Filed: Sep. 25, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA September 25, 2019 GARY JOINER, successor to ) MIKE WELLS, Pasco County ) Property Appraiser, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-1040 ) PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, ) and MIKE FASANO, as Pasco ) County Tax Collector, ) ) Appellees. ) ) BY ORDER OF THE COURT. Appellee, Pinellas County, Florida, has filed an "Alternative Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Certification to the Supreme Court of Florida as an Issue of Great Public Im
Summary: IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA September 25, 2019 GARY JOINER, successor to ) MIKE WELLS, Pasco County ) Property Appraiser, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-1040 ) PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, ) and MIKE FASANO, as Pasco ) County Tax Collector, ) ) Appellees. ) ) BY ORDER OF THE COURT. Appellee, Pinellas County, Florida, has filed an "Alternative Motion for Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, for Certification to the Supreme Court of Florida as an Issue of Great Public Imp..
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA
September 25, 2019
GARY JOINER, successor to )
MIKE WELLS, Pasco County )
Property Appraiser, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-1040
)
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, )
and MIKE FASANO, as Pasco )
County Tax Collector, )
)
Appellees. )
)
BY ORDER OF THE COURT.
Appellee, Pinellas County, Florida, has filed an "Alternative Motion for Rehearing,
Rehearing En Banc, for Certification to the Supreme Court of Florida as an Issue of
Great Public Importance, or for Clarification." We deny Appellee's requests for
rehearing and rehearing en banc but grant the motions for clarification and certification.
The prior opinion dated May 3, 2019, is accordingly withdrawn, and the attached opinion
is issued in its place.
No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE
COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
GARY JOINER, successor to )
MIKE WELLS, Pasco County )
Property Appraiser, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-1040
)
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, )
and MIKE FASANO, as Pasco )
County Tax Collector, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed September 25, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco
County; Linda Babb, Judge.
Loren E. Levy of The Levy Law Firm,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Yvette Acosta MacMillan, Senior
Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater,
for Appellee Pinellas County, Florida,
a political subdivision of the State of
Florida.
Frederick T. Reeves of Frederick T.
Reeves P.A., New Port Richey, for
Appellee Mike Fasano, as Pasco
County Tax Collector.
ATKINSON, Judge.
The Pasco County Property Appraiser (Pasco Property Appraiser) appeals
the entry of final summary judgment in favor of Pinellas County declaring the 12,400
acres of property it owns within Pasco County immune from ad valorem taxation. This
case presents an issue of first impression: whether a county's immunity from taxation
extends extraterritorially to property that it owns in another county. We conclude that it
does not and reverse.
The 12,400 acres of real property, located entirely within Pasco County,
consists of thirty-six parcels of land, collectively known as the Cross Bar Ranch and the
A1 Bar Ranch (collectively, the Property). Pinellas County has paid ad valorem taxes
on the Property since its acquisition in 1976 and 1989.1
In January 2014, a certified public accountant employed by the Division of
Inspector General for the Pinellas County Clerk and Comptroller conducted an updated
audit that suggested that some or all of the parcels of the Property may be exempt from
taxation. In May 2015, Pinellas County filed suit against the Pasco Property Appraiser
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Pinellas County's immunity from
paying ad valorem taxes on the Property and reimbursement for Pinellas County's
payments for 2014 through 2016. The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment on purely legal grounds. Pinellas County's motion was granted, and the
Pasco Property Appraiser filed this appeal.
1In
1976, Pinellas County purchased some of the parcels located in the
Cross Bar Ranch. It purchased some of the parcels comprising the A1 Bar Ranch in
1989.
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This court reviews pure questions of law de novo. See Kirton v. Fields,
997 So. 2d 349, 352 (Fla. 2008); D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice,
863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla.
2003). Resolution of the legal question here turns upon whether any property owned by
a county, regardless of the property's geographic location, is immune from taxation or
whether this immunity is confined to property that a county owns within its own borders.
In Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957), the Florida
Supreme Court held that ad valorem taxes could not be levied by the city and county
against property owned by the county but leased to a private business, because the
property of a county "is immune from taxation."
Id. at 573.2 The Pasco Property
Appraiser argues that Park-N-Shop is distinguishable because its stated rationale—that
the county should not assess taxes against its own land, pay the money to itself, then
surcharge lessees for that amount—does not apply where a county is taxing a sister
county. As such, it argues that a county's immunity from taxation does not apply in
situations where one county is seeking such immunity of lands located outside of its
jurisdictional boundaries. We agree.
