JORGE L. ALONSO, District Judge.
The City sues defendants for their alleged violations of the Chicago Municipal Code and state law in connection with their marketing of opioids. Seven of the defendants, Purdue Pharma, Purdue Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., (collectively, "Purdue"), Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Endo Health Solutions, Inc. ("defendants"), have filed a "Joint Motion for Relief from Improper Delegation of Governmental Police Power to a Financially-Interested Private Party." For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
On April 8, 2013, the City retained the law firm of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, ("Cohen") "to represent [the City] in an investigation and litigation of potential claims regarding fraudulent marketing of opioid drugs ("Opioid Matter")." (Stein Decl. Supp. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 5, 4/8/13 Retainer Agreement, Preamble.) The agreement provides that Cohen "is responsible for providing all legal services required in investigating and litigating this matter" and "will be paid on a contingent fee basis, only upon a recovery in the Opioid Matter." (Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.) It also states that: (1) "The City will maintain control of the investigation and litigation and will make all key decisions, including whether and how to proceed with litigation, which claims to advance, which defendants to sue, what relief to seek, and whether and on what terms to settle the litigation."; (2) "The City must approve any settlements and must be apprised of any settlement offers made by defendants."; and (3) after the investigation is completed, "the City will determine whether to move forward to litigation." (Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 14.)
Pursuant to the retention agreement and the City's False Claims Ordinance, Cohen served investigative subpoenas on defendants. Defendants Purdue, Endo, Johnson & Johnson, and Janssen objected, arguing that the Ordinance barred the City from delegating to Cohen the power to issue investigative subpoenas.
Defendants ask the Court to invalidate the City's contract with Cohen and issue a permanent injunction barring the City from using Cohen in this suit "or any similar action against [defendants]." (See Defs.' Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 13.) Defendants contend that they are entitled to this relief because: (1) the City unlawfully delegated its investigative subpoena power under the False Claims Ordinance to Cohen; (2) Cohen's involvement in this case violates the City's Ethics Ordinance; and (3) Cohen's pecuniary interest in the outcome of the suit creates a conflict of interest that violates defendants' right to due process.
M.C.C. § 1-22-50(a)(1) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that the corporation counsel cannot delegate to outside counsel the subpoena power vested in him by the Ordinance.
Even if that is true, an issue the Court does not decide, it is immaterial here. After defendants objected to Cohen's issuance of the subpoenas, the City withdrew them and/or issued new subpoenas through Assistant Corporation Counsel Dolesh. (See Fitzgerald Decl. Supp. Defs.' Mot. ¶ 6; Stein Decl. Supp. Defs.' Mot. ¶¶ 3-4; Davis Decl. Supp. Defs.' Mot. ¶¶ 3-4.) Because the moving defendants were not required to comply with the Cohen-issued subpoenas, they could not have been harmed by them, even if they were erroneously issued.
Defendants argue, however, that the subpoenas issued by Dolesh were equally defective because the False Claims Ordinance vests nondelegable subpoena power in a single individual — the corporation counsel. In support of their argument, defendants cite Cudahy Packing Co. of Louisiana v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942), in which the Supreme Court held that section 4 of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") did not implicitly authorize the Administrator of the Department of Labor to delegate subpoena power to his regional assistants. Id. at 366. The Court reached this conclusion because the structure and content of FLSA, and "[t]he entire history of [federal] legislation controlling the use of subpoenas by administrative officers," suggested that when Congress authorized delegation it did so explicitly, not implicitly as the Administrator had argued. Id. at 364-69. Defendants, however, identify no part of the False Claims Ordinance itself or the Chicago Municipal Code ("Code") as whole that suggests delegation is forbidden. In fact, the Code suggests that delegation is the norm, as it states that "the corporation counsel shall . . ., [s]uperintend and, with his assistants and clerks, conduct all the law business of the city." M.C.C. § 2-60-020(a). Issuing subpoenas for false claims investigations, or any other purpose, is part of the "the law business of the city." Thus, Cudahy Packing does not further defendants' case.
