vs.
Respondent.
Case No. 19-5702
Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Garnett W. Chisenhall of the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), in Gainesville, Florida, on December 6, 2019.
For Respondent: Brian T. Moore, Esquire
School Board of Alachua County 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601
The issues for determination are: (1) did the Alachua County School Board (“the School Board”) commit an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of a disability; and (2) did the School Board subject Petitioner to a hostile work environment.
Felecia Hines-Penny filed an “Employment Complaint of Discrimination” (“Complaint of Discrimination”) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“the Commission”) on March 27, 2019, alleging that she was “subjected to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment” by the School Board. While not specifying the nature of her disability, Ms. Hines- Penny alleged that the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office and the School Board improperly Baker Acted her after she had a “medical episode” on December 6, 2018, at Idylwild Elementary School. Ms. Hines-Penny further alleged that discriminatory conduct continued after she was transferred to a new position at a different location.
The Commission issued a determination on September 19, 2019, finding there was no reasonable cause to conclude that Ms. Hines-Penny had been the victim of an illegal employment practice:
[Ms. Hines-Penny] worked for [the School Board], a school system, as a teacher specialist and social worker. [Ms. Hines-Penny] claimed that she was forced to submit to a medical exam, forced to submit to mental health services, and wrongfully terminated. [The School Board]’s staff provided notes which state that they observed [her] stare blankly and then remove her clothes. [The School Board]’s resource officer, EMS, and the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office were called to respond. In addition, these notes state that [Ms. Hines-Penny] did not recognize her coworkers and did not understand why EMS was called to [the] school. Afterwards, [Ms. Hines-Penny] did not recall what happened or how she behaved. These incidents took place in front of [sic] students. After this, the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office had [Ms. Hines- Penny] Baker Acted and [she] was given a fitness for duty examination. As a result, [Ms. Hines- Penny] was then reassigned and her contract was
not renewed. The investigation did not reveal how other employees were treated. Furthermore, the evidence does not show that [Ms. Hines-Penny] complained of any discrimination or harassment. [Ms. Hines-Penny] alleged that she was subjected to disparate treatment based on her disability. [Ms. Hines-Penny] fails to prove a prima facie case because the investigation did not reveal evidence of similarly situated comparators outside [her] protected class who were treated more favorably or any other evidence of discrimination. Also, [Ms. Hines-Penny] alleged that she was harassed based on her disability. [She] fails to prove a prima facie case because the evidence does not show that she suffered any severe or pervasive conduct.
Ms. Hines-Penny responded to the Commission’s determination by filing a Petition for Relief, and the Commission referred this matter to DOAH on October 24, 2019.
The final hearing convened on December 6, 2019. Ms. Hines-Penny testified on her own behalf and Petitioner’s Composite Exhibit 1 was accepted into evidence. The School Board presented the testimony of Kevin Purvis, and the undersigned accepted Respondent’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4a through 4c, and 5 into evidence.1
The one-volume transcript from the final hearing was filed on December 26, 2019. The parties agreed that their proposed recommended orders would be due on Friday, January 17, 2020, and the School Board’s
Proposed Recommended Order was timely-filed. Ms. Hines-Penny submitted
1 Many of the documents in Respondent’s Exhibit 1 are written statements from School Board employees and others, who did not testify at the final hearing, describing instances in which Ms. Hines-Penny experienced seizures. While Ms. Hines-Penny did not object to those documents being accepted into evidence, those documents are hearsay statements that contradict, rather than supplement and corroborate, her testimony. Therefore, the undersigned elected not to base any findings of fact on those documents. See §120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019)(providing that “[h]earsay evidence may be used for the purpose of
her Proposed Recommended Order by facsimile at 5:28 p.m. on January 17, 2020. While Ms. Hines-Penny’s Proposed Recommended Order was untimely under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.104(3), that untimeliness did not prejudice the School Board. As a result, the undersigned considered both proposed recommended orders in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made:
Ms. Hines-Penny graduated cum laude from the University of Florida with a minor in Human Services and a Bachelor’s Degree in Family, Youth, and Community Science. She graduated from the University of Central Florida with a Master’s Degree in Social Work and is certified in Family Life Education. Her work experience includes three years of clinical counseling in the field of social work.
