WIGGINS, Justice.
An applicant filed a postconviction-relief action claiming he was actually innocent although he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to the charged crimes. He based his actual-innocence claim on a recantation by the victim. The district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment, ruling the applicant cannot use the recantation to attack his knowing and voluntary guilty pleas because the recantation was extrinsic to the pleas. The applicant appealed, and we transferred the case to our court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed. The applicant sought further review, which we granted.
On further review, we overrule our cases holding that defendants may only attack the intrinsic nature — the voluntary and intelligent character — of their pleas. We now hold the Iowa Constitution allows freestanding claims of actual innocence, so applicants may bring such claims to attack their pleas even though they entered their pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Accordingly, we adopt a freestanding claim of actual innocence that applicants may bring under our postconviction-relief statute.
On December 19, 2006, the State filed a trial information charging Jacob Lee Schmidt with sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1) (2005). On March 23, 2007, the State moved to amend the trial information to charge Schmidt with two additional counts of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of section 709.4(2)(b) (counts II and III) and one count of incest in violation of section 726.2 (count IV). The district court granted the motion.
The minutes of testimony attached to the original trial information and the police
Peter realized he had forgotten his cigarettes and went back home to retrieve them. Once inside, he saw neither Schmidt nor B.C. in the living room, where they had been up until his departure. Peter thought this was strange, so he looked around the home and eventually opened the bedroom door and saw Schmidt attempting to penetrate B.C. anally. Peter yelled, "What the hell are you doing!" and told Schmidt to "get the hell out of the house." Schmidt left the house, and Peter called the police.
Officers Todd Ferry and Kevin Heineman responded. Officer Ferry took Peter out to the squad car to interview him while Officer Heineman spoke to B.C. inside the home. Because Peter could not write or spell well, Officer Ferry used the in-car camera to record Peter's interview.
Meanwhile, B.C. recounted what had happened to Officer Heineman. B.C. stated he was "not afraid," and Schmidt had only threatened him on a previous occasion when Schmidt actually penetrated him approximately two or three months ago. Schmidt had told B.C. not to tell anyone unless B.C. wanted to get hurt. B.C. defined "penetrate" as "when he actually went inside his anal area." B.C. stated he was "positive" Schmidt did not penetrate him this time and "no part of his body hurt." All B.C. wanted was for the police to arrest Schmidt. Officer Heineman asked B.C. to fill out a witness statement and realized B.C. had difficulty with spelling and writing. Officer Heineman did not have B.C. continue writing the witness statement after B.C. had written three or four words.
Peter's home landline phone rang, and Officer Heineman answered it. Shanna, Schmidt and B.C.'s mother, was on the other end of the phone. She stated Schmidt had come to her home and she was going to take him to Mercy Hospital because he was having suicidal thoughts. At the hospital, Shanna advised Officer Ferry that Schmidt said Peter was lying about the whole incident.
Officer Christopher Groves followed up on the case. He asked to interview Schmidt who declined on the advice of his lawyer. Officer Groves described B.C. as "lower functioning" and stated he did not interview him because it was "very evident" he could "lead him [to] answers." Officer Groves thus scheduled B.C. for an interview with the Child Advocacy Center, which conducted a videotaped interview on March 2.
During the March 2 interview, B.C. told the interviewer "[Schmidt] tried to molest him." B.C. stated Schmidt had penetrated him on at least one occasion, and "it hurt and he tried to escape." He was thirteen at the time. B.C. stated he had sucked Schmidt's penis before but could not say how many times this occurred.
On April 2, 2007, Schmidt entered into a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (amended count I) and incest (count IV). The State agreed to dismiss the two other
That same day, during the combined plea and sentencing hearing, the court reviewed the consequences of pleading guilty with Schmidt. Schmidt informed the court he understood the rights he was giving up and wished to plead guilty to the charges. Schmidt acknowledged the minutes of testimony accurately described what he did. The court reviewed the factual basis for each count, and Schmidt confirmed he understood. The court accepted Schmidt's pleas and convicted him of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and incest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court entered sentences of incarceration to run consecutively for a total term not to exceed seven years. Schmidt did not appeal this decision.
On June 23, 2014, Schmidt filed an application for postconviction relief under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d) (2014). In support of his application, he contended B.C. recanted his story by "com[ing] forward with the truth." Schmidt further claimed, "I was not guilty. I was scared so I pled guilty [be]cause I was fac[ing] over [fifty] years." Schmidt alleged the victim's recantation was new evidence supporting postconviction relief. In its answer, the State denied "each and every ground for postconviction relief."
On May 14, 2015, the State filed a motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment, making two arguments. First, the State argued the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.3 procedurally barred Schmidt's postconviction-relief application.
Second, on the merits, the State asserted Schmidt's "application [was] in direct contradiction to the record as well as in direct contradiction to his voluntary and knowing plea[s] of guilty." It claimed Schmidt pled guilty after an extensive colloquy, knowing his involvement or noninvolvement in the alleged sexual act and the evidence against him.
On May 28, Schmidt filed a resistance, arguing B.C.'s recantation was "new evidence [that] prevented earlier filing [of his postconviction-relief application] and [that] establishes actual innocence." Schmidt included B.C.'s affidavit. In his affidavit, B.C. stated under oath,
On July 30, the district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment. It did not rule on the statute of limitations. Rather, relying on an unpublished court of appeals decision, it stated that "newly discovered exculpatory evidence does not provide grounds to withdraw a guilty plea unless intrinsic to the plea itself." In other words, the court decided Schmidt waived his claim of actual innocence by pleading guilty. Schmidt appealed.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. Affirming the district court's grant of summary dismissal/summary judgment, the court of appeals reasoned the alleged recantation was not intrinsic to Schmidt's guilty pleas. It therefore concluded, "[B]ecause Schmidt's convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot challenge those convictions in a [postconviction-relief] action on the basis of newly discovered evidence in the form of his alleged victim's recantation."
"[T]he principles underlying [a] summary judgment procedure apply to motions of either party for disposition of an application for postconviction relief without a trial on the merits." Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Iowa 2002). In other words, for a summary disposition to be proper, the State must be able to prevail as if it were filing a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011) ("The standards for summary judgment in postconviction[-]relief actions are analogous to summary judgment in civil proceedings.").
We review summary dismissals of postconviction-relief applications for errors at law. Id. at 792. Applying summary judgment principles, summary disposition is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show ... there is no genuine issue of material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa App. 1994) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c), now r. 1.981(3)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no material fact exists. C & J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Iowa 2011). We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Eggiman v. Self-Insured Servs. Co., 718 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Iowa 2006). We also draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. C & J Vantage, 795 N.W.2d at 73.
Under our current law,
State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)). It is on this basis the district court dismissed and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Schmidt's postconviction-relief action. The time has come to reevaluate this law in regards to an actual-innocence claim. We now turn to the first issue and begin our analysis by examining our postconviction-relief statute.
Iowa Code section 822.2 provides, "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense and who claims any of the following may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief." Iowa Code § 822.2(1).
We have previously discussed the meaning of the term "conviction" under section 822.2 in Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 597-99 (Iowa 2011). There we said,
Id. at 597 (citations omitted). We then stated our postconviction statute uses the word conviction in its "`strict legal sense' and not in its broader popular context." Id. at 598-99. Thus, the technical legal sense of the word conviction requires adjudication of guilt and the entry of a judgment. Id. at 599.
In another case, we stated the acceptance by the court of a defendant's plea "constitutes a conviction of the highest order" and authorizes the court to sentence the defendant as though the factfinder returned a guilty verdict. State v. Kobrock, 213 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 1973). That is what happened here: Schmidt entered his pleas, the court accepted his pleas, and sentenced him accordingly. In doing so, the court adjudicated him guilty and entered judgment. Adjudication and entry of judgment constitute conviction, and conviction is a requirement for filing a postconviction-relief action under section 822.2. See Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 599. Thus, Schmidt's pleas do not preclude him from filing a postconviction-relief action.
The second issue is whether Schmidt faces any other barriers to filing his postconviction-relief action after pleading guilty. Specifically, the issue is whether Schmidt may attack his pleas by bringing an actual-innocence claim even though such a challenge is extrinsic to his pleas. First, we discuss the current state of our caselaw regarding challenges to pleas. Second, we examine the implication of State v. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1990), on the possibility of challenging a plea in a postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence. Third, we discuss the phenomenon of pleading guilty despite actual innocence. Lastly, we examine our legislature's codification of section 81.10, which allows postconviction-DNA testing.
A valid plea "waive[s] all defenses and the right to contest all adverse pretrial rulings." State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001). However, the defendant may attack his or her plea when the plea itself contains intrinsic irregularities or the trial information charges no offense. See State v. Mattly, 513 N.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Iowa 1994); Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d at 885.
