LISA GODBEY WOOD, Chief Judge.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 6.
This case is predicated upon alleged unlawful discrimination against airline passengers.
On May 4, 2012, the family and Plaintiff Jerich07 Arnaud Projects, Inc. ("the company") entered into a contract and bought round-trip airline tickets from Defendant American Airlines, Inc. ("the airline"). Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. The family and company were travelling to deliver medicine to people in Haiti. Id. ¶ 25.
The parents booked a trip from Miami, Florida to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, while the daughter booked a trip from Jacksonville, Florida through Miami and then to Port-au-Prince. Id. ¶ 24. The daughter purchased a trip with this itinerary because the airline prohibited her from purchasing a "round tip" ticket in which she would leave from Miami to Haiti and return to Jacksonville. See id. ¶ 27.
The family alleges that they informed the airline prior to the flight that the daughter would not fly the Jacksonville-to-Miami leg of the trip, but would fly the remainder of the itinerary. See id. ¶ 28. When they arrived at the Miami airport, however, the airline's employees "refused to honor" the daughter's ticket and said that it had sold the seat to another person. Id. ¶ 30.
The family complained to the ticketing agent, who summoned his supervisor, a man named "Louis." Id. ¶ 31. Louis was Hispanic and spoke with a thick accent. Id. ¶ 32. Yet, he insulted the family and their guests by saying that they "needed to get an interpreter because they could not speak or understand English." Id. Louis's rudeness "mortified and humiliated" the family. Id. ¶ 33.
The airline forced the family to purchase another ticket for the daughter to get to Haiti. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. The ticket cost more than $1,000-that is, more than double the original price. Id. ¶ 34. Although the airline purportedly guaranteed the daughter a seat on the next flight to Port-au-Prince, Plaintiffs claim that the airline intentionally did not tell the family that they had only purchased a standby ticket and that all the flights to Port-au-Prince that day were sold out. Id. ¶¶ 36-39. Instead of being placed on the next flight, the daughter was stranded at the Miami airport for nearly two days. Id. ¶¶ 40-41.
While the daughter was waiting, Plaintiffs allege that the airline did not care about the daughter's welfare or the parents' concern about their "missing daughter" by "refus[ing]" to communicate with the parents about her location or condition. Id. ¶¶ 42-44. The lack of communication caused "unwarranted heartache, stress, and confusion." Id. ¶ 45. Because the parents did not know the whereabouts of
When the daughter was finally placed on a flight two days after purchasing the second ticket, the parents were not told about the flight. Id. ¶¶ 49, 51. Instead, the parents learned about their daughter's arrival "by happening to run into" the daughter at the Port-au-Prince airport. Id. ¶ 50. Because of the two day delay, the daughter "missed the most meaningful portion" of the mission trip, her luggage was destroyed, and the company failed to get medication to certain people. Id. ¶¶ 52, 56. The family never received a refund for the second ticket. Id. ¶ 53. Moreover, the mother allegedly "suffer[ed] physical complications from a heart attack" because of the airline's "outrageous conduct," and the daughter became ill from "needless stress." Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
On October 10, 2013, Plaintiffs Joseph Benjamin, Eunide Benjamin, Berneide Benjamin, and Jerich07 Arnaud Projects, Inc. filed suit against Defendant American Airlines, Inc. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint asserts six claims for relief: breach of contract (Count 1); public accommodation discrimination in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count 2); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Count 3); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Count 4); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 5); and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Count 6). Id. ¶¶ 59-136
On February 26, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 6. Defendant's motion is fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 6; 15; 17.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court must construe the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir.2009). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). At a minimum, a complaint should "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.2001)).
Defendant argues that the Montreal Convention preempts Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim. The Montreal Convention
Although the Warsaw Convention no longer applies to claims arising after November 2003, the caselaw developed under it is regarded as applicable in the interpretation of the Montreal Convention's equivalent language. Jacob v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 12-62384-CIV, 2014 WL 243150, at *7 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 13, 2014); Ugaz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1360 (S.D.Fla.2008); Serrano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 08-2256 AHM(FFMx), 2008 WL 2117239, at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 15, 2008); see also Christopher E. Cotter, Recent Case Law Addressing Three Contentious Issues in the Montreal Convention, 24 No. 4 Air & Space L. 9, 9 (2012) ("The drafters of the Montreal Convention tried wherever possible to embrace the language of the original Warsaw Convention and its various amendments so as not to disrupt existing jurisprudence."). This is despite the Montreal Convention's greater focus on consumer protection and equitable compensation. Tory A. Weigand, Recent Developments Under the Montreal Convention, 77 Def. Couns. J. 443, 443-44 (2010).
