SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on Petitioner Leon T. Lamb's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Civ. Doc. No. 1; Cr. Doc. No. 18). The Court will not cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States Attorney and shall proceed to address the matter, because a review of this motion and the record in this case conclusively shows that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
On November 19, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to manufacturing and possessing with intent to manufacture 100 or more marijuana plants. On February 26, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 188 months. He was sentenced as a career offender. His prior convictions used to enhance him were state of Florida convictions for Aggravated Battery and Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On December 21, 2015, Petitioner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Petitioner's motion is untimely.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 established a mandatory, one-year period of limitation for § 2255 motions, which runs from the latest of the following events:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4). Petitioner's § 2255 motion is dated December 21, 2015, and it is deemed to have been filed on that date. Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a prisoner's § 2255 motion is considered filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing which, absent evidence to the contrary, is presumed to be the date the prisoner signed it).
Under § 2255(f)(1), "when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires." Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). Judgment was entered against Petitioner on February 26, 2010. Therefore, for purposes of the limitations period, Petitioner's conviction became final when the 14-day period for filing an appeal elapsed on March 12, 2010. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). Accordingly, pursuant to § 2255(f)(1), Petitioner was required to file his § 2255 motion by March 12, 2010, in order for it to be timely filed. Petitioner did not submit the instant § 2255 motion to prison authorities for mailing until December 21, 2015. Therefore, Petitioner cannot rely on § 2255(f)(1) to establish the timeliness of his motion.
Petitioner asserts that his § 2255 motion is timely because it asserts a right to relief based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Court held that one provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. However, Petitioner's reliance on Johnson is misplaced, because Johnson did not announce a right that was "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 18 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). The Supreme Court did not make its decision in Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has not given retroactive effect to Johnson. See In re Franks, No. 15-15456, 2016 WL 80551 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016), and In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, Petitioner cannot rely on § 2255(f)(3) to establish the timeliness of his motion.
Petitioner's motion is untimely. It is untimely under § 2255(f)(1) because it was filed more than one year after his judgment of conviction became final, and Petitioner cannot rely on Johnson to establish the timeliness of his motion under § 2255(f)(3). Accordingly, Petitioner's § 2255 motion (Civ. Dkt 1; Cr. Dkt. 18) is
The Clerk is directed to close the civil case.
IT IS