We fashioned the general rule precluding extrinsic challenges to pleas on the premise that "[a] defendant plead[s] guilty in open court, with assistance of counsel, knowingly and understandingly." State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Iowa 1968). Thus, the defendant waives his or her rights "with respect to conduct of criminal prosecution and any objection to prior proceedings which may include a violation of his [or her] rights." Id. This waiver could preclude certain postconviction-relief actions under section 822.2(1)(a), which provides relief for a "conviction or sentence [that] was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state." Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a).
It does not preclude relief under section 822.2(1)(d), which provides relief when "[t]here exists evidence of material facts,
In Alexander, the defendant pled guilty to going armed with a dangerous weapon. 463 N.W.2d at 421. After his plea and sentencing, the defendant filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of witness testimony supporting a theory of justification or self-defense. Id. at 422. We examined then rule 23(2)(a) of our rules of criminal procedure. That rule stated,
Id. (quoting Iowa R. Crim. P. 23(2)(a), now r. 2.24(2)(a) (emphasis added)).
We reasoned "[l]ogic would suggest that the concept of new trial should have as its predicate the existence of a former trial." Id. Based on the legislative history, we then concluded inclusion of the phrase "plea of guilty" in rule 23(2)(a) was inadvertent and erroneous, and therefore held rule 23(2)(a) as written did not allow for a new trial following a guilty plea. Id. at 422-23. We buttressed this conclusion by stating,
Id. at 423.
We reasoned "[n]otions of newly discovered evidence simply have no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt." Id. However, we noted the defendant was not without a remedy. Id. We stated the remedy the defendant sought was available under Iowa Code section 663A.2(4) (1989), now codified at section 822.2(1)(d) (2014), when challenging his plea based on newly discovered evidence. Id. Thus, in Alexander, we left the door open for challenging a plea in a postconviction-relief action based on newly discovered evidence.
We now examine the phenomenon of actually innocent people pleading guilty. The National Registry of Exonerations reported that seventy-four exonerations in 2016 arose from pleas. The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in 2016 2 (2017), www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf.
We have stated "criminal cases in general, and guilty pleas in particular, are characterized by considerable uncertainty[.]" State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009).
Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)).
Pleading guilty despite actual innocence is not limited to uncertainty. One of our recent cases recognizes that actually innocent people plead guilty for many different reasons. See Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 436-38 (Iowa 2016).
People have been known to confess to crimes they did not commit during police interrogations
Moreover, innocent defendants plead guilty for reduced charges and shorter sentences. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow]; see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) [hereinafter Scott & Stuntz] ("Defendants accept bargains because of the threat of much harsher penalties after trial; they are thus forced to give up the protections that the trial system's many formalities provide."). The reality of plea bargaining is that "[defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes." Barkow, 58 Stan. L. Rev. at 1034.
Simply put, in economic terms, defendants engage in a cost — benefit analysis. Entering into a plea agreement is not only rational but also more attractive than dealing with the uncertainty of the trial process and the possibility of harsher sentences. Indeed, "even with competent counsel, going to trial can be incredibly risky business." Uphoff, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. at 799. We stated in Rhoades that "[w]hen the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually innocent." 880 N.W.2d at 436-37 (alteration in
A plea does not weed out the innocent. Rather, a plea is an explicit agreement
Innocent defendants may also plead guilty in the face of pressure from prosecutors and even their own defense counsels. Today, "our criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining, negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight." Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014). Behind these closed doors, prosecutors have broad discretion: "the prosecutor-dictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate pressures to enter into plea bargains, appears to have led a significant number of defendants to plead guilty to crimes they never actually committed." Id.; see also Innocence Project, Why Are People Pleading Guilty to Crimes They Didn't Commit? (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-are-people-pleading-guilty-to-crimes-they-didnt-commit/[https://perma.cc/3CEX-WEW2].
H. Lee Sarokin, a former federal judge, described the plea bargaining process as involving "intimidation by the prosecution and incompetence by the defense." H. Lee Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty?, HuffPost (May 29, 2012, 4:39 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/innocent-people-guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html [https://perma.cc/6PSQ-6QW4]. He illustrated,
Id. We again emphasize the prosecutor's promise of a shorter sentence is more attractive than going to trial and possibly losing. Defendants, even those who are actually innocent and especially those who are indigent, have more to lose by going to trial than by pleading guilty.
Finally, we review the current legislative policy regarding guilty pleas and actual innocence. In 2005, in passing Iowa Code section 81.10, the legislature recognized a person who pleads guilty could be actually innocent. See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 10 (codified at Iowa Code § 81.10). Section 81.10 allows a convicted defendant to make a motion that, if granted, would require DNA testing "on evidence collected in the case for which the person stands convicted." Iowa Code § 81.10 (2014). The motion must state the following:
Id. § 81.10(2)(b), (h), and (l) (emphases added).
After the convicted defendant files the motion and the county attorney files an answer to the motion, the court may order a hearing on the motion. Id. § 81.10(3), (6). The court must grant the motion if all of the requirements of section 81.10(7) apply. One of the requirements recognizes the applicability of DNA exoneration to pleas. Id. § 81.10(7)(d). Section 81.10(7)(d) provides, "The evidence subject to DNA analysis is material to, and not merely cumulative or impeaching of, evidence included in the trial record or admitted to at a guilty plea proceeding." Id. (emphasis added). This legislation reaffirms the fact that even actually innocent persons do in fact plead guilty and should have a chance for exoneration.
In light of these recent developments, we hold convicted defendants can attack their pleas when claiming actual innocence even if the attack is extrinsic to the pleas. We know people plead guilty for all sorts of reasons. Many of these reasons are unrelated to whether the defendant actually committed the crime. Additionally, the legislature has set the policy that the state should not incarcerate actually innocent people if DNA evidence exonerates them, regardless of their pleas. We see no reason why we should treat people exonerated by DNA evidence differently from people exonerated by other reliable means. For example, when the court determines the police planted evidence, such as drugs, why should that defendant remain in prison simply because he or she pled guilty to a reduced charge in light of the overwhelming evidence of his or her guilt?
What kind of system of justice do we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison? See Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 484 (S.D. 2014) ("Punishment of the innocent may be the worst of all injustices." (quoting Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D. 1999))); see also In re Kaufmann, 245 N.Y. 423,157 N.E. 730, 733 (1927) (noting that in circumstances in which a convicted individual establishes his innocence, "the
Accordingly, we overrule our cases that do not allow defendants to attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim actual innocence. Therefore, we hold Schmidt's pleas do not preclude his actual-innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to the charges.
1. Freestanding claim versus gateway claim. In the federal system, a habeas petitioner may overcome a procedural bar to habeas review by bringing a gateway claim of actual innocence such that the petitioner may obtain review of the underlying constitutional merits of his or her procedurally defaulted claim. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); see also In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955, 130 S.Ct. 1, 3, 174 L.Ed.2d 614 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Federal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceedings." Herrera, 506 U.S. at 416, 113 S.Ct. at 869. The United States Supreme Court has declined to stretch the reach of federal habeas review to freestanding claims of actual innocence when there is a state avenue to provide for pardons. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 142 N.M. 89, 163 P.3d 476, 482 (2007); People v. Cole, 1 Misc.3d 531, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 484 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
To overcome a procedural bar to federal habeas review, a petitioner must generally show "cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2076, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). "Cause" turns on the question of "whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has vaguely defined "prejudice" but "prejudice" at least entails an "actual prejudice" standard that requires a showing that "is `greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.'" Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134-35, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1575, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736-37, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)).
Absent the showing of cause and prejudice,
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) (citations omitted).
The procedural default doctrine arises from the principles of comity and finality, and the conservation of judicial resources. House, 547 U.S. at 536, 126 S.Ct. at 2076. However, in certain circumstances, such principles "must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495, 106 S.Ct. at 2649); see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (holding the miscarriage-of-justice exception allows successive claims given the petitioner shows "under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual innocence"); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649 (holding "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim could be reached). For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice, or actual-innocence, exception.
In Schlup v. Delo, in considering a petitioner's actual-innocence claim accompanied by an assertion of constitutional violations at trial, the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a gateway claim and articulated the gateway standard. 513 U.S. 298, 315-17, 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851, 861-62, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). The Court defined the petitioner's gateway claim of actual innocence as "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. at 861 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862). In other words, the petitioner's claim of actual innocence does not alone provide a basis for a court to vacate his conviction. See id. Rather, his claim of actual innocence depends on the validity of his underlying constitutional claims. See id.