The Pasco Property Appraiser contends that in the case of overlapping
sovereignty, the sovereign acting outside of its territory must be treated as a private
entity. Because the Property is within the jurisdictional boundaries of Pasco County,
and subject to the authority of Pasco County as a result, the Pasco Property Appraiser
2Although Park-N-Shop was decided under a prior version of the Florida
Constitution, subsequent case law of the Florida Supreme Court suggests its ongoing
validity. See Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d 1, 3 n.6 (Fla. 1975) ("[Park-n-
Shop] arose under a predecessor Florida Constitution. Nonetheless, [it is] controlling
here since the principle of immunity is not constitutionally dependent."). However, other
cases have opined that "immunity from taxation flows directly from the Constitution."
Orange County v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 605 So. 2d 1333, 1334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
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argues that those lands are subject to taxation. The Pasco Property Appraiser
commends the analogous reasoning of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472
(1924), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the State of Georgia, which
had purchased land in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was not immune from condemnation
of the lands by the city because land "acquired by one state in another state is held
subject to the laws of the latter and to all the incidents of private ownership."
Id. at 480.
The Pasco Property Appraiser also warns that extraterritorial application of
immunity from taxation "would result in a skewed application of the doctrine and
ultimately have unjust and impractical consequences." What if, the Pasco Property
Appraiser queries, Pasco County purchases the Don CeSar hotel on St. Pete Beach in
Pinellas County? It could operate a lucrative, for-profit enterprise, avoiding payment of
ad valorem taxes to Pinellas County solely based upon its status as the property's
owner. Not only would this deprive Pinellas County of substantial revenues, the Pasco
Property Appraiser claims, but it would also elevate one county above another despite
the fact that each county's sovereignty is coequal.
Pinellas County, on the other hand, argues that it is a political subdivision
of the State of Florida and, as such, is afforded an "inherent sovereign immunity" from
taxation. See Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1975) (holding
state, county, and county school board were immune from tax levied by city); see also
Canaveral Port Auth. v. Dep't of Revenue,
690 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 1996) (holding
that a port authority was not immune from ad valorem taxation because, unlike a
county, it was not a political subdivision of the state);
Park–N–Shop, 99 So. 2d at 573–
74. Emphasizing the distinction between an exemption and immunity, Pinellas County
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contends that there is no power to tax the state or its political subdivisions because they
are immune. Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 1 ("Exemption presupposes the existence of a
power to tax whereas immunity connotes the absence of that power." (quoting Orlando
Utils. Comm'n v. Milligan, 229 So. 2d 262, 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969))). Because each
county's sovereign immunity emanates not from the county itself but rather from the
state, it argues that property owned by a county anywhere in the state is immune from
ad valorem taxation.
Pinellas County challenges the Pasco Property Appraiser's argument that
there are geographical limits on a county's sovereign immunity on the grounds that it
presupposes that each county is in and of itself a sovereign, when a county is only a
piece or subdivision of the state, which is actually the sovereign. On this basis, Pinellas
County contends that the cases cited by the Pasco Property Appraiser relating to
territory outside of a state are distinguishable.
The parties also address whether a statutory exemption from taxation
applies depending on the use of the county-owned property. However, the record is not
sufficiently developed to address this argument, and it was not the basis for the
underlying judgment.3
***
The Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes confer upon each county the
authorization to tax all property in the county. See art. VII, § 9, Fla. Const. (providing
3The only discovery propounded was requests for admissions, and despite
the parties' claim that there are no factual disputes, the parties do not appear to agree,
for example, as to whether the various agreements Pinellas County entered into
regarding the Property constitute leases.
-5-
that counties shall be authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes); § 125.016, Fla. Stat.
(2014) (authorizing counties to levy ad valorem tax "upon all property in the county").
Pinellas County's argument necessarily implies that this constitutional grant of authority
to tax real property within a county's boundaries must yield to the common law immunity
from taxation of another county who owns property situated therein. None of the cases
cited by Pinellas County supports this assertion.
