CAROL MIRANDO Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Mark George Krejci appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). For the reasons discussed herein, the Commissioner's decision is
Plaintiff raises three interrelated issues on appeal:
On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for a period of DIB and SSI alleging that he became disabled and unable to work on January 15, 2011 due to traumatic brain injury and a right hand injury resulting from a motorcycle accident in which Plaintiff was not wearing a helmet. Tr. 12, 17, 176, 180, 206, 210. The Social Security Administration denied his claim initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 12, 106-118, 121-34. Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an ALJ on October 18, 2011, during which he was represented by an attorney. Tr. 12, 31-101. Plaintiff, Plaintiff's mother, Zdenka Krejci, and vocational expert ("VE") Robert Lessne testified at the hearing. Tr. 31-101.
On September 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denied his claim. Tr. 12-23. The ALJ first determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2013. Tr. 14. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 15, 2011, the alleged onset date. Id. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of hypertension and dysesthetic pain syndrome. Id. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. . . ." Tr. 15.
Taking into account the effects of all of Plaintiff's impairments, severe and nonsevere, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to:
Tr. 15-16. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments are not as severe or limiting as alleged, and his statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms are not fully credible for reasons explained in the opinion. Tr. 17. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a bus rental clerk, diesel bus mechanic, bus driver or parcel/post clerk because such work exceeds the RFC of light work with additional limitations. Tr. 21. Considering the Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ held there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as addresser, sandwich board carrier and marker. Tr. 21-22. Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled and denied his claim. Tr. 22.
Following the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff filed a request for review by the Appeals Council which was denied. Tr. 1-6. Accordingly, the ALJ's September 30, 2013 decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court on March 24, 2015. Doc. 1. Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, and this matter is now ripe for review. Doc. 14.
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits when he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to either result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis for evaluating a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the five steps as follows:
Atha v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App'x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(g), 416.960(c)(2); Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four; and, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the Commissioner's burden at step five is temporary, because "[i]f the Commissioner presents evidence that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy, `to be considered disabled, the claimant must then prove that he is unable to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists.'" Atha, 616 F. App'x at 933 (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2001)). The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, i.e., evidence that must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, and such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see also Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that "[s]ubstantial evidence is something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance") (internal citation omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit recently has restated that "[i]n determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, we give great deference to the ALJ's factfindings." Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Black Diamond Coal Min. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 95 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996)). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). "The district court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision." Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the factual findings). It is the function of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Lacina v. Commissioner, 2015 WL 1453364, at *2 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1971)).
Plaintiff first states that the ALJ committed reversible error by finding that Plaintiff's TBI was not a medically determinable impairment or MDI. Doc. 18 at 7. Further, Plaintiff argues that this error was compounded because as a result, the ALJ did not consider any effects from this condition in determining Plaintiff's RFC or evaluating his credibility. Id. Plaintiff further argues that "[e]ssentially, the ALJ found that [TBI] was not a legitimate condition. . . ." Id. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly found Plaintiff's TBI was not a medically determinable impairment in this case, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Further, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ accounted for any limitations in his mental RFC finding. Doc. 19 at 3-8. The Commissioner further states that even assuming Plaintiff's TBI was an MDI "at some point," the evidence falls short of satisfying Plaintiff's burden to show that the impairment lasted or was expected to last at least twelve consecutive months. Id. at 6. In his reply brief, Plaintiff correctly points out that the ALJ did not determine Plaintiff's TBI was not an MDI on a durational basis, and this Court may only uphold the ALJ's decision on the same bases articulated in the agency's order, citing Baker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 384 F. App'x 893, 896 (11th Cir. 2010). Further, Plaintiff states substantial evidence shows Plaintiff's condition did meet the durational requirement. Doc. 22 at 2. Finally, Plaintiff notes that, because the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff's TBI to be a medically determinable impairment, he was precluded under the Social Security regulations from considering the impact of this impairment on the RFC. Id. at 3; citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 415, 929(b). Because the Court finds, after review of the entire record, that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's TBI is not a medically determinable impairment, and thus it is not clear whether the ALJ considered the mental or physical limitations from Plaintiff's TBI in his RFC analysis, remand is required.