Schlup held a petitioner asserting a gateway claim must demonstrate that in light of all the evidence, including the new evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (adopting "the Carrier `probably resulted' standard"); accord Kenfield v. State, 384 Mont. 322, 377 P.3d 1207, 1211-12 (2016); Berry v. State, 131 Nev. ___, 363 P.3d 1148, 1155 (2015); In re Personal Restraint of Weber, 175 Wn.2d 247, 284 P.3d 734, 740 (2012) (en banc). This more-likely-than-not standard "ensures that petitioner's case is truly `extraordinary,'... while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)). The petitioner does not need to establish with absolute certainty that he or she is innocent. House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. at 2077. In declining to adopt a clear and convincing standard, the Court stated that actual-innocence claims "pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources and to principles of finality and comity than do claims that focus solely on the erroneous imposition of the death penalty." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. at 865.
Based on the foregoing, we carefully distinguish between the two forms of an actual-innocence claim: a gateway claim of actual innocence with an underlying constitutional challenge and a freestanding claim of actual innocence that is itself the substantive basis for relief.
The federal circuit courts of appeals remain unsettled on the question of whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists. John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts' Approaches to a Constitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(1)(G-1)?, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 1453, 1464-65 nn.83-95 (2013) (citing cases). If a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists, it would have to overcome an "extraordinarily high threshold." Id. at 1464 & n.85 (collecting cases); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that he is entitled to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.").
At the state level, a number of jurisdictions acknowledge freestanding claims of actual innocence. Engesser, 856 N.W.2d at 481 n.3 (collecting cases and statutes that allow freestanding claims of actual innocence). States that do recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence apply varying standards. Compare People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475, 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (1996) (holding the defendant must present new evidence that is "`of such conclusive character' as would `probably change the result on retrial'" (quoting People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830, 834 (1987))), with State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (holding the petitioner must "make a clear and convincing showing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in the correctness of the judgment").
In Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly addressed whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on new evidence implicated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d at 1335-37. In regards to procedural due process, the court reasoned "to ignore such a claim would be fundamentally unfair." Id., 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d at 1336.
In terms of substantive due process, the court stated "[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger operation of substantive due process." Id. It stated, "The [United States] Supreme Court rejected substantive due process as means to recognize freestanding innocence claims because of the idea that a person convicted in a constitutionally fair trial must be viewed as guilty." Id. In declining to adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, the court stated, "The stronger the claim — the more likely it is that a convicted person is actually innocent — the weaker is the legal construct dictating that the person be viewed as guilty." Id. Because "no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence[,]" the court held the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution gives credence to freestanding claims of actual innocence and affords convicted defendants additional process.
In Montoya, the New Mexico Supreme Court held the New Mexico Constitution, specifically the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, provides protection to actually innocent people. 163 P.3d at 484. The court reasoned it would be "fundamentally unfair" to convict, incarcerate, or execute an innocent person. Id. The court further reasoned "the incarceration of an innocent person [fails to] advance[ ] any [acceptable] goal of punishment, and ... the punishment is indeed grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id.
We now turn to the Iowa Constitution. First, we note the Iowa Constitution vests authority to grant pardons with the Governor. Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 118 (Iowa 2013). Thus, the incarceration of an actually innocent person in Iowa does not violate the Federal Constitution. See Montoya, 163 P.3d at 482; Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 484. We therefore address the possibility of a freestanding claim of actual innocence pursuant to Iowa constitutional jurisprudence.
The Iowa Constitution affords individuals greater rights than does the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 395 (Iowa 2014) (noting "we expanded the reach of the Supreme Court's reasoning in a trilogy of juvenile justice cases decided under the Iowa Constitution"). Moreover, we have discretion to construe the Iowa Constitution in such a way as to "provid[e] greater protection for our citizens' constitutional rights." Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 755 (Iowa 2016). Because we "jealously" safeguard our authority to interpret the Iowa Constitution on our own terms, we do not employ a lockstep approach in following federal precedent although United States Supreme Court cases are "persuasive." See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010).
Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 (due process clause). We have enforced "the due process clause of article I, section 9 ... in a wide variety of settings." Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 871 (Iowa 2017). In fact, "[t]he Iowa constitutional provision regarding due process of law is ... not a mere hortatory command, but it has been implemented, day in and day out, for many, many years." Id. We see no reason why article I, section 9 would not be enforceable for purposes of vindicating defendants who prove they are factually innocent and believe their incarceration triggers the due process clause.
An innocent person has a constitutional liberty interest in remaining free from undeserved punishment. Holding a person who has committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process. See Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (holding "the conviction or incarceration of a guiltless person violates elemental fairness, deprives that person of freedom of movement and freedom from punishment[,] and thus runs afoul of the due process clause of the [New York] State Constitution").
Even if defendants allege substantive due process violations, they must meet the demanding actual-innocence standard to prove the validity of their actual-innocence claims — a standard we articulate in the next section. Thus, there are limits on actual-innocence claims.
Moreover, actually innocent people should have an opportunity to prove
Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Iowa Const. art. I, § 17 (cruel and unusual punishment). This prohibition "embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime." Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009)); accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1190, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions."). Applying this bedrock principle, we believe "punishing an actually innocent person is disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the cruel and inhuman treatment clause." Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 485; accord Herrera, 506 U.S. at 431, 113 S.Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting punishment "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" is unconstitutional and excessive (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
Furthermore, we agree with Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent person is `at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency.'" 506 U.S. at 431, 113 S.Ct. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016)). We believe Justice Blackmun's reasoning also applies to the conviction and incarceration of an innocent person because "the basic concept underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment `is nothing less than the dignity' of humankind." Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)).
We reject the notion that the rationale used in cases involving trials cannot be applied to those involving pleas.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals permits freestanding claims of actual innocence even if the applicant pled guilty. Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 393. In Tuley, the applicant pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 390. Years later, the applicant pursued postconviction relief when the complainant recanted her allegation. Id. The court sought to answer the question of whether the applicant's plea precluded his freestanding actual-innocence claim. Id. It reasoned the policy behind allowing freestanding actual-innocence claims was to protect innocent individuals from punishment. Id. at 390-91.
The court further reasoned that "[c]onvicting courts should ... give great respect to knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas of guilty." Id. at 391. However, "we should not foreclose relief because a defendant [pled] guilty when the policy behind granting relief on a bare innocence claim is the same." Id. Moreover, "[t]here is nothing equitable about permitting an innocent person to remain in prison when he produces new evidence that unquestionably shows that he did not commit the offense for which he is incarcerated." Id. at 392. Thus, the court held an applicant must "show[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence." Id. We agree with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the same rudimentary policy reason — safeguarding against violations of due process — form a substratum for claims of actual innocence, regardless of whether defendants pled guilty or went to trial.
Therefore, we now find the Iowa Constitution permits freestanding claims of actual innocence. Furthermore, freestanding claims of actual innocence permitted by the Iowa Constitution are available to applicants even though they pled guilty.
3. The standard to apply to freestanding actual-innocence claims. States that have adopted freestanding actual-innocence claims require a higher burden than that of a gateway claim for an applicant to succeed. We again note the United States Supreme Court adopted a more-likely-than-not standard in proving gateway claims of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 at 867.
In Jamison v. State, a case involving newly discovered evidence that would allegedly support an applicant's self-defense theory, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a stringent standard.
There the court held,
Id. (emphasis added).
We believe the standard the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted is not only amorphous but also impractical. What does it mean for the "interests of justice" to outweigh the guilty plea waiver? The
Similarly, the California Supreme Court requires applicants to meet a high burden such that the evidence "undermine[s] the entire prosecution case and point[s] unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability." In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (1993); accord In re Bell, 42 Cal.4th 630, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 781, 170 P.3d 153, 157 (2007).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals originally adopted a very burdensome standard, requiring applicants claiming actual innocence to demonstrate "based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Ct. of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc), overruled by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
However, in lowering the burden of proof, the court in Ex parte Elizondo stated the Holmes standard was too high because it would be "theoretically impossible" to attain relief. Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205. The court reasoned "exculpatory evidence can never outweigh inculpatory evidence under [the] standard" set in State ex rel. Holmes. Id. Thus, the court adopted a clear and convincing standard requiring "the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence." Id. at 209.
A number of states apply the Elizondo clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., Roper, 102 S.W.3d at 548; Montoya, 163 P.3d at 486; Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 486; Miller v. State, 340 P.3d 795, 796 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam); see also Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 242 Conn. 745, 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (1997) (adopting a clear and convincing standard and also requiring the petitioner to show that "no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty").
