BRADFORD, Judge.
Effective July 1, 2013, the Indiana General Assembly (the "General Assembly") adopted a law allowing for the expungement of certain conviction records if the petitioning individual meets certain requirements. On February 27, 2014, Appellee J.S., who held a commercial driver's license ("CDL"), petitioned to have the records relating to his April 6, 2009 convictions for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OWI") and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement expunged. On July 7, 2014, the trial court issued an order granting J.S.'s petition. As part of this order, the trial court prohibited the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from disclosing J.S.'s 2009 OWI conviction to the Commercial Driver's License Information System ("CDLIS") as is required by existing federal and Indiana law.
Appellants the State of Indiana, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and Kent W. Abernathy, in his position as Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (collectively, the "BMV"), now appeal the trial court's order prohibiting the BMV from disclosing J.S.'s conviction to the CDLIS. In challenging the trial court's July 7, 2014 order, the BMV argues that the portion of the trial court's ruling relating to the BMV is erroneous as it is inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly. Specifically, the BMV argues that the ruling violates both existing federal and Indiana law and would lead to illogical and absurd results. Concluding that the BMV is not barred from challenging the trial court's order and that the trial court erred in prohibiting the BMV from disclosing J.S.'s conviction to the CDLIS, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the BMV to comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV to disclose J.S.'s conviction to the CDLIS.
On April 6, 2009, J.S. was convicted of Class A misdemeanor OWI and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. In 2013, J.S. was convicted of Class D felony OWI while having a prior OWI conviction. As a result of his 2013 conviction, J.S., who had held a CDL, received a lifetime prohibition from ever carrying a CDL.
Following the General Assembly's adoption of a law allowing for the expungement of certain conviction records, on February 27, 2014, J.S. petitioned to have the records relating to his April 6, 2009 convictions for Class A misdemeanor OWI and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement expunged. At the time J.S. filed his petition, he had two pending post-conviction petitions challenging his 2009 convictions. J.S.'s petition indicated the prosecutor agreed to waive the requirement that J.S. not commit or be convicted of any crime within the five preceding years and that expungement of the 2009 convictions would resolve his pending petitions for post-conviction relief.
On November 10, 2014, the BMV filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. In this motion, the BMV argued that if it were to comply with the trial court's July 7, 2014 order, it would be violating existing federal and Indiana law. The trial court conducted a hearing on the BMV's motion on January 16, 2015. On February 2, 2015, the trial court issued an order in which it denied the BMV's motion. This appeal follows.
On appeal, we are faced with the question of whether the trial court erred in finding that the BMV was prohibited from reporting J.S.'s 2009 OWI conviction to the national CDLIS database following the expungement of said conviction.
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the BMV was prohibited from reporting J.S.'s 2009 conviction to the CDLIS, we must interpret the relevant federal and Indiana statutes.
Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1032-33 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), aff'd on reh'g, 15 N.E.3d 72 (Ind.Ct.App.2014).
"Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law is the supreme law of the land, and state law which conflicts with federal law is without effect." Gibson v. Hand, 756 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied). "`State law actually conflicts with federal law where it is impossible for a citizen to comply with both state and federal requirements or if state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (quoting Ziobron, 667 N.E.2d at 206).
In order to promote safe travel, to lower the probability and severity of accidents involving commercial motor vehicles throughout the United States, and to ensure that persons responsible for driving commercial motor vehicles are qualified to operate said vehicles, the federal government passed the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 ("MCSIA"). See Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Orange, 889 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). To ensure that States would comply with the regulations of the MCSIA, the federal government conditioned the receipt of federal highway funding upon compliance with the MCSIA. See generally, id. at 391 (providing that in order to ensure federal support in highway funding, Indiana enacted Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2 which incorporated certain provisions of the MCSIA and required the BMV to adopt various rules to regulate individuals holding CDLs).
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations sets forth certain requirements relating to transportation with which States must comply. With regard to an individual who holds a CDL, 49 C.F.R. § 384.225(a) provides that the State must:
Further,
49 C.F.R. § 384.226 (emphasis added).
Each State's CDL program is subject to review by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA"). 49 C.F.R. § 384.307. If the FMCSA finds that a State has failed to comply with the above-quoted sections, the State faces the loss of its Federal-aid highway funds. Specifically,
49 C.F.R. § 384.401 (emphases added). In addition, the FMCSA could decertify the State's CDL program or prohibit the State from performing any of the following CDL transactions: (1) initial issuance of a CDL license, (2) renewal of a CDL license, (3) transfer of a CDL license, or (4) upgrade of a CDL license. 49 C.F.R. § 384.405. The Indiana General Assembly has specifically adopted 49 C.F.R. § 384 as Indiana law. Ind.Code § 9-24-6-2(d).
Effective July 1, 2013, the General Assembly adopted a law allowing for the expungement of certain criminal conviction records. See generally, Ind.Code ch. 35-38-9. With respect to an individual convicted of a misdemeanor, including a Class D felony that had been reduced to a misdemeanor, the version of this new law that was in effect when J.S. filed his expungement petition provided that:
Ind.Code § 35-38-9-2.
Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 further provided, in relevant part, that:
However, effective July 1, 2015, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6(a)(2) was amended to read, in relevant part, as follows:
(Emphasis Added).
The BMV contends that the trial court erred in finding that it was prohibited from reporting J.S.'s 2009 conviction for OWI to the CDLIS. Specifically, the BMV argues that the trial court's interpretation and application of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6, as it applies to the BMV, is contrary to the General Assembly's intent. For his part, J.S. argues that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 was clear and unambiguous and the trial court's interpretation and application of said statute was not contrary to the intent of the General Assembly.