The gravamen of Pinellas County's argument is simply that because
counties are subdivisions of the State, their sovereign immunity is derivative of the
State's sovereign immunity; and since the State's sovereign immunity is statewide, so
should a county's be:
The constitutional sovereign immunity of the State of Florida
flows to its subdivisions and cloaks both Pinellas County and
Pasco County. Each county's sovereign immunity
emanates, not from the county itself, but rather, from the
state. Therefore, Pinellas County's properties are immune
from ad valorem taxation within the State of Florida.
Pinellas County cites no authority for the proposition that a county's immunity from
taxation extends beyond its territorial boundaries, relying instead on the foregoing
formulation.
Because counties are political subdivisions of the State, their ad valorem
taxation power must necessarily yield to the immunity of the State, whose boundaries
subsume all county property. But that does not mean that a county's taxation authority
must yield to the immunity of another county, whose boundaries, of course, are neither
overlapping nor coextensive with any other county.
Like a county's assertion of immunity from municipal taxes on property the
county owns within its own boundaries, see Dickinson 325 So. 2d at 3, the State's
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assertion of immunity from county taxation is not extraterritorial. However, a state that
owns property outside its territorial boundaries cannot assert immunity from taxation by
the jurisdiction in which that property lies, such as another state. In fact, this court is
unaware of any political entity—not states, not Indian tribes, not nations—that can claim
sovereign immunity from taxation for its extraterritorial land holdings. Pinellas County
apparently aims to be the first.
Nations are not immune from taxation of their extraterritorial property. Cf.
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 618 F.3d 172,
175 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Foreign Missions Act "permits the State Department
to designate affirmative benefits such as tax exemptions and that the Act allows the
State Department to make such tax exemptions preemptive of State and municipal tax
laws"). Indian tribes are not immune from taxation of their extraterritorial property. See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973) ("Absent express
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally
been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the State."); cf. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. ex rel. Bd. of
Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 78 So. 3d 31, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding
that the eminent domain action did not implicate the Tribe's sovereign immunity
because it was an in rem action involving land that "is not tribal reservation land, is not
within the aboriginal homelands of the Tribe, is not allotted land, and is not held in trust
by the federal government for the Tribe"). And states are not immune from taxation of
their extraterritorial property. See
Georgia, 264 U.S. at 481 (concluding that Georgia's
sovereignty did not extend into Tennessee by its purchase of land to operate a railway).
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Pinellas County argues that a state's loss of sovereign immunity across
the line of a co-sovereign state has no applicability here because all of Florida's
counties are within the boundaries of the state, which is the sovereign from which the
counties' sovereignty derives. But counties have boundaries too. And, just as sister
states are separate entities, sister counties are separate entities as well.
Like states, counties are creatures of the Constitution. See art. VIII, § 1,
Fla. Const. ("The state shall be divided by law into political subdivisions called
counties."). And they have their own rights as separate political entities. It is true that a
county "deriv[es] its power wholly from the sovereign state." Amos v. Mathews, 126 So.
308, 321 (Fla. 1930); see art. VIII, § 1, Fla. Const. ("Counties may be created, abolished
or changed by law . . . ."). However, that does not mean that counties lack a separate,
autonomous identity; a county is not "a mere arm or agency of the state" or merely "the
state acting locally." Amos, 126 So. at 321.
[T]he principle of local self-government does not constitute
each county "an independent sovereignty. . . ."
Nevertheless, their existence as local entities for local
purposes as well as their existence as legal political divisions
of the state is recognized by the Constitution. The same
power which created the Legislature, namely, the sovereign
people, recognized the counties. While a county in the
performance of certain functions is an agency or arm of the
state, it is also something more than that. . . . While the
county is an agency of the state, it is also under our
Constitution, to some extent at least, an autonomous, self-
governing, political entity with respect to exclusively local
affairs, in the performance of which functions it is
distinguished from its creator, the state . . . .
Id. (reasoning that if a county "were no more than a mere agent of the state—the state
acting locally—bonds issued by a county would in effect constitute state bonds").
-8-
Pasco County and Pinellas County might each derive its sovereignty from
the state, of which each are subdivisions. But it does not follow that each may exert its
sovereignty within the territory of the other so as to vitiate the constitutional power the
other enjoys within its own jurisdiction. The distinction between an exemption and an
immunity from taxation—asserted by Pinellas County to justify such encroachment on
the power of its neighbor—is actually a distraction. States are immune from taxation,
but that immunity does not eliminate their obligation to pay taxes on property situated in
another political entity's jurisdiction.