Other jurisdictions have codified freestanding claims of actual innocence. The Maryland statute uses a standard of "substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different." Md. Code. Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-301(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1-4 2018 Reg. Sess.). The statute gives the court discretion to "set aside the verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence." Id. § 8-301(f)(1). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, held a defendant who has pled guilty could not petition for a writ of actual innocence. Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45, 108 A.3d 448, 460 (2015), aff'd 446 Md. 183, 130 A.3d 486, 492 (2016).
In discussing freestanding claims of actual innocence, the District of Columbia statute explicitly assigns different remedies upon meeting the respective standards. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4135 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 20, 2018). If the court determines "it is more likely than not that the movant is actually innocent of the crime," the remedy is to grant a new trial. Id. § 22-4135(g)(2). If the court determines "by clear and convincing evidence that the movant is actually innocent of the crime," the remedy is to vacate the conviction. Id. § 22-4135(g)(3). Thus, the District of Columbia statute requires a more stringent standard to vacate a conviction but fashions this stronger remedy upon the movant meeting his or her burden of proof. Moreover, "[i]f the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, and other charges were dismissed as part of a plea agreement, the court shall reinstate any charges of which the defendant has not demonstrated that the defendant is actually
After reviewing the differing standards our sister states have adopted, we find that after pleading guilty, applicants claiming actual innocence must meet the clear and convincing standard. We reach this conclusion for a number of reasons. In House, the United States Supreme Court mentioned the required proof to establish actual innocence as a freestanding claim is greater than that required to establish a gateway claim of actual innocence. 547 U.S. at 555, 126 S.Ct. at 2087; accord In re Weber, 284 P.3d at 741 ("[A]ny standard by which a free-standing actual innocence claim must be proved will be higher than that applied in the gateway context.").
In light of House, a clear and convincing standard is the appropriate burden of showing a freestanding claim of actual innocence. This standard is heavier than the more-likely-than-not standard governing gateway claims of actual innocence. It makes sense to have a lower standard for gateway claims because such claims have underlying claims that allege constitutional defects in the trial or plea colloquy. However, an applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair, constitutionally compliant trial or plea colloquy free of constitutional defects.
Additionally, a clear and convincing standard balances the interest of an innocent defendant and that of the state. Although the interests of both parties are important, we believe "it is far worse to convict an innocent person than to acquit a guilty one" such that "the scale tips in favor of the [defendant's] interest." Miller, 700 A.2d at 1133. Thus, we simultaneously vindicate this principle and recognize the interest of the state in finality of criminal litigation by adopting a clear and convincing standard.
Finally, the higher burden answers the problems posed by the Colorado Supreme Court regarding claims of newly discovered evidence after a defendant has pled guilty. In People v. Schneider, the court stated,
25 P.3d 755, 761-62 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis added). However, by adopting a higher burden of proof — a clear and convincing standard — we account for the differences.
We now adopt the clear and convincing standard to prove a freestanding actual-innocence claim. For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.
Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a), (d).
The Iowa Constitution gives a floor to bring freestanding claims of actual innocence under our postconviction-relief statute, specifically sections 822.2(1)(a) and (d). Cf. Washington, 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d at 1337 (holding the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution provides a footing to assert freestanding actual-innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act). A conviction of an innocent person violates the Iowa Constitution, specifically the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, section 822.2(1)(a) is one vehicle to bring an actual-innocence claim. Additionally, conviction of an innocent person infringes upon the "interest of justice" precisely because it violates the Iowa Constitution. Therefore, section 822.2(1)(d) is another vehicle to assert an actual-innocence claim.
In sum, we hold subsections 822.2(1)(a) and (d) provide avenues for freestanding actual-innocence claims.
We first address the statute of limitations issue and then the question of how to proceed under our new standard.
Iowa Code § 822.3.
Thus, to avoid the three-year statute of limitations contained in section 822.3, an applicant must show he or she could not have raised the ground of fact within the applicable time period. Additionally, "a postconviction-relief applicant relying on the ground-of-fact exception must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction." Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003). This is the nexus requirement. Id. at 520. We made it clear a ground of fact is "relevant" if it is the type of fact "that has the potential to qualify as material evidence
We explicitly and "specifically reject[ed] any requirement that an applicant must show the ground of fact would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense." Id. The ultimate determination as to whether the applicant is entitled to relief "must await an adjudication, whether in a summary proceeding or after trial, on the applicant's substantive claim for relief." Id. In other words, we do not reach the merits of a claim based on a new ground of fact in deciding whether the exception to the three-year statute of limitations applies.
Here, B.C.'s recantation was not available to Schmidt within the three-year period following the date of his conviction and Schmidt could not have discovered the recantation earlier than he did in the exercise of due diligence. Additionally, the recantation has the potential to qualify as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of Schmidt's case. See id. at 521 (holding the undisclosed police reports and the recantations "are the type of facts having the potential to qualify as material evidence that probably would have changed the outcome of [the defendant's] trial").
We ultimately decided Harrington based on the withheld police reports in order to resolve the due process issue of whether the prosecution suppressed material evidence that was favorable to the defendant. Id. at 521-25. As for the statute-of-limitations analysis, we held both the recantation evidence and the police reports were sufficient; and thus, the defendant was not time barred from bringing his action. Id. at 521.
Based on the foregoing, section 822.3 does not time bar Schmidt's freestanding claim of actual innocence.
Iowa Code § 822.6.
At the time the court ruled on the State's motion, it decided the case as a matter of law relying on our jurisprudence that defendants who knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty cannot attack their pleas with challenges extrinsic to the pleas. Today, we have reversed this line of cases and created a new standard for freestanding actual-innocence claims.
Generally, when we create a new standard, we remand the case to the district court to apply the standard. See McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Iowa 2015) (adopting a new standard for the evaluation of a pregnancy claim and remanding the case to the district court to apply that standard); cf. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 707 (Iowa 2016) (remanding the case to the district court to apply the appropriate standard when it initially applied the wrong standard).
Here, we have created a new standard. Thus, the proper result is to remand
We are not commenting on the merits of Schmidt's claim. Contrary to the other opinions filed in this case, both parties are entitled to their day in court to litigate their positions under the new standard we have adopted today. We will address any unanswered questions when a party presents the court with actual cases raising those issues. That is how the law progresses in this state. We do not issue advisory opinions. See Linn v. Montgomery, 903 N.W.2d 337, 344 (Iowa 2017).
It is for the district court to determine whether the recantation, in light of any other evidence that meets the requirements of rule 1.981, creates a genuine issue of material fact. We are not in a position to decide the merits of this case by assuming that certain evidence, which may or may not comply with the requirements of rule 1.981, shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in order to affirm the summary disposition in favor of the State. Prohibiting the parties here from the benefit of the procedural processes provided to litigants is no better than incarcerating an innocent person.
Only after the parties develop a record in a summary proceeding can the court decide if a genuine issue of material fact exists. If it does, then a trial may be necessary to resolve Schmidt's claim.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion for summary dismissal/summary judgment. We remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cady, C.J., Hecht and Appel, JJ., join this opinion. Cady, C.J., files a special concurrence. Waterman, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join. Mansfield, J., files a separate dissenting opinion in which Waterman and Zager, JJ., join.
CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
The process of justice must always be fair. This case stands tall as the embodiment of this fundamental principle of law. It is a substantial step forward in our constitutional march to become better. Innocent people should always have a forum to prove their innocence. I fully concur in the opinion of the court.
Yet, the actual process of justice available to Schmidt to now pursue the new claim given to him must also be fair. This fairness is the reason the case must be remanded to the district court for it to decide if summary adjudication should be granted. I write separately only to explain this important part of the case more fully and why the actual-innocence claim cannot now be decided on appeal.
Going forward, when an actual-innocence claim based on the recantation of a witness is brought in our courts, summary judgment will remain a viable procedural vehicle for the state to ask the court to resolve the claim. Consistent with all summary judgment proceedings, the legal issue
In this case, the assumed undisputed facts, at this time, may support summary judgment. In his plea colloquy, Schmidt acknowledged the minutes of testimony were true and accurate. Significantly, the minutes included a witness who was an eyewitness to the assault. With only the recantation evidence offered by Schmidt at this point to prove his innocence, a reasonable fact finder could still conclude Schmidt committed the crime.
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to Schmidt for us to apply the new standard to the existing record to decide the actual-innocence claim now on appeal. At the time the State brought its motion for summary judgment in this case, it argued Schmidt's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2014) and the recantation evidence identified in his petition for postconviction relief was discoverable within the limitation period. Thus, at the time Schmidt resisted the summary judgment motion, the legal issue before the court was whether the recantation was discoverable within the three-year period. The district court granted the summary judgment after concluding the exculpatory evidence was extrinsic to the plea and could not be grounds for relief.
