OPINION ON OBJECTION OF ORLANDO A. MONTOYA TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN

Edward J. Coleman, III, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the objection (dckt. 36) filed by pro se creditor Orlando A. Montoya ("Montoya") to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plain (dckt. 4) filed by William B. Spinks (the "Debtor"). This is the Debtor's second Chapter 13 case. In the Debtor's first case, filed on April 2, 2015, Montoya claimed priority treatment for unpaid wages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), which requires such wages to have been earned within 180 days prior to the bankruptcy filing or to the debtor's cessation of operations. Before the Debtor completed payments under the plan, his 2015 case was dismissed on October 10, 2017. Ten days later, on October 20, 2017, the Debtor filed a second Chapter 13 case, in which Montoya was unable to claim priority treatment for the remaining unpaid wages because they were not earned within the 180-day "lookback" period. Montoya contends that this lookback period should be equitably tolled for the pendency of the Debtor's first bankruptcy case to allow his claim as a priority wage claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will overrule Montoya's objection.

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), and the Standing Order of Reference signed by then Chief Judge Anthony A. Alaimo on July 13, 1984. This is a "core proceeding" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts in this case are not in dispute. From March 18, 2014, to January 8, 2015, Montoya worked for the Debtor as a tour guide.1 When Montoya's employment ended, the Debtor owed him a total of $1,125.00 in unpaid wages for the months of October, November, and December of 2014.2 Montoya sued the Debtor in magistrate court, but his collection efforts were interrupted when, on April 2, 2015, the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition (2015 dckt. 1), commencing Case No. 15-40495-MJK (the "first case"). On May 7, 2015, Montoya filed a proof of claim in the amount of $1,125.00, consisting of $1,072.50 for which he claimed priority treatment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) and $52.50 in nonpriority wages.3 (2015 Claim 7-1).

The Court entered an order confirming the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan on January 8, 2016. (2015 Dckt. 62). On October 10, 2017, the first case was dismissed (2015 dckt. 90) because the Debtor defaulted4 under the terms of a consent order (2015 dckt. 87) entered on July 31, 2017.5 According to the Chapter 13 Standing Trustee's Final Report and Account (2015 dckt. 92), Montoya received a total of $199.36 in the Debtor's first case. Before Montoya could resume his state court remedies to collect the remaining $925.64, the Debtor filed a second Chapter 13 petition (dckt. 1) on October 20, 2017, commencing Case No. 17-41579-EJC (the "second case").6 That same day, the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan, pursuant to which all § 507 claims would be paid in full over the life of the plan. (Dckt. 4). The plan, however, does not treat Montoya's claim as a priority claim. As amended, the Debtor's plan proposes to pay general unsecured creditors with allowed claims a minimum total of $19,219.00, resulting in a dividend of approximately 75%. (Dckt. 45).

On December 1, 2017, Montoya filed a proof of claim in the second case in the amount of $925.64. (Claim 2-1). Attached to the proof of claim, which was filed on an outdated form, were a series of emails between Montoya and the Debtor, a document entitled "Disbursement History by Claim ID" listing the disbursements to Montoya in the first case, and a letter from Montoya to the Court. (Claim 2-1, pp. 3-11). Pursuant to a deficiency notice entered that same day, Montoya was directed to file an amended proof of claim on a current form. (Dckt. 25). On December 13, 2017, Montoya filed an amended proof of claim on Official Form 410. (Claim 2-2). Question 12 on this form asks whether all or part of the claim is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). Montoya, however, did not check the box for priority treatment because his unpaid wages were not earned within 180 days before the second case, and he did not want to make a false statement on the form under penalty of perjury.7

On February 9, 2018, Montoya filed the instant objection to confirmation (dckt. 36) on the basis that the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan "reduces [Montoya's] wage claim to a non-priority status for no reason other than the Debtor's failure to comply with this court's order in the 2015 bankruptcy and Debtor's subsequent filing of another bankruptcy in 2017." Id. at p. 2. Montoya requests that the Court equitably toll the 180-day lookback period of § 507(a)(4) to accord priority status to $873.14 of his wage claim. Id. At a continued confirmation hearing on March 27, 2018, the Court heard testimony and argument from Montoya. Laura Grifka, counsel for the Chapter 13 Trustee, stated that the Chapter 13 Trustee does not believe Montoya's claim is entitled to priority status. The Debtor's counsel represented that the Debtor would not object to Montoya's claim as a priority. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.