In other words, even though an immunity from taxation indicates "the
absence" of the "power to tax," Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 1, some political entities
actually do have the power to tax other entities that are immune from taxation: those
political entities in whose territorial jurisdiction the otherwise immune entities' property
lies. This is true of states, Indian tribes, and nations. Nothing about the distinction
between immunity and exemption makes this untrue with regard to a county. Political
entities only have sovereign immunity where they are sovereign and, to paraphrase a
point cogently expressed by Judge Casanueva in his concurring opinion: Pinellas and
Pasco cannot both be sovereign on the same matter in the same place.
The trial court asserted that only the State can waive sovereign immunity
and that it has not done so for the ad valorem taxation of properties owned by counties
outside their county lines. And Judge Black cites the lack of express waiver of such
immunity as support for his dissenting opinion. But that presupposes that counties are
immune from taxation of property situated outside their boundaries.
-9-
Neither the trial court nor Pinellas County has identified any case law or
constitutional provision that supports the proposition that counties are immune from
taxation of their extraterritorial properties. Instead, Pinellas County has cobbled
together inferences from inapposite cases to justify the faulty deduction that, because a
county is a subdivision of the State, a county's taxation immunity must be coterminous
with the State's taxation immunity.
Pinellas County urges this extraterritorial extension in the face of
constitutional language guaranteeing each county the right to tax all real property within
its boundaries. That explicit taxation authority cannot be abrogated by common law
taxation immunity that no Florida court has ever held to extend beyond an immune
sovereign's territorial boundaries.
We therefore reverse the trial court's order and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing, which may include a determination of
whether the Property is statutorily exempt from taxation by Pasco County. We also
certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance:
IS PROPERTY OWNED BY A COUNTY LOCATED OUTSIDE ITS
JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES IMMUNE FROM AD VALOREM
TAXATION BY THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS
LOCATED?
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs with opinion.
BLACK, J., Dissents with opinion.
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CASANUEVA, Judge, Concurring.
This case of first impression presents an issue of the extent to which a
county may claim sovereign immunity as a defense to payment of real estate taxes
imposed by another county in which the real property is found. In my view, the analysis
of this issue turns in part on whether, as a matter of law, the asserting county, Pinellas
County, is operating as a sovereign in this instance. I conclude that the answer is no
because—to paraphrase a line from the movie Highlander—there can be only one.
Here, the mantle of sovereign rests on the shoulders of Pasco County because the land
at issue rests within the territorial boundary establishing its constitutional domain.
I.
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that a sovereign
cannot be sued without its own permission, . . . was a part of the English common law
when the State of Florida was founded and has been adopted and codified by the
Florida Legislature." Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So.
2d 459, 471 (Fla. 2005) (citing § 2.01, Fla. Stat. (2004)). In Florida, the legislature has
waived sovereign immunity in the area of torts, § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2014), but has not
directly spoken to the issue presently before this court. At its core, Pinellas County
asserts that its claim is founded on the common law and that as an equal sovereign
under state law it is immune from taxation. In opposition, Pasco County asserts that the
common law does not afford Pinellas County an immunity from taxation on real property
residing within Pasco County's territorial domain. Despite a claim of immunity, our
jurisprudence has observed "[t]hat, within constitutional limits, the Legislature may
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provide for the taxation of lands or other property of the State." State ex rel. Charlotte
County v. Alford, 107 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1958).
By constitutional provision, our state is divided "into political subdivisions
called counties." Art. VIII, § 1(a), Fla. Const. To these counties is afforded the power
and authority "to levy ad valorem taxes." Art. VII, § 9, Fla. Const. For tax purposes, our
legislature has mandated that "all property located within the county" is to be assessed.
§ 192.011, Fla. Stat. (2014). Property "shall be assessed according to its situs," §
192.032, and real property is to be assessed "in that county in which it is located and in
that taxing jurisdiction in which it may be located," § 192.032(1). Here, the power to
assess and impose real estate taxes is vested, both by our constitution and by statutory
enactment, in Pasco County. Neither source of law affords Pinellas County immunity
from this form of taxation, nor has Pinellas County been able to cite such a specific
authority.
