ORDER

ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the following:

Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be granted.

BACKGROUND

Despite previous admonitions (see Doc. 52, p. 5), factual allegations in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint remain sparse. (See Doc. 53.) From what the Court can glean from the face of the pleading and the attachments thereto, the events underlying Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims allegedly unfolded as follows:

On March 25, 2013, Sheriff's Deputy David Lovell conducted an undercover investigation into a Brevard County shop called "Kronic AM." (See Doc. 53-1, p. 2.) For reasons unclear, the investigation led to the arrest of Plaintiff Bethany York, a Kronic AM employee, for selling alcohol to minors. (See Doc. 53, ¶ 24.)

During the investigation, Lovell noticed a "glass sales counter" containing several items that he believed to be drug paraphernalia. (Doc. 53-1, p. 2.) Specifically, Lovell observed "in plain view" and "clearly marked for sale": two "Special Blue Suede Series" two-pint canisters labeled "Same gas as Whip-it"; "several miscellaneous inhalant canister parts and a small canister cleaning brush"; two twenty-four-pack boxes of whipped-cream charges labeled "Special Blue"; and three "straight Whip-it inhalant nozzles."1 (Id.) Plaintiff Keith Woodring, the owner of Kronic AM, confirmed "that all of the items were for sale." (Id.)

Three days later, Lovell presented his observations to Brevard County Circuit Judge Robert Wohn Jr. in an arrest affidavit. (See id.) Based on the affidavit, Judge Wohn found probable cause to believe that Woodring had violated Florida Statutes § 893.147(2), which forbids possessing drug paraphernalia with the intent to sell it "under circumstances where one should reasonably know" that it would be used to "inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce [nitrous oxide] into the human body." (See id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 897.142(2)).) Judge Wohn accordingly issued a warrant for Woodring's arrest, which Lovell and other Brevard County Sheriff's Deputies executed the next day. (See Doc. 53, ¶¶ 12-13.)

Following their arrests, the Brevard County State Attorney's Office filed criminal charges against both Plaintiffs. (See Doc. 53, ¶ 15; Doc. 53-2.) York was presumably charged with violating Florida Statutes § 562.11(1)(a),2 which prohibits selling alcohol to minors. (See Doc. 53, ¶ 24.) Woodring was charged with violating Florida Statues § 877.111—a slightly different charge than the § 893.147(2) violation identified in Judge Wohn's arrest warrant.3 (Compare Doc. 53-1, with Doc. 53-2.) "[E]ventually, both of the criminal cases were dismissed with prejudice." (Doc. 53, ¶ 15.)

Based on those allegations, Plaintiffs invoke the Court's federal-question jurisdiction, and they each assert a § 1983 false-arrest claim against Lovell and the other arresting deputies. (See id. ¶¶ 5-6, 35-46.) Also based on essentially the same allegations, Plaintiffs invoke the Court's supplemental jurisdiction to assert several state-law tort claims against those Defendants as well as Brevard County Sheriff Wayne Ivey. (See id. ¶¶ 6, 18-34.)

Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims as barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Doc. 54.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Doc. 56.) The matter is ripe for the Court's adjudication.

STANDARDS

"At the motion to dismiss stage in the litigation, the qualified immunity inquiry and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard become intertwined." Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 760 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune from suit unless the official's conduct violates clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 762 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Court will dismiss a complaint if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and disregarding all conclusions of law, the complaint fails "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Taking the standards together, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss based upon qualified immunity, the plaintiff must have alleged sufficient facts to support a finding of a constitutional violation of a clearly established law."4 Chandler v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION5

Plaintiffs assert their § 1983 claims together in a single count,6 in which they allege that Defendants "falsely arrested" them in violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. (See Doc. 53, ¶¶ 35-46.) Within the § 1983 count, Plaintiffs themselves raise the issue of qualified immunity, conceding that "Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary duties" and acknowledging that Plaintiffs therefore bear the burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity should not bar their claims. (See id. ¶¶ 38-39 (citing Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013); Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009)).) To carry that burden, York alleges that Defendants arrested her "for no reason, in an effort to harass and or humiliate her," and Woodring alleges that Defendants arrested him pursuant to a warrant obtained through "deceit, trickery, and false statements." (See id. ¶¶ 9, 12.) Woodring also takes issue with the fact that his arrest warrant indicated that he had violated Florida Statutes § 897.142(2) but he was ultimately arrested and prosecuted for violating § 877.111. (See id. ¶ 12.) The Court will address each claim in turn.