On May 2, 2018, a consent order on confirmation, which contained the following provision, was entered:

(Dckt. 48, p. 1). On May 31, 2018, the Court entered an order confirming the Debtor's plan. (Dckt. 51).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The sole issue before the Court is whether to equitably toll the 180-day lookback period of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4). Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code "sets forth 10 categories of claims that are entitled to be paid ahead of a debtor's general body of unsecured creditors." In re Norwalk Furniture Corp., 418 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009). "These categories of priority claims reflect the Congressional determination that, while equality of distribution is a major goal of the Bankruptcy Code, certain categories of claims deserve to be paid over other claims." Id. Here, Montoya claims priority status, in the form of his objection to confirmation, pursuant to the fourth category of priority claims as set forth in § 507(a)(4), which provides in pertinent part:

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(A). "Pursuant to section 507(a)(4), an employee generally `earns' wages at the time that the services are performed or the entitlement to the benefits vests, regardless of when the payment is made." In re Golden Gate Cmty. Health, 577 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing In re Idearc Inc., 442 B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010)).

If Montoya's unpaid wages are entitled to priority status, then his claim must be paid in full over the life of the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) ("[t]he plan . . . shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title . . ."). The problem for Montoya is that his unpaid wages were not earned within 180 days before October 20, 2017, the date the Debtor filed the petition in the second case.8 Thus, under the plain language of § 507(a)(4), Montoya's claim is not entitled to priority status.

As Montoya points out, however, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) prohibited him from pursuing any collection efforts against the Debtor between the filing of the Debtor's petition in the first case on April 2, 2015, and the dismissal of that case on October 10, 2017. Accordingly, Montoya requests that the Court equitably toll the 180-day lookback period for the pendency of the Debtor's first bankruptcy case. "The doctrine of equitable tolling applies to periods of limitation in appropriate circumstances. It permits a court to suspend the measuring period for a party to take action during the time the party was unable to act."9 Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Williams (In re Williams), 333 B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005). In other words, Montoya contends that the period from April 2, 2015, through October 10, 2017, should not count against the 180-day lookback period. If the Court equitably tolls this period, then a portion of Montoya's wages, which were earned within 180 days before the first case, would still be entitled to priority status in the second case.

This appears to be a matter of first impression, as Montoya does not cite, and the Court has not found, any cases in which a bankruptcy court addressed the issue of equitable tolling in the context of the 180-day lookback period of a § 507(a)(4) wage claim.10 Numerous courts, however, have addressed equitable tolling in connection with priority tax claims under § 507(a)(8), and these cases may assist the Court in resolving the present issue. Thus, the Court will briefly survey the history of equitable tolling of priority tax claims.

Section 507(a)(8) provides in pertinent part:

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). In other words, unpaid income taxes are entitled to priority status so long as the tax returns were due less than three years before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. Further, § 523(a)(1)(A) renders such priority tax debts nondischargeable, stating:

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A).

Prior to the seminal case of Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002), several bankruptcy courts equitably tolled the three-year lookback period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).11 See Bair v. United States (In re Bair), 240 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999); Blakely v. United States (In re Blakely), 219 B.R. 722 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998); Daniel v. United States (In re Daniel), 227 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998). Courts, however, disagreed as to which section of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes equitable tolling. Some courts relied on 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), which provides as follows:

11 U.S.C. § 108(c). This section "extends the statute of limitations for creditors in actions against the debtor, where the creditor is hampered from proceeding outside the bankruptcy court due to the [automatic stay] provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362." In re Taylor, 81 F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Brickley v. United States (In re Brickley), 70 B.R. 113, 115 (9th Cir. BAP 1986)). Courts finding authority to equitably toll pursuant to § 108(c) read this section in conjunction with a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6503, which states in relevant part:

