveniles on Probation 41 . The Challengers contend that all days in detention served by a juvenile on probation are the responsibility of the s tate, and not the c ounties. Accordingly, the Challengers contest the DepartmentÓs Proposed Rules which assign responsibility for detention days of juveniles with new law violations to the c ounties, and not the s tate. 42 . Much of the testimony and argument at the hearing focused on the DepartmentÓs definitions for pred isposition and postdisposition, and how these definitions apply as to youth on probation status with the Department. These definitions are crucial, as they relate to how t he costs are split amongst the s tate and the c ounties. Only the costs of predisposi tion detention days may be billed to the c ounties under section 985.686. 43 . Final court disposition is specifically defined by the Proposed Rules as the Ðdecision announced by the court at the disposition hearingÑ including Ðcommitment, probation, and dismissal of charges.Ñ ÐPredispositionÑ is further defined as the Ðperiod of ti me a youth is in detention care prior to entry of a final court disposition.Ñ Proposed Rule 63G 1.011(14). ÐPostdispositionÑ on the other hand, means Ðthe period of time a youth is in detention care after entry of a final court disposition.Ñ Proposed Ru le 63G 1.011(15). However, the definitions do not stop with this gen eral language. Proposed Rule sections 63G 1.011(14)(b) and (15)(b) provide that it is the c ountiesÓ responsibility to fund the costs for days when a youth is on probation and is charged with a new law violation. These definitions are implemented through the Proposed Rules relating to the estimate and reconciliation processes. 44 . The Department argues that youth who are on probation and commit new offenses may be held in secure detentio n for the new offense but cannot be legally held in secure detention on the underlying violation of probation. However, the DepartmentÓs position would appear to be counter to the express language of several statutory provisions. 45 . S ection 985.439(4) p rovides in relevant part: (4) Upon the childÓs admission, or if the court finds after a hearing that the child has violated the conditions of probation or postcommitment probation, the court shall enter an order revoking, modifying, or continuing probation or postcommitment probation. In each such case, the court shall enter a new disposition order and, in addition to the sanctions set forth in this section, may impose a ny sanction the court could have imposed at the original disposition hearing. If the child is found to have violated the conditions of probation or postcommitment probation, the court may: (a) Place the child in a consequence unit in that judicial circu it, if available, for up to 5 days for a first violation and up to 15 days for a second or subsequent violation. (b) Place the child in nonsecure detention with electronic monitoring. However, this sanction may be used only if a residential consequence unit is not available. (c) If the violation of probation is technical in nature and not a new violation of law, place the child in an alternative consequence program designed to provid e swift and appropriate consequences to any further violations of probation. 46 . Neither statute nor Department rules define what is meant by a ÐtechnicalÑ violation of probation. However, retired juvenile court judge Frank A. Orlando, accepted as an ex pert in juvenile detention issues, explained at hearing that: A technical violation in my opinion is something that doesnÓt involve a law violation. It is a condition of probation. It would be a curfew. It could be going to school. It could be staying away from a family, a victim, or staying away from a place. It could be not obeying the probation officer, him or herself. In that sense they are technical violations of probation, but they are both violation of probation. 47 . In addition, s ection 985.101(1) provides that a juvenile may be Ð taken into custody Ñ under c hapte r 985 for, among others, Ð a delinquent act or violation of law, pursuant to Florida law pertaining to a lawful arrest,Ñ and Ð[b]y a law enforcement officer who has probable cause t o believe that the child is in violation of the conditions of the childÓs probation, home detention, postcommitment probation, or conditional release supervision; has absconded from nonresidential commitment; or has escaped from residentia l commitment.Ñ § 985.101(1)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. However, this provision also expressly provides that Ð[N]othing in this subsection shall be construed to allow the detention of a child who does not meet the detention criteria in part V.Ñ 48 . Part V of the Act includes se ction 985.255, which sets forth the detention criteria, and provides in pertinent part: (1) Subject to s. 985.25 (1), a child taken into custody and placed into secure or nonsecure detention care shall be given a hearing within 24 hours after being taken into custody. At the hearing, the court may order continued detention if: (a) The child is alleged to be an esca pee from a residential commitment program; or an absconder from a nonresidential commitment program, a probation program, or conditional release supervision; or is alleged to have escaped while being lawfully transported to or from a residential commitment program. 49 . Thus, the undersigned is persuaded that sections 985.439(4), 985.101(1) , and 985.255 all support a finding that a violation of probation, not associated with a new violation of law, may under some circumstances result in a new disposition of secure detention. However, pursuant to the Proposed Rules, under these circumstances the state would continue to be responsible for the cost of the secure detention. 50 . As explained at hearing, there is an idiosyncrasy in c hapter 985 regarding secure detention for juveniles who have been charged with a violation of probation or violating a term of their conditional release. Under c hapter 985, a child taken into custody for violating the terms of probation or conditional re lease supervision shall be held in a consequence unit. If a consequence unit is not available, the child is to be placed on home detention with electronic monitoring. § 985.255(1)(h), Fla. Stat. These consequence units have not been funded by the Florid a Legislature for a number of years. However, the juvenile justice system has found a practical method to accommodate the nonexistence of these Ðconsequence units.Ñ For technical violations of probation, the courts often convert the violations of probation to a contempt of court, and will hold the juvenile in detention on this basis. This contempt of court procedure may also be used by the courts to detain a juvenile in secure detention for a violation of probation based on a new law violation. 51 . Pursuant to section 985.037, a juvenile who has been held in direct or indirect contempt may be placed in secure detention not to exceed five days for the first offense, a nd not to exceed 15 days for a second or subsequent offense. As noted by Judge Orlando and Seventh Judicial Circuit Judge Terrill J. LaRue, an order to show cause for indirect criminal contempt is the mechanism used to place a juvenile in secure detention for a violation of probation or conditional release. 52 . In addition, the probation is a significant factor that weighs heavily into the DepartmentÓs decision to securely detain the juvenile, and in large part determines whether the juvenile will be deta ined. For a youth who is on probation and is charged with a new substantive law offense, the Department, pursuant to its rules and policies, determines whether the youth will be detained in secure detention based on the DepartmentÓs Detention Risk Assessm ent Instrument (ÐDRAIÑ). § 985.245, Fla. Stat.; r ule 63D 9.002. Under the DRAI, if the child scores 0 7 points, the child is not detained; 7 11 points, the child is detained on home detention; for 12 points or more, the child is detained on secure detent ion. 53 . For a youth who is on probation, the underlying charge for which that youth was placed on probation and/or the Ðlegal statusÑ of the youth itself will always be taken into account under the DRAI and will make secure detention significantly more likely than had the youth not been on probation on a number of fronts. This is also true for a youth on commitment status, in the case of conditional release. T he highest scoring underlying charge may be used to assess the juvenile for probation if the n ew law violation does not score enough points for the juvenile to be securely detained. Therefore, there are days served in secure detention based on the scoring of the underlying charge for which the juvenile is on probation, and not the new law violatio n. 54 . In addition, t here are a number of points resulting from the underlying charge for which the juvenile is on probation, regardless of whether the DRAI is scored on the new law violation or the underlying charge. A juvenile on probation will always get points purely for his or her legal status of probation. The number of points depends on the amount of time since the last adjudication or adjudication withheld. Six points is assigned for active probation cases with the last adjudication or adjudica tion withheld within 90 days. Two points are assigned if the last adjudication or adjudication withheld was more than 90 days ago. Similarly, the legal status of commitment, in the case of conditional release, also results in points towards secure detent ion. The prior adjudication or adjudication withheld which resulted in the probation or commitment status would also score points under the prior history section of the DRAI. 55 . In many cases, the underlying charge for which the youth is on probation will be the deciding factor regarding whether the youth is held in secure detention. Thus, the DRAI is significantly affected by a probationary status which adds additional points, a nd can trigger secure detention, regardless of the nature of the new law violation. In addition, a trial judge has the discretion to place a youth in secure detention on a violation of probation for committing a new law offense even when the score on the DRAI does not mandate secure detention. 