Accordingly, I conclude that the legislature, through its enactments, and
the people, by approving our state Constitution, have authorized the situs county to
impose and collect real estate taxes on the property located within its domain and, in
doing so, have not specifically afforded another county—a coequal sovereign, within our
constitutional hierarchy of levels of government—an immunity from real estate taxation
for that real property not located within its defined domain.
II.
At common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity was said to originate in
the maxim, "[T]he king can do no wrong." Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d
379, 381 (Fla. 1981); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
- 12 -
Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963). However, acquiring real property
outside its lawful boundaries by purchase does not afford Pinellas County the right to
raise its flag and assert its dominion as a sovereign over Pasco County, the county in
which that land is located. Purchasing real estate does not afford the right to claim
dominion by conquest and to thereafter govern the subject land.
For these reasons, I conclude that there is and can only be one sovereign
in this case, and that sovereign is Pasco County. Therefore, the protection provided by
sovereign immunity is not within the rights held by Pinellas County. I would reverse the
trial court's order on this basis.
III.
Further, I join fully in the majority opinion authored by Judge Atkinson.
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BLACK, Judge, Dissenting.
Because neither the Florida Constitution nor the controlling statutes
express a waiver of the immunity from taxation of county-owned property, I would affirm
the trial court's order. Absent such a waiver, the property owned by Pinellas County
within the boundaries of Pasco County remains immune from taxation. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent. Recognizing, however, the potential impact of this issue,
particularly in instances where a county may be operating a for-profit business on the
property it owns in another county, I would also certify a question of great public
importance.
It is well-settled that "[t]he [S]tate and its political subdivisions, like a
county, are immune from taxation because there is no power to tax them." Cason v.
Fla. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., 944 So. 2d 306, 309-10 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Dickinson v.
City of Tallahassee,
325 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1975)); accord Markham v. Broward County,
825 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ("All counties are political subdivisions of the
[S]tate, Art. VIII, § 1, Fla. Const., and under Canaveral[ Port Authority v. Department of
Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 1996),] are immune [from taxation].").4 This
immunity from taxation "is not dependent upon statutory or constitutional provisions but
rests upon broad grounds of fundamentals in government."
Cason, 944 So. 2d at 309
(quoting State ex rel. Charlotte County v. Alford,
107 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1958)); see
Sun 'N Lake of Sebring Improvement Dist. v. McIntyre,
800 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 2d
4Immunity should not be confused with exemption. "Exemption
presupposes the existence of a power to tax whereas immunity connotes the absence
of that power." Cason, 944 So. 2d at 309-10 (quoting
Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 3);
accord Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville,
918 So. 2d 250, 255 (Fla. 2005);
Russell v. Se. Housing, LLC,
162 So. 3d 262, 266-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
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DCA 2001) ("Immunity from taxation is not derived from the state constitution; it arises
from common law concepts of sovereign immunity." (citing Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 3
n.6)).
Nevertheless, "[d]espite the State's immunity, 'within constitutional limits,
the [l]egislature may provide for the taxation of lands or other property of the
State.' " Cason, 944 So. 2d at 310 (quoting
Alford, 107 So. 2d at 29); see Am. Home
Assurance Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
908 So. 2d 459, 471-72 (Fla. 2005)
("[T]he Florida Constitution provides that the [l]egislature can abrogate the [S]tate's
sovereign immunity." (citing Art. X, § 13, Fla. Const.)). "However, the authority to tax
the State cannot be inferred. Such authority must be manifested by 'clear and direct
expression of the State's intention to subject itself to' the tax." Cason, 944 So. 2d at 310
(emphasis added) (quoting
Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 4); accord Manatee County v.
Town of Longboat Key,
365 So. 2d 143, 147 (Fla. 1978) (holding that a county's waiver
of immunity from taxation must be "clear and unequivocal"). "[W]aiver will not be found
as a product of inference or implication." Am. Home Assurance Co.,
908 So. 2d at 472
(citing Spangler v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth.,
106 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958)). In the case
before us, there was simply no express waiver. This fact is fatal to the Pasco County
Property Appraiser's case.