Although Schmidt claimed his actual innocence in the summary judgment proceedings, the legal issue he was responding to was whether the recantation evidence was discoverable within the three-year statute of limitations. He was not responding to a substantive claim by the State that his recantation evidence would still be insufficient as a matter to law to support a claim of actual innocence. In fact, recantation as a claim of innocence has still not been teed up by the State, and Schmidt has not been alerted to the requirement to submit all evidence of innocence in direct response to such claim. Thus, the record does not show Schmidt has had a full and fair opportunity to present all new evidence to resist summary judgment.
Likewise, the State has not had a full and fair opportunity to specifically identify its evidence to support summary adjudication under the actual-innocence standard. See Iowa Code § 822.6. Even though the state asked the district court in the summary judgment proceedings to take judicial notice of the complete record in the case, the state must still identify those portions of the record it relies on to support summary judgment. See id.
The case needs to be remanded to the district court so the State can amend its motion for summary judgment to claim Schmidt has failed to bring a claim of actual innocence that survives summary adjudication. The district court needs to consider the motion after Schmidt has filed an amended response. This procedure is required to ensure the process of justice is fair.
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court's summary judgment and the court of appeals decision affirming it under our long-standing precedent enforcing
I would also affirm summary judgment based on the statute of limitations because Schmidt knew what really happened in the bedroom and knew when he pled guilty whether his victim, B.C., and the eyewitness, Peter, were lying. Schmidt knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge their allegations when he pled guilty in a detailed colloquy with the court while represented by effective defense counsel. Iowa law has always provided innocent people a forum to prove their innocence — through a trial. Schmidt is an admittedly guilty man who chose to give up his right to trial.
The majority undermines the finality of guilty pleas and eviscerates the three-year statute of limitations for postconviction-relief (PCR) actions. Today's decision will have bad consequences, as counsel for the State warned, including fewer plea bargains, renewed turmoil for victims and their families years after the crime, and a flood of PCR applications. The majority, by remanding this case instead of itself applying its new standard on the existing record, needlessly leaves district courts in the dark on whether evidentiary hearings or new trials will be required whenever a victim or other witness recants years after a defendant, ably represented by competent counsel, formally confessed to the crime in open court through a guilty plea devoid of legal error. Soon, we will see PCR applications by defendants who pled guilty to domestic assault and now bully the survivors into recanting.
Courts appropriately regard recantations with the utmost suspicion — especially those involving intrafamily sexual abuse. In my view, summary judgment can and should be affirmed on the existing record after remand under the majority's newly adopted test for actual innocence. This is
The majority is unable to find fault with the manner in which Schmidt pled guilty. Schmidt raises no claim that his counsel was ineffective and alleges no defect or constitutional infirmity in connection with his guilty plea. The majority, nevertheless, allows Schmidt, and presumably any other convicted offender, to belatedly challenge a guilty plea based solely on someone's subsequent recantation. The majority thereby upends Iowa law on the finality of guilty pleas and does so without acknowledging the many built-in protections our legal system employs to ensure the validity of plea-based convictions and without quoting Schmidt's in-court colloquy showing those safeguards were followed to the letter in his case.
Until today, it had been "well settled that a plea of guilty `waives all defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself.'" State v. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421, 422 (Iowa 1990) (quoting State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001)). I would honor stare decisis and affirm Schmidt's conviction under the foregoing precedent.
Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted) (addressing when ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes an irregularity intrinsic to the plea by rendering it involuntary or unknowing). Schmidt does not dispute the district court's finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and he has never alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
"A plea colloquy that covers the specific ground subsequently raised in a postconviction relief application would normally support summary judgment on those grounds." Id. at 795. The district court properly considered Schmidt's admissions in his plea colloquy and the legal effect of his guilty plea in granting the State's motion for summary disposition of the PCR action. See id. Schmidt was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the veracity of B.C.'s recantation without first establishing that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. It is undisputed that Schmidt pled guilty and admitted to the crimes in the plea colloquy. The legal effect of his guilty plea is a question of law the district court correctly decided by summary judgment
Nothing B.C. says now or said in 2006 may be regarded as an irregularity intrinsic to Schmidt's guilty plea. "Any subsequently-discovered deficiency in the State's case that affects a defendant's assessment of the evidence against him, but not the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea, is not intrinsic to the plea itself." State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998). "Notions of newly discovered evidence simply have no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt." Alexander, 463 N.W.2d at 423. New exculpatory evidence does not alter "a defendant's understanding of what a plea means." Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 596 (distinguishing the "defendant's tactical rationale for pleading guilty"). Thus, "[a] guilty plea is normally understood as a lid on the box, whatever is in it, not a platform from which to explore further possibilities." Kyle v. State, 322 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Iowa 1982) (quoting United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. 1975)). I would keep the proverbial lid on the box. When a tenable claim of actual innocence comes along, we will know it. This is not such a case.
The majority upends our long-standing precedent on guilty pleas. I find it astounding that neither the majority nor the special concurrence ever mentions stare decisis, the doctrine that provides stability, predictability, and legitimacy to our law. Just months ago, our court unanimously reiterated, "From the very beginnings of this court, we have guarded the venerable doctrine of stare decisis and required the highest possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking such a step." State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Iowa 2017) (quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005)); see also Bd. of Water Works Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 61 (Iowa 2017) ("Legal authority must be respected... because it is important that courts, and lawyers and their clients, may know what the law is and order their affairs accordingly." (quoting State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Iowa 2003))). We may overrule a decision found to be "clearly erroneous" when "compelling reasons exist" to do so. State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Iowa 2017) (overruling State v. Wing, 791 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 2010)). In Wing, a divided court had overturned long-standing Iowa precedent and adopted a new interpretation of the speedy indictment rule that proved unworkable in practice; by overruling Wing, our court restored the prior long-standing Iowa rule that worked well. See id. at 867-68 (Mansfield, J., specially concurring). The Williams majority devoted a section of the opinion to stare decisis. See id. at 859-60 (majority opinion). The dissent lectured about the importance of the doctrine and pointedly "call[ed] for the restoration of the principle of stare decisis in Iowa jurisprudence." Id. at 870 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Yet today the same members of this court say nothing about stare decisis and overrule countless decisions without showing that our guilty plea precedent was clearly erroneous or unworkable.
Iowa law requires a detailed guilty plea colloquy to satisfy the court that the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the crime. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b); see also Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 732-34 (Iowa 2017) (vacating guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel because plea colloquy failed to address the postdeportation immigration consequences of the conviction). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8 requires the court to determine "the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). Before accepting a plea, the court must address the defendant in
Id. The court also must inquire "whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or the defendant's attorney" and disclose the plea agreement on the record. Id. r. 2.8(2)(c). Schmidt alleges no violation of rule 2.8 in this PCR action.
Here, the district court fully complied with rule 2.8 in accepting Schmidt's guilty plea. The district court described the legal rights Schmidt would have if he withdrew the plea and went to trial, and Schmidt informed the court he understood his rights and wished to plead guilty to the charges. The court reviewed the factual basis for each count. The prosecutor recited the elements of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and the maximum and minimum penalties for that offense. After confirming Schmidt understood, the court inquired whether the minutes of testimony were accurate concerning this offense:
Next, the prosecutor recited the elements of incest and the maximum and minimum penalties. After confirming Schmidt understood, the court engaged in another colloquy:
Schmidt told the court he was satisfied with the services of his counsel. The court accepted Schmidt's guilty plea, finding the plea was "made voluntarily and intelligently" and Schmidt "underst[ood] the legal rights that he [was] giving up by pleading guilty to each of these two charges." Schmidt does not challenge those findings, which the district court and court of appeals correctly determined required the summary dismissal of his PCR action.
A plea must "be a genuine one, by a defendant who is guilty; one who understands his situation, his rights, and the consequences of the plea, and is neither deceived nor coerced." State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1991) (quoting State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Iowa 1969)). A guilty plea is effectively a confession of committing the crime made under judicial oversight with representation by defense counsel. See Woods v. State, 52 Kan.App.2d 958, 379 P.3d 1134, 1141 (2016). That is what we have here. As the United States Supreme Court has held, "A plea of guilty is more than a voluntary confession made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced.... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 n.4, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 n.4, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (alteration in original) (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965));
Schmidt relies on People v. Whirl, which allowed postconviction claims to proceed to challenge a conviction resulting from a guilty plea following a confession coerced by police torture. 395 Ill.Dec. 647, 39 N.E.3d 114, 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). That case is inapposite because Schmidt claims no torture, coercion, or other constitutional violation in connection with his guilty plea.