56 . The Juvenile Justice Information System (ÐJJISÑ) is an extensive database maintained by the Department, and utilized during the process of billing the c ounties for secure juvenile detention. The reason for the detention stay can be readily ascertained based on information entered into JJIS at the time a juvenile is assessed and detained. For instance, in the case of a violation of probation, there is always a referral for a violation of probation entered by th e probation officer. This is true whether the violation is a new law violation or a technical violation of the terms of the probation. In addition, the Department can also ascertain from JJIS whether the juvenile was scored on the new law violation or, a lternatively, the underlying charge which resulted in probation. 57 . The Department concedes that it can determine, in any given instance, why a juvenile has been detained. As acknowledg ed by the Department, the responsibility for days, whether predispo sition or post disposition, should be based on the reason for the detention. 58 . Probation is considered a post disposition status. Likewise, detention days of juveniles on probation are postdispositional, and the financial responsibility of the State. U nder the Proposed Rules, the only exception are those instances in which a youth is on probation and is detained because the youth is charged with a new violation of law, in which case the detention days prior to final court disposition on the new charge a re the responsibility of the counties. 59 . This finding is further supported by the DepartmentÓs treatment of juveniles on conditional release, which is also a post dispositional status. When a youth is on conditional release with the Department, the youth is on supervision similar to probation supervision. Conditional release and probation contain the same standard conditions. The only essential difference between a youth on Ðconditional releaseÑ and a youth on probation is that a youth on conditional release has the status of commitment rather than probation. There is no real difference in how a probation officer treats a yout h on conditional release or a youth on probation and the DRAI does not provide any distinction for the two legal statuses. The Department considers both probation and conditional release qualified post disposition al statuses. 60 . Under the Proposed Rules , the c ounties pay for detention days for youth on probation who commit a new law violation. This is true regardless of whether the youth would be placed in secure detention but for the probation. However, detention days incurred by the same youth who c o mmits a technical violation of probation are deemed the responsibility of the s tate , since, under the Proposed Rules, the youth has not been charged with a new violation of law . 61 . Under the Proposed Rules, when a youth on conditional release commits ei ther a new law violation or technical violation of conditional release and is placed in secure detention, those detention days are to be paid by the State. VIII. The Two Day Rule 62 . As part of the Notice of Change, the Department added a provision refer red to as Ðthe Two Day RuleÑ to the definitions for pre and postdisposition. The Two Day Rule provides that detention days where the youth is on probation are the responsibility of the s tate Ðunless the youth is charged with a new violation of law that ha s a referral date between zero and two days prior to the detention admission date, as determined by subtracting the referral date in JJIS from the detention admission date in JJIS.Ñ Proposed Rule 63G 1.011(15)(b) . 63 . Despite conceding that it knows why juveniles are being detained, the Department included the ÐTwo Day RuleÑ in the Proposed Rule Ð[b]ecause it is difficult to determine the level of accuracy in the aggregate looking at thousands of cases at once.Ñ Thus, the Two Day Rule captures when the Department receives a referral date for a new criminal charge and presumes that if a juvenile is put in secure detention within two days of that referral date, the detention is for that new charge. 64 . In some instances , detention days that should be tre ated as s tate days would in fact be treated as c ounty days under the ÐTwo Day Rule . Ñ Mark Greenwald , Director of Research and Planning for the Department, testified : Q . Well, letÓs see how factually this would work is that there is a referral for a charge, a new offense, and the youth is detained the next day on a contempt unrelated to that new charge. IsnÓt that day going to now be he is going to be detained because of a violation of the law because of your two day rule? A . Under the rule , yes, the open charge would count. Q . But if he was a probationer and it was a contempt, that would not have been a county day. That would be a State day. A . Yes . Q . But now because of the two day rule we will now treat that as a county responsibility and coun ty responsibility for the cost? A . Yes. 65 . Other examples were cited in the testimony, such as where there was a pick up order for a youth on probation who had absconded. Where there was also a new charge, the deten tion days would be billed to the county, even if the pick up order was issued prior to the new law violation. 66 . Mr. Greenwald testified that when the Department decided to adopt the Two Day Rule, it had done no analysis to determine whether a One Day Ru le or a Three Day Rule would more accurately identify probationary youths placed in detention due to a new law violation. 67 . Both Judges Orlando and LaRue expressed uncertainty regarding the applicability and utility of the Two Day Rule, noting that the Two Day Rule does not have any correlation or relationship to when or how juveniles are placed in secure detention for violations of probation. 68 . Judge LaRue further indicated that the term Ðreferral dateÑ as referenced in the Two Day Rule has no impact on what he does ÐwhatsoeverÑ and is a term: IÓve never heard before. I donÓt use that term. IÓve never heard the term. This is something that, in reviewing this potential rule change here Î or the rule change, I should say, thatÓs something I came across and scratched my head a little bit about exactly what it means. I think I know what it means. But itÓs not a term that I use Î itÓs not a term of art, and itÓs not a term that I use generally. 69 . The evidence adduced at hearing did not establish a ration al basis for inclusion of the Two Day Rule provision in the definitions of pre and postdisposition. Notably absent wa s any credible evidence that use of the Two Day Rule would accurately identify detention days related to new law violations by probationers. To the contrary, the evidence established that use of a blanket metric, arbitrarily set a t two days, would u nder s everal scenarios improperly shift responsibility for detention days to the counties. Moreover, given the capabilities of the JJIS, there is simply no reason to ÐassumeÑ that a detention has resulted from a new law violation if within a given period of tim e from referral , when the Department has the ability to accurately determine the actual reason for the detention. IX. Estimates, Reconciliation and Actual Costs 70 . At the start of the fiscal year, the Department provides an estimate to the c ounties of their respective costs of secure detention which is broken down into 12 installments that the c ounties pay on a monthly basis. At the end of the fiscal year, the Department performs a reconciliation of those costs based on the Ðactual costsÑ an d sends a statement to each county showing under or overpayment, and providing for debits and credits as appropriate. The credits or debits would be applied to the current year billing, although they would relate to the previous fiscal year . 