Counties are authorized by the Florida Constitution and statutory law to
assess and impose ad valorem taxes on property within their boundaries. See art. VII,
§ 9, Fla. Const.; §§ 125.016, 192.011, Fla. Stat. (2014). The majority cannot cite to a
clear waiver of the immunity from taxation of county-owned property in these authorities
but instead concludes that this immunity from taxation does not extend beyond a
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county's boundaries into that of another just as a state's sovereign immunity does not
extend into the territorial boundaries of another sovereign. But while the states are
separate sovereigns, Pinellas County and Pasco County are political subdivisions of the
same sovereign from which their immunity from taxation emanates. See art. VIII, § 1(a),
Fla. Const.; Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116, 120 (Fla. 1968) (holding that as a
subdivision of the State, a county "enjoys the [S]tate's sovereign immunity").5
Moreover, I have found no support in the law to suggest that at its foundation the
immunity afforded to the counties was intended to be restricted to their boundaries. Cf.
Gwin v. City of Tallahassee,
132 So. 2d 273, 276 (Fla. 1961) (holding that property
owned by the City of Tallahassee located in Wakulla County and used for municipal
purposes was exempt from taxation by the tax assessor of Wakulla County because
"[t]he exemption inures to the property itself when held and used for municipal
purposes" and "[t]he [c]onstitution makes no requirement as to its location." (quoting
Saunders v. City of Jacksonville,
25 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1946))).
The concurrence further concludes that because neither article VII, section
9, of the Florida Constitution nor chapter 192 afford Pinellas County immunity from
taxation, the authority vested in Pasco County to tax property within its boundaries is
unyielding. However, it is not the lack of a clear expression of immunity in the
5Unless the immunity at issue derived from federal law, it certainly would
not extend beyond the territorial boundaries of Florida. It would be more appropriate to
compare the circumstances of this case to those involving the immunity from taxation of
property owned by the United States and located within the territorial boundaries of
Florida. See, e.g., Russell v. Se. Housing, LLC, 162 So. 3d 262, 263-64 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015) (holding that because property owned by the United States is immune from state
taxation, the properties serving the Naval Air Station at Key West were immune from
Florida ad valorem taxes).
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constitution and applicable statutes that controls the outcome of the issue but rather the
lack of a clear waiver of that immunity which otherwise remains. The majority and
concurrence have improperly inferred a waiver of Pinellas County's immunity from
taxation when in fact "[t]he [l]egislature's inaction does not constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity." See City of Key West v. Fla. Keys Cmty. Coll., 81 So. 3d 494,
497-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (concluding that the State's sovereign immunity from the
city's imposition of stormwater utility fees was not waived by inference). "[S]overeign
immunity is the rule[] rather than the exception," and "the State enjoys sovereign
immunity unless immunity is expressly waived."
Id. at 497-98 (quoting Pan–Am
Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr.,
471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984)).
The supreme court's decision in Cason is instructive. In analyzing
whether the nonclaim provisions of section 194.171, Florida Statutes (2006), applied to
State-owned property, such that the failure to comply with the statute would result in the
issuance of tax certificates and the sale of tax deeds, the supreme court considered "the
effect of sovereign immunity on the application of section 194.171 to actions filed by the
State." 944 So. 2d at 312. The court determined that "[t]he crucial inquiry is whether
the language of section 194.171 clearly and unambiguously demonstrates legislative
intent to apply this section to challenges by the State on State-owned property."
Id.
That inquiry turned on whether the State is a taxpayer as used in chapter 194. Though
the supreme court found definitions of "taxpayer" to be useful, including the definition
set forth in section 192.001(13), Florida Statutes (2006),6 a related statute, it explained
6Section 192.001(13), Florida Statutes (2006), defined "taxpayer" to mean
"the person or other legal entity in whose name property is assessed." This definition
remains unchanged in the 2014 version of the statute.
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that in construing the statutory term consideration must be given to the purpose of
section 194.171, "which is to ensure a reliable and predictable method for counties to
collect revenue while also providing for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments."
Cason, 944 So. 2d at 313. The supreme court concluded that
a "taxpayer" is not merely the entity in whose name the
property is assessed, but one whom the county has the
power to tax subject to disputes about individual
assessments. In short, a "taxpayer" under section 194.171
is a taxable entity. This definition excludes the State and its
political subdivisions, which are "immune from taxation since
there is no power to tax them."
944 So. 2d at 313 (quoting
Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 3). "Accordingly, where the State
files suit challenging ad valorem taxation on grounds of sovereign immunity, the State's
assertion that it is not a taxable entity takes it outside the category of 'taxpayer' targeted
by section 194.171."
