REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

JOEL B. TOOMEY, Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the undersigned on Plaintiff's appeal of an administrative decision denying his applications for a Period of Disability, Disability Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. In a decision dated August 3, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from March 1, 2012, the alleged disability onset date, through the date of decision. (Tr. 11-23.) Plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. The undersigned has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.

I. Issue on Appeal

Plaintiff makes the following argument on appeal:

(Doc. 14 at 1-2.)

II. Standard of Review

As the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). "With respect to the Commissioner's legal conclusions, however, our review is de novo." Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).

III. The ALJ's Decision

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of "a history of coronary artery disease, hypertension and lumbar degenerative disc disease, which is worse at the L4-S1 levels."2 (Tr. 14.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listing. (Tr. 14.) Prior to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

(Tr. 14-15.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. (Tr. 21.) However, at step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's age (fifty-four on the alleged disability onset date), education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 22-23.) Therefore, Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 23.)

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the opinions of a treating doctor, Dr. Mark Murphy, and an examining doctor, Dr. Rahel Eyassu. (Doc. 14 at 9-17.) The undersigned recommends that the ALJ did not err regarding the opinions of either doctor.

A. Dr. Murphy

To discount the opinions of a treating doctor, the ALJ is required to provide "good cause." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2014). Good cause to discount a treating doctor's opinion exists when "(1) [the] treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the] evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Id. at 1240-41. The Court "will not second guess the ALJ about the weight the treating physician's opinion deserves so long as he articulates a specific justification for it." Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 823 (11th Cir. 2015).

Regarding Dr. Murphy, the ALJ stated:

(Tr. 19.)

In addition, in giving partial weight to the opinions of a State agency doctor, Dr. Larry Meade, the ALJ stated:

(Tr. 20.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in misinterpreting Dr. Murphy's opinion and in failing to recognize that Dr. Murphy offered to provide Plaintiff with work restrictions. (Doc. 14 at 10-13.) The undersigned recommends that both arguments be rejected. First, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Murphy did not agree with Plaintiff that Plaintiff was disabled, despite Plaintiff attempting to present himself as disabled and despite Plaintiff's insistence that he was. As the ALJ noted, on February 17, 2016, Dr. Murphy indicated that Plaintiff told him "I can't work, I have applied for disability, and been turned down 4 times." (Tr. 758.) Further, Dr. Murphy indicated that Plaintiff "mentions more than once that he is disabled." (Tr. 758.) Also, Plaintiff presented "himself is [sic] disabled and uncomfortable and uses a cane."3 (Tr. 759.) Despite Plaintiff's statements and presentation, Dr. Murphy concluded: "I am not in a position to support and [sic] application for permanent disability benefits." (Tr. 759.)

On April 6, 2016, Dr. Murphy noted:

There is no need for neurosurgical follow-up at this time. (Tr. 750.) Based on the foregoing notes, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ did not err in giving significant weight to Dr. Murphy's refusal to find Plaintiff disabled. Further, the ALJ reasonably interpreted Dr. Murphy's opinion.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ had an affirmative duty to contact Dr. Murphy to ascertain what work restrictions he would give Plaintiff, the undersigned recommends that such argument be rejected. First, it is not clear that Plaintiff is making this argument. (Doc. 14 at 11-12.) Second, if he is, he cites no authority in support of it. (Id. at 10-13.) Thus, the Court could decide that this argument has been waived. (See Doc. 13 at 1-2 ("Any issue not specifically raised by Plaintiff will be considered to have been waived unless the interests of justice require the Court to consider the issue.").)

In addition, the undersigned recommends that the argument has no merit. First, although the ALJ did have an obligation to develop a full and fair record, it was not a special duty because Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. (Tr. 59-61.) See Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) ("Because a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversary proceeding, the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record. . . . [T]he ALJ's basic obligation to develop a full and fair record rises to a special duty when an unrepresented claimant unfamiliar with hearing procedures appears before him.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Burgin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 6:09-cv-1233-Orl-DAB, 2010 WL 2510650, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2010), aff'd, 420 F. App'x 901 (11th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he heightened duty to develop the record . . . from Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1981), applies when claimants are not represented. . . ."). The ALJ could reasonably conclude from Dr. Murphy's note that Plaintiff and/or his attorney disregarded Dr. Murphy's offer to provide Plaintiff with work restrictions, as such restrictions would not be "of benefit" to Plaintiff. (Tr. 750.)

Additionally, there was no need to contact Dr. Murphy to develop the record further because the evidence already in the record, and upon which the ALJ relied, was sufficient for the ALJ to assess Plaintiff's asserted limitations. See Prince v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 551 F. App'x 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2014)4 (holding that ALJ did not err in failing to recontact treating physician where record was sufficient to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled); Harrison v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 569 F. App'x 874, 879 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding no reversible error where ALJ did not contact treating physician for further clarification of treatment notes because record allowed the ALJ to make a "conclusive determination regarding [Plaintiff's] disability status").