71 . Proposed Rule 63G 1.013 provides the process for calculating the estimate to each county at the beginning of the fiscal year. As part of this process, the Proposed Rule provides that the Department shall estimate Ðdetention costs, using the current year actual ex penditures projected through the end of the fiscal year, with necessary annualized adjustments for any new legislative appropriations within the detention budget entity.Ñ 72 . The Department has modified its process in the Proposed Rules so that the estima te of costs is based , to a certain extent , on actual expenditures from the prior year, instead of the appropriation. However, the estimate process also takes into account the appropriation for the upcoming fiscal year, and a portion of the estimate of cos ts is still based on the appropriation. The Department concedes that th ere is a need for it to calculate the estimate as accurately as possible, and that there have been occasions in the past where the Department has not provided the c ounties credits owed as part of the reconciliation process. It is also clear from the record that credits for overpayments have not been provided by the Department to the c ounties for several fiscal years, beginning in FY 2009 10. 73 . Proposed Rule 63G 1.017 provides the an nual reconciliation process at year end for determining each countyÓs actual costs for secure detention. This process includes the calculation of each countyÓs actual cost which is determined by the number of detention days and a calculation of the actual costs. The total Ðactual costsÑ for secure detention are divided by the Ðtotal number of service daysÑ to produce an Ðactual per diem,Ñ which is then applied to each countyÓs detention days to calculate each countyÓs share of the actual costs. Proposed Rule 63G 1.011 provides a definition for Ðactual costsÑ as follows: [T]he total detention expenditures as reported by the department after the certified forward period has ended, less $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care per section 985.686(3). These costs include expenditures in all fund types and appropriations categories (Salaries & Benefits, Other Personal Services, Expenses, OCO, Food Products, Legislative Initiatives, Fiscally Constrained Counties, Contracted Service, G/A Contracted Services, Risk Management Insurance, Lease or Lease Purchase of Equipment, Human Resources Outsourcing, and FCO Maintenance & Repair). 74 . The challengers assert that the proposed rules relating to the reconciliation process are vague, int ernally inconsistent, and inconsistent with statutory requirements contained in the law implemented. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the definition of actual costs fails to include an exclusion for Ðthe costs of preadjudicatory nonmedical educ ational or therapeutic servicesÑ pursuant to section 985.686(3); (2) the definition of actual costs is over broad by including Ðexpenditures in all fund types and appropriations categories ; Ñ and (3) the Proposed Rules fail to provide for input from the c ou nties, as set forth in section 985.686(6) . 75 . T he Proposed Rules do not provide for input from the c ounties regarding the calculations the Department makes for detention cost share. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 76 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to sections 120.56, 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Jurisdiction attaches when a person who is substantially affected by an agencyÓs rule claims that it is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. 77 . The parties stipulated that Petitioners and Intervenor have standing to initiate this proceeding. (Joint Pre Hearing Stipulation, at 9 10, 16). In addition, Petitioners and Intervenor have demonstrated they meet the Ðsubstantial interestsÑ tests for standing established in Agrico Chemical Co mpany v. Departmen t of En vironmental Reg ulation , 406 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The non fiscally constrained c ounties, includin g Petitioners, Intervenor, and a substantial number of FACÓs members, are adversely affected by the Proposed Rules, which result in a negative fiscal impact to these c ounties . 78 . The party challenging a proposed agency rule has the burden of going forwar d. The agency then has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority a s to the objections raised. § 120.56(2)(a), Fla. Stat. When any substantially affected pe rson seeks a determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule pursuant to section 120.56(2), the proposed rule is not presumed to be valid or invalid. § 120.56(2)(b), Fla. Stat. 79 . Section 120.52(8) defines what constitutes an Ðinvalid exercise of del egated legislative authorityÑ: (8) ÐInvalid exercise of delegated legislative authorityÑ means action that goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one of the following applies: (a) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures or requirements set forth in this chapter; (b) The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54 (3)(a)1 .; (c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54 (3)(a)1.; (d) The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; (e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious. A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is capricious if it is adopted without thought or reason or is irrational; or (f) The rule imposes regulatory costs on the regulated person, county, or city which could b e reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives. A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also requ ired. An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is within the agencyÓs class of powers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authorit y to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than implementin g or interpreting the specific powers and duties conferred by the enabling statute. 80 . The Department has no authority as a matter of law to further limit a statutory term beyond its plain meaning. Courts employ a fundamental precept arising from the separation of powers doctrine that an agency may not redefine statutory terms to modify the meaning of a statute. See Campus Co mmc'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Rev. , 473 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1985) (department rule defining "newspaper" for purposes of a statutory sal es tax exemption invalid for adding criteria to statute); see also State, DepÓt of Bus. Reg. v. Salvation Ltd. Inc. , 452 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (providing that a rule which added a fifth criterion that meals must be prepared and cooked on the premis es to the existing statutory criteria for a special restaurant beverage license Ðenlarged upon the statutory criteria and, thus, exceeded the ÒyardstickÓ laid down by the legislatureÑ); Pedersen v. Green , 105 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1958) (where statute excepted "f eed" from sales tax, agency cannot adopt rule limiting exemption to feed for animals kept for agricultural purposes thereby excluding feed for zoo animals). Nor may an agency apply a construction which conflicts with the plain language of the statute. 81 . In addition, a rule is invalid where it is arbitrary and capricious. A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is capricious if it is adopted without thought or reason or is irrational. § 120.52(8)(e), Fla. Stat. X. New Law Violations by Probationers 82 . In this case, the law implemented, section 985.686, provides that the c ounties are only responsible for the costs of secure detention for the period of time prior to Ðfinal court disposition.Ñ As such, th e Department may only charge the c ounties, including Petitioners and Intervenor, the cost of detention days serve d by a juvenile prior to the entry of a final court disposition. The costs of all other secure detention days are the responsibility of the s t ate, and not the c ounties. 83 . Section 985.686(3) provides as follows: (3) Each county shall pay the costs of providing detention care, exclusive of the costs of any preadjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services and $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care at the detention centers, for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition. The department shall develop an accounts payable system to allocate costs that are payable by t he counties. 84 . The term Ðfinal court dispositionÑ is not defined by statute. This phrase, which establishes the cut off point between a county's cost and the state's cost, is actually mentioned five times in section 985.686. Aside from section 3, the phrase "final court disposition" is also included twice in section 4(a), once in section 4(b) , and once in section 5. 