I. York's False-Arrest Claim

York's § 1983 false-arrest claim presents a classic example of "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" that fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation and thus cannot survive Defendants' qualified-immunity motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The only hint of the circumstances underlying York's arrest is the statement—buried in a paragraph from a state-law claim that was not incorporated into her § 1983 count—that she "was falsely arrested for Sale of an Alcoholic Beverage to a Person under 21" without any "reasonable basis . . . which would have provided probable cause for the Defendants to . . . arrest her." (Doc. 53, ¶ 24.)

As the Court noted in its order dismissing a previous, similarly unsupported iteration of York's false-arrest claim, "`[a]n arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim,' [but] the existence of `probable cause or arguable probable7 cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern.'" (Doc. 52, pp. 3-4 (quoting Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)).) Thus, plausibly alleging an arrest without probable cause requires at least minimal allegations regarding the factual circumstances of the arrest. Cf. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (observing that whether "arguable probable cause" shields law enforcement officers from false-arrest claims depends upon the factual circumstances of the arrest).

Despite that explanation, York's false arrest claim in the Third Amended Complaint once again rests only on "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). York has therefore failed to plausibly allege that Defendants arrested her without probable cause, and thus her § 1983 false-arrest claim is due to be dismissed as barred by qualified immunity.

II. Woodring's False-Arrest Claim

As a threshold matter, Woodring's § 1983 false-arrest claim fails from the outset because he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. (See Doc. 53-1.) "[W]here an individual has been arrested pursuant to a warrant, his claim is for malicious prosecution rather than false arrest." Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App'x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014).

Regardless, qualified immunity would have barred the § 1983 claim even if Woodring had properly pled it under the malicious-prosecution framework. Essentially, Woodring claims that the items identified as paraphernalia in his store were not actually "illegal to obtain or sell" and, consequently, Lovell's representations to the contrary in his arrest affidavit amounted to "deceit, trickery, and false statements." (See Doc. 56, pp. 4-5.) The problem with Woodring's claim is that it relies upon a non-sequitur: even if the items identified in Lovell's arrest affidavit were not actually "illegal to obtain or sell,"8 Lovell's representation to the contrary would not necessarily amount to "deceit," "trickery," or any other type of intentional falsehood. As pled, Lovell could just as easily have been mistaken. (See Doc. 53, ¶¶ 10-14, 35-46.) This is not an academic point; making false statements in support of a warrant can violate the Fourth Amendment and give rise to a malicious prosecution claim, see Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994), but qualified immunity bars such claims unless "the plaintiff can prove that the officer perjured himself—that is, put forth information he did not believe or accept as true—in order to obtain a search warrant." Carter, 557 F. App'x at 908 (emphasis added). Accordingly, at the motion to dismiss stage, viably alleging a perjurious-statement malicious-prosecution claim requires factual allegations bearing on the officer's "subjective belief about the veracity of the assertions made in his affidavit," such as a "possible motive" for the officer to lie. Id. at 910. Woodring makes no such allegations (see Doc. 53), and thus his § 1983 claim cannot survive Defendants' qualified-immunity motion to dismiss.

Finally, it is immaterial that the offense identified in Woodring's arrest warrant differed slightly from the offense for which he was ultimately arrested and charged. (See id. ¶ 12.) "Where a defendant [is] arrested for the `wrong' offense, the arrest is nonetheless valid where the crime for which he was arrested and the crime for which there was probable cause to believe he had committed are closely related and there is no proof of sham or fraud." United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1979). Here, Florida Statutes § 893.147(2) and § 877.111(2) are closely related, see supra note 3, Woodring has not plausibly alleged that the different charges were the product of "sham or fraud" (see Doc. 53), and thus, as pled, Woodring's arrest was valid.

For those reasons, Woodring's § 1983 claim is due to be dismissed.

III. Remaining State-Law Claims

As discussed above, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims—the only federal claims in this action (see id. ¶¶ 35-46)—are due to be dismissed. In light of Plaintiffs' failure to plead viable § 1983 claims after four attempts (see Docs. 1, 40, 48, 53), and consistent with the Court's previous warning (see Doc. 52, p. 5), the Court further finds that the § 1983 claims are due to be dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims, which lack an independent jurisdictional basis. (See Doc. 53, ¶¶ 5-7); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting a court to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction when it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction"). The state-law claims are therefore due to be dismissed without prejudice—meaning that they may be refiled in state court, but not in this action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

DONE and ORDERED.