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that he was prejudiced by the ALJ's failure to contact Dr. Murphy. See Couch v. Astrue, 267 F. App'x 853, 855 (11th Cir. 2008) (in determining whether an ALJ's failure to recontact a treating source warrants remand, the court is guided by "whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice"); Harrison, 569 F. App'x at 879 ("Without any demonstration that the record was inadequate or led to unfairness or clear prejudice, we cannot say that the ALJ committed reversible error by choosing not to contact [the treating physician] for additional information."). In this case, Plaintiff "has not shown that [he] suffered prejudice as a result of any failure of the ALJ to perform further factfinding, because there is no evidence [the] ALJ's decision would have changed in light of any additional information." Robinson v. Astrue, 365 F. App'x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ did not err in addressing the opinions of Dr. Murphy.

B. Dr. Eyassu

In order to discount the opinions of Dr. Eyassu, the ALJ only had to provide adequate reasons supported by substantial evidence. See McNamee v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 164 F. App'x 919, 924 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no reversible error "[b]ecause the ALJ gave specific reasons for according no weight to [an examining physician's] opinion, and because the ALJ based his decision on substantial medical evidence").

Dr. Eyassu examined Plaintiff on two occasions, first on February 15, 2012, and then again on August 19, 2014. (Tr. 451-57, 527-32.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred regarding the opinions of Dr. Eyassu on both occasions. (Doc. 14 at 13-17.) Regarding the February 15, 2012 examination and opinion, the ALJ stated:

(Tr. 17.)

The undersigned recommends that the ALJ's reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Eyassu's aforementioned opinions are adequate and supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's arguments essentially ask the Court to reweigh the evidence, which is not this Court's function. (See Doc. 14 at 13-17.) For example, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's statement that Plaintiff sought little treatment for his alleged back pain prior to the examination. (Id. at 14-15.) However, in support of this argument, Plaintiff cites only two emergency room visits in 2007 and 2008 (Tr. 368-406, 407-24), well before Dr. Eyassu's examinations and the alleged disability onset date. (Doc. 14 at 14.) Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's statement that Dr. Patel's treatment records do not corroborate Dr. Eyassu's limitations. The only document Plaintiff cites that arguably suggests otherwise is a treadmill exercise tolerance test from 2008, which merely notes "subjective distress" at certain stages of the test. (Tr. 446.)

Plaintiff also argues that the "ALJ held his poverty against him." (Doc. 14 at 14.) In Henry v. Commissioner of Social Security, 802 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit stated: "When the ALJ `primarily if not exclusively' relies on a claimant's failure to seek treatment, but does not consider any good cause explanation for this failure, this court will remand for further consideration." The undersigned recommends that this case is distinguishable from Henry because the ALJ did not rely "primarily if not exclusively" on Plaintiff's failure to seek treatment. As shown above, the ALJ gave a number of reasons for discounting the opinions of Dr. Eyassu. Moreover, the ALJ adequately addressed Plaintiff's allegations that he could not afford certain treatment. The ALJ noted Plaintiff's hearing testimony as follows:

(Tr. 15, 20-21.) In short, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ did not "primarily if not exclusively" rely on a lack of treatment and did consider Plaintiff's explanation in that regard. Moreover, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ's reasons for discounting Dr. Eyassu's February 15, 2012 opinions are adequate and supported by substantial evidence.

On August 19, 2014, Dr. Eyassu provided different limitations for different reasons. The ALJ summarized this examination as follows:

(Tr. 18.)

In addressing Dr. Eyassu's opinions from this examination, the ALJ stated:

(Tr. 20.)

The undersigned recommends that these reasons are adequate and supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff is again in effect arguing that the Court should reweigh the evidence. (Doc. 14 at 13-17.) For example, although Plaintiff argues that it is "not true" that his diagnostic testing was negative for angina, he does not cite any diagnostic test that found angina. (Id. at 16.) Rather, he points to testing that was done because of an indication of angina, but that did not confirm angina. (Tr. 571, 575.) Moreover, Plaintiff's cardiologist, Dr. Thomas Joiner, who reviewed, interpreted, and/or performed such testing concluded that Plaintiff had "[c]oronary artery disease without angina pectoris." (Tr. 565.) Plaintiff's prior treating cardiologist in New Jersey, Dr. Constantinos Costeas, noted in part that Plaintiff had "[p]leuritic type chest pain." (Tr. 554.) Moreover, the ALJ was correct that Dr. Joiner placed no limitations on Plaintiff and recommended a "heart healthy diet, regular aerobic exercise, lipid level monitoring, avoidance of tobacco, and appropriate weight maintenance." (Tr. 565.) Thus, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ did not err in addressing Dr. Eyassu's August 19, 2014 opinions.

V. Conclusion

The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh the evidence or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the question is not whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on de novo review; rather, the Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are based on correct legal standards and are supported by substantial evidence. Applying this standard of review, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:

1. The Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.

2. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and close the file.