26 U.S.C. § 6503 (emphasis in original). Courts following this approach acknowledged that the plain language of § 108(c) indicates that it applies only to nonbankruptcy law and thus is inapplicable to the lookback period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). Waugh v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Waugh), 109 F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, "[t]hese decisions rationalized that the combination of § 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and § 6503 of the Tax Code showed an intent on the part of Congress to not `allow a taxpayer to escape liability by protecting his assets in a bankruptcy proceeding until the statute of limitations expired.'" Putnam v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Putnam), 503 B.R. 656, 661 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2014) (quoting Teeslink v. United States (In re Teeslink), 165 B.R. 708, 712 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994)).12

Other courts, however, found authority for equitable tolling pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which provides as follows:

11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Concluding that a bankruptcy court "has the equitable powers under Section 105(a) to toll the three year time limitation of Section 507(a)(8) in appropriate cases," these courts would then "consider the facts and the relative positions of the parties in determining whether to exercise these equitable powers." In re Offshore Diving & Salvaging, Inc., 242 B.R. 897, 901 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1999).

In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit addressed in Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999), "whether the priority period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) may be tolled during a prior bankruptcy proceeding in the absence of explicit language in applicable statutes permitting such tolling." Id. at 778. In Morgan, the debtors filed a Chapter 13 case in August of 1990, and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") filed a proof of claim for unpaid income taxes for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989. Id. at 776. The debtors' plan proposed to pay this priority claim in full, but their case was dismissed in October of 1994 when they failed to make plan payments, and the IRS claim was not satisfied before dismissal. Id. at 776-77. In January of 1995, the debtors filed a second Chapter 13 case. Id. at 777. When the IRS again filed a proof of claim for the 1987, 1988, and 1989 income taxes, the debtors objected to the priority status of the claims on the basis that these taxes were due prior to the three-year lookback period. Id. The bankruptcy court tolled the lookback period for the pendency of the debtors' first case, and the district court affirmed. Id.

The Eleventh Circuit recognized that apart from the Fifth Circuit, every circuit to have addressed the issue had concluded that the three-year lookback period could be equitably tolled. Id. at 778. A majority of those circuits relied on 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) in conjunction with 26 U.S.C. § 6503(b). Id. at 778-79. The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed. "[T]he plain language of 108(c) ... states that it only applies to `nonbankruptcy law' and `nonbankruptcy proceedings'" and therefore § 108(c) cannot apply to § 507(a)(8)(A)(i). Id. at 779. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is broad enough to permit a bankruptcy court, exercising its equitable powers, to toll the three-year priority period, where appropriate, during the pendency of a debtor's prior bankruptcy proceeding." Id. Because "the applicability and use of § 105(a) is a decision that is typically left to the bankruptcy court," the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case. Id. at 780.

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of whether the three-year lookback period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)13 is tolled during the pendency of a previous bankruptcy case. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002). In Young, the debtors' 1992 income tax return was due on October 15, 1993. Id. at 44-45, 122 S.Ct. 1036. The debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition on May 1, 1996. Id. at 45, 122 S.Ct. 1036. On March 12, 1997, one day before the bankruptcy court dismissed their Chapter 13 case, the debtors filed a second case under Chapter 7. Id. On June 17, 1997, the debtors received a discharge in the second case. Id. When the IRS subsequently demanded payment of the 1992 tax debt, the debtors sought to have their Chapter 7 case reopened and their debt to the IRS declared discharged. Id. The debtors argued that their tax return was due more than three years before they filed their Chapter 7 petition, and thus the debt had been discharged. Id. The bankruptcy court reopened the case but equitably tolled the three-year lookback period, which decision was affirmed by the district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 45-46, 122 S.Ct. 1036.

The Supreme Court held that "[t]he three-year lookback period is a limitations period subject to traditional principles of equitable tolling" and that "[s]ince nothing in the Bankruptcy Code precludes equitable tolling of the lookback period ... the courts below properly excluded from the three-year limitation the period during which the [debtors'] Chapter 13 petition was pending." Id. at 47, 122 S.Ct. 1036. As the Supreme Court stated:

Young, 535 U.S. at 46-47, 122 S.Ct. 1036.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that the three-year lookback period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) "is a limitations period because it prescribes a period within which certain rights (namely, priority and nondischargeability in bankruptcy) may be enforced." Id. at 47, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Tax claims arising before the lookback period become dischargeable, and therefore the lookback period incentivizes the IRS to protect its rights by collecting the debt. Id. Thus, "the lookback period serves the same `basic policies [furthered by] all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery and a defendant's potential liabilities.'" Id. (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2000)).