Ms. Hines-Penny developed epilepsy after her head hit a steering wheel during a car accident in 2015. Rather than experiencing uncontrollable muscle spasms, Ms. Hines-Penny’s seizures leave her in a catatonic state for a few minutes. Those seizures may be triggered by stress, insufficient sleep, and/or low blood sugar. Medication limits the frequency of the seizures but does not eliminate them.
Ms. Hines-Penny has a drivers’ license but does not drive. When fatigued, she attempts to arrange her work schedule so that she is doing paperwork rather than working with people.
Ms. Hines-Penny was 33 years old when she became a full-time School Board employee in August of 2018, and joined the System of Care (“SOC”)
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.”).
program, a grant-funded program that connects at-risk students with service organizations within the local community.
Ms. Hines-Penny began the 2018-2019 school-year as the new SOC social worker at Idylwild Elementary. At this point in time, Ms. Hines-Penny had not disclosed to the School Board that she suffered from epilepsy.
After working at Idylwild Elementary for two weeks, Ms. Hines-Penny experienced a seizure in her office on August 23, 2018, that left her in a catatonic state for two to three minutes. Coworkers present at the time later relayed to her that she said “mommy” and sucked her fingers and/or thumb.
Ms. Hines-Penny had recovered by the time paramedics arrived. She accompanied them to the ambulance and disclosed to them that she had epilepsy. After taking her vitals, the paramedics determined that Ms. Hines- Penny did not require hospitalization.
One of the paramedics may have reported to an Idylwild Elementary administrator that Ms. Hines-Penny suffered a seizure. Rather than notifying her SOC program supervisor, Ms. Veita Jackson-Carter, that she had epilepsy, Ms. Hines-Penny merely disclosed that she had a medical condition.
Ms. Hines-Penny began experiencing harassment from some of her coworkers at Idylwild Elementary. A fellow staff member in the school’s front office would enter Ms. Hines-Penny’s office, lick his fingers, and say “mommy.” She perceived this as his attempt to mimic her behavior during the August 23rd episode. 2 In addition, Ms. Hines-Penny overheard co- workers making disparaging remarks about her. She reported this to Ms. Jackson-Carter and Idylwild Elementary’s vice-principal, but the harassing conduct continued.
Ms. Hines-Penny had a doctor’s appointment on approximately September 20, 2018, and her physician recommended that Ms. Hines-Penny
2 Ms. Hines-Penny could not specify how often this particular co-worker engaged in such behavior. She testified that it occurred often enough for her to complain about it.
tell her co-workers that she had epilepsy. However, Ms. Hines-Penny decided against doing so because she feared the harassing conduct would get worse.
Ms. Hines-Penny had another seizure on October 2, 2018, when she was in a classroom and speaking privately with a teacher. She reached under the two shirts she was wearing, removed her bra, and then removed her top shirt. Ms. Hines-Penny left the classroom for a short period of time and then returned. Upon regaining her senses, Ms. Hines-Penny apologized to the teacher and went to the bathroom to collect herself.
The principal, the school resource officer, and the school nurse had arrived by the time Ms. Hines-Penny left the bathroom. They walked her back to her office and contacted Ms. Jackson-Carter. Ms. Jackson-Carter drove Ms. Hines-Penny to the emergency room at Shands Hospital, where the medical staff confirmed that she had experienced a seizure. The medical staff also determined that she could return to work and released her that same day.
The next morning, Ms. Hines-Penny provided Ms. Jackson-Carter with a document from Shands Hospital stating she had been treated. However, Ms. Hines-Penny did not disclose her condition to Ms. Jackson-Carter. Due to concerns associated with her seizures, Ms. Hines-Penny was put on administrative leave with pay.
