ELIZABETH A. KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17), and Defendant's Response in Opposition, (Doc. 19). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is
First Liberty Ins. Corp. ("Defendant") removed this case to the Middle District of Florida (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs, Fausto and Candida Sevila ("Plaintiffs"), filed an amended Complaint (Doc. 2) on April 17, 2013. Defendant filed its answer to amended complaint (Doc. 5) on April 17, 2013. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment as to the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the insurance policy in dispute (Doc. 17). Defendant filed its Response in opposition on August 7, 2013 (Doc. 19). Plaintiffs filed its Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 28) in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2014.
This is an action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment arising out of an insurance policy issued by Defendant to Plaintiffs. The parties in support and/or opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion submit the following facts for Summary Judgment. The Court recognizes these as "facts" only in regard to the resolution of the pending motion.
At all material times, Plaintiffs owned the property ("the insured property") located at 8018 N. Hale Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Defendant provided property insurance to Plaintiffs under policy number ¶ 32-251-065589-4000 ("The policy"), with effective dates of August 25, 2010 through August 25, 2011. (Doc. 17, ¶ 2) Plaintiffs' claimed damage to the Insured property was discovered on May 24, 2011. (Doc. 17, ¶ 3) The policy provides:
After sending Florida Geotechnical Engineering, Inc. ("FGE") to investigate, Defendant denied Plaintiffs' claim based on FGE's conclusion that the insured property did not experience "structural damage" as defined by Fla. Stat. § 627.706 (2011). (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 6-8) After Defendant denied Plaintiffs' claim, on October 2, 2012, Plaintiffs requested Defendant perform full geotechnical testing consistent with applicable current Florida Statutes. (Doc. 17, ¶ 9) On October 5, 2012, Defendant refused to conduct additional testing. Id. On October 15, 2013 (sic), Plaintiffs again requested that Defendant perform full geotechnical testing consistent with applicable current Florida Statutes. (Doc. 17, ¶ 10) On October 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Civil Remedy Notice of Insurer Violation notifying Defendant of its deficiencies and bad faith claims handling for its retroactive application of a law and refusal to conduct full geotechnical testing in direct contravention to Florida Law. Id. On November 5, 2012, Defendant prepared a responsive correspondence confirming its reliance on the 2011 Florida Statute definition of structural damage and sinkhole loss. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for its motion for summary judgment and "identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party meets its burden if it demonstrates "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to identify specific facts that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact in order to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
An issue of fact is "genuine" only if a reasonable jury, after considering the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A factual issue is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the trial under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all inferences to be taken from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). The weighing of evidence, the determination of credibility, and the drawing of reasonable inferences from the facts are all functions of the jury, not the judge. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Therefore, if determination of the case rests on deciding which competing version of the facts and events is true, then summary judgment is inappropriate and the case should be submitted to the jury. Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1987).
From 1981, Florida Statute 627.706(1) required that insurers make coverage
In 2005, the Florida Legislature redefined a "sinkhole loss" as "structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity." Universal Ins. Co. of N. Am., 82 So.3d at 55-56. The 2005 definition incorporated the previous definition of the term "loss" and that term was removed from the statute. Bay Farms Corp. v. Great American Alliance Ins. Co., 835 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1230 (M.D.Fla.2011). The 2005 version also added definitions for other terms such as "sinkhole" and "sinkhole activity." Id. A separate definition for the term "structural damage" was not included. Id.
In 2011, the Florida Legislature defined "structural damage" to be applied to insurance policies providing coverage for sinkhole losses. Id. The 2011 Amendment went into effect on May 17, 2011. As amended, the statute provides:
See FLA. STAT. 627.706(j)-(k) (2011).
Defendant claims that the dispute in this case is that Plaintiffs are requiring a "full
This district has had numerous decisions, which have addressed the legal issues in this case. In Ayres v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1094321 (M.D.Fla.2012), the court held that the undefined phrase "structural damage" in insurance policy means "damage to the structure." Furthermore, this district has held that the 2011 Amendment to Florida Statute 627.706 cannot be applied retroactively to insurance policies that predate the enactment of the 2011 Amendment and that, as defined in Ayres, the undefined term "structural damage" means "damage to the structure." Zawadzki, 2012 WL 3656456 at *3 (M.D.Fla.2012). Leon v. The First Liberty Ins. Corp., 2012 WL 5417294 (M.D.Fla.2012) also held that the 2011 Amendment does not retroactively apply to insurance policies that predate its enactment and that the phrase "structural damage" should be read according to its plain meaning to mean "damage to the structure." Garcia v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 2012 WL 5328660, at *2 (M.D.Fla. 2012) also determined the 2011 Amendment does not retroactively apply to insurance policies that predate its enactment and that the phrase "structural damage" is defined as "damage to the structure". Most recently, Shelton v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1663290, at *3 (M.D.Fla. 2013), held "with respect to the undefined phrase `structural damage,' numerous Florida trial courts and courts within this district, including this Court, have already held that the phrase should be read according to its plain meaning ... the phrase `structural damage' is defined as `damage to the structure.'"
Should this Court accept Defendant's position, the Court would be ignoring numerous decisions from this District that have addressed the exact same legal issues raised in this case. The Court sees no reason to depart from these well-reasoned and supported rulings.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds the undefined phrase "structural damage" in the Policy at issue is defined as "damage to the structure." Furthermore, there is no clear legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively, and retroactive application of the statute would substantially impair Plaintiff's contractual
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs and to close this case.
As to the request of attorneys' fees in Plaintiffs' amended complaint, the Court grants the parties forty-five (45) days to resolve the issue. If the parties cannot come to an agreement then the Plaintiffs will have fifteen (15) days thereafter to file any appropriate motion.