STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
HARRY BOGGS,
Petitioner,
vs.
KELLY SERVICES,
Respondent.
/
Case No. 20-2560
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The final hearing in this matter was conducted before Andrew D. Manko, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2020),1 on August 21, 2020, by video teleconference between sites in Tallahassee and Altamonte Springs, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Harry Scott Boggs, pro se
General Delivery Orlando, Florida 32802
For Respondent: Misbah Shahid, Esquire
Kelly Services
999 West Big Beaver Road, 2nd Floor Troy, Michigan 48084
Daniel P. Hart, Esquire Seyfarth Shaw, L.P.
1075 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309
1 All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2020 version, unless otherwise noted.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether Respondent, Kelly Services, Inc., engaged in a discriminatory employment practice and/or retaliated against Petitioner, Harry Boggs.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner filed a Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“Commission”) on May 16, 2019, alleging that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory employment practice on the basis of a handicap and retaliated by terminating him from his substitute teacher position.
The Commission investigated the claims and, on April 29, 2020, issued a determination that no reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred.
On June 2, 2020, Petitioner timely requested a hearing by filing a Petition for Relief. On June 4, 2020, the Commission transmitted the Petition to DOAH to conduct a formal administrative hearing under section 120.57.
On August 13, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the facts at issue were not in dispute. On August 21, 2020, the undersigned denied the Motion because the parties agreed that a dispute of material fact existed.
The final hearing occurred on August 21, 2020. Petitioner testified on his own behalf. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 4, 18 through 23, 25, and 26 were admitted in evidence. Petitioner’s Proposed Exhibits 5 through 17, 24,
27 through 30, 32, and 33 were excluded; Petitioner’s Proposed Exhibit 31 was withdrawn.
Respondent presented the testimony of three witnesses: Karen Randolph, an Orlando-area manager for Respondent; Stephen Sovey, Respondent’s manager of security and investigations; and Marisa Thaxter, a human resources consultant for Respondent. Ms. Randolph testified live at the Altamonte Springs location; Mr. Sovey and Ms. Thaxter testified via Zoom Conference. Respondent’s Exhibits 1 through 24 were admitted in evidence.
A two-volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed on October 7, 2020.
The undersigned granted Respondent’s unopposed request for a ten-day extension of time to file proposed recommended orders (“PROs”). The parties thereafter timely filed their PROs on October 29, 2020, which were duly considered in preparing this Recommended Order.
In making the findings below, the undersigned only considered hearsay evidence that either supplemented or explained other admissible evidence or would be admissible over objection in civil actions. § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Kelly Services, Inc., is a staffing corporation with multiple divisions. Kelly Educational Staffing has a contract with Orange County Public Schools (“OCPS”) to place up to 2,000 substitute teachers per day at over 212 schools. The only educational contract that Kelly Services has in the Orlando area is with OCPS. Kelly Services also has a commercial division where it places workers in retail, office, and other manual-labor positions.
Harry Boggs, a 63-year-old man, has worked on and off as a substitute teacher in both California and Florida since 1984. From 2002 to 2009, he worked full time for OCPS as a teacher’s aide at a middle school.
In 2010, Kelly Services hired Mr. Boggs as a substitute teacher serving its contract with OCPS. After substituting for four months, he left the position to take care of his mother after his brother died.
In January 2016, after his mother’s death, Mr. Boggs applied to Kelly Services to again serve as a substitute teacher. He received the Kelly Services employee handbook, which included the job description and policies regarding professional conduct, attendance, accommodations, and training.
Mr. Boggs signed forms acknowledging receipt of the handbook, his agreement with the various policies, and the fact that he understood what they required. For instance, the compliancy rule required substitute teachers to accept at least one assignment in a 30-day period and work at least two Fridays in a 45-day period, or be subject to deactivation. Further, both Kelly Services’ Standards of Professional Conduct and an OCPS directive required substitute teachers to self-report arrests or convictions within 48 hours and to submit a follow-up statement in writing within five days; the failure to do so subjected the teacher to discipline or dismissal.