The Montreal Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward." Montreal Convention art. 1(1). "[I]nternational carriage" means, as it pertains to this case:
Montreal Convention art. 1(2). Because Plaintiffs bought round-trip tickets in the United States with an agreed stopping place in Haiti, Plaintiffs' flights involved international carriage as defined by the Montreal Convention. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 501 F.Supp.2d 902, 908 (E.D.Ky.2007) (determining that the Montreal Convention applies to a "round-trip ticket from the United States with an agreed upon stop in St. Lucia"). However, the Montreal Convention's effect on this case depends on whether Plaintiffs' causes of action fall within the Convention's scope.
To determine "whether a claim falls within the scope of the Convention, courts `are directed to look to its liability provisions.'" Oparaji v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., No. 04-CV-1554(FB), 2006 WL 2708034, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2006) (brackets omitted) (quoting King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.)). The Convention imposes three categories of strict liability on air carriers, only one of which is pertinent to Defendant's motion, see infra Part IV.A.2. Serrano, 2008 WL 2117239, at *3; Knowlton v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL 273794, at *2 (D.Md. Jan. 31, 2007). Where one of these categories is applicable, the treaty "preempts the remedies of a signatory's domestic law, whether or not the application of the Convention will result in recovery in a particular case." Best, 581 F.Supp.2d at 362.
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant focuses exclusively on Article 19 and its preemptive force. Dkt. No. 6, at 9-12. Article 19 provides that "[t]he carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo."
By its plain language, Article 19 governs only claims for delay, not non-performance of a contract.
Cotter, supra, at 12; see also Atia v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 692 F.Supp.2d 693, 699-701 (E.D.Ky.2010) (citing numerous cases adopting such an approach to deny summary judgment on a claim for breach of contract arising from the airline's refusal to transport the plaintiff to her destination); Fangbeng Fuondjing v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. DKC 10-1169, 2011 WL 1375606, at *4 (D.Md. Apr. 12, 2011) ("[I]t is the failure to provide alternative transportation that gives rise to nonperformance of the contract such that the exclusivity clause of the Convention is not triggered."); Weigand, supra, at 452 ("Recent cases continue to generally affirm that claims based on an airline's refusal to fly passengers is not `delay' under the Convention.").
Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of contract, which is purportedly brought under Georgia law and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 59-68. However, Plaintiffs have separately listed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Count 3, and any analysis of a breach-of-contract claim under that statute would be redundant of the Court's analysis of the civil rights claims, infra Part IV.B. Therefore, the Court interprets Count 1 as brought solely under state law.
Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract is premised upon the airline "refusing to honor" the contract for passage from Jacksonville to Miami to Port-au-Prince.
As Defendant admits, however, the daughter had to purchase a new ticket to depart to Haiti. Id. Rather than provide alternative transportation as part of the same contract, Defendant forced the daughter to enter into an entirely new contract for carriage. Therefore, taking the Complaint's allegations as true, Defendant failed to fulfil its obligation to transport the daughter to Haiti under the first contract for carriage. This situation does not fall under Article 19's provision for delay because the airline did not offer an alternative means to travel without additional consideration. As a result, Article 19 does not preempt Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract.
Having determined that Count 1 is not preempted, the Court assesses the sufficiency of the Complaint's allegations. "The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being broken."
The Complaint makes out a claim for breach of contract.
In Counts 2 through 4, Plaintiffs allege various species of violations of their civil rights. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69-114. In their response, they apparently admit that there is no authority allowing recovery for any of these civil rights claims under the Montreal Convention. See Dkt. No. 15, at 6 (stating that counsel "has not found any authority
For the same reason that Plaintiffs' contract claim is not preempted, their civil rights claims weather Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs assert a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Two actions are explicitly identified as constituting extreme and outrageous conduct. First is Defendant's "publicly attacking [the family] in the airport in front of the [family's] travel companions and the general public in the airport for not knowing English and needing an interpreter while Defendant's employee had a heavy accent." Id. ¶ 119. Second is Defendant's intentional or reckless failure "to do anything to communicate to [the parents] the predicament of [the daughter] or provide any assistance to [the daughter] in her time of need during her stranding in the airport." Id. ¶ 121. In addition, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, the undisclosed delay in travelling to Haiti and having to purchase a new ticket might also be considered in assessing the egregiousness of Defendant's actions. Thus, Plaintiffs' claim encompasses Defendant's actions or omissions at different points in time.