The School Board’s Human Resources Department notified Ms. Hines- Penny that she needed to undergo a Fitness for Duty evaluation, a review by a healthcare professional to ascertain whether a school board employee is able to perform a position’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodations.3
3 The School Board’s policy manual describes a Fitness for Duty evaluation as follows: “If the Superintendent believes an instructional staff member is unable to perform essential functions of the position to which the staff member is assigned, with or without reasonable accommodations, the staff member will be offered the opportunity for a meeting to discuss these issues. The Superintendent may require an instructional staff member to submit to an appropriate examination by a health care provider designated by the Board to determine whether or not the staff member is able to perform essential functions of the position to
Ms. Hines-Penny reported to a School Board contractor on October 10, 2018, for her Fitness for Duty evaluation and underwent medical tests, including a drug analysis and a basic physical examination.
Dr. Scott Wilson of SIMEDHealth wrote the following memorandum to the School Board:
Based on review of medical records and the Fit for Duty evaluation, Ms. Hines-Penny has a form of epilepsy that manifests itself with brief episodes of blank gaze that lasts a short time. The recent episode of October 2, 2018 was a drastic episode of her seizure disorder that occurred due to a problem with her seizure medication. Now that her medication has been adjusted and she is taking it correctly, she should be fit to return to her regular duties.
It was recommended that Ms. Hines-Penny tell her school nurse and at least one administrator at her school about her medical condition and the plan that her and her Neurologist have for any occurrence of her seizures.
It was also recommended that Ms. Hines-Penny discuss with her Neurologist about the possibility of wearing an alert bracelet regarding her seizures. It is also important for Ms. Hines-Penny to take her medication as prescribed and try to eat well and get proper sleep to prevent any occurrences of her seizures. If there are further episodes like the most recent one on October 2, 2018, we will have to revisit her fitness to perform her duties and continuing to work with children.
which the staff member is assigned, with or without reasonable accommodations. The Board shall pay any uninsured fees for such examinations. The staff member will be required to execute a release that complies with the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in order to allow the report of the medical examination to be released to the Superintendent and to allow the Superintendent or his/her designee to speak to the health care provider who conducted the medical examination in order to get clarification. Refusal to submit to an appropriate examination or to execute the HIPAA release will be grounds for disciplinary action in accordance with the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.”
At some point following the Fitness for Duty evaluation, Ms. Hines- Penny met with Rick Jamison of the School Board’s Risk Management department. She described the harassment she experienced at Idlywild Elementary and asked to be assigned to a different school. Ms. Hines-Penny believed that this meeting led to an agreement between herself and
Mr. Jamison, requiring him to notify Idylwild Elementary’s school nurse of Ms. Hines-Penny’s epilepsy. Ms. Hines-Penny would provide similar notice to the school’s principal. According to Ms. Hines-Penny, this agreement required the school nurse or the principal to assist Ms. Hines-Penny if she were to suffer another seizure. Ms. Hines-Penny agreed to leave work for the rest of the day following a seizure.
Ms. Hines-Penny experienced another seizure in December of 2018 while meeting in her office with a mental health counselor. When Ms. Hines- Penny became catatonic, the counselor alerted the school nurse. After
Ms. Hines-Penny recovered, it became readily apparent that the school nurse had not been apprised of Ms. Hines-Penny’s epilepsy because she refused to allow Ms. Hines-Penny to leave the office. The school resource officer arrived and also barred Ms. Hines-Penny from leaving. Ms. Hines-Penny became frustrated that the agreement she had reached with Mr. Jamison was not being followed.
Ms. Hines-Penny managed to call the Risk Management unit and was told that someone was on the way. While Ms. Hines-Penny waited for Risk Management to arrive, she unsuccessfully attempted to get the principal and school nurse to follow the agreement she and Mr. Jamison had formulated.
Ms. Hines-Penny was then escorted to the school resource officer’s office. The resource officer’s supervisor arrived on the scene, declared that Ms. Hines-Penny was “mental,” and decided to have her Baker Acted. By the time Mr. Jamison arrived, Ms. Hines-Penny was in tears and telling him that their agreement had not been followed. Mr. Jamison told her there was nothing he could do because the school resource officer and her supervisor
worked for the sheriff’s office rather than the school board. Ms. Hines-Penny was then escorted outside, placed in the back of a patrol car, and transported to a mental health facility.