Id. Section 192.011, like section 194.171, is part of "a
comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes
simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments." Ward v.
Brown,
894 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 2004). Given that chapter 192 and chapter 194 are
part of the same statutory scheme, it necessarily follows from the supreme court's
conclusion that the "entity in whose name property is assessed" pursuant to section
192.011 cannot include the counties as political subdivisions of the State. The supreme
court in Cason went on to hold as follows:
The necessity of a clear expression of legislative
intent to authorize taxation of the State reinforces our
construction of section 194.171. We presume that the
[l]egislature was aware of precedent recognizing both the
State's immunity and the necessity of a clear and direct
expression of intent to authorize taxation of the State when it
enacted the jurisdictional nonclaim provision, section
194.171, in 1983. Thus, the absence of specific language
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imposing the procedural requirements on the State, rather
than on taxpayers generally, is significant.
....
We do not find, either within section 194.171 or elsewhere,
the clear and unambiguous expression of legislative intent
necessary to conclude that the [l]egislature intended that the
State be subject to the harsh provisions of section 194.171
and as a result lose its immunity from taxation.
Id. at 313-14, 316 (citations omitted).7
Though involving a municipality rather than a county, Dickinson is also
instructive. Dickinson concerned the validity of a utility tax imposed by the City of
Tallahassee on the State. 325 So. 2d at 2. The city ordinance imposed a tax on all
purchases of electricity, water, and gas, and while the federal government and churches
were specifically exempted, the State was not.
Id. The supreme court discussed the
interplay between the constitutional provision allowing a municipality to impose certain
taxes, see art. VII, § 9(a), Fla. Const., and the implementing statute upon which the
municipality based its claim that it could tax the State, see § 166.231, Fla. Stat.
(1973). The result was that neither the constitution nor the enabling legislation
constituted a waiver of the State's immunity.
Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 3 ("The crux of
this case . . . is whether the State has waived its immunity from city taxation in either the
1968 Constitution or the applicable tax statutes. We think not."). The court was
"unwilling to supply that implication" where it was not expressly stated. Id. at 4. The
same analysis applies here. The constitution, chapter 192, and chapter 125 authorize
7The
supreme court did not address whether the property at issue in
Cason—which had been leased to a nongovernmental entity and was being used for
nongovernmental purposes—was immune from ad valorem taxation. Id. at 316.
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counties to levy ad valorem taxes. But neither the constitution (as stated outright in
Dickinson) nor the statutes supply the necessary express waiver of immunity. Park-N-
Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman,
99 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1957) (reviewing the constitution and
applicable statutes and concluding that buildings on county-owned property that was
leased to private businesses could not be subject to taxation because the "property of
the [S]tate and of a county, which is a political division of the [S]tate, Sec. 1, Article VIII,
is immune from taxation.").
The above-referenced authorities demonstrate that as a county's immunity
from ad valorem taxation emanates from the State and not from the county itself, the
immunity must necessarily extend to the boundaries of the State absent a clear and
unequivocal waiver of that immunity. I have found no express waiver of a county's
immunity from taxation in the controlling statutes as would be applicable to this case.
Had the legislature intended such a waiver, it would have made that intention known. In
fact, section 125.421, titled "Telecommunications services," provides in part as follows:
A telecommunications company that is a county or other
entity of local government may obtain or hold a certificate
required by chapter 364, and the obtaining or holding of said
certificate serves a public purpose only if the county or other
entity of local government:
....
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pays, on its
telecommunications facilities used to provide two-way
telecommunication services to the public for hire and for
which a certificate is required under chapter 364, ad valorem
taxes, or fees in amounts equal thereto, to any taxing
jurisdiction in which the county or other entity of local
government operates. Any entity of local government may
pay and impose such ad valorem taxes or fees. Any
immunity of any county or other entity of local government
from taxation of the property taxed by this section is hereby
waived.
