JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Amy Helms, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against Gabe Withington, John Jeffrey, Jessica Penn, Jeffrey Cope, Ronald Magana, the Sheriff's Department of Lyon County, and the Emporia Police Department alleging use of excessive force and denial of medical treatment in violation of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that when she was arrested, she was handcuffed, slammed against stairs, and broke her back. She alleges that Sheriff Jeffrey Cope refused her medical treatment despite multiple requests during her detention. This Court dismissed the Emporia Police Department on October 19, 2016 (Doc. 32). This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sheriff's Department of Lyon County and Sheriff Jeffrey Cope's (collectively "Lyon County Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26). Plaintiff has not filed a response and the time to do so has expired.
Under D. Kan. Rule 7.4, "a party . . . who fails to file a responsive brief or memorandum within the time specified in D. Kan. Rule 6.1(d) waives the right to later file such brief or memorandum."
Plaintiff was apprised of the pending motion for summary judgment during a scheduling conference held before Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James on October 5, 2016.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe the plaintiff's filing liberally and afford the plaintiff's filing some leniency.
Finally, summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" on the contrary, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
The Lyon County Defendants have filed a Martinez Report.
Plaintiff Amy Helms is a former detainee in the Lyon County Detention Center. Defendant Jeffrey Cope is, and at all relevant times to Plaintiff's allegations was, the duly elected Sheriff of Lyon County, Kansas.
On June 6, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested by the Emporia Police Department on a charge of battery of a law enforcement officer. Following her arrest, Plaintiff was transported to the Lyon County Detention Center where she arrived at approximately 3:44 a.m. on that same morning. After arriving at the Lyon County Detention Center, Plaintiff began acting out toward staff. She was so uncooperative that she could not be immediately processed. She was placed into a holding cell where she yelled obscenities, insulted and threatened staff, beat on her cell window, stood on her bunk, threw her breakfast food around her cell, and smeared a banana on her cell window. Plaintiff's behavior became so problematic that she had to be temporarily confined to a restraint chair.
At around 3:30 p.m., Plaintiff was taken out of her holding cell to finish being processed and booked. The Lyon County Detention Center has a booking procedure that requires the booking officer to conduct a medical screening of the detainee. The medical screening procedure requires the booking officer to observe the detainee and ask the detainee a series of questions in an effort to ascertain his or her medical condition. This includes filling out two forms—called the "Inmate Medical History" and "Inmate Medical Assessment" forms.
The Lyon County booking officer followed this policy when Plaintiff was booked into the Lyon County Detention Center. According to the Inmate Medical Assessment form filled out when Plaintiff was booked, Plaintiff answered "no" to the following question: "Are you in need of special medical care?" According to the Inmate Medical History form, Plaintiff answered "no" when asked about having suffered traumatic injury. Additionally, according to the Inmate Medical Assessment form, the booking officer answered "no" to the following question: "Does the [inmate] complain of pain?" On that same form, the booking officer answered "yes" to the following questions: "Are there visible signs of alcohol or drug influence?"; "Are there visible signs of withdrawal from alcohol or drugs?"; and "Is behavior suggestive of assault risk for staff or other inmates?" After completing the booking process, Plaintiff was returned to the holding cell. She was released from the Lyon County Detention Center on June 8, 2014 at approximately 3:44 a.m.
Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Cope typically has limited interaction with Lyon County inmates and detainees. Defendant Cope has no involvement in the processing or booking of detainees upon arrival at the Lyon County Detention Center. During Plaintiff's detention in Lyon County, Defendant Cope had no interaction with Plaintiff, including not seeing Plaintiff, not communicating with Plaintiff, and not receiving reports from officers relating to Plaintiff.
Defendant Cope is unaware of, and the Lyon County Detention Center has no record of, any request from Plaintiff, verbal or written, that she be taken to the hospital, receive medical treatment, or visit any in-house medical staff during her detention. Defendant Cope is unaware of, and the Lyon County Detention Center has no record of, any complaint by Plaintiff that she was suffering from any back pain or injury while she was detained in the Lyon County Detention Center. Nor did Defendant Cope have any knowledge or awareness that Plaintiff exhibited signs or symptoms that would have indicated that she was experiencing, or at risk of experiencing, any serious medical condition during her detention.
Defendant Cope did not learn of Plaintiff's detention or activities in the Lyon County Detention Center until the filing of this lawsuit.
Defendants argue that Defendant Lyon County Sheriff's Department should be granted summary judgment because it is an entity not capable of suit. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), the capacity of a party to be sued in federal court is to be determined by the law of the state where the court is located.
Defendants argue that Defendant Cope should be granted summary judgment because he is protected by qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Construing Plaintiff's pleading liberally, the only allegation against Defendant Cope is the denial of medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants argue that Defendant Cope did not cause a deprivation of Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional right to medical care for three reasons. First, there is no evidence to suggest Sheriff Cope participated in the alleged deprivation. Second, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the objective prong of the claim for denial of medical care because she cannot show she suffered a serious medical condition. Third, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the subjective prong of the claim for denial of medical care because the evidence confirms that Defendant Cope took no actions with a culpable state of mind.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented evidence that a constitutional violation occurred—namely, that Plaintiff was denied medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, there has been no evidence produced that any alleged injury was an objectively, sufficiently serious injury to be cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining whether a medical need or harm is sufficiently serious under the objective component, courts consider both the symptoms initially presented to the prison employee as well as any resulting harm.
When she was processed, the evidence shows—both by her own admission and by observation from the booking officer—that she was not suffering any trauma or injury. The Inmate Medical History and Inmate Medical Assessment forms do not reflect any injury. Plaintiff admitted that she did not suffer a traumatic injury. A broken back is a sufficiently serious injury that a reasonable jury could only conclude that an officer would note or Plaintiff would have told the officer during the booking process that Plaintiff had a broken back.
Further, there has been no evidence produced of "lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain."
Second, Plaintiff has not satisfied the subjective component of deliberate indifference to medical needs because there has been no evidence produced that Defendant Cope acted with a culpable state of mind. The plaintiff must allege that the prison official "kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety."
Applying those standards in this case, there is no evidence Defendant Cope or any officer under his supervision knew or should have known Plaintiff allegedly broke her back. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cope refused her treatment despite her numerous requests.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence as to the subjective or objective prong of deliberate indifference to medical needs that constitute a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation, she has failed to meet her burden. Therefore, Defendant Cope is properly granted qualified immunity.