Ms. Hines-Penny was at the mental health facility for no more than one day. After her release, Ms. Jackson-Carter notified Ms. Hines-Penny that the School Board wanted to transfer her to the Manning Center, an office building housing the School Board’s administrative personnel. While
Ms. Hines-Penny would still be with the SOC program, she would no longer be working with students or their families. Instead, her duties would include tasks such as data mining and report preparation. Ms. Hines-Penny initially objected to being relocated but ultimately acquiesced. The transfer occurred in December of 2018.
In January of 2019, Ms. Hines-Penny was transferred to another unit within the Manning Center. While she was still a social worker, she was now working with private and charter schools.
Ms. Hines-Penny had no more seizures following her transfer to the Manning Center, but she was dissatisfied with her new supervisor, Jennifer Taylor. Ms. Hines-Penny asserts that Ms. Taylor did not meet with her as frequently as she met with her other subordinates. Ms. Hines-Penny also asserts that she was excluded from training received by her co-workers. According to Ms. Hines-Penny, Ms. Taylor made disparaging remarks to her such as: “why are you not thinking,” “you’re a little brain,” and “what is wrong with you.” Furthermore, Ms. Taylor was supposedly unwilling to consider Ms. Hines-Penny’s comments when writing the latter’s performance evaluation.
Toward the end of the 2018-2019 school year and after she filed her Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission, Ms. Hines-Penny learned that the School Board was not going to retain her. Because she was on probationary status, Ms. Hines-Penny could be non-renewed without cause. Ultimate Findings
In her Complaint of Discrimination, Ms. Hines-Penny alleges she was the victim of an illegal employment practice when she was involuntarily committed in December of 2018. However, the testimony demonstrates that employees of the sheriff’s office, rather than School Board employees, were responsible for the decision to have Ms. Hines-Penny Baker Acted. Moreover, the preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that the personnel at Idlywild Elementary were discriminating against Ms. Hines-Penny because of her epilepsy. As discussed above, Ms. Hines-Penny did not disclose her condition to anyone associated with the School Board until her Fitness for Duty Evaluation and her meeting with Mr. Jamison of Risk Management. In addition, Ms. Hines-Penny did not present any persuasive evidence demonstrating that School Board employees without disabilities received more favorable treatment.
As for her hostile work environment claim, Ms. Hines-Penny’s Complaint of Discrimination alleged that she was the victim of a hostile work environment but set forth no details in support thereof. Even if the allegations from Ms. Hines-Penny’s testimony had been included in her Complaint of Discrimination, those allegations, if accepted as true, are not sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes4, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Y-4.016(1).
The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme contained in sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes, known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the FCRA”), incorporates and adopts the legal principles and precedents established in the federal anti-discrimination laws specifically set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C.
4 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2019 version of the Florida Statutes.
§ 2000e, et. seq. Therefore, federal case law construing Title VII is applicable.
See St. Johns Sch. Dist. v. O’Brien, 973 So. 2d 535, 540 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
Section 760.10 prohibits discrimination “against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.” § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
Ms. Hines-Penny alleged in her Complaint of Discrimination that she was the victim of disparate treatment due to her disability and a hostile work environment. As a result, Ms. Hines-Penny has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the School Board discriminated against her. See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).5
Ms. Hines-Penny’s Discrimination Claim
A party may prove unlawful discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44885, at *9 (M.D. Fla. 2009). Direct evidence is evidence that, “if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Mil. Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence consists of “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate” on the basis of an impermissible factor. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989).
There is no direct evidence of unlawful discrimination in the instant case. That is not uncommon because “direct evidence of intent is often unavailable.” Shealy v. City of Albany, 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, those who claim to be victims of discrimination “are permitted to
5 Ms. Hines-Penny filed her Complaint of Discrimination with the Commission on March 29, 2019. As a result, no events subsequent to that date, such as the School Board’s decision to not renew her contract, can lead to a finding in the instant case that an illegal employment practice occurred.
establish their case through inferential and circumstantial proof.” Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).