As with the other counts, part of the claim escapes the purview of the Montreal Convention. The allegations involving Louis's rude comments and the forced purchase of a new ticket are related to the nonperformance of the original contract rather than the delay in transporting the daughter under the second contract. In contrast, the other allegations have an intimate connection with the delayed transportation of the daughter and therefore fall under Article 19's purview. Therefore, to the extent the claim is based on those acts or omissions, it is preempted.
Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir.2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)). To determine whether the ADA's preemptive force applies, the key question is whether a state cause of action is "related to" the "price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). In short, there must be "a connection with or reference to the elements of air travel that are bargained for by passengers with air carriers." Branche, 342 F.3d at 1258. Indeed, this phrase can contemplate various characteristics and activities of airlines:
Id. at 1258-59. However, "state law personal injury actions generally have been held not to be pre-empted under the ADA." Id. at 1259; see also Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1343-45 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (analyzing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress apart from claims found to be preempted by the ADA). Such a determination depends on the facts of the specific claim. Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir.1998). "Suits stemming from outrageous conduct on the part of an airline toward a passenger will not be preempted under the ADA if the conduct too tenuously relates or is unnecessary to an airline's services." Id.
Taking all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, it is possible that Louis's rude behavior was maliciously motivated and unnecessary to the airline's services. Greater factual development would be necessary on this point and to determine whether the ADA's preemptive force properly applies here. Likewise, although the repurchase of a ticket appears to be closely related to the price, route, or service of an air carrier, the Court would allow further factual development. Nevertheless, taking the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for relief.
To succeed on this claim, Plaintiffs must establish four elements: "(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) The emotional distress must be severe." Hendrix v. Phillips, 207 Ga.App. 394, 395(1), 428 S.E.2d 91 (1993) (quoting Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga.App. 227, 230(1), 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985)).
Plaintiffs' primary deficiency is their failure to show the second element. In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiffs cite no legal authority to explain how the Complaint's allegations constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Dkt. No. 15, at 7. Instead, Plaintiffs apparently rely
Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 314 Ga.App. 321, 323, 723 S.E.2d 721 (2012) (quoting Wilcher v. Confederate Packaging, Inc., 287 Ga.App. 451, 454(2), 651 S.E.2d 790 (2007)); see also Northside Hosp., Inc. v. Ruotanen, 246 Ga.App. 433, 434-35, 541 S.E.2d 66 (2000) (stating that rude behavior to the family of a deceased person was not sufficiently egregious). A determination on this element is a question of law. Hill v. City of Fort Valley, 251 Ga.App. 615, 616(la), 554 S.E.2d 783 (2001).
The Complaint alleges, at best, mere insults and indignities. Criticism of another's proficiency in speaking English does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.
Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees is made under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and premised upon the alleged violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 134-36. The availability of attorney's fees is contingent upon a plaintiff being a "prevailing party," 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), who has not yet been determined in this action. In light of the Court not dismissing the claims upon which attorney's fees would be based, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 6 is
The Complaint states a claim for punitive damages, which Defendant seeks to dismiss. Dkt. No. 1, at 32-33. Punitive damages may be awarded as a matter of federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Georgia law under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. As to recovery under federal law, "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Similarly, under Georgia law, "[p]unitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b).
Plaintiffs apparently admit that they cannot "seek punitive damages under the Montreal Convention." Dkt. No. 15, at 7. However, because the Montreal Convention does not apply to the remaining claims, as pleaded in the Complaint and left after this Order, this concession is unwarranted. Greater factual development is necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs can make a claim for punitive damages. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss this claim is
Defendant seeks to dismiss Jerich07 from the case based on (A) it not having standing to recover under the Montreal Convention, (B) it not contracting with Defendant, or (C) it not being capable of having its civil rights violated. Dkt. No. 6, at 22-24. The first argument is moot because, as already discussed, the Montreal Convention is inapplicable to the remaining claims. The second argument fails because, taking the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, the company might have contracted with Defendant. See supra Part IV.A.3.
As to the third argument, there is authority for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, a racially neutral corporation or organization may assert a claim under § 1981. E.g., Ultimax Transp., Inc. v. British Airways, Inc., 231 F.Supp.2d 1329, 1338 (N.D.Ga.2002); Inash Corp. v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., Civ. A. No. CV688-103, 1990 WL 622095, at *3 n. 1 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 28, 1990); Rosales v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1489, 1496-97 (D.Colo.1988). The company's ability to bring a Title II claim is less clear. The Court is unaware of any authority either countenancing or wholly rejecting an organization's ability to have standing to make a claim under Title II. But see Maced. Church v. Lancaster Hotel Ltd. P'ship, 498 F.Supp.2d 494, 499-501 (D.Conn.2007) (dismissing a Title II claim brought by a church because the complaint
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