After Mr. Boggs underwent a background check and completed all paperwork and training, Kelly Services re-hired him in February 2016. Mr. Boggs understood that he was required to abide by OCPS policies, too.
Starting on February 10, 2016, Mr. Boggs worked pretty consistently at a variety of different schools for the next month.
On March 15, 2016, after substitute teaching all day, Mr. Boggs almost got into a three-car collision on his way home. He was disoriented and confused, and apparently told a police officer at the scene that he was on his way to kill a lawyer retained by his sister in a pending dispute about their mother’s estate. Police found a loaded gun and shooting range targets with bullet holes in Mr. Boggs’ car. The loaded gun had been in the car while parked on campus at the school that entire day in violation of OCPS policy.
Based on Mr. Boggs’ threatening statements and the items in his car, the police involuntarily detained him under the Baker Act. He was taken to University Behavioral Center (“UBC”) where he stayed for about six days.
Mr. Boggs testified that he called the Kelly Services office in Orlando from UBC on March 16 or 17, 2016, and told an unnamed representative that
he had been involuntarily detained, was unsure of his diagnosis, and would provide an update later. Although Kelly Services’ employee contact log reflects that Mr. Boggs called on March 16, 2016, it notes that he reported being absent from work that day solely due to an unspecified illness. The log also notes that Kelly Services representatives left voicemails for him on March 23 and 28 to discuss exclusions from working at a particular school and available shifts that he could pick up, which supports the finding that Mr. Boggs did not disclose the Baker Act confinement at that time.
Regardless, he was not yet obligated to self-report because he had not been arrested or charged with a crime.
However, upon his discharge from UBC, the police formally arrested Mr. Boggs for attempted murder and took him to the Orange County jail. After a week there, the police transported him to the Seminole County jail where he stayed for approximately five to six weeks.
It is undisputed that Mr. Boggs did not call or otherwise put Kelly Services on notice within 48 hours of the arrest or during his six-week confinement. In fact, Kelly Services continued to leave voicemails for
Mr. Boggs over that six-week period regarding available shifts, further supporting a finding that it had no notice of the arrest or confinement.
While in jail, Mr. Boggs underwent a psychiatric evaluation to assess his competency to stand trial. The psychologist who performed the evaluation diagnosed Mr. Boggs with probable Autism Spectrum Disorder. Based on the psychologist’s recommendation that Mr. Boggs presented no danger, the charges were dropped and he was released around May 20, 2016.
Mr. Boggs remained concerned about his six-week absence from work, including the fact that he may have been terminated for not working within the last 45 days, as required. As such, Mr. Boggs called Kelly Services on the day of his release and left a message to speak with someone in compliance; that message was sent to Mr. Flores, Kelly Services’ compliance coordinator.
On May 23, 2020, Mr. Boggs visited the Kelly Services office and spoke to a receptionist. Mr. Boggs testified that he was ready to report his arrest at that point, but never told the receptionist about it; he also never told the receptionist about his Autism diagnosis because he was embarrassed about it.2 Instead, Mr. Boggs asked if there was any paperwork to fill out. According to Mr. Boggs, the receptionist brought him a handwritten note that stated this was his lucky day, which was purportedly signed by Mr. Flores, Kelly Services’ compliance coordinator. Mr. Boggs did not understand what the note meant, except that he was likely cleared to return to work.
Importantly, Mr. Boggs confirmed that he never disclosed the
March 2016 incident, the Baker Act confinement, or the subsequent arrest to Mr. Flores on May 23, 2016. Mr. Boggs also never submitted a written statement regarding the arrest to Kelly Services.
Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Mr. Boggs failed to timely report his March 2016 arrest to Kelly Services in violation of the policies of both Kelly Services and OCPS.
Mr. Boggs immediately began picking up substitute teacher shifts again starting on May 24, 2016.
Over the next three years, Mr. Boggs continued teaching as a substitute. OCPS directed Kelly Services on several occasions to either counsel Mr. Boggs or exclude him from working at a particular school based on poor classroom management, improper discipline, arriving late, and otherwise engaging in inappropriate behavior for the classroom. Although Mr. Boggs disputes some of the reports, it is clear that Kelly Services was precluded from permitting him to pick up a shift at a particular school from which OCPS excluded him.