The BMV first argues that the trial court's ruling should be found contrary to the General Assembly's intent because the trial court's interpretation of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 is in conflict with both federal and Indiana law. J.S. argues, to the contrary, that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 can be reconciled with the applicable federal regulations because said regulations do not explicitly
In Gibson, we were confronted with the question of whether the trial court erred in granting the petitioner, who was employed as a truck driver, a restricted CDL during a period in which his operator's license was suspended because of a chemical test failure. 756 N.E.2d at 545. The State argued that the trial court's order was in conflict with 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311 which provided, in relevant part, that
Id. at 547 (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311).
In reviewing the trial court's ruling together with 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311, we concluded as follows:
Id.
The situation before us on appeal is similar to that presented in Gibson. 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 explicitly provides that the State must not mask, defer imposition of judgment, or allow an individual to enter into a diversion program that would prevent a CDL holder's conviction for any violation, in any type of motor vehicle, from appearing on the individual's CDLIS driver record. We believe that prohibiting the BMV from reporting the expunged conviction would violate 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 as it would force the BMV to prevent the conviction from appearing on J.S.'s CDLIS driver record. Considering both the plain language of the statutes in question and our prior opinion in Gibson, we conclude that the trial court's ruling that the BMV was prohibited by Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 from reporting J.S.'s 2009 OWI conviction directly conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226. See generally, id. at 546 (providing that a state law actually conflicts with a federal law when it is impossible for a citizen or entity to comply with both the state and federal requirements).
Because we conclude that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 conflicts with federal law, we further conclude that pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 controls over Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6. See id. Furthermore, it is also of note that because Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, it also conflicts with Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2(d), which expressly adopted 49 C.F.R. § 384 as Indiana law.
The BMV also claims that the trial court's ruling, which again prohibits the BMV from complying with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, will lead to illogical and absurd results as it places Indiana at risk of losing federal highway funding and could lead to the decertification of Indiana's CDL program. J.S. claims that the State's arguments regarding the potential loss of federal funding or decertification of Indiana's CDL program are "demagoguery" as the State failed to point to any instance where any other state has lost federal funding or has had its CDL program decertified for failing to report an expunged conviction. Appellee's Br. p. 10.
Again, Indiana's CDL program is subject to review by the FMCSA. 49 C.F.R. § 384.307. If the FMCSA finds that Indiana has failed to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226, the FMCSA shall order that a portion of Indiana's Federal-aid highway funds be withheld. Specifically,
In addition, if Indiana fails to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226, the FMCSA has the power to decertify Indiana's CDL program or prohibit Indiana from performing any of the following CDL transactions: (1) initial issuance of a CDL license, (2) renewal of a CDL license, (3) transfer of a CDL license, or (4) upgrade of a CDL license. 49 C.F.R. § 384.405. The BMV asserts that there are currently 171,811 individuals holding active CDLs in Indiana, including those holding CDL learner's permits. (Appellant's Br. 15) The BMV further asserts that decertification of Indiana's CDL program could have staggering effects, both within Indiana and nationwide, because decertification of Indiana's CDL program would prevent each of these individuals from obtaining or holding a CDL and companies in almost every sector of Indiana's economy rely on CDL drivers in some form or fashion. (Appellant's Br. 15) Again, despite J.S.'s claim that the BMV's argument in this regard is demagoguery because the State has not presented evidence that the FMCSA has ever decertified a state's CDL program, we observe that federal law clearly provides the FMCSA with the power to do so if Indiana were to fail to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226.
Given the substantial statutorily proscribed potential negative economic implications, it would be illogical and absurd to find that the General Assembly intended to create a law that would put Indiana at risk of losing over $32 million in federal aid or having its CDL program de-certified.
Effective July 1, 2015, presumably in response to the instant case and cases like it, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 to explicitly provide that records sealed by expungement may be disclosed to "the bureau of motor vehicles, the [FMCSA], and the [CDLIS], if disclosure is required to comply with IC 9-24-6-2(d) relating to reporting a conviction for a violation of a traffic control law." Ind.Code § 35-38-9-6(a)(2). While the Indiana Supreme Court has held that inaction by the legislature can operate as implicit acceptance of the judicial interpretation of a law, see Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 957 (Ind.2015), it seems reasonable that the opposite is also true, i.e., that action by the legislature to amend a law can help clarify the legislature's original intent in adopting the law. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the General Assembly's act of amending Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 indicates that the General Assembly intended for
In sum, we cannot foresee a situation where the General Assembly would intend to (1) create a law that is in direct conflict with existing state and federal law, (2) put Indiana at risk of losing substantial sums of federal aid, or (3) risk the decertification of Indiana's CDL program. Likewise, we believe that the recent amendment to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-2, which expressly allows the BMV to comply with the reporting requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 384.225 and Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2(d), indicates that the General Assembly has always intended for the BMV to comply with said laws.
We conclude that the trial court's order prohibiting the BMV from doing so is contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. In addition, even if we were to conclude otherwise, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, any application of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 which would require noncompliance with the relevant federal authority would be without effect. See Gibson, 756 N.E.2d at 546. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court as it applies to the BMV and remand the matter to the trial court with the instruction to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the BMV to comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV to disclose J.S.'s 2009 OWI conviction to the CDLIS.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instruction.
KIRSCH, J., and ALTICE, J., concur.
