WENTWORTH, J.
This matter involves Nick Popovich's Second Motion to Compel requesting that the Court order the Indiana Department of Revenue to produce certain original documents for use at a deposition.
On December 1, 2011, Popovich issued a subpoena to the Department's designated Trial Rule 30(B)(6) witness pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 45. The subpoena directed the witness to appear and bring several original documents to the deposition.
The Court held the attorneys' conference seven days later and the parties agreed that the witness would be deposed on January 6, 2012. (See Pet'r Sec. Mot. Compel at 2, Ex. B.) On December 14, 2011, Popovich sent a Notice of Deposition to the Department's witness confirming the date, time, and location of the deposition.
Less than 24 hours before the deposition, the Department advised Popovich in an email that it would not permit the removal of the original documents from its offices because that request exceeded the requirements of Trial Rule 34. (See Pet'r Sec. Mot. Compel, Ex. D.) The Department's email further stated that Popovich could inspect the original documents at its offices and that its witness would bring true and accurate copies of the documents for use at the deposition. (See Pet'r Sec. Mot. Compel, Ex. D.)
That same afternoon, Popovich responded to the Department by email that he believed his request was consistent with Indiana's Trial Rules, but as an accommodation, he would limit his request to twenty-seven (27) pages of original documentation and accept copies of the other requested documents.
The next day, the Department's witness appeared at the deposition with copies of the requested documents, but no originals. (See Pet'r Sec. Mot. Compel at 3; Pet'r Reply Supp. Sec. Mot. Compel (hereinafter "Pet'r Reply"), Ex. C at 18-21.) As a result, Popovich adjourned the deposition. (See Pet'r Reply, Ex. C at 21.) About two weeks later, on January 23, 2012, Popovich filed this Motion. The Court held a hearing on March 1, 2012. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
In Indiana, "[d]iscovery is designed to be self-executing with little, if any, supervision of the court." Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 772 N.E.2d 500, 512 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. When the goals of this system break down, Indiana's trial rules provide the parties with tools for moving the process forward. For instance, Indiana Trial Rule 37 states that "[a] party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery[.]" Ind. Trial Rule 37(A). Before any party files a motion seeking to enforce, modify, or limit discovery, however, Indiana Trial Rule 26(F) requires the party to:
Ind. Trial Rule 26(F). This Rule further provides that "[t]he court may deny a discovery motion filed by a party who has failed to comply with [these] requirements[.]" T.R. 26(F).
Popovich maintains that by not producing the original documents he requested during the deposition, the Department has failed to cooperate in discovery in contravention of Trial Rule 37(A)(2).
Indiana Trial Rule 26(F) requires a party seeking to compel discovery to attempt to resolve the discovery dispute before seeking Court intervention and to document its attempts in the motion. See T.R. 26(F); see also generally Walker v. McCrea, 725 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). The failure to comply with either of these requirements may result in a dismissal of the party's motion. See T.R. 26(F).
Popovich's Motion and his oral argument focus on the Department's purported "bad acts" before and after the deposition. (See Pet'r Sec. Mot. Compel; Pet'r Reply; Hr'g Tr. at 84-93.) This litany of bad acts, however, did not document Popovich's informal attempts to resolve the discovery dispute as required by Trial Rule 26(F).
Nonetheless, Popovich's Motion did report that he sent an email modifying the number of originals requested as an accommodation. This alone, however, is an insufficient showing under Trial Rule 26(F) because the Rule indicates that the moving party must attempt to reach an agreement with the opposing attorneys, not just send a "message in a bottle" communication. Although Popovich's Motion reported that an email was sent, the Motion did not state whether this communication hit its mark to indicate a back and forth exchange had occurred. Nor did the Motion report that the parties had any discussion to resolve the impasse after Popovich adjourned the deposition, even though the Department produced an original document that was material to one of Popovich's claims immediately thereafter. Instead, Popovich's Motion merely reported that he filed his Second Motion to Compel about two weeks later. Accordingly, Popovich failed to provide the required showing in his Motion to meet the requirements of Trial Rule 26(F).
SO ORDERED.