People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 760 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 372 Pa.Super. 202, 539 A.2d 399, 401 (1988) ("After a defendant has entered a plea of guilty the only cognizable issues in a [postconviction] proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty and the legality of the sentence."). The State should be able to rely on the finality of guilty pleas such as Schmidt's entered in compliance with Iowa law. As Justice Alito observed, "Roughly 95% of felony cases in the federal and state courts are resolved by guilty pleas. Therefore it is critically important that defendants, prosecutors, and judges understand the consequences of these pleas." Class, 583 U.S. at ___, 138 S.Ct. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
The majority's holding undermines the value of guilty pleas. "One of the benefits to the state from a plea bargain is finality." Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 447-49 (Iowa 2016) (holding guilty plea barred recovery for wrongful imprisonment). Other "factors favoring pleas include risk avoidance, conservation of prosecution and court resources, efficiency, and timeliness of disposition." Id. at 449. The State (and victims) can no longer rely on the finality of guilty pleas. If Schmidt had gone to trial in 2007, the State presumably would have proven its case then, and trial testimony would have been preserved for any retrial. Not so when trial preparation is short-circuited by a guilty plea and no trial takes place. See id. (noting the lack of a trial record when the defendant pleads guilty).
The majority fails to confront the proof problems that arise when a defendant is allowed to renege on a guilty plea years later and there is no prior trial record because of his guilty plea. Other courts avoid such problems by enforcing the guilty plea. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1355 (8th Cir. 1997) (Loken, J.,
The district court correctly granted the State's motion for summary judgment. Relying on the court of appeals recent decision in Walters v. State, the district court found that "newly-discovered exculpatory evidence does not provide grounds to withdraw a guilty plea `unless it is intrinsic to the plea itself.'" No. 12-2022, 2014 WL 69589, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014) (quoting Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 596). The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissing Schmidt's PCR action. The court of appeals found "the analysis and reasoning in Walters to be spot-on" and held that "because Schmidt's convictions were entered following his guilty pleas, he cannot challenge those convictions in a PCR action on the basis of newly discovered evidence in the form of his victim's alleged recantation." I agree.
Nothing in today's majority opinion should preclude the State from introducing Schmidt's guilty plea colloquy into evidence at the postremand hearing. In my view, Schmidt's admissions of guilt in 2007 entitle the State to summary dismissal of his PCR claims. See Castro, 795 N.W.2d at 795.
We have never vacated a guilty plea based on the victim's recantation. The majority fails to mention that "[w]e have repeatedly held that a witness' recantation testimony ... is looked upon with the utmost suspicion." Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 275 (Iowa 1991). Our skepticism of recantations is widely shared. Haouari v. United States, 510 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 2007) ("It is axiomatic that witness recantations `must be looked upon with the utmost suspicion.'" (quoting Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003))); see also Yonga, 108 A.3d at 475 (noting "post-trial recantation[s] of witnesses are looked on with the utmost suspicion" (quoting Carr v. State, 39 Md.App. 478, 387 A.2d 302, 305-06 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 606 (Md. 1979))); Addai v. State, 893 N.W.2d 480, 483 (N.D. 2017) ("This Court reviews recanting testimony with suspicion and disfavor.").
Haouari, 510 F.3d at 353 (alterations in original) (quoting Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233-34, 105 S.Ct. 34, 36, 82 L.Ed.2d 925 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
Our distrust is heightened when the recanting victim is a child sexually abused by a family member. See, e.g., State v. Kostman,
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
This view too is widely shared. See United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Recantation is particularly common when family members are involved and the child has feelings of guilt or the family members seek to influence the child to change her story."); Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he child's recanting of her statement to family members is not atypical in sex abuse cases."); Schneider, 25 P.3d at 763 ("Skepticism about recantations is especially applicable in cases of child sexual abuse where recantation is a recurring phenomenon."); State v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 554 A.2d 221, 225 (1988) (allowing hearsay exception for child victims of sex crimes because of "the high probability of a child victim recanting a statement about being abused sexually"); see also Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1155 (Boehm, J. concurring) (viewing recantation of victim's mother as "inherently somewhat suspect, coming as it does after the fact and from [a] relative[ ] of the defendant").
Recantations are especially common with victims of domestic violence. See State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 180, 187-88 (Iowa 2016) (citing authorities concluding many victims of domestic violence recant); id. at 194 (Waterman, J., dissenting) ("The rate of recantation among domestic violence victims has been estimated between eighty and ninety percent."). After today, we can
Mindful of the law's appropriate distrust of recantations by victims of child sex abuse, I conclude B.C.'s fainthearted "recantation" is insufficient to vacate Schmidt's guilty plea. B.C.'s affidavit stated in its entirety:
Notably, B.C. never stated under oath which story he told is true. Nor did B.C. claim that police or his family induced him to lie in 2007. The timing of B.C.'s new story seven years later coincides with Schmidt's expected release from prison. On February 25, 2006, the night Peter caught Schmidt in the act of attempting to rape B.C., Schmidt stood six foot, three inches tall and weighed between 350 and 400 pounds. B.C., who had just celebrated his fourteenth birthday, was four feet, six inches tall and weighed between seventy-five and ninety pounds. While B.C. may have added some pounds and inches since then, I can understand his motivation to make peace with his much larger half-brother before Schmidt's release from prison.
Perhaps an evidentiary hearing on remand will bring this matter to a swift conclusion. "The trial court is not required to believe the recantation ...." State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 517, 154 N.W.2d 845, 849 (1967). To the contrary, if the court believes the recantation is false,
Id.
We have repeatedly affirmed denials of applications for postconviction relief based on witness recantations. See Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 275 (affirming district court's denial of application for PCR because "Jones' entire claim is based upon an assumption that Coleman's trial testimony was in fact false," but "[t]he postconviction court is certainly not required to believe the recantation"); State v. Folck, 325 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Iowa 1982) ("Recantation of trial testimony is viewed with suspicion, and the trial court has broad discretion in looking to the whole record to determine if defendant had a fair trial."); see also State v. Frank, 298 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1980) (noting testimony later recanted still had probative value); State v. Taylor, 287 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1980) (affirming denial of motion for new trial because a recantation is "not really based on newly discovered evidence"); State v. Jackson, 223 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Iowa 1974) ("The general rule is a witness' recantation should be looked upon with utmost suspicion.").
When the witness's original testimony is corroborated by other evidence supporting the conviction following a jury trial, a subsequent
I would also affirm the summary judgment because Schmidt's PCR — filed seven years after his conviction — is time-barred under Iowa Code section 822.3's three-year statute of limitations. The majority holds it is not time-barred because Schmidt could not know within the limitations period that B.C. would later recant. But Schmidt did know what happened in the bedroom in 2006 and knew then whether the allegations made by Peter and B.C. were false.
PCR actions "must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued." Iowa Code § 822.3 (2014). An exception is made for applications claiming "a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period." Id. The three-year time-bar "limit[s] postconviction litigation in order to conserve judicial resources, promote substantive goals of the criminal law, foster rehabilitation, and restore a sense of repose in our system of justice." Wilkins v. State, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 1994) (quoting State v. Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)). A corollary purpose is "`to reduce injustices occurring as a result of lost witnesses' necessary to resolve factual issues arising in postconviction proceedings and upon retrial of cases where convictions have been overturned." Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Brewer v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 395 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1986)), abrogated on other grounds by Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Iowa 2003).
To further those goals, the exception to the three-year time-bar in section 822.3 is limited to claims in which the applicant had "no opportunity to test the validity of the conviction in relation to [the ground of fact or law that allegedly could not have been raised within the time period]." Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824 (alteration in original) (quoting Edman, 444 N.W.2d at 106). An applicant may not assert a claim he or she has "at least been alerted to" in the prior action. Id. This promotes repose and conserves judicial resources. See id. (holding second application for relief was time-barred when applicant should have been alerted to "ground of fact" in prior postconviction application); see also Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 886 (barring action when applicant was aware of ground of fact because "[a]ny other decision would result in an endless procession of postconviction actions, and the legislature's hope to avoid stale claims and to achieve a sense of repose in the criminal justice system would not be realized").
The State filed a two-pronged motion for summary judgment to dismiss Schmidt's PCR action, arguing that his (1) guilty plea barred relief and (2) PCR application was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The State correctly argued B.C.'s statements were not "new evidence" that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence:
I agree.
"[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had `no opportunity' to assert the claim before the limitation period expired." Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 823-24). "[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been `alerted' to the potential claim before the limitation period expired." Id. (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824).