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§ 125.421(3) (emphasis added).8 Nowhere else in chapter 125 or chapter 192 does the
legislature indicate that the immunity from taxation has been waived. And while I
recognize that the Florida Constitution and chapters 125 and 192 authorize counties to
levy ad valorem taxes upon property within its boundaries, that authority does not
preempt another county's immunity from taxation in the first instance: absent a clear and
express waiver, immunity from taxation remains. See City of Key West, 81 So. 3d at
499. This premise is further supported by the fact that should Pinellas County refuse to
pay the ad valorem taxes despite the majority determining that its immunity from
taxation does not extend into Pasco County, the Pasco County Property Appraiser
would not have the power to issue tax certificates. See
Cason, 944 So. 2d at 314-15
("[T]he [l]egislature did not intentionally enact a statutory scheme that precludes the loss
of State property for nonpayment of taxes on leased property but allows the loss
through a tax deed sale of State property that has not been leased merely because the
State failed to file a timely challenge to the assessment"). The statutory scheme
"suggests the [l]egislature never contemplated that the State would be a taxpayer
whose property could be lost through nonpayment of ad valorem taxes." Id. at 315. If
tax certificates cannot be issued on State and county-owned property due to sovereign
immunity it would be illogical to permit the assessment and imposition of taxes on that
property in the first place given that there is no recourse for the failure to pay the
imposed taxes. Thus, a county's immunity from taxation which derives from the State
8As
pointed out by the concurrence, the legislature has also waived
sovereign immunity for liability for torts. See § 768.28(1).
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extends to the boundaries of the State—not just to the boundaries of that county—
absent an express waiver.
My position is further bolstered by Prosser v. Polk County, 545 So. 2d 934
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989), a case that Pinellas County has astutely brought to our attention in
the motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, certification, or clarification. In that case,
David Prosser and Elouisa Ramose filed a petition for writ of prohibition to stop Polk
County's eminent domain action involving their property.
Id. at 935. Polk County
sought to condemn the petitioners' property in order to extend a roadway.
Id.
Importantly, the property at issue was located entirely within the boundaries of
Hillsborough County.
Id. The "sole question" presented was "whether Polk County may
condemn and take property located outside its territorial limits."
Id. In answering that
question, this court recognized "that the authority of a county government to exercise
the power of eminent domain derives solely from statute."
Id. (citing Peavy-Wilson
Lumber Co. v. Brevard County,
31 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1947)). The only geographical
limitation placed on this power in the governing statute, section 127.01(1), Florida
Statutes (1987)—which remains unchanged in the current version of the statute—was
the following: "no county has the right to condemn any lands outside its own county
boundaries for parks, playgrounds, recreational centers, or other recreational purposes."
Prosser, 545 So. 2d at 935 (quoting § 127.01(2)). This court concluded that Polk
County's eminent domain action against the petitioners was therefore not precluded
since Polk County was not seeking to condemn the property in Hillsborough County for
a recreational purpose.
Id. Because "the applicable statute is silent as to where such
property may lie," this court could not "find that the present action is . . . precluded." Id.;
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see also Pinellas County v. Baldwin, 80 So. 3d 366, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (citing
Prosser and recognizing that "there could be a question about [Pinellas] County's
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in [Hillsborough County]").
The power of eminent domain—like the "power" of immunity from
taxation—"is an attribute of the sovereign." See Peavy-Wilson Lumber, 31 So. 2d at
485; Pinellas
County, 80 So. 3d at 370 (quoting Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.
Scott,
418 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)). While a county's power of eminent
domain derives from statute unlike a county's power of immunity from taxation, the
dictates of Prosser are controlling. And as plainly set forth in Prosser, a county's
sovereign power is not limited to its own boundaries but extends into the boundaries of
the other counties of this state absent an express limitation otherwise. As such, Judge
Casanueva's assertion, which was adopted by the majority, that there "can only be one
sovereign" is in direct conflict with our precedent.
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the order on appeal. I do recognize
the potential impact of the immunity and even the potential abuse of it, particularly
where the sovereign subdivision is operating a for-profit enterprise, but in the absence
of a waiver, we must apply the law as it is currently written. See Markham, 825 So. 2d
at 473-74 (concluding that even where county property is leased to for-profit businesses
for nongovernmental purposes the county property is immune from taxation where there
is no clear and unambiguous waiver of that immunity in the controlling statute). Given
the potential impact of the immunity—not to mention the intradistrict conflict created by
the majority opinion—I agree with the majority's decision to certify a question as a
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matter of great public importance. However, I believe the question would be more
appropriately phrased as follows:
IS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM TAXATION OF
COUNTY-OWNED PROPERTY WAIVED WHEN THAT
PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF
ANOTHER COUNTY?
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