According to the Supreme Court, "[i]t is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling," and that "Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background principle." Id. at 49, 122 S.Ct. 1036. This principle is particularly applicable in the bankruptcy context because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. Id. at 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Accordingly, the three-year lookback period of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) "is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition." Id. at 54, 122 S.Ct. 1036. And this is true regardless of whether the debtor filed the second bankruptcy case "in good faith or solely to run down the lookback period." Id. at 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036. The debtor's intentions are irrelevant in this analysis. Id.

By focusing on "traditional principles of equitable tolling," the Supreme Court in Young did not resolve the dispute among lower courts as to whether § 108(c)(1) contains a tolling provision. Id. at 47, 52, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Even if § 108(c)(1) did authorize tolling, Justice Scalia stated that the Court "would draw no negative inference from the presence of an express tolling provision in § 108(c)(1) and the absence of one in § 507." Id. at 52, 122 S.Ct. 1036. In other words, Congress simply "assum[ed] that bankruptcy courts will use their inherent equitable powers to toll the federal limitations periods within the Code." Id.

Following Young, as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") of 2005, Congress added an unnumbered paragraph after § 507(a)(8)(G), sometimes called the "Suspension Paragraph."14 In re Montgomery, 446 B.R. 475, 480 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011). This paragraph "both codified and expanded the rule of Young" Id. It provides as follows:

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(G) (Suspension Paragraph) (emphasis added). "In accord with the holding in Young, the paragraph expressly provides for tolling of the lookback period" and "adds 90 days to the suspension period."15 Montgomery, 446 B.R. at 480.

Returning to the question of whether the Court may equitably toll the 180-day lookback period applicable to Montoya's wage claim under § 507(a)(4), the principles set forth in Young offer some guidance. The Bankruptcy Code contains numerous deadlines and lookback periods, not all of which are subject to equitable tolling. See Hingiss v. MMCC Fin. Corp., 463 B.R. 877, 881-83 (E.D. Wis. 2011) ("Young does not hold that all lookback periods are statutes of limitation; it holds only that one particular lookback period is a statute of limitations-the three-year lookback period [of § 507(a)(8)(A)(i)]."). For example, several courts have held that the 910-day period set forth in the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a) is not subject to equitable tolling. Hingiss, 463 B.R. at 881; In re Maas, 416 B.R. 767, 770 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009); In re Murphy, 375 B.R. 919, 921 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (Walker, J.). In Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Williams, 498 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2007), the Fourth Circuit held that equitable tolling does not apply to § 727(a)(8), which provides that a debtor cannot receive a discharge if the debtor received a discharge under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 in a previous case commenced within eight years before the current case. Id. at 254-58. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that § 727(a)(2), which denies a discharge to a debtor who improperly transferred property within one year before filing the petition, is not subject to equitable tolling.16 DeNoce v. Neff (In re Neff), 824 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016).17

To determine whether a particular statutory period is subject to equitable tolling, courts look to Young, where the Supreme Court identified the attributes of limitations periods subject to equitable tolling. See Tidewater, 498 F.3d at 255; Hingiss, 463 B.R. at 882; Maas, 416 B.R. at 771. As set forth above, Justice Scalia stated in Young that a statutory period subject to equitable tolling "prescribes a period within which certain rights ... may be enforced," thereby serving the policies of repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty. Young, 535 U.S. at 47, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Similarly, as the Fourth Circuit explained in Tidewater:

Tidewater, 498 F.3d at 255-56 (quoting Young, 535 U.S. at 48-49, 122 S.Ct. 1036). Applying that reasoning here, whether the 180-day lookback period of § 507(a)(4) is subject to equitable tolling depends on whether it has the same attributes described in Young and Tidewater.