This is not a case in which a new, disinterested witness has come forward. See State v. Burgess, 237 Iowa 162, 164-65, 21 N.W.2d 309, 310 (1946) (allowing new trial based on subsequent discovery of disinterested alibi witness, a train conductor, when the defendant "was the only witness who testified at the trial that he was on the train at the time the state's witnesses testified the crime was committed [elsewhere, because c]learly the evidence of the conductor of the train, placing the [defendant] on the train at the time of the commission of the crime, was not cumulative"). And this is not the case of a mere he-said, he-said account without another witness to the incident.
Nor has Schmidt come forward with new physical evidence or new scientific developments that were previously undiscovered.
B.C.'s recantation is "not new evidence in the real sense." Compiano, 261 Iowa at 517, 154 N.W.2d at 849. "On the contrary, it is but an assertion by affidavit that the former testimony given by the witness was false." Id.; see also Taylor, 287 N.W.2d at 578 (same). As the Kansas Court of Appeals stated,
Woods, 379 P.3d at 1141.
Our decision in Harrington, 659 N.W.2d 509, does not require a different result. In Harrington, we stated that newly discovered, previously undisclosed police reports together with recantations by three trial witnesses qualified as a ground of fact that could not have been raised within the three-year window. 659 N.W.2d at 521. A jury found Terry Harrington guilty of murder in 1978. Id. at 514. Harrington had presented an alibi defense at trial that was undermined by several witnesses who placed him with accomplices on the night of the murder. Id. at 515. Over twenty years later, Harrington filed an application for postconviction relief. Id. Three witnesses had come forward, recanting their trial testimony that placed him with accomplices. Id. at 516-17. One recanting witness "claim[ed] he gave a contrary story at trial because he was pressured by the prosecutors and police." Id. at 517. Another "said he lied [at trial] to obtain a $5000 reward ... and to avoid being charged with the crime." Id. Harrington's counsel also discovered Brady violations — eight police reports containing exculpatory
Id. at 521. We concluded Harrington's PCR application was not time-barred, see id., but went on to determine the Brady violations alone entitled him to a new trial, id. at 525.
Harrington is distinguishable. Schmidt alleges no Brady violations. No unrecanting eyewitness caught Harrington in the criminal act. The district court made no finding B.C.'s recantation was newly discovered evidence. And B.C. makes no claim he was paid or pressured to testify falsely when Schmidt was charged. Most significantly, unlike Schmidt, Harrington did not plead guilty but steadfastly maintained his innocence. Id. at 523 & n.10.
The majority today adopts for the first time a freestanding actual-innocence claim for postconviction relief. Under this new standard,
In my view, Schmidt fails to meet this standard as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has stated that an applicant claiming actual innocence must present "new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Requiring new reliable evidence significantly reduces "[t]he threat to judicial resources, finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence." Id. at 324, 115 S.Ct. at 866. Assessing reliability, "the court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence." Id. at 332, 115 S.Ct. at 869.
Moreover, to succeed on an actual-innocence claim, the applicant also must show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). The court must therefore assess the merits of the claim, considering "`all the evidence,' old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under `rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.'" House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513
Schmidt cannot show it is more likely than not in light of B.C.'s recantation that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Peter personally witnessed Schmidt's attempt to sexually assault B.C., literally catching them with their pants down. Police officers took contemporaneous statements from Peter and B.C. at the scene within minutes of the incident. The police officers could have testified as to what B.C. and Peter described minutes after the incident under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2) (defining excited utterance as "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused"); see also State v. Richards, 809 N.W.2d 80, 95 (Iowa 2012) (holding domestic violence victim's statement to daughter about choking while victim's neck was still red was admissible as an excited utterance). Moreover, B.C. gave a recorded forensic interview five days later in which he detailed the events of the night and disclosed Schmidt's past assaults. That video, recorded while his memory was fresh, could be used to impeach his subsequent recantation. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.613(b) ("Extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness about it, or if justice so requires."); see also State v. Austin, 585 N.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Iowa 1998) (concluding district court properly admitted videotape of child victim describing sexual abuse recorded shortly after it occurred, when defense counsel opened the door by cross-examining the child about inconsistent statements); Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (allowing jury to consider recorded statement of child discussing abuse despite child's recantation at trial); State v. Church, 167 Vt. 604, 708 A.2d 1341, 1342 (1998) (allowing state to present rehabilitating testimony from witness whom child told she had been abused after defendant attempted to show child had recanted her testimony).
Schmidt's claim of actual innocence in this PCR action must be evaluated in light of that evidence and, as the special concurrence acknowledges, Schmidt's guilty-plea colloquy in which he admitted to the facts in the minutes of testimony establishing his crimes. See Castro, 795 N.W.2d at 795 (approving use of plea colloquy in summary disposition). Schmidt cannot succeed on his actual-innocence claim based solely on B.C.'s recantation; he cannot show no reasonable juror would convict him. I would hold that the district court properly granted the State's motion for summary
This case falls outside the typical categories of cases of actual innocence. In Rhoades, we reviewed a growing body of scholarship on wrongful convictions. 880 N.W.2d at 434-39. Retrospective studies of cases following DNA exonerations found the wrongful convictions "were frequently based upon false confessions obtained from the defendant [during police interrogations], eyewitness identification that proved to be unreliable, failure of the state to turn over exculpatory evidence, use of unreliable informant testimony, and ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted). Schmidt alleges none of those.
Most wrongful convictions followed trials in which the defendant (unlike Schmidt) steadfastly maintained his or her innocence.
Accordingly, I would not use this case to decide whether to recognize a freestanding or gateway actual-innocence claim under the Iowa Constitution for postconviction-relief
Id. at 534 (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 30 (Iowa 2005)).
For all these reasons, I dissent.
Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Constitutional interpretation is not Darwinian evolution, and a decision of this court today is not superior to the decisions that preceded it just because it is more recent. Whether this court is on a "constitutional march to become better" should be determined by others, not by ourselves.
While it is tempting to agree that "[i]nnocent people should always have a forum to prove their innocence," the realities of any criminal justice system are more complex. Even the majority does not take this statement literally. For example, even the majority accepts for now the limits in Iowa Code chapter 822 on claims brought by those who say they are actually innocent.
I join Justice Waterman's dissent, and write separately only to highlight several points.
First, this case does not involve an actual recantation.
Second, the rule that a guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea is both long-standing and sound.
Third, the court has provided no doctrinal basis for grounding an actual-innocence claim in the Iowa Constitution.
Fourth, the court leaves many questions unanswered that will have to be sorted out by our district judges in the coming years.
Here is the so-called recantation that is launching a thousand ships:
Just two years ago, in Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray v. Baldi, we applied the "contradictory affidavit rule." 880 N.W.2d 451, 463-64 (Iowa 2016). Under this rule, an affidavit that contradicts prior sworn testimony does not create an issue of fact if it "clearly and unambiguously contradicts [the] earlier sworn testimony" unless the affiant offers "a reasonable explanation for any apparent contradiction." Id. Since the court purports to be applying civil summary judgment standards, Estate of Gray may well indicate that there is no issue of fact here, even if a change in our long-standing law on guilty pleas were appropriate.
A change in the law is not needed. Our court should adhere to its long-standing rule that "a defendant's guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea." State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009).
What does "intrinsic to the plea" mean? It means a defendant who pleads guilty can later argue that the plea was "unintelligent or involuntary." Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642-44. This includes the situation where the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel "in connection with the plea." Id. at 642. All such matters are intrinsic to the plea. But later-discovered evidence — by definition — is extrinsic to the plea.
In State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1998), we specifically held that new exculpatory evidence is not intrinsic to the plea and cannot be used to challenge a guilty plea. We explained,
Id. at 596.
State v. Alexander, 463 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1990), likewise reiterated that "a plea of guilty `waives all defenses or objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself.'" Id. at 422 (quoting State v. Morehouse, 316 N.W.2d 884, 885 (Iowa 1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001)). In Alexander, we relied on this rule to hold that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence was not available for a defendant who had pled guilty. Id. at 422-23. We said, "Notions of newly discovered evidence simply have no bearing on a knowing and voluntary admission of guilt." Id. at 423.
It is true that Alexander contains the following enigmatic sentence at the end of the opinion: "The remedy Alexander seeks is available to him in the form of postconviction relief. See Iowa Code § 663A.2(4) (1989) [now Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d) (2014)]." Id. The majority seizes on this single sentence to find that a defendant who pleads guilty can attack his or her guilty plea in postconviction-relief proceedings under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d) based on newly discovered evidence.
I am not persuaded. The one-sentence dictum from Alexander cannot be right and, indeed, is inconsistent with the rest of the Alexander opinion. See 463 N.W.2d at 422. One can attack a guilty plea on grounds extrinsic to the plea or one cannot — the case cannot stand for both propositions. Given our many other decisions upholding the rule against extrinsic attacks on a plea, including not just Alexander but also decisions that preceded and followed Alexander, the stray sentence from Alexander must be regarded as an error. Certainly, it has been treated as a legal dead end. In the nearly thirty years since we decided Alexander, that sentence has never been quoted or cited by our court. Instead, for decades, until today, we have consistently followed the rule that a guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.