Nor does Appeal Board of Department of Environmental Control of City of Chicago v. U.S. Steel Corp., 272 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1971). The Court in that case held that state law did not permit the City to vest its environmental appeal board with subpoena power. See id. at 48-49. Defendants do not contend that the City exceeded its state mandate by creating subpoena power to investigate false claims. Accordingly, Appeal Board is also inapposite.
Moreover, even if the subpoenas were improperly issued, defendants offer no authority for the notion that voiding the City's contract with Cohen would be the appropriate remedy for that harm rather than that set forth in the Code:
M.C.C. § 1-22-50(j)(2). Defendants' apparent failure to use this process to contest the subpoenas is not a basis for invalidating the City's contract with Cohen.
Defendants also argue that the contract should be invalidated because it violates the City's Ethics Ordinance, which provides:
M.C.C. § 2-156-030(a). The Ordinance defines "employee" as "an individual employed by the City of Chicago, whether part-time or full-time, but excludes elected officials and city contractors." M.C.C. § 2-156-010(j). It defines "city contractor" as "any person . . . who is paid from the city treasury or pursuant to city ordinance, for services to any city agency, regardless of the nature of the relationship of such individual to the city for purposes other than this chapter. A `city contractor' shall not include officials and employees." M.C.C. § 2-156-010(e). Based on these definitions, the City's Ethics Board concluded that Cohen was a city contractor, not an employee, and thus not subject to § 2-156-030 of the Ethics Ordinance:
(See Mem. Law Opp'n Mot., Ex. A, Letter from Dolesh to Defs.' Counsel, Ex. 1, Chicago Bd. Ethics, Adv. Opinion at 3-4, Jurisdiction of Ethics Ordinance, No. 14032.A (Aug, 20, 2014) (footnotes omitted).) The Court agrees with the Ethics Board's reasoning.
Further, the Court rejects defendants' assertion that Cohen is a City official for purposes of the Ethics Ordinance. The Ordinance defines "official" as "any person holding any elected office of the city or any appointed, non-employee member of any city agency." M.C.C. § 2-156-010(q). Cohen was neither elected nor appointed to the City's Law Department, and thus by the plain language of the Ordinance is not a City official.
Finally, defendants argue that Cohen's pecuniary interest in the outcome of this litigation disqualifies the firm from working on this case. A number of courts have held that government entities may hire outside counsel on a contingent-fee basis if there are certain safeguards in place. The Court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S.Ct. 920 (2011), for example, held that:
Id. at 40. Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that "the Attorney General [was] not precluded from engaging private counsel pursuant to a contingent fee agreement" if the Attorney General's Office: (1) "retain[ed] complete control over the course and conduct of the case"; (2)"retain[ed] a veto power over any decisions made by outside counsel"; and (3) "involved [a senior staff member] in all stages of the litigation." State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 477 (R.I. 2008); see generally David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of "Substitute" Attorneys General, 2010 Mich. St. L. Rev. 423.
These principles were applied in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp v. Conway, 947 F.Supp.2d 733 (E.D. Ky. 2013). In that case, the Kentucky Attorney General ("AG") filed suit against a drug manufacturer alleging that it had committed unfair trade practices in connection with the marketing of one of its drugs. Id. at 735. When the AG hired outside counsel pursuant to a contingent-fee contract, the drug company filed a second suit, seeking a declaration that outside counsel's pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trade practices suit deprived the company of due process. Id. at 736.
The court held that the contract, which contained the following provisions, adequately protected the drug company's rights:
Id. at 737, 741-44.
The City's contract with Cohen contains the safeguards identified in County of Santa Clara, Lead Indus., and Merck:
(See Stein Decl. Supp. Mot., Ex. 5, Retainer Agreement at 2.) Because the City retains control over the investigation and litigation of this case, its retention of Cohen does not violate defendants' due process rights.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies defendants' joint motion for relief from improper delegation of police power [148].