On April 24, 2019, Mr. Boggs worked at Wedgefield School. When he reached his car at the end of the day, he took off his shirt in the parking lot
2 The affidavit and questionnaire that Mr. Boggs completed and submitted to the Commission are in accord.
and proceeded to drive away. He initially was confused about how to leave the parking lot, but eventually was able to do so. Although Mr. Boggs saw no students around, OCPS received complaints from students who apparently saw Mr. Boggs remove his shirt and felt uncomfortable.
That afternoon, OCPS decided to exclude Mr. Boggs from working at Wedgefield and sent that exclusion to Kelly Services. The school resource officer who reported the students’ complaints also ran Mr. Boggs’ license plate and discovered the arrest in March 2016.
Later that evening, Ms. Randolph, Kelly Services’ area manager for its educational division, received a call from the OCPS human resources director about the incident earlier that day. Ms. Randolph did not know of Mr. Boggs, but looked through Kelly Services’ system. When asked about Mr. Boggs’ prior arrests, Ms. Randolph confirmed that the background screening taken in January 2016 revealed none.
At that point, OCPS directed Kelly Services to remove Mr. Boggs from the system used to accept shifts, cancel his upcoming shifts, and deactivate him pending its investigation. Kelly Services also began an investigation.
On April 26, 2019, Mr. Boggs met with Ms. Randolph to discuss the investigation. Mr. Boggs explained what happened at the school and, when prompted, discussed the circumstances surrounding the 2016 arrest. This was the first time that Ms. Randolph learned about the arrest. Mr. Boggs did not disclose to her that the police found a loaded gun in his car, a fact she learned for the first time at the final hearing in this case.
Ms. Randolph asked Mr. Boggs to make a statement concerning the incident and he completed two statements that day. The first described how he removed his shirt when he got into his car, drove around without his shirt on trying to exit the parking lot, and saw the school resource officer as he exited. In the second statement, Mr. Boggs noted that he had only one prior arrest, which occurred in 2016 and was health-related. Mr. Boggs did not disclose in the statement or to Ms. Randolph that he suffered from Autism.
On April 26, 2019, OCPS concluded its investigation and decided to exclude Mr. Boggs from serving as a substitute teacher in its schools. As such, Kelly Services could not allow him to serve as a substitute teacher under its OCPS contract unless OCPS decided to reverse its decision. And, although OCPS had a procedure for appealing its decision to a board,
Mr. Boggs presented no evidence that he attempted to do so.
Separate from OCPS’s decision, Kelly Services had independent grounds to terminate Mr. Boggs. First, Mr. Boggs violated Kelly Services’ Standards of Professional Conduct by failing to report the 2016 arrest. Kelly Services terminated every other substitute teacher in Florida who failed to timely report an arrest in the last three years, except for one who it allowed to work in the commercial division. Second, Mr. Boggs received exclusions from several schools for lack of classroom management and improper discipline, and, after being counselled about those incidents, he received another exclusion for the recent incident in April 2019. Kelly Services regularly deactivates substitute teachers when they receive multiple exclusions for similar conduct. Third, the fact that Mr. Boggs kept a loaded gun in his car while parked on campus in March 2016 violated the policies of OCPS and Kelly Services and constitutes reasonable grounds for termination.
However, Kelly Services did not terminate Mr. Boggs. Although Mr. Boggs was precluded from serving as a substitute teacher with OCPS,
Kelly Services offered to accommodate him with a position in its commercial division—an offer that remains open to this day.
On May 10 and 14, 2019, two Kelly Services employees—Ms. Thaxter, a human resources consultant, and Mr. Sovey, the manager of security and investigations—discussed such opportunities with Mr. Boggs via telephone. Although not every job in the commercial division may be a good fit for him, Kelly Services offered to assist him in finding a position based on his qualifications even if the job was in another state. They requested that he provide documentation so they could determine what accommodations were
necessary to clear him for work. Mr. Boggs provided a copy of the psychiatric evaluation he obtained while incarcerated in 2016 and he remains eligible to apply for positions in the commercial division.