85 . When construing a statute, one looks first to the statute's plain meaning. Moonlit Waters Apts., Inc. v. Cauley , 666 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996). Furthermore, "[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its p lain and obvious meaning." Holly v. Auld , 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (citing A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey , 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). 86 . T his is not the first time the c ounties have challenged the DepartmentÓs rules regarding detention cost share . Okaloosa C n ty . , et al. v. DepÓt of Juv . Just . , DOAH Case No. 12 0891RX (Final Order, July 17, 2012). The Final Order in the 2012 r ule c hallenge was affirmed by Florida Ós First District Court of Appeal. DepÓt of Juv . Just . v. Okaloosa Cnty . , 113 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). 87 . In the 2012 r ule c hallenge, several of the same c ounties involved in these proceedings challenged the DepartmentÓs existing rules, implemented in 2010, on the basis that the 2010 rules inappropriately altered the statutory dividing line for detention cost share. Although section 985.686 provides that the non fiscally constrained c ounties are only responsible for the costs of detention care prior to Ðfinal court disposition,Ñ the 2010 rules provided that the c ounties were r esponsible for all costs of secure detention unless the youth had been committed to the Department. 88 . As part of the decision issued in the prior r ule c hallenge, the DepartmentÓs use of ÐcommitmentÑ as the line of demarcation for state and county respon sibility in its 2010 rules was invalidated. Set forth in that decision are the following Conclusions of Law pertinent here: 71. Competent evidence established that there are detention days associated with dispositions other than commitment that are curr ently being charged to the counties, such as time waiting to be picked up by a parent following a disposition of probation or dismissal of charges. And there are other varying secure detention days which should be post dispositional, and charged to the st ate under the statutory dividing line of Ðfinal court dispositionÑ which are evidently being charged to the counties under the DepartmentÓs commitment definition. Examples include days in detention for violations of probation, and contempt of court relati ng to a charge that has already been disposed . . . . 72. In the Challenged Rules, the Department limited the statutory term Ðfinal court dispositionÑ only to final court disposition orders of commitment to the Department. With the adoption of the Chall enged Rules, the Department took the broad category of Ðfinal court dispositionÑ and limited it to one type of disposition, i.e. commitment to the Department. Thus, the Challenged Rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law impleme nted. Although the Department defends its rule as a clarification of a statutory term, the Department has no authority as a matter of law to further limit a statutory term beyond its plain meaning. Okaloosa Cnty . , et al. v. DepÓt of Juv . Just . , Case No. 12 0891RX (Fl a. DOAH July 17, 2012), affÓd , 113 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). 89 . While t he above Final Order did determine that Ðfinal court dispositionÑ could not be narrowed to mean only orders of commitment to the Department , it did not distinguish between days in detention based on a new law violation of probation and days based on a technical violation of probation. These days were all treated the same under the analysis. 90 . T he Department's interpretation of section 985.686 , a statu te it is charged with administering, is entitled to great deference. Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs , 810 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2002); Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Johnson , 708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998). The deference to an agency interpretation of a sta tute it is charged with enforcing applies even if other interpretations or alternatives exist. Atl . Shores Resort v. 507 S. St. Corp. , 937 So. 2d 1239, 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Miles v. Fla. A & M Univ. , 813 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Int. Improv. Fd. v. Levy , 656 So. 2d 1359, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). When an agency committed with authority to implement a statute construes the statute in a permissible way, that interpretation must be sustained even though another interpretation may be possible or even, in the view of some, preferable. Humhosco, Inc. v. DepÓt of Health and Rehab. Svcs. , 476 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1985). 91 . Historically, courts have given deference to agencies based on agency expertise in the areas regulated. S ee , e.g. , Wallace Corp. v. City of Miami Beach , 793 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (noting that an agencyÓs construction of a statute it is given power to administer will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous). Traditionally, agencies generally have more expertise in a specific area they are charged with overseeing, and courts have noted the benefit of the agencyÓs technical and/or practical experience in its field. Rizov v . Bd. of ProfÓl EngÓrs , 979 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 92 . Stated otherwise, an agency is accorded broad discretion and deference in the interpretation of the statutes which it administers, and an agency's interpretation should be upheld when it is within a range of permissible interpretat ions and unless it is clearly erroneous. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm Ó n , 427 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1983); see also Bd. of Podiatric Med. v. Fla. Med. Ass Ó n , 779 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). The same principle has been applied Ð to rules which have been in effect over an extended period and to the meaning assigned to them by officials charged with their administration. Ñ Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. , 427 So. 2d at 719 (italics in original). 93 . Ð On the other hand, Ò judicial adhere nce to the agency's view is not demanded when it is contrary to the statute Ó s plain meaning. ÓÑ Sullivan v. Dep Ó t of Envtl. Prot. , 890 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citations omitted). 94 . Without question, an agency must follow its own rules . . ., but if the rule, as it plainly reads, should prove impractical in operation, the rule can be amended pursuant to established rulemaking procedures. However, Ð absent such amendment, expedience cannot be permitted to dictate its terms. Ñ . . . That is, while an administrative agency Ð is not necessarily bound of its initial construction of a statute evidence d by the adoption of a rule, Ñ the agency may implement its changed interpretation only by Ð validly adopting subsequent rule changes. Ñ Cleveland Clinic Fla. Hosp. v. Ag . for Health Care Admin. , 679 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citations omitted). 95 . It has been established that Ð if an agency changes a non rule based policy, it must either explain its reasons for its discretio nary action based upon expert testimony, documentary opinions, or other appropriate evidence . . . or it must implement its changed policy or interpretation by formal rule making. Ñ Courts v. Agency for Health Care Admin. , 965 So. 2d 154, 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citations omitted). 96 . Notwithstanding the above, s tatutory changes to laws which authorize rulemaking have in recent years circumscribed the amount of discretion that agencies may employ. S.W. Fla. Water Mgmnt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc. , 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Daniel Manry, Ð Agency Exercise of Legislative Power and ALJ Veto Authority, Ñ 28 J. Nat'l Ass'n L. Jud. 421 ( Fall 2008). 97 . In this instance, the challengers argue that the deference normally accorded to agencies in construing statutes they administer should not attach because the Department did not rely on any agency expertise or practical knowledge. Instead, a ccording to the challengers , the Department changed its interpretation of the applicable statut e and decisional authority interpreting the statute, based solely on the budget decisions of the governor and L egislature, as ultimately adopted in the GAA. 98 . To the extent the DepartmentÓs interpretation of section 985.686, as now codified in the chall enged rules, is inconsistent with its prior practice, the reasonableness of the DepartmentÓs explanation of the inconsistencies is a factual matter for determination based on the evidence. § 120.68(7)(e)3., Fla. Stat. 99 . In this instance, the Department has met its burden to explain the reason for its changed interpretation of the countiesÓ responsibility under section 985.686 for predisposition detention days. As articulated by Mr. Schuknecht, the Department realized that its (hastily formulated) initi al interpretation following the app ellate courtÓs decision in June 2013 was overly broad, because it included probati oners with new offenses as post disposition cases. The Department concluded that detained probationers with new offenses sho uld logically b e considered pre disposition cases, since there is no Ðfinal court dispositionÑ as to the new offenses. 