The Social Security Regulations explain what is needed for a claimant to show an impairment:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. The impairment must be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The "impairment must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id.
Here, in his step two analysis, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's allegation of disability due to traumatic brain injury. Tr. 15. The ALJ accurately stated that a medically determinable impairment may not be established on the basis of an individual's allegations regarding his symptoms, but instead must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms and laboratory findings. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508; SSR 96-4p). Citing to § 404.1508, the ALJ properly noted that "[s]igns are anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be observed apart from an individual's statements regarding symptoms, and they must b[e] shown by medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic techniques." Tr. 15. The ALJ then discussed that the medical evidence and records in Plaintiff's case did not include such signs, symptoms or laboratory findings indicating that Plaintiff suffered from traumatic brain injury. Id. As discussed herein, substantial evidence does not support this finding of the ALJ.
Plaintiff argues that in determining that Plaintiff's TBI was not a MDI, the ALJ relied exclusively on an opinion of Jonathan Jagid, M.D., who examined Plaintiff in a one-time evaluation in June 2011. Doc. 22 at 2. Although the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been in a motorcycle accident in January 2011, it is true he discussed only Dr. Jagid's opinion in the step two portion of the decision. Tr. 15.
Dr. Jagid examined Plaintiff on June 21, 2011 on referral from Dr. Allan D. Levi about six months after Plaintiff's accident. Tr. 600. He noted that Plaintiff had spent approximately three months in the hospital following his accident and had initially been on a ventilator for a few days. Id. Dr. Jagid stated it was "unclear" as to what Plaintiff's "acute intracranial injury" consisted of, however:
Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Jagid reported that Plaintiff was on a number of medications, including Inderal,
Id.
Other medical records of Plaintiff's head injury and its effects include the initial CT scan of Plaintiff's head immediately following his accident on January 15, 2011, which showed mild traumatic brain injury (less than 30 minutes loss of consciousness) and a low Glasgow coma score ("GCS") of 7,
In an examination on January 23, 2011 by Dr. Dean D. Lin, M.D., NRS, Dr. Lin noted that while Plaintiff was confused and easily arousable, his current GCS was 14; and an MRI of the brain and the CT scans of his head performed earlier in the month were negative for acute intracranial process. Tr. 278. He further noted that no surgical intervention was planned, and he recommended continuing "supportive care." Tr. 279. Dr. Lin also opined that Plaintiff would need rehabilitation for cognitive improvement, and recommended observation and re-imaging if his neurological status declined. Tr. 279. Although the ALJ discussed the hospital records outlined above, he did not discuss them in relation to his determination whether Plaintiff's TBI was an MDI.
Following discharge from the hospital in February, Plaintiff saw his primary care physician, Dr. Peter Schreiber, D.O., on March 18, 2011, who assessed that Plaintiff had cognitive and functional deficits "following traumatic brain injury." Tr. 510. A CT scan performed in March 2011, which was compared to Plaintiff's scans on January 18 and 22, 2011, showed resolution of the hygromas, no acute internal hemorrhage and no hydrocephalus. Tr. 17, 853.