Importantly, however, Mr. Boggs made it clear on the phone calls with Ms. Thaxter and Mr. Sovey and at the final hearing that he did not want to work in the commercial division. Rather, the only acceptable option for him with Kelly Services was to return to substitute teaching in OCPS.
ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT
There is no dispute that Mr. Boggs suffers from a qualifying handicap, namely, Autism, under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”). Kelly Services concedes this point.3
Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Mr. Boggs failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Kelly Services engaged in employment discrimination against him on the basis of his handicap. OCPS forbade Kelly Services from allowing Mr. Boggs to act as a substitute teacher in any of its schools because he violated its policy by failing to report his 2016 arrest. Mr. Boggs also violated Kelly Services’ policies by failing to report the arrest. Although his handicap may have contributed to the arrest, the weight of the credible evidence did not prove that the handicap caused him to violate these employment policies. Further, similarly situated employees who did not have a known handicap but failed to report arrests were also precluded from serving as substitute teachers; in fact, all but one of them was terminated.
Although Kelly Services had reasonable, nondiscriminatory grounds to terminate Mr. Boggs, it did not do so. Instead, it offered to accommodate him by moving him to the commercial division. But, he rejected that
3 In July 2019, Mr. Boggs underwent another psychological evaluation by a licensed clinical psychologist as part of his application for vocational rehabilitation with the Department of Education. The psychologist diagnosed him with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of the death of his mother and resulting eviction, and Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood.
accommodation and demanded instead to be reinstated as a substitute teacher in OCPS—a demand that Kelly Services lacked authority to meet. Mr. Boggs could make that choice, but doing so undermines any claim that Kelly Services failed to accommodate him as a result of his handicap.
Based on the weight of the credible evidence, Kelly Services also did not engage in retaliation against Mr. Boggs for disclosing his handicap. To the contrary, the evidence established that Mr. Boggs violated the policies of OCPS and Kelly Services by failing to report his arrest, which resulted in his deactivation as a substitute teacher irrespective of his handicap. And, though Kelly Services had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate
Mr. Boggs entirely, it nevertheless offered to accommodate him through its commercial division. That offer treated Mr. Boggs better than his similarly situated counterparts who were terminated for similar violations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this cause. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.11(7), Fla. Stat.
FCRA protects employees from discrimination at work, including on the basis of a disability or handicap. See §§ 760.10(1)(a) and 760.11, Fla. Stat. Disability is “a conduction that is an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities as interpreted by 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y- 3.001(13); accord § 760.22(7), Fla. Stat. (defining “handicap” similarly as it relates to housing discrimination claims).
The FCRA “is remedial and requires a liberal construction to preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the Legislature.” Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., 829 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000)).
The burden of proof is on Mr. Boggs as the complainant. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co.,
670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996). Mr. Boggs must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Valenzuela v.
GlobeGround N. Am., LLC, 18 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009);
§ 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. A preponderance of the evidence means evidence that “more likely than not” tends to prove a certain proposition. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014).
Because the FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17, “the Florida statute will take on the same constructions as placed on its federal prototype.” Brand v. Fla. Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998).
Discrimination may be proven by direct, statistical, or circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment decision without any inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Holifield v. Reno,
115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997). But, “‘only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate …’ will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
The record in this case contains no direct evidence that Kelly Services discriminated against Mr. Boggs on the basis of a handicap. The record also contains no statistical evidence of discrimination by Kelly Services.
In the absence of such direct evidence, Mr. Boggs must rely on circumstantial evidence to prove his claim. “It is well-settled law that Florida courts follow the three-part framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and its progeny, for establishing, by circumstantial evidence, a discrimination claim based on disparate treatment in the workplace.” Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 21-22.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Mr. Boggs must establish a prima facie case of handicap-based discrimination. To do so, he must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and
(4) Kelly Services treated similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class more favorably than he was treated. Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22; Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
If Mr. Boggs establishes a prima facie case, he creates a presumption of discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts to Kelly Services to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse action. Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22. The reason for Kelly Services’ decision should be clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. Dep’t of Corr. v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
If Kelly Services meets its burden, the presumption disappears and the burden shifts back to Mr. Boggs to prove that Kelly Services’ proffered reason was not the true reason but merely a “pretext” for discrimination. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997); Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 25. In order to satisfy this final step of the process, Mr. Boggs must show “directly that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing that the proffered reason for the … decision is not worthy of belief.” Chandler, 582 So. 2d at 1186 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981)).