100 . The undersigned cannot, as a matter of law, conclude that the DepartmentÓs revised in terpretation of section 985.686 is clearly erroneous or contra ry to the Ð plain and obvious meaning Ñ of the statute . This is because the statute simply does not address the situation where a youth commits multiple substantive law violations over time and thus has the status of both postdisposition (commitment or prob ation) and predisposition (detained and awaiting final court disposition on a new charge). The DepartmentÓs interpretation that detention arising from a new law violation by a youth on probation is the responsibility of the counties is certainly one reaso nable interpretation of section 985.686, is not clearly erroneous, and is entitled to deference. 101 . While the DepartmentÓ s new statutory interpretation wa s likely influenced by input from the GovernorÓs O ffice, such fact does not, in and of itself, render the new interpretation Ðclearly erroneous . Ñ Rather, because the new interpretation of section 985.686 is amo ng those that are reasonable and is not clearly erroneous, it is permissible, and therefore does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the stat ute being implemented. 102 . The challengers also assert that the Department changed its interpretation of section 985.686, and decisional authority interpreting the same, based solely on its perception that the L egislature mandated a certain reading of th e statute through an appropriations bill. Again, while the evidence established that the GovernorÓs Office encouraged the Department to reconsider its initial interpretation of the stateÓs responsibility following the appellate courtÓs decision, the re is no evidence that the Department was mandated by the L egislature to change its interpretation. Indeed, while the GovernorÓs Office may have urged the Department to change its interpretation, the GAA funding was not the same as what had been recommended in the GovernorÓs budget submittal. 103 . Since the DepartmentÓs new interpretation of section 985.686 is permissible, the challengers Ó argument that the Department, through its Proposed Rules, has interpreted the GAA as a modification to the substantive law, is rejected. XI. The ÐTwo Day RuleÑ 104 . At hearing t he Department acknowledged that the specific reason a youth has been det ained can be deter mined through its JJIS database. H owever, because the Two Day Rule does not differentiate between detentions resulting from new law violations and those unrelated to new law violations (e.g., detentions resulting from technical violations of probation and contempt of court) , it would improperly pass on detention costs to the c ounties for days which otherwise woul d properly be assigned to the state under the DepartmentÓs new interpretation . 105 . The DepartmentÓs JJIS has the capability to readily and accurately ascertain the reason a youth has been detained. At hearing, the Department did not persuasively explain why , when it has the technical capability to know precisely why a youth has been detained, it was necessary to presum e that if a juvenile is put in secure detention within two days of a referral date, the detention is for a new law violation . The evidence established that the two day presumption would, in some circumstances, improperly attribute detention days to the counties. As such, this provision of the Proposed Rules fail s to advance the purposes for which they were purportedly adopted , and c ontravenes the statute being implemented . 106 . Even assuming , arguendo , that the use of some blanket timeframe between referral and detention was justified , the DepartmentÓs selection of two days, as opposed to some other period of time, is arbitrary, as there was no investigation or analysis underlying the selection of two days . 107 . Since the Department, through the Proposed Rules, is seeking to shift the responsibility for probationers who commit a new violation of law to the countie s, it is not unreasonable to require the Department to accurately determine in which instances that should occur. The Two Day Rule is counter to this goal, and is therefore invalid, since it would assign to the counties costs for which they are not statut orily responsible. XII. Estimate, Reconciliation, and Actual Costs 10 8 . Section 985.686 provides in relevant part: (3) Each county shall pay the costs of providing detention care, exclusive of the c osts of any preadjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services and $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care at the detention centers, for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition. The department shall develop an accoun ts payable system to allocate costs that are payable by the counties. * * * (5) Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition. This amount shall be based upon the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department. Each county shall pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. Any difference between the estimated costs and actual costs shall be reconciled at the end of the state fiscal year. (6) Each county shall pay to the department for deposit into the Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund its share of the countyÓs total costs for juvenile detention, based upon calculations published by the department with input from the counties. 109 . Proposed Rule 63G 1.013Ós process for calculating the estimate purports to be based on the actual expenditures a nd usage of the prior year, yet continues to allow adjustments based on the current year appropr iation. 110 . Appropriations are not costs. Appropriation means Ða legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law.Ñ § 216.011, Fla . Stat. 111 . As part of the estimate process provided by statute for the funding of secure detention, the Department bills each c ounty prospectively for its respective share of the costs of secure detention. This amount must be based on Ðprior usage.Ñ § 985.686(5), F la. Stat. However, the estimate process provided by the Proposed Rules overinflates the amounts required to be paid by the c ounties on a monthly basis by continuing to focus at least a portion of this estimate on the appropriation to the Department, as op posed to the expenditures incurred for the prior year which are based on prior usage. 112 . Section 985.686(6) also provides that the calculations of the Department must be made with input from the c ounties. The estimate process provided by the Proposed R ules fails to comply with the law implemented, and is thus invalid. 113 . In terms of the definition of actual costs provided by Proposed Rule 63G 1.011, section 985.686(3) excludes from the c ountiesÓ funding responsib ilit y the following costs: Ðthe costs of any preadjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services and $ 2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care at the detention centers.Ñ Although the Proposed Rules incorporate a portion of this exclusion, the Department h as inexplicably failed to include Ðpreadjudicatory nonmedical educational or therapeutic services.Ñ This language has been a part of the statute since its inception, yet the Department has failed to include any provision in its rule addressing this subjec t. Further, as in the process for the estimate, the Department does not provide a process for c ounty input into these amounts and calculations before the annual reconciliation statement is finalized and provided to each county, contrary to the requirement s of the law implemented. § 985.686(6), Fla. Stat. XIII. The Statement of Estimated Regulatory Costs (SERC) 114 . Pursuant to section 120.52(8)(f), an agency rule is invalid where Ð[t]he rule imposes regulatory costs on the regulated person, county, or c ity which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives.