CRICHTON, Justice.

This case involves the interpretation of two provisions of the Public Works Act ("Act"), La. R.S. 38:2241, et seq. We granted the writ application to determine whether, under La. R.S. 38:2247, the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) are necessary conditions for a claimant's right of action against a bond furnished pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2241. Consistent with the stated purpose of the Act, we hold that the claimant's failure to file a sworn statement with the public authority did not affect the right of the subcontractor, in contractual privity with the general contractor, to proceed directly against the contractor and its surety. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the decision of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of a public works project for the construction of a gymnasium in Terrytown, Louisiana. Pursuant to a contract between JaRoy Construction Inc. ("JaRoy" or "contractor") and Jefferson Parish Council ("Jefferson Parish"), JaRoy was to serve as the general contractor. In compliance with La. R.S. 38:2241, et seq., the contractor furnished to Jefferson Parish a bond, on which the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty") was the surety.

JaRoy thereafter entered into a written subcontract with Pierce Foundations, Inc. ("Pierce") to provide and install pilings on the project. On November 3, 2008, Pierce completed the pile driving as called for in the contract. The contractor failed to pay to Pierce certain funds Pierce contended were due under the contract.1

In July 2009, Pierce filed a "Petition for Damages in Contract" against the contractor, and, in July 2010, amended the petition to add Ohio Casualty as a defendant. Pierce alleged that Ohio Casualty and the contractor were "jointly and severally liable" to Pierce for the failure of the contractor to perform under the contract. Ohio Casualty asserted several affirmative defenses to these allegations, one of which was that Pierce failed to comply with conditions precedent to filing a claim against the surety. When the contractor filed a petition for bankruptcy protection in December 2010, the lawsuit proceeded solely against Ohio Casualty.

On October 17, 2011, when the project was substantially completed, the Jefferson Parish government filed a notice of acceptance of work with the Jefferson Parish mortgage records office. This occurred over a year after Pierce amended its lawsuit to add Ohio Casualty as a defendant. It is undisputed that Pierce never filed a sworn statement of claim in the mortgage records.

Before trial, Ohio Casualty filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Pierce was required to comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) and, because it failed to do so within 45 days of Jefferson Parish's acceptance of the project, Pierce could not recover from Ohio Casualty under La. R.S. 38:2247. Pierce opposed the motion, asserting that the statute does not affect the right to proceed in contract, and the Act never contemplated a situation in which notice would be given and suit filed before the events outlined in R.S. 38:2242. Pierce contended that the Act does not contemplate any loss of rights, other than the privilege against the public entity. The trial court granted Ohio Casualty's motion in part, "only to the extent that there is no privilege in favor of [Pierce]," and otherwise permitted the suit to proceed. Ohio Casualty sought supervisory review, and the court of appeal denied relief, stating:

Pierce Founds., Inc. v. The Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 12-0859 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/09/12) (unpublished).

On December 13, 2012, after a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Pierce in the amounts of $59,428.96 for sums owed under the contract and $57,000.00 for idle time, plus judicial interest from the date of the original judgment. As to Ohio Casualty's argument that Pierce's exclusive right of action against it was limited to the relief granted by the Act and subject to compliance with its requirements, the trial court noted that it had "already rejected" this defense and stated that there was "no reason for this court to revisit that issue." Following several motions for a new trial and amended judgments, the final judgment was signed on May 19, 2014.

Ohio Casualty suspensively appealed the judgment, contending that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss it prior to trial, because Pierce's failure to comply with the notice provisions of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) resulted in forfeiture of its right of action against the surety. Pierce devolutively appealed, asserting the trial court erred by awarding interest only from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, concluded that Pierce's failure to comply with the relevant notice provisions deprived it of a right of action against Ohio Casualty, reversed the trial court judgment, and dismissed the suit as to Ohio Casualty. Pierce Founds., Inc. v. JaRoy Constr., Inc., 14-669 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 580.

We then granted Pierce's application for a writ of certiorari. Pierce Founds., Inc. v. JaRoy Constr., Inc., 15-0785 (La.6/5/15), 171 So.3d 938.

RELEVANT LAW

In 1918, the legislature enacted Act 224, the precursor to the modern Public Works Act, La. R.S. 38:2241, et seq., to "protect those performing labor and furnishing materials for public works." Wilkin v. Dev Con Builders, Inc., 561 So.2d 66, 70 (La. 1990). The laws do not grant beneficiaries a lien on the public work itself, but rather gives them "a privilege against the unexpended fund in the possession of the public entity with whom the original contract was entered into." Id. (quoting Pigeon-Thomas Iron Co. v. Drew Bros., 162 La. 836, 111 So. 182, 183 (1926)). As this Court stated:

Id. at 70. The laws also protect a public authority complying with the requirements of the statute from expenses caused by the failure of the contractor to perform the contract. 561 So.2d at 71.