In a visit on April 4, 2011 to Ivan L. Mazzorana, Jr., M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist, Plaintiff was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury with depression. Tr. 511. In a return visit to Dr. Lin on May 2, 2011, in which Plaintiff complained of nasal drainage and headaches, Dr. Lin discussed that a CT scan of Plaintiff's head taken on April 18, 2011 revealed no evidence of the subdural hygromas. Tr. 595. He observed that there appeared to be some sinus disease, but did not see any fluid in any of Plaintiff's sinuses, indicating there was not a post-head injury spinal fluid leak. Id. Dr. Lin explained that Plaintiff's postconcussive syndrome, including headache, dizziness and gait difficulty, may persist for several months, especially since Plaintiff has had multiple head injuries in the past. Id. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, neurologist Dr. Edward Davis, D.O., opined after treatment of Plaintiff from August 22, 2011 through December 14, 2011, that Plaintiff still was experiencing severe and chronic headaches in spite of increases in medications, disequilibrium, short-term memory, traumatic encephalopathy,
Despite medical evidence to the contrary up to at least one year after Plaintiff's accident that he still was experiencing severe medical issues from the multiple diagnoses of TBI he received, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's TBI was not a medically determinable impairment simply is not supportable by substantial evidence in the record. Although the Commissioner points out that the evidence may not satisfy the twelve-month durational requirement (Doc. 19 at 6), the Court is not convinced this is the case. Furthermore, as noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ did not reject Plaintiff's TBI as an MDI on a durational basis; thus, it would be erroneous for the Court to uphold the ALJ's opinion on that basis. Baker, 384 F. App'x at 896. Even Dr. Jagid, on whose opinion the ALJ appeared to primarily base his determination, acknowledged that Plaintiff had an acute intercranial injury and very severe headaches that had not improved and for which Dr. Jagid prescribed additional medication, in addition to the myriad of other strong medications Plaintiff was taking to address his headaches and seizures. Tr. 600-01. In light of these facts, Dr. Jagid's opinion that Plaintiff had made a "very nice recovery" is not supportable. Tr. 601. The record shows that as late as December 2011, Plaintiff's headaches still had not resolved, and his medications were being adjusted. Tr. 927.
Because substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff's TBI is not an MDI, and it is not clear that the ALJ considered the mental or physical limitations of Plaintiff's TBI in his RFC assessment, as he was not required to do so if it was not determined to be an MDI, the Court finds remand is proper. On remand, the Commissioner should direct the ALJ to reconsider the medical evidence in light of whether Plaintiff's TBI was an MDI, and, if so, determine what impact the impairment has on Plaintiff's ability to work.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because he failed to provide a legally sufficient basis for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating neurologist, Edward David, D.O., and consultative psychologist, Claudia Zsigmond, Psy.D. Doc. 18 at 11. The Commissioner responds that, contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, the ALJ properly evaluated these opinions under the proper legal standards. Doc. 19 at 11-15.
When determining how much weight to afford an opinion, the ALJ considers whether there is an examining or treatment relationship and the nature and extent thereof; whether the source offers relevant medical evidence to support the opinion; consistency with the record as a whole; the specialization of the source, if any; and any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). Under the regulations, opinions of treating sources usually are given more weight because treating physicians are the most likely to be able to offer detailed opinions of the claimant's impairments as they progressed over time and "may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations. . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Medical source opinions may be discounted, however, when the opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or if the opinion is inconsistent with the record as a whole. SSR 96-2p; Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159-60.
Accordingly, "[a]n ALJ must give a treating physician's opinion substantial weight, unless good cause is shown." Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App'x 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); Sabo v. Chater, 955 F.Supp. 1456, 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1996). "Good cause exists when the `(1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241).
If the opinion of a treating physician as to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment is supported by acceptable medical evidence and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record, the treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight. SSR 96-2p; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). By contrast, if the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, he must clearly articulate the reasons for doing so. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Although the regulations require that the ALJ consider all factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the ALJ is not required to expressly address each factor so long as he demonstrates good cause to reject the opinion. Lawton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 431 F. App'x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011).
Dr. Davis treated Plaintiff from August 2011 through December 2011. Tr. 925-941. Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Davis from Dr. Lin for evaluation on August 22, 2011. Tr. 932. Dr. Davis noted that at that point in time Plaintiff was complaining of low grade daily headaches, punctuated by severe right-sided headaches occurring once or twice per week and lasting up to a day and a half. Id. Plaintiff also complained of problems with disequilibrium and short-term memory loss since the accident. Id. Plaintiff's neurological examination showed that his mental status was alert, and he was oriented to person, place, date, and time. His speech was fluent and he showed no hemineglect.