Unlike the three-year lookback period for taxes under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), the 180-day lookback period for wages under § 507(a)(4) does not encourage a creditor to take prompt action to enforce its rights. Section 507(a)(4), and its predecessor, § 507(a)(3),18 "was derived from § 64(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, which granted priority only for wages earned within 90 days before the commencement of the bankruptcy." Boatwright v. Rau (In re Rau), 113 B.R. 619, 621 (9th Cir. BAP 1990). The provision "was intended for the benefit only of those who are dependent upon their wages, and who, having lost their employment by the bankruptcy, would be in need of such protection." Id. (quoting Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1915)). "It `was intended to favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit of their employer, but must accept a job as it comes ....'" Id. (quoting In re Lawsam Elec. Co., Inc., 300 F. 736, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Learned Hand, J.)). Thus, the history of § 507(a)(4) shows that it was intended to protect employees after a bankruptcy has commenced. There is nothing for an employee to do to enforce his rights during the 180-day lookback period that is comparable to the IRS's ability to collect unpaid taxes or to perfect a tax lien over a three-year period. The short nature of the 180-day lookback period for wages in comparison to the three-year period for taxes further supports this conclusion. Accordingly, pursuant to the principles set forth in Young, the Court finds that the 180-day lookback period of § 507(a)(4) is not subject to equitable tolling.

However, even if the 180-day lookback period is subject to equitable tolling under Young, the Court declines to equitably toll such period for the pendency of the Debtor's first bankruptcy case. "Equitable tolling is a rare remedy and [is] usually applied on a case-by-case basis."19 In re Maas, 416 B.R. at 770. See also Ross v. Camus (In re Camus), 386 B.R. 396, 398 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008) ("Equitable tolling permits courts to extend a limitations period on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity, even when such period would otherwise have expired."). "Equitable tolling should be applied sparingly." In re Sasso, 550 B.R. 550, 555 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016). "Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way." Akers v. Mattei (In re Dugger), Nos. SC-11-1052, 05-00024-LA7, 2012 WL 2086562, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) (quoting Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2010)). "Generally, equitable tolling is difficult to attain, as it is reserved for `extraordinary or exceptional circumstances.'" Lund v. Benoit (In re Lund), 330 B.R. 96, 102 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2004) (quoting United States v. All Funds Distributed to Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Here, the Court finds that Montoya has failed to carry his burden. Although the Court has no reason to doubt that Montoya pursued his rights diligently by suing the Debtor in magistrate court, he fails to establish any extraordinary or exceptional circumstances. The relevant obstacle precluding Montoya's collection efforts was the automatic stay of § 362(a), which is "one of the fundamental debtor protections in the Bankruptcy Code ... giv[ing] the debtor a `breathing spell' from creditors and stop [ping] all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions." In re Lopez, 492 B.R. 595, 601 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013). The Court does not find the operation of the automatic stay to be an extraordinary circumstance.

Further, "[a] proper exercise of the Court's equitable powers requires `full development and examination of the facts and the relative positions of the parties.'" Bair, 240 B.R. at 252. Here, although a debtor's good faith or lack thereof is immaterial in § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) priority tax cases pursuant to Young, the Court notes that Montoya presented no evidence of any bad faith on the Debtor's part in filing back-to-back Chapter 13 petitions. In seeking to extend the stay in the second case, the Debtor's counsel represented that the Debtor defaulted in the first case due to a health issue and to the hurricanes in 2016 and 2017, which affected his tour guide business. (Dckt. 7, p. 2). As to Montoya, he already received payments totaling $199.36 in the Debtor's first case. (2015 Dckt. 92). Moreover, the instant case is unusual in that the Debtor's Chapter 13 plan (dckt. 4) proposes to pay general unsecured creditors a dividend of approximately 75%. Most Chapter 13 debtors pay little or nothing to their general unsecured creditors, and thus even without priority status, Montoya is in a better position than most creditors. Thus, Montoya has not satisfied his burden of showing that the Court should exercise its equitable powers to toll the 180-day lookback period.

Montoya raises a novel argument concerning the Court's ability to equitably toll the 180-day lookback period for wage priority. However, there is no precedent under § 507(a)(4) for the relief he requests, and in any event he fails to establish that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, the Court declines to equitably toll the 180-day lookback period. A separate order will be entered consistent with this Opinion.