Westlaw will be busy tracking down and flagging the decisions of our court that, after today, are no longer good law.
I acknowledge that in the real world, defendants do at times plead guilty to offenses which, in a final reckoning, they did not commit. Typically, there are two reasons why this occurs. One is a strategic decision by the defendant to avoid other, more serious convictions or additional, more severe penalties that would result from going to trial. See, e.g., State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88, 89 (Iowa 2015) (noting that the defendant was charged with first-degree murder but pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, attempted murder, and willful injury causing serious injury). The other
The majority cites one case from South Dakota and one case from New York before asking, rhetorically, "What kind of system of justice do we have if we permit actually innocent people to remain in prison?" Despite this sloganeering, the fact remains that both cases involved defendants who went to trial. See In re Kaufmann, 245 N.Y. 423, 157 N.E. 730, 730-31 (1927); Engesser v. Young, 856 N.W.2d 471, 473 (S.D. 2014).
Before a defendant pleads guilty, the law protects that defendant in several ways. First, a detailed colloquy is required. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). The defendant is informed he or she is giving up the right to a trial and there will not be a further trial of any kind. Id. r. 2.8(2)(b)(4)-(5). Until today, those were true statements.
Second, the record must show a factual basis for each charge to which the defendant is pleading guilty. See, e.g., Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 525; Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 33 (Iowa 2014); State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014).
Third, as discussed above, the plea must be voluntary and intelligent, and if counsel was ineffective in some manner that rendered the plea involuntary or unintelligent, that can be raised. See Castro, 795 N.W.2d at 793-94; Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 642-43.
In my view, these safeguards serve their intended purpose. "Once a defendant has waived his right to a trial by pleading guilty, the State is entitled to expect finality in the conviction." State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999); see also State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 2006).
While I expect today's decision to lead to a new wave of applications for postconviction relief, and more work for appointed counsel, prosecutors, and the courts, I do not see the need. Why are the legal grounds already established by this court and the legislature for relief from guilty pleas not enough?
The majority underplays the critical distinction between defendants who claim actual innocence following a jury trial conviction and those who claim actual innocence following a guilty plea. Most of the decisions cited by the majority involve a defendant who was convicted after a trial. See Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 242 Conn. 745,
Iowa is not alone in giving finality to guilty pleas notwithstanding claims of actual innocence. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 2017 Ark. 313, 530 S.W.3d 844, 846 (2017) ("Williams's argument that he is actually innocent of the offense to which he pleaded guilty does not establish a ground for the writ because it constitutes a direct attack on the judgment."); Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008) (rejecting an actual innocence claim and stating that "[a] plea of guilty thus forecloses a post-conviction challenge to the facts adjudicated by the trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea and resulting conviction"); Woods v. State, 52 Kan.App.2d 958, 379 P.3d 1134, 1142 (2016) (stating that a claim of actual innocence is "insufficient to override the longstanding rule that a freely and voluntarily entered guilty plea bars a collateral attack on the sufficiency of the evidence").
One should also read the articles cited by the majority. One of the articles is written by a senior federal judge and another by a former federal judge. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014), www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/[https://perma.cc/LT8T-XKAV]; H. Lee Sarokin, Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty?, Huffington Post (May 29, 2012, 4:39 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/innocent-people-guilty-pleas_b_1553239.html/[https://perma.cc/6PSQ-6ZW4]. As participants in the system, the views of these two authors deserve our consideration. Yet neither of these authors recommends today's solution — i.e., a freestanding claim of innocence as a way to challenge guilty pleas. To the contrary, Judge Rakoff advocates "involving judges in the plea-bargaining process," while Mr. Sarokin insists "[t]he only solution is vigilance by all involved."
Reexamining a guilty plea years after the fact is far different from reviewing a trial. Unlike with a case that actually went to trial, no trial transcript can be relied on if the witnesses no longer are around, have forgotten the events, or no longer are motivated to remember them. See Rhoades, 880 N.W.2d at 449 (acknowledging the difficulty in accurately determining a claim of
Under Maryland law, convicted persons may not petition for a writ of actual innocence if they have pled guilty. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-301 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1-4 2018 Reg. Sess.). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has noted,
Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45, 108 A.3d 448, 461 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nicholas Phillips, Comment, Innocence and Incarceration: A Comprehensive Review of Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute and Suggestions for Improvement, 42 U. Balt. L.F. 65, 93-94 (Fall 2011) (footnotes omitted)), aff'd, 446 Md. 183, 130 A.3d 486 (2016).
Changes in the law intended to benefit defendants can end up harming them. Now that we have allowed guilty pleas to be set aside based on newly discovered evidence, the state has a powerful incentive not to accept such pleas, despite the benefits to defendants discussed above. The advantages of a plea from the state's perspective are that it provides certainty, closure, and finality. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1627-28, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). That is why the state is often willing to bargain down the original charges as part of a deal. Take away those advantages, and more cases may go to trial on more charges. See id. (noting that the advantages of plea negotiations to judges, prosecutors, and defendants "can be secured... only if dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality").
The majority maintains that an actual-innocence claim for those who plead guilty is required by the Iowa Constitution, specifically article I, section 9 and article I, section 17. It is noteworthy that Schmidt barely argues Iowa constitutional law at all and then only in the supplemental brief which we invited.
The majority's constitutional reasoning is thin and, to me, unpersuasive. I begin with article I, section 9, the Iowa due process clause. The majority initially asserts that convicting an actually innocent person violates article I, section 9's constitutional guarantee of substantive due process. According to the majority, it is a matter of substantive due process because the violation consists of the mere fact an innocent person has been convicted.
But the majority can't literally mean that — otherwise there would be no limits on actual-innocence claims. Thus, the majority shifts to the position that innocent people need to have an opportunity to prove they are innocent. That's a matter of procedural due process. Yet our justice system already has many procedures in place to protect innocent people from being convicted. These include the trial, the guilty plea colloquy, the right to counsel, and so forth.
Weaker still is the majority's invocation of article I, section 17. This section prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. Yet the issue before this court is not the punishment for Schmidt's crime, but whether Schmidt should have a new opportunity to prove he didn't commit that crime. Unless we are going to ignore the fundamental distinctions among the different rights within our own constitution, article I, section 17 has no bearing on today's case.
Having demonstrated enough self-confidence to tear up an established rule of law, the majority now claims to be too modest to tell us what today's decision means. That's not good enough. One way to test the soundness of a decision is to consider the implications of that decision.
Here are a few questions raised by today's decision.
Yet earlier, the majority says, "Holding a person who has committed no crime in prison strikes the very essence of the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process." The two statements do not line up. Where are we?
Obviously, at a minimum, the defendant must prove he or she did not commit the crime to which he or she pled guilty. Must the defendant also prove his or her conduct does not amount to a different crime (even a much less serious one)? And what if the defendant pled guilty to several charges at once? Must the defendant establish that none of the incidents involve a crime committed by that defendant?
The majority refuses to consider issues like these because it doesn't want to get into the merits of the case. But none of these matters goes to the actual merits. Some of them were discussed in the supplemental briefing invited by this court. If our court is going to change the law, it should clarify the change as much as possible and not leave it to district courts to play a game of twenty questions. In other decisions, we have given "protocols" to our district courts. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 45-46 (Iowa 2017) (describing a "protocol" to use in the future); State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 2016) (same); Fagen v. Grand View Univ., 861 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Iowa 2015) (plurality opinion) (same); State v. Cashen, 789 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 2010) (same), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 622.10).
From the State's perspective, I am guessing it would have simply preferred to try Schmidt all those years ago. In the long run, I am doubtful today's decision will benefit defendants. More importantly, today's decision needlessly overturns an
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.
Schmidt makes no such constitutional challenge to the statutes he pled guilty to violating. The Class Court made clear that a defendant who pleads guilty waives any right to later contest his factual guilt, challenge the evidence against him, or retreat from factual admissions in the guilty plea. 583 U.S. at ___, 138 S.Ct. at 804, 805-06; id. at ___, 138 S.Ct. at 812-13 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. § 81.10(1), (9).
The Reid interrogation techniques that prompted his false confession in 1955 are described in the Eighth Circuit decision holding Parker's confession to be involuntary, see Parker, 413 F.2d at 465, and discussed at length by the Miranda Court, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-58, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1614-19, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Jacob Schmidt is no Darrel Parker, and today's decision involves no counterpart to John Reid.