There are no other medical records from Dr. Davis until he completed a medical source statement dated June 28, 2013 concerning organ brain syndrome for Plaintiff's Social Security disability claim, a year and a half later. Tr. 972-74. In the statement, Dr. Davis found that Plaintiff had mild restriction in activities of daily living and difficulty in maintaining social functioning, and no deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace or episodes of decompensation. Tr. 972. In contrast, Dr. Davis opined that Plaintiff had marked impairments in his ability to remember locations and work-like procedures, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, make simple work-related decisions, complete a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms, accept instructions from supervisors, maintain socially appropriate behavior or respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. Tr. 972-73. He also opined that Plaintiff had a medically documented history of chronic organic mental disorder of at least two years' duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation in his ability to do basic work activities. Tr. 972. There is no indication in the record that Dr. Davis had examined Plaintiff since his last visit in December 2011.
Based on these opinions discussed by the ALJ, the ALJ gave Dr. Davis' opinions little weight. He noted some of the answers circled by Dr. Davis concerning the organic brain syndrome "appear to require confirmation of psychological or mental impairments which is not supported by the medical evidence of record of claimant's treatment history." Tr. 20. The ALJ noted these opinions also were internally inconsistent with Dr. Davis' own opinions, the opinion of Dr. Jagid, diagnostic testing showing Plaintiff's hygromas and post-concussive symptoms had completely resolved and that his headaches were controlled with medication. Id. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Davis' opinion that Plaintiff could not return to his work was based on Plaintiff's "subjective complaints," and in any event, such issues bearing on whether Plaintiff is disabled is reserved to the Commissioner. Id., citing SSR 96-5p.
Although the Court finds the ALJ's articulated reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Davis' opinions, particularly to his 2013 opinion that Plaintiff is disabled, which decision is reserved to the Commissioner,
Plaintiff next alleges the ALJ "ignored" the opinion of consulting psychologist Dr. Zsigmond, who examined Plaintiff in July 2011. Doc. 18 at 13-14. Dr. Zsigmond reported that Plaintiff denied any history of mental health evaluations or treatment or having ever been psychiatrically hospitalized or attempting suicide. Tr. 611. Plaintiff had no history of substance abuse or family history of mental health or substance abuse issues. Id. While Dr. Zsigmond noted Plaintiff drives only on a very limited basis due to his vision and "cognitive problems," he was appropriately groomed and dressed with good basic functioning and hygiene, no prominent gait abnormalities or gross motor coordination problems. Tr. 612. She noted rapport was easy to establish. Id. Dr. Zsigmond further noted that Plaintiff did not evidence symptoms of psychosis and had adequate recall of remote events; however, his mother, who was present during part of the evaluation, had to provide many details following Plaintiff's accident. Id. Dr. Zsigmond noted that Plaintiff was unable to spell the word "world" backwards, which Dr. Zsigmond opined indicated limited attention and concentration. Id. She further noted his judgment and insight into his difficulties are limited "due to cognitive impairment." Id. Plaintiff had a "slightly blunted affect, however used humor at times and appeared in no acute mental distress." Id. Dr. Zsigmond noted Plaintiff's social life was "somewhat active visiting with friends 1-2 times a month [and his a]verage day consists of watching television, spending time o[n] Facebook, memory exercises and light housecleaning. Id. In conclusion, Dr. Zsigmond opined:
Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the ALJ discussed Dr. Zsigmond's examination. See Tr. 18. Plaintiff is correct, however, that the ALJ failed to explain the weight, if any, he accorded her opinion. See id. This was error, because unless the ALJ gives controlling weight to Plaintiff's treating physician, which as noted he did not do here, the ALJ must explain the weight given to the opinions of other consultants, doctors or medical specialists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); Vuxta v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 194 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, remand is required concerning this issue as well.
Because the decision must be remanded for the reasons discussed above, and the ALJ's decision on remand concerning Plaintiff's TBI may affect the ALJ's credibility determination, the Court will not address this remaining issue. On remand, the ALJ also should reevaluate Plaintiff's credibility after determining whether Plaintiff's TBI is an MDI and consider any mental or physical effects from such impairment on Plaintiff's credibility.
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby
1. The decision of the Commissioner is
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, and close the file.