Ñ 115 . In addition, a proposed rule is invalid for material failure to follow applicable rulemaking procedures where the agency fails to prepare a proper statement of estimated regulatory costs or to respond to a written lower cost regulatory alternative. § 120 .541(1)(f), Fla. Stat. 116 . Section 120.541 sets forth the process regarding the statement of estimated regulatory costs (ÐSERCÑ): (1)(a) Within 21 days after publication of the notice required under s. 120.54 (3)(a), a substantially affected person may submit to an agency a good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative to a proposed rule which substantially accomplishes the objectives of the law being implemented. The proposal may include the alternative of not adopting any rule if the proposal explains how the lower costs and objectives of t he law will be achieved by not adopting any rule. If such a proposal is submitted, the 90 day period for filing the rule is extended 21 days. Upon the submission of the lower cost regulatory alternative, the agency shall prepare a statement of estimated regulatory costs as provided in subsection (2), or shall revise its prior statement of estimated regulatory costs, and either adopt the alternative or provide a statement of the reasons for rejecting the alternative in favor of the proposed rule. 117 . The Challengers assert that the DepartmentÓs SERC did not comply with the statutory requirements because it did not address the Ðregulatory costsÑ of the Proposed Rule. The y further argue that the Department has failed to demonstrate that the regulatory cost s to the c ounties could not be reduced by the adoption of a less costly alternative, t o wit , the Department Ós prior interpretation of section 985.686 and practice in place at the time the Department entered into the joint stipulations. Therefore , the Proposed Rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority , according to the Challengers . 118 . The ChallengersÓ arguments regarding the DepartmentÓs SERC are rejected. As found, the DepartmentÓs new interpretation of section 985.686, as c odified in the Proposed Rule s , is not invalid. Conversely, the alternative advanced by the counties , that the state continue to pay the detention costs for probationers who are charged with a new violation of law, is inconsistent with the DepartmentÓs valid interpretation of section 985.686. 4 / XIV. AttorneyÓs Fees and Costs 119 . Petitioners and Intervenor have requested attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 120.595(2). Inasmuch as this Final Order determines that some provisions of the Propos ed Rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in section 120.52(8) (c), and ( e ), Petitioners and Intervenor are entitled to a hearing as to entitlement and, if entitled, the amount of any reasonable fees and costs. ORDER Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the specifically identified provisions of proposed rule 6 3G 1.011, 63G 1.013 and 63G 1.017 constitute an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority. Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of determining the issue of the award of attorney Ó s fees and costs. Any motion to determine fees and costs shall be filed within 60 days of the issuance of this Final Order. DONE AND ORDE RED this 22nd day of April, 2015 , in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 3060 (850) 488 9675 Fax Filing (850) 921 6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2015 . ENDNOTES 1 / Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 2014 version of the Florida Statutes. 2 / The Department not ed that Ðother Counties have advocated a similar position though they have not formally identified it as a lowe r cost regulatory alternative.Ñ 3 / ÐIndependent JudgmentÑ is de fined by section 216.011(1), Florida Statutes, as follows: (u) ÐIndependent judgmentÑ means an evaluation of actual needs made separately and apart from the legislative budget request of any other agency or of the judicial branch, or any assessments by the Governor. Such evaluation shall not be limited by revenue est imates of the Revenue Estimating Conference. 4 / The DepartmentÓs SERC estimated that the counties would incur certain Ðtransactional costsÑ under the draft rule, stating: Although it is not a mandatory transactional cost Ðnecessary to comply with the r ule,Ñ non fiscally constrained (paying) counties might be inclined to implement a process for reviewing their resident probationersÓ detention stays to ensure the existence of an open charge. And, During fiscal year 2012 13, there were 6761 probationers with detention stays on open charges. If counties decided to review these cases to ensure that they were responsible for the stay, it is estimated that a data analyst earning an average of $20 per hour should take no longer than 15 minutes on average to r eview each case. The total, statewide annual cost would thus be $33,805 ($5 X 6761 = $33,805).Ñ The abovesigned notes that with the invalidation of the ÐTwo Day RuleÑ provision, the county audit process referenced by the Department above should not be necessary. Rather, it will be incumbent on the Department to document probationers with a new violation of law in order to properly shift those detention days to the counties. COPIES FURNISHED : Brian D. Berkowitz, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312V 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 3100 (eServed) Mary G. Jolley, Esquire County of Volusia 123 West Indiana Avenue , Room 301 Deland, Florida 32720 (eServed) Adam Katzman, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue , Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (eServed) Gregory Thomas Stewart, Esquire Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A. 1500 Mahan Drive , Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Terrell K. Arline, Esquir e Bay County Attorney's Office 840 West 11th Street Panama City, Florida 32401 2336 (eServed) Virginia Delegal, General Counsel Florida Association of Counties 100 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michele L. Lieberman, Esquire Alachua County Attorney General Office Post Office Box 5547 Gainesville, Florida 32627 Janette S. Knowlton, Esquire Charlotte County Attorney`s Office 18500 Murdock Circle , 5th Floor Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 1094 Shannon L. Wilson, Esquire Office of the C ounty Attorney 2725 Judge Fran Jamieson Way Building C, 3rd Floor Viera, Florida 32940 (eServed) Jeffrey A. Klatzkow, Esquire Collier County Attorney`s Office 3299 Tamiami Trail East , Suite 800 Naples, Florida 34112 4902 (eServed) Charles V. Peppler, Esquire Escambia County Attorney's Office 221 Palafox Place , Suite 430 Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Garth Christopher Coller, Esquire Hernando County Attorney`s Office 20 North Main Street , Suite 462 Brooksville, Florida 34601 2817 Albert J. Hade ed, Esquire Flagler County Attorney's Office 1769 East Moody Boulevard , Building 2 Bunnell, Florida 32110 5992 (eServed) Sanford A. Minkoff, Esquire Lake County Attorney`s Office 315 West Main Street, Suite 335 Post Office Box 7800 Tavares, Florida 32778 7800 Stephen M. Todd, Esquire Hillsborough County Attorney`s Office Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 (eServed) Richard Wm. Wesch, Esquire Lee County Attorney's Office 2115 Second Street Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 0398 Mitchell O. Palmer, Esquire Manatee County Attorney's Office Post Office Box 1000 Bradenton, Florida 34206 1000 Herbert W. A. Thiele, Esquire Leon County Attorney's Office 301 South Monroe Street , Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 1803 (eServed) Michael D. Durham, Esquire Martin County Attorney Ós Office 2401 Southeast Monterey Road Stuart, Florida 34996 David Allen Hallman, Esquire Nassau County Attorney's Office 96135 Nassau Place , Suite 6 Yulee, Florida 32097 8635 (eServed) Denise Marie Niem an, Esquire Palm Beach County Attorney's Office 300 North Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 James Bennett, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street , 6th Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Angela J. Jones, Esquire Santa Rosa Co unty Attorney's Office 6495 Caroline Street , Suite C Milton, Florida 32570 (eServed) Stephen E. DeMarsh, Esquire Sarasota County Attorney's Office 1660 Ringling Boulevard , 2nd Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 6808 Patrick F. McCormack, Esquire St. Johns County Attorney's Office 500 San Sebastian View St. Augustine, Florida 32084 (eServed) Daniel S. McIntyre, Esquire St. Lucie County Attorney's Office 2300 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 34982 (eServed) Mark D. Davis, Esquire Walton County Atto rney's Office 161 East Sloss Avenue Defuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Carly J. Schrader, Esquire Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A. 1500 Mahan Drive , Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Christina K. Daly, Interim Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 3100 Loree L. French, Esquire Office of General Counsel, City of Jacksonville 117 West Duval Street , Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Scott D. Shevenell, E squire Orange County Attorney's Office 201 South Rosalind Avenue , 3rd Floor Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the o riginal notice of administrative appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law. ' . . I Pos-1 N oC TeA CoW Froi'\\, R.u!r Y i1f · ( 1 (t- 0) '6 I;.. 