State, Ex Rel. v. Rowe, (1933)
Court: Supreme Court of Florida
Number:
Visitors: 7
Judges: Davis, C. J. —
Attorneys: M. S. McGregor, for Relator;
M. G. Rowe, in pro per., for Respondent.
Filed: May 09, 1933
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Section 76 (2) of the 1931 Chancery Act (Chapter 14658, Acts of 1931) reads as follows: *Page 142 "(2) No Notice to Party in Default; No notice of any motion, hearing or any other proceeding under a bill of complaint or under answer asserting a counterclaim and praying affirmative relief shall be required as to a party against whom a decree pro confesso has been taken, and no time need elapse as to any such defaulting party in order to allow the court to proceed with the cause." An alternative w
Summary: Section 76 (2) of the 1931 Chancery Act (Chapter 14658, Acts of 1931) reads as follows: *Page 142 "(2) No Notice to Party in Default; No notice of any motion, hearing or any other proceeding under a bill of complaint or under answer asserting a counterclaim and praying affirmative relief shall be required as to a party against whom a decree pro confesso has been taken, and no time need elapse as to any such defaulting party in order to allow the court to proceed with the cause." An alternative wr..
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In view of the State's peculiar interest in divorce proceedings, I am inclined to think the special Circuit Court rule might be upheld. We have held that in such cases, admission of the parties by way of decree pro confesso amount to but little. Considerable discretion is vested in the Circuit Courts in cases of this nature, and it is their duty to keep in mind the public welfare and morals that are involved. I doubt if Section 76 of the 1931 Chancery Act was intended to circumscribe the exercise of reasonable discretion by the Circuit Judges in protecting the public interests in divorce cases, and in the preventing of collusive or fraudulent divorces. See Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004,113 So. 2d 374. The Legislature cannot deprive the courts of the rule-making power when its exercise is essential to the rightful administration of their constitutional jurisdiction. State v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 2d 748.
Source: CourtListener