To prove unlawful discrimination by circumstantial evidence, a party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If successful, this creates a presumption of discrimination. Then the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer meets that burden, the presumption disappears and the employee must prove that the legitimate reasons were a pretext. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d 17, 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Facts that are sufficient to establish a prima facie case must be adequate to permit an inference of discrimination. Id.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), the
U.S. Supreme Court articulated a scheme for analyzing employment discrimination claims where, as here, the complainant relies upon circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Pursuant to this analysis, the complainant has the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Failure to establish a prima facie case ends the inquiry. If, however, the complainant succeeds in making a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the accused employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its complained-of conduct. If the employer carries this burden, then the complainant must establish that the proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993).
In order to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under section 760.10, one must demonstrate that he or she: (1) has or had a “disability;” (2) was a “qualified individual” who could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was discriminated against because of his or her disability. See, e.g., Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).
In order to establish that one suffers from a “disability,” one must prove that he or she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” a “major life activity;” (2) has a “record of” such impairment; or (3) is “regarded as” having such an impairment. See, e.g., Mohammed v. Dupage Legal Assistance Found., 781 Fed. Appx. 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2019).
With regard to the instant case, epilepsy that does not result in uncontrollable muscle spasms could be considered a disability that substantially limits a major life activity. See Hargett v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 219 F.S.Supp.3d 1227, 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2016)(rejecting an argument that epilepsy resulting in brief seizures from which the plaintiff could recover from in minutes did not substantially limit a major life activity).
Even if it were to be assumed that Ms. Hines-Penny sufficiently notified the School Board and/or her coworkers of her condition so as to satisfy the second and third criteria associated with establishing one has a “disability” within the meaning of the FCRA, the preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that the personnel at Idlywild Elementary were discriminating against Ms. Hines-Penny when she was Baker Acted. Even if they had been responsible for having her involuntarily committed, the preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that decision was motivated by discriminatory animus.
Ms. Howell’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
“Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Coles v. Post Master Gen. United States Postal Serv., 711 Fed. Appx. 890, 897 (11th Cir. 2017).
In order to substantiate such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the following criteria: (a) she belongs to a protected group; (b) she has been
subjected to unwelcome harassment; (c) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the employee; (d) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment; and (e) the employer was responsible for the harassment under a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
“It is a bedrock principle that not all objectionable conduct or language amounts to discrimination under Title VII. Therefore, only conduct that is based on a protected category . . . may be considered in a hostile work environment analysis. Innocuous statements or conduct, or boorish ones that do not relate to the [protected category] of the offended party, are not counted.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)(internal citations omitted).
With regard to the severity or pervasiveness of harassment, an employee must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and the employee’s subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). “The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that he perceived, and that a reasonable person would perceive, the working environment to be hostile or abusive.” UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d at 1299.
As for whether an employee’s subjective perception is objectively reasonable, the United States Supreme Court has held that courts should consider: (a) the frequency and severity of the conduct at issue; (b) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating rather than a mere offensive utterance; and (c) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff’s job performance. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. “Although these factors help guide the inquiry, the objective element is not subject to mathematical precision.” Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs., 904 F.3d 1276,
1285 (11th Cir. 2018). A court “must view the evidence cumulatively and in the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Dexter v. Amedisys Home Health, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2013). “The Eleventh Circuit considers an incident a week to be sufficiently frequent to bolster a plaintiff’s case but considers an incident every two months to be insufficiently frequent to do so.” Id. But see Smelter, 904 F.3d at 1286 (rejecting an argument that a single use of the n-word was insufficient to establish severity as a matter of law, and noting “[t]his Court has observed that the use of this word is particularly egregious when directed toward a person in an offensive or humiliating manner.”).
As noted in the Findings of Fact, Ms. Hines-Penny’s Complaint of Discrimination alleged that she was the victim of a hostile work environment but set forth no descriptive details to support that allegation. Nevertheless, even if the details from Ms. Hines-Penny’s testimony had been included in her Complaint of Discrimination, those details, if accepted as true, do not describe events sufficiently severe to amount to a hostile work environment.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief.
DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2020.
Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk
Brian T. Moore, Esquire
School Board of Alachua County 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 (eServed)
Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