7 I l 63G-1.010 Scope. This rule establishes the process by which the funding of detention services is shared by state and county government. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(1) FS. History-New 7-6-10. 63G-l.Oll Definitions. (1) "Funding of detention services" means the funding required to provide detention services as determined by the General Appropriations Act Implementing Bill and/or General Bills. (2) "Final Court Disposition" means the decision announced by the court at the disposition hearing determining the most appropriate services for a youth. Final court disposition includes commitment, probation, and dismissal of charges. "Cemmitm:ent" means the fiaa-1 eeurt diSJ>esitiea ef a juvenile deliaqueney eharge through an erder plaeiag a yeuth ia the eustedy ef the department for plaeement ia a resideatia-1 er aea resiaential pregram. COI'flfflitm:eat te the aepartment is ia lieu efa dispesitiea efprobatiea. (3) "Shared County/State Juvenile Detention Trust Fund" means the state trust fund used to capture budget and costs associated with the counties' share of detention funding. (4) "Fiscally constrained county" means a county which is.not required to pay the full costs of its resident juveniles' detention services. (5) "Juvenile Probation Officer" (JPO) means the primary case manager for the purpose of managing, coordinating, and monitoring the services provided and sanctions saaetieas required for youth on probation, post-commitment probation or conditional release supervision. (6) "Juvenile Justice Information System" (JJIS) means the department's electronic information system used to gather and store information on youth having contact with the department. (7) "County of Residence" means the county where, at the time of referral, a child resides, as determined by a department intake officer pursuant to Rule 63G-1.012, F.A.C., and entered in the Juvenile Justice Information System, except for those youth described in subsection 63G- 1.012(2), F.A.C., below. (8) "Pre eemmitm:ent" means these says a yeuth is aetaiaed ia a detentiea eeater prier te beiag eemmitea te the aepartment . .([}f9t "Reconciliation period" means the first through the last day of a month during which reconcilation by the county and the department for the previous month's utilization takes place. {2}fl-Gj "Secure detention .. " "detention" or "detention care" means a physieally state owned and operated physically restricting facility used for the temporary care of children, pending adjudication, disposition, or placement. tl.Q)fl-B "Service day" means any day or portion of a day spent by a youth in secure detention. "Utilization" means a summary of service days. (12) "Estimated per diem" means the per diem calculated for billing purposes prior to the upcoming state fiscal year utilizing an estimate of the total service days and the estimated costs for the detention budget entity for the current fiscal year. with necessary annualized adjustments. The resulting per diem is then used to estimate the cost to a county under the methodology in Rule 630-1.013, F.A.C. (13) "Actual per diem" means the per diem calculated utilizing actual service days and the actual costs of the completed fiscal year for the purpose of reconciliation. (14) "Predisposition" means the period of time a youth is in detention care prior to entry of a final court disposition by the court. The counties are responsible for all predisposition days including all service days for youth that are, at the time of the detention: (a) In detention for contempt of court if the youth is not committed to the department or on department supervised probation. (b) In detention while on department supervised probation when the youth is charged with a new violation of law that has a referral dated between zero and two days prior to the detention admission date, as determined by subtracting the referral date in JJIS from the detention admission date in JJIS. (15) "Postdisposition" means the period of time a youth is in detention care after entry of a final court disposition. The State is responsible for all postdisposition days including all service days for youth that are, at the time of the detention: (a) Committed to the department, including youth on conditional release. (b) On department supervised probation, unless the youth is charged with a new violation of law that has a referral date between zero and two days prior to the detention admission date, as determined by subtracting the referral date in JJIS from the detention admission date in JJIS. (c) Without charges, as all charges against the youth have been dismissed or the youth has been found not guilty. (16) "Actual costs" means the total detention expenditures as reported by the department after the certified forward period has ended, less $2.5 million provided for additional medical and mental health care per section 985.686(3). These costs include expenditures in all fund types and appropriations categories (Salaries & Benefits, Other Personal Services, Expenses, OCO, Food Products, Legislative Initiatives, Fiscally Constrained Counties, Contracted Service, G/A­ Contracted Services, Risk Management Insurance, Lease or Lease-Purchase of Equipment, Human Resources Outsourcing, and FCO-Maintenance & Repair). (17) "Referral date" means the date that the department receives notification and associated documents from law enforcement that the youth has been charged with an offense. The referral date is often the same date as the offense date, but in some cases occurs after the offense date. · Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985. 686(11) 985. 986(1 0) FS. Law Implemented 985.686 FS. History-New 7-6-10 , A=m=en=d=e=d ____ _ 63G-1.012 Determining Residence. (1) Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) JPOs and contracted providers responsible for intake shall utilize the following procedure to determine a referred child's county of residence: (a) The address provided by the child at intake will initially be checked against the address included in the arrest affidavit and against any existing address for the child already in the JJIS. (b) In all cases, an effort will be made to verify the address with the child's parent or guardian. (c) All attempts to contact the parent or guardian, and the results of those attempts, will be noted in the chronological record in the child's case file. (2) County of residence for children in substitute care placements, such as foster care, will be where the dependency case originated for the youth. Street address information recorded in the JJIS will be that of the Department of Children and Family Services or its contracted agency district office or service center for confidentiality purposes. (3) Address verification procedures are to be included in the annual refresher training on the JJIS given to departmental JPOs and its contracted providers responsible for intake. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(5) FS. History-New 7-6-10. 63G-1.013 Calculating Estimated Funding. (1) Estimates for each county's individual portion of detention funding will be calculated as follows: (a) The department shall estimate the number of service days for the upcoming fiscal year based upon prior use of secure detention and generally accepted statistical methods. Utilizing previous fiscal year data, the department shall estimate: All youth served iR secure deteH:tioH: duriH:g the most receH:tly reconeiled previous fiscal year as retleeted in the JJIS will be identified; 1. detention costs, using the current year actual expenditures projected through the end of the fiscal year, with necessary annualized adjustments for any new legislative appropriations within the detention budget entity; 2. The number of predisposition service days for each county; and 3. The total number of service days for secure detention, including both predisposition and postdisposition service days. (b) The estimated costs shall be divided by the total number of service days estimate, which will produce an estimated per diem. The total number of pre commitment service days iR seeure deteH:tion is computed by including all days up to but not ineluding the date of commitmeH:t to the department. (c) The department shall multiply the estimated per diem by the expected number of predisposition service days for each county to calculate each county's estimated share of detention costs. (2) The total H:Umber of pre commitmeH:t service da;·s for each county from the most recently reconciled pre•lious fiscal year data \\Vill be dhrided by the total pre commitmeH:t senrioe days for all coooties for that same time period to arrive at each county's percentage ofthe tetah (3) Each coooty's percentage will be multiplied by the total estimated aooaal appropriation in the shared eoooty/state jw1erule deteH:tion trust fimd for the upcoming fiscal year to determine each eoooty' s share of the total badget. Each county's The estimated share of the total budget will be billed to the cmmties in monthly installments. Invoices are to be mailed at the beginning of the month prior to the service period, so that an invoice for the August service period will be mailed in July. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(11) 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(3) FS. History-New 7-6-10z...:. ___ __ 63G-1.014 Fiscally Constrained Counties. (1) Each fiscally constrained county's estimated share of detention budget is determined in the same manner as those for non- fiscally constrained counties. (2) For informational purposes, fiscally constrained counties will be invoiced for their estimated monthly share even though they will not be required to remit payment. (3) Prior to the beginning of each fiscal year the total estimated budget needed for all fiscally constrained counties will be compared to the amount appropriated in General Revenue to the department for fiscally constrained counties. If the total estimated annual amount for utilization exceeds the appropriated amount, matching funds will be required to make up the shortfall. Fiscally constrained counties will be assessed for the amount of the shortfall under the following methodology: (a) Each fiscally constrained county's utilization will be compared to the total for all fiscally constrained counties to determine a percentage of the total. (b) The county's percentage will be multiplied by the shortfall amount computed in subsection (3) above to determine the individual county's amount due. ( 4) The department shall determine whether an estimated shortfall is likely by July 31. If a shortfall is expected, the department shall provide fiscally constrained counties information on their share of the expected shortfall on or before August 15. (5) Fiscally constrained counties will be billed for their share of the shortfall in equal monthly installments beginning November 1 through May 1. ( 6) If after the annual reconciliation is complete it is found that there was in fact no shortfall or that the shortfall was overestimated, the fiscally constrained counties will receive a refund. If the shortfall was underestimated, the department may seek matching funds from the counties to make up the difference. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(4) FS. History-New 7-6-10. 63G-1.015 Receipt of Payment. (1) Payment is to be made by check or by pre-arranged wire transfer, which is due the first day of the monthly service period, such that the July service period payment is due July 1. (2) Payment will be deemed in arrears on the second day of the month the payment is due. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(5), (6) FS. History­ New 7-6-10. 63G-1.016 Monthly Reporting. (1) Each month, the department shall generate a web based on-line utilization report that provides each county's actual usage for the previous service month. The report is to be used by the counties to validate utilization. (2) The report shall contain the following information: (a) Youth's name; (b) Youth's address at the time of the referral; (c) Sex; (d) Date of birth; (e) N arne of parent or guardian, if available; (f) Phone contact, if available; (g) Charge category; (h) Admission date; (i) Final court Commitm:ent disposition date, if available; and .G1fgj Number of detention days. (3) The report will be available electronically on the first day of each month for the previous month's utilization. (4) The limited release of juvenile identifying information contained in each county's monthly report is confidential. The release will not include treatment or charging information, is limited to the county official(s) designated to receive the report, and is not to be used for any purpose other than that of verifying the provision of detention services. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.6860 1) 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686{11 (7) FS. History-New 7-6-10,_,, A=m=en=d=e=d ____ .... 63G-1.017 Monthly/Annual Reconciliation and Dispute Resolution. (1) On the first day of each month, the department shall make available to each county a utilization report described in Rule 630-1.016, F.A.C. (2) The county shall have from the first to the fourteenth day of the month to review the on­ line utilization information reported for the previous month. If the county takes issue with any of the utilization data, it shall mark the record for dispute on-line and provide a reason for the dispute. Disputes involving a detained youth's county of residence or disposition must include one or more of the following indicia of specificity: (a) Address invalid- not in county; (b) Address invalid street number not valid; (c) Address invalid- not residence of youth; (d) Address invalid- see text (must enter text); (e) Detention stay invalid- see text (must enter (f) Service day is a postdisposition day- see text (must enter text). (3) The department will make every effort to review all disputes for the previous month between the fifteenth and twenty-fourth day of each month for the reconciliation period. The department's response, provided on-line, constitutes notice of final action. All pending disputes will be resolved by the department no later than 60 days after the end of the reconciliation period. ( 4) In October of each year, the department will perform an annual reconciliation of utilization and costs for the prior fiscal year to calculate the difference between the estimated costs and the actual costs of each county for its share of detention care. The dg>artment shall provide: Based oH a county's actual utili:t:atioH, a reealoolatioH of that eoaB:ty' s share of the shared emmty/state jliYeHile deteHtioH trust fund expeHditllfes \\vill be performed. (a) The actual cost to operate detention care based on actual expenditures. detailing expenditures by appropriation category and by detention center. (b) The number of predisposition service days for each county. (c) The total number of all service days for secure detention, including both predisposition and postdisposition service days. (5) In November of each year, the department will provide each county an annual reconcilation statement for the previous fiscal year. The calculation shall be performed as follows: The statemeHt shall reflect the differeaee betv;eea the amoliHt paid by the eo\\:Hlty based on the estimated litilization and the aeteallitilization recoHeiled iR Slibsectioo (4) above. (a) The actual costs shall be divided by the total number of service days, which will produce an actual per diem. (b) The actual per diem will be applied to each county's actual predisposition service days to calculate each county's actual costs. (c) The reconciliation shall reflect the difference between the estimated costs paid by the . ' . ' county during the fiscal year and the county's actual costs. The statement shall reflect the difference between the amount paid by the county based on the estimated utilization and the actual utilization reconciled in subsection ( 4) above. (6) If the total amount paid by a county falls short of the amount owed based on actual utilization, the county will be invoiced for that additional amount. The amount due will be applied to the county's account. An invoice will accompany the reconciliation statement, and shall be payable on or before March 1. If the amount paid by a county exceeds the amount owed based on actual utilization, the county will receive a credit. The credit will be applied to the county's account and be included on the invoice sent in November. (7) For the purpose of determining the actual utilization and actual per diem, the department is responsible for paying for the cost of detention for all service days for youth that reside out of state or whose addresses cannot be determined. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 986. 686(11) 985. 686(1 ()) FS. Law Implemented 985. 686(5), (7) FS. History-New 7-6-1 0 , 63G-L018 Billing. (1) The monthly reporting marks the point at which a county may take issue with the charges referenced in the report, but it cannot be the basis for withholding payment. Adjustments, including those necessitated by dispute resolution, cannot be made until the annual reconciliation. (2) Invoices will include the following information: (a) Invoice date; (b) Invoice number; (c) Remittance address; (d) Payment due date; (e) Billing Service period; (f) Total amount billed; and (g) Department contact information. Rulemaking Authority 985.64, 985.686(10) FS. Law Implemented 985.686(5), (7) FS. History­ New 7-6-10.

Docket for Case No: 14-002799RP

Orders for Case No: 14-002799RP