Despite the shifting burdens of proof, “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the respondent intentionally discriminated against the petitioner remains at all times with the [petitioner].” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Valenzuela, 18 So. 3d at 22.
Based on the Findings of Fact and Ultimate Findings of Fact above, Mr. Boggs failed to establish that Kelly Services discriminated against him on the basis of his handicap. It is undisputed that Mr. Boggs suffers from Autism, which is a qualifying handicap under the FCRA, and at least
arguably suffered an adverse employment action by being deactivated from serving as a substitute teacher in OCPS. However, because he violated the policies of Kelly Services and OCPS by failing to report his arrest (and given the number of exclusions he received for lack of classroom management, among other things), OCPS reasonably determined that Mr. Boggs was no longer qualified to serve as a substitute teacher in its schools and Kelly Services was bound by that decision. Mr. Boggs failed to establish that his handicap in any way contributed to his violation of those policies.
Moreover, the weight of the credible evidence confirmed that similarly situated employees who failed to report arrests but had no known handicap were precluded from serving as substitute teachers. In fact, all but one of them was terminated. By deciding not to terminate Mr. Boggs and instead accommodating him through positions in its commercial division, Kelly Services treated Mr. Boggs more favorably than all but one of the similarly situated employees outside his protected class, and equally to one employee. Mr. Boggs decided not to apply to those positions because the only acceptable accommodation to him was to return to serving as substitute teacher in OCPS—a position for which he was no longer qualified based on the controlling decision of OCPS.
Even if Mr. Boggs had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination on the basis of his handicap, Kelly Services sufficiently demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision. Apart from the fact that OCPS made the ultimate decision, which precluded Kelly Services from allowing Mr. Boggs to continue to serve as a substitute teacher in Orange County, the decision was based on Mr. Boggs’ failure to report his arrest, which had nothing to do with his handicap. Mr. Boggs failed to prove that the decision was a mere pretext for discrimination.
Employers are also prohibited from retaliation by “discriminat[ing] against any person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section.” § 760.10(7), Fla. Stat. As
to this claim, Mr. Boggs must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by proving that: (1) he was engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the events. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1566.
Based on the Findings of Fact and Ultimate Findings of Fact above, Mr. Boggs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Kelly Services engaged in any unlawful retaliation against him. The decision to deactivate Mr. Boggs from serving as a substitute teacher was based primarily on the fact that OCPS refused to allow him to continue to serve as a substitute teacher. The first time that Kelly Services learned of Mr. Boggs’ handicap was when its representatives met with him to discuss OCPS’s decision. Unless OCPS reversed the decision, Kelly Services had no authority to allow Mr. Boggs to work as a substitute teacher in Orange County. Kelly Services offered to accommodate Mr. Boggs through its commercial division, but he refused because the only acceptable accommodation to him was returning to teach in OCPS, which was not a reasonable or possible demand. In sum, there is no causal connection between the disclosure of his handicap (and filing his Complaint) and the decision to preclude him from serving as a substitute teacher in OCPS.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Harry Boggs, failed to establish that Respondent, Kelly Services, committed an unlawful employment practice against him and dismissing his Petition for Relief.
DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
COPIES FURNISHED:
S
ANDREW D. MANKO
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2020.
Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk
Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Harry Scott Boggs General Delivery Orlando, Florida 32802 (eServed)
Misbah Shahid, Esquire Kelly Services
999 West Big Beaver Road, 2nd Floor Troy, Michigan 48084
Daniel P. Hart, Esquire Seyfarth Shaw, L.P.
1075 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309 (eServed)
Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110
Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Nov. 23, 2020 | Recommended Order | Petitioner failed to prove disability employment discrimination or retaliation where he violated Respondent's policies and refused accommodations to switch to a different division. |
