GARY R. JONES, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on ECF No. 19, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has responded. (ECF No. 23.) Defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore ripe for review. For the reasons explained below, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted.
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC"), initiated this case by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint ("Complaint"). (ECF No. 12.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings an access-to-courts claim against Defendant, Secretary Julie Jones of the FDOC. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was convicted of first-degree murder and second-degree assault with a firearm, for which he was sentenced to 39 years in prison on November 17, 2006, in King County Superior Court, located in Washington State. He was originally sentenced to the Washington State Department of Corrections, but he was then transferred to the FDOC on an interstate compact on October 1, 2012. (ECF No. 12 at 5-6; ECF No. 12-1 at 2-4, 7-9.)
Plaintiff says that he was sent to Florida without his legal documents, and since 2013 he has requested case law and legal materials, such as statutes and court rules, from Washington State so that he can pursue a "nonfrivolous legal claim." However, Washington State has not provided him with these requested materials.
Plaintiff says the Washington State Department of Corrections and Defendant have denied him meaningful access to the Washington State courts by not providing him with case law and legal materials, all of which he says violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Article 1, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the interstate compact. (ECF No. 12 at 6-7; ECF No. 12-1 at 4, 6, 9.) As relief Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, nominal damages, and attorney's fees. (ECF No. 12 at 7; ECF No. 12-1 at 9-11.)
As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and the complaint "must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action."
Further, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 1951-53 (2009), the Supreme Court stated that Twombly "expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions," and conclusory allegations that "amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional . . . claim" are "not entitled to be assumed true," and, to escape dismissal, complaint must allege facts sufficient to move claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible." "The plausibility standard is met only where the facts alleged enable `the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' . . . . The complaint's allegations must establish `more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Defendant argues Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for four reasons: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief; (2) Plaintiff's claim for damages against Defendant in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, (3) Plaintiff's claims for punitive and compensatory damages are barred pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) ("PLRA"), (4) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant based on respondeat superior, and (5) Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has denied him access to Washington State courts by not providing him with legal materials from Washington State. He says this failure to provide him with these materials has prevented him from raising a "nonfrivolous legal claim" to attack his conviction. Plaintiff alleges this violates his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
"It is now well established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). "[This] fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. Of course, "prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring `a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'" Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).
Since Bounds, the Supreme Court has clarified what an individual must show to state a claim regarding access to the courts.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (citation omitted). In other words, an individual must show actual injury. Id. at 349.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that "[a]ctual injury may be established by demonstrating that an inmate's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded by a deficiency in the prison library or in a legal assistance program or by an official's actions." Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, then citing Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998)). More specifically, "the plaintiff must identify within his complaint, a `nonfrivlous, arguable underlying claim.'" Id. at 1226 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial court should not be "left to guess at the plaintiff's unstated cause of action." Id.
Applying Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent to Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state an access-to-courts claim because he failed to allege that he suffered the requisite actual injury. Without any reference to the type of claim or particular proceeding, Plaintiff has merely made the conclusory allegation that the failure of Defendant to provide him with Washington State legal materials has prevented him from pursuing a nonfrivolous legal claim to attack his conviction. He has not stated in his complaint or his response to Defendant's motion whether he is attempting to file a direct appeal or a habeas petition regarding his conviction. Notably, he has failed to allege any facts showing that any such claim would be nonfrivolous, particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced almost 12 years ago—a circumstance which makes a direct appeal or even a petition for collateral review highly unlikely. As a result, this Court is left to guess what nonfrivolous claim Plaintiff has been hindered in bringing.
Further, any amendment to Plaintiff's complaint to include additional facts to describe the nonfrivolous claim to which Plaintiff refers would be futile because the sending state, and not the receiving state, has the responsibility for ensuring a prisoner has access to the courts of the sending state. See Boyd v. Wood, 52 F.3d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "sending state authorities maintain responsibility for providing state legal materials to their prisoners incarcerated in out-of-state facilities," and finding that authorities from the receiving state were the wrong defendants); Clayton v. Tansy, 26 F.3d 980, 982 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e adopt the present consensus that it is the sending state which bears the burden of providing the required state legal materials . . . .").
This approach makes the most sense. Washington State officials, who transferred Plaintiff to the Florida Department of Corrections, are in the best position to provide access to legal materials. If Florida correctional institutions were required to provide legal materials from other states to prisoners transferred to Florida under an interstate compact Florida prisons would have to have legal materials from all fifty states available, a requirement that does not make economic sense and a requirement that does not make logical sense.
Therefore, even assuming Plaintiff has a valid denial of access to court claim the proper defendants are the Washington State authorities, who were directly responsible for Plaintiff's transfer, and the proper place to bring such a claim against them is in a court located in Washington State, not here in the Northern District of Florida.
Accordingly, for these reasons, even assuming Plaintiff could allege a valid denial of access to court claim, the claim would be dismissed against the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections because Washington State officials, and not Florida correctional officials, have the responsibility for providing access to Washington State legal materials.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendant in her official capacity, those claims also should be dismissed.
First, Florida has not consented to be sued in damage suits brought under § 1983. See Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986). Nor has Florida waived its sovereign immunity. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(18). Second, Congress did not intend to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 damage suits. See Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, while Plaintiff is permitted to bring suit against Defendant in her individual capacity for damages, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Plaintiff from suing Defendant in her official capacity for damages under § 1983.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff's claims are asserted against Defendant in her official capacity for damages, those claims are due to be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) ("[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
Additionally, even if Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim for relief against Defendant in her individual capacity, Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive or compensatory damages. "The PLRA provides that `no Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.'" Boxer X v. Donald, 169 F. App'x 555, 558 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). "[T]o avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner's claims for emotional or mental injury must be accomplished by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de minimis." Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002); Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any physical injuries whatsoever from Defendant's alleged actions. Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages. See Logan v. Hall, 604 F. App'x 838, 840-41 (11th Cir. 2015) (district court correctly determined plaintiff failed to allege a claim for compensatory or punitive damages for a claim because he did not allege physical injury).
Plaintiff, however, would have been entitled to pursue nominal damages against Defendant in her individual capacity if she was the proper defendant and if he had stated a claim against her. A plaintiff is entitled to receive nominal damages for the violation of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual injury. Williams v. Brown, 347 F. App'x 429, 436 (11th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007). However, because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendant violated any of his constitutional rights, no such claim for nominal damages remains.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise claims against Defendant based on vicarious liability or respondeat superior, such claims are unavailable under § 1983. See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Additionally, "the law is well established that a prison official cannot be named as a Defendant in a civil rights case merely because he or she has supervisory authority over others." Garland v. Jones, No. 4:15cv280-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 3709619, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2016) (citing Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010)), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3708174 (N.D. Fla. July 11, 2016).
Because Plaintiff has not stated how Defendant was personally involved in the conduct related to his access-to-courts claim, to the extent his claims against Defendant are brought based upon the theory of respondeat superior, Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed.
Lastly, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, he is not entitled to any attorney's fees. As the Supreme Court has stated, "The Circuits are in agreement, however, on the proposition that a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees." Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991). Because Plaintiff is not a lawyer, even if he were entitled to some relief—which the Court has found he is not—his claim for attorney's fees would be due to be dismissed.
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to Plaintiff's case. Claims regarding access to courts under the Fourteenth Amendment involve the same standard as applied in such claims under the First Amendment—"a plaintiff must show actual injury by demonstrating that her efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded by an official's action." McCauley v. Georgia, 466 F. App'x 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998).
