Judges: PER CURIAM. —
Attorneys: Milam, McIlvaine Milam and W. H. Poe, for Appellant.
Huffaker Edwards and Ellis F. Davis and B. K. Roberts, Lambden Ramseur, for Appellee.
Filed: Aug. 02, 1933
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: The Holly Hill Grove Fruit Company filed an information with the Florida Real Estate Commission under Section 4088, C. G. L., making certain allegations which complainant contended required the revocation or suspension of the registration of Frank W. Crisp as a real estate broker. To this information Crisp filed an answer. The Commission appointed an examiner and testimony was taken before him pursuant to Section 4090, C. G. L. The testimony is voluminous and the exhibits many. After taking the
Summary: The Holly Hill Grove Fruit Company filed an information with the Florida Real Estate Commission under Section 4088, C. G. L., making certain allegations which complainant contended required the revocation or suspension of the registration of Frank W. Crisp as a real estate broker. To this information Crisp filed an answer. The Commission appointed an examiner and testimony was taken before him pursuant to Section 4090, C. G. L. The testimony is voluminous and the exhibits many. After taking the t..
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Upon reversal and remand of a cause like this one for the purpose of having made a proper finding of facts as required by the statutes, the effect is to open up the entire record for the purpose of making such findings of facts, and to leave the cause open for the entry of such appropriate decree pursuant to such findings, as the law and the facts as hereafter found, will justify.
Upon a remand of this cause the court below is not precluded from reaching a different conclusion, nor is it restrained from rendering a different decree, if in his opinion the finding of facts, when made by him, as circuit judge, shall so require.
To give such effect to our previous opinion in this case would be to make the required finding of facts we have directed, a useless formality to be carried out by the circuit judge only as a means for amplifying the record for a possible new appeal, whereas what we have done is to reverse the present decree as having been erroneously entered because it was not properly predicated upon a finding of specific facts, as the statute requires.
Rehearing denied.
DAVIS, C. J., and WHITFIELD, BROWN and BUFORD, J. J. concur.