The statutory framework set forth in the Act accomplishes this purpose, first, by mandating that, when a public entity enters into a contract in excess of $25,000.00 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public works, the contractor is required to post a bond "in a sum of not less than fifty percent of the contract price for the payment by the contractor or subcontractor to claimants as defined in R.S. 38:2242." La. R.S. 38:2241(A)(2). The law further establishes a means for asserting a claim under the Act, set forth in La. R.S. 38:2242(B):

The Act also addresses a claimant's direct right of action on the bond against the general contractor and/or surety, making clear that the subcontractor maintains a separate right of action outside of the parameters of the Act. To that end, La. R.S. 38:2247 provides, in pertinent part:

The court of appeal, construing La. R.S. 38:2247, held that "only those claimants who have complied with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) shall not be deprived of a right of action on the bond." Pierce Founds., Inc. v. JaRoy Constr., Inc., 14-669, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 580, 585 (emphasis added). The court of appeal therefore concluded: "[T]he notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) are necessary conditions for a right of action on a bond. The failure to comply with these requirements deprives a claimant of a right of action on a bond." Id. (emphasis added). The court of appeal also rejected the reasoning of the case "K" Construction, Inc. v. Burko Construction, Inc., 629 So.2d 1370 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), which it had previously cited in denying the relief that Ohio Casualty sought pre-trial.

Ohio Casualty urges this Court to affirm the court of appeal, arguing that Pierce's failure to file the sworn statement of claim is fatal to its cause of action against Ohio Casualty. Ohio Casualty argues that exclusive rights of action against the surety are set forth in La. R.S. 38:2247, and Pierce's failure to comply with the requirements of the Act — including the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) — bar recovery against Ohio Casualty.

Pierce argues that the court of appeal decision frustrates the purpose of the Act — specifically, that the Act was adopted to protect those performing labor and furnishing materials for public works, as set forth in Wilkin, not to immunize sureties from lawsuits brought in contract related to unpaid funds. Pierce contends, inter alia, that the court of appeal erred by converting the permissive "may" of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) into a mandatory requirement, thereby holding that a claimant who does not file the sworn statement is "deprived of all rights against the surety" — including rights in contract. Additionally, because Pierce filed suit over a year before Jefferson Parish filed the notice of acceptance, Ohio Casualty could not reasonably claim it did not have notice of the claim. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Pierce.

ANALYSIS

Legislation is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198; La. Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 09-0023, p. 8 (La. 6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 355-56. See also La. R.S. 24:177(B)(1). When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in search of the legislative intent. La. R.S. 1:4. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Cat's Meow, 98-0601, p. 15, 720 So.2d at 1198; Timbermen, 09-0023, p. 8, 17 So.3d at 356. Additionally, "all laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari materia, or in reference to each other." See, e.g., State v. Williams, 10-1514 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1189, 1191; La. C.C. art. 13. When, on the other hand, a statute is not clear and unambiguous, or its application leads to absurd consequences, we rely on secondary rules of statutory interpretation to discern the meaning of the statute at issue. See Red Stick Studio Dev., L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Dev., 10-0193, p. 10 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187-88 (quotation omitted). In such cases, the statute "must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole." Id.

Because this matter involves the interpretation of statutory provisions and only questions of law are presented, review by this court is de novo. See, e.g., Red Stick Studio, 56 So.3d at 187. Additionally, because the case involves the Public Works Act, it must be strictly construed. Wilkin, 561 So.2d at 75.

The court of appeal found that Ohio Casualty was entitled to summary judgment before trial, because Pierce did not comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B). In so holding, the court of appeal construed La. R.S. 38:2247 as imposing an affirmative requirement: "[O]nly those claimants who have complied with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) shall not be deprived of a right of action on the bond." 14-669, p. 7, 169 So.3d at 584. Accordingly, the court of appeal concluded: "Logic ... dictates that the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) are necessary conditions for a right of action on a bond." Id. In other words, the court of appeal found that R.S. 38:2247's reference to the "requirements" of 2242(B) causes the formalities to become mandatory in any action against the bond.3

We disagree with this holding, and find that where the subcontractor fails to comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B), the subcontractor loses his privilege against funds in the hands of the public authority, but the failure to comply does not affect the right of the subcontractor, in contractual privity with the general contractor, to proceed directly against the contractor and its surety. As an initial matter, we point out that the plain language of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) and La. R.S. 38:2247 conflict, because R.S. 38:2242(B) provides that a claimant "may" file a sworn statement, but R.S. 38:2247 refers to the recordation "requirements" of 2242(B). Because of this ambiguity, we pursue the statutory meaning in the context of the statute as a whole, with particular focus on the statute's purpose.

The fundamental error in the court of appeal's analysis is that it renders the permissive "may" in La. R.S. 38:2242(B) — "[a]ny claimant may ... file a sworn statement" — mandatory in La. R.S. 38:2247. But the revised statutes instruct: "The word `shall' is mandatory and the word `may' is permissive." La. R.S. 1:3. The court of appeal's interpretation of the language of La. R.S. 38:2247 as mandatory, even where preexisting contractual rights exist, is inconsistent with the "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that the word `may' is permissive." Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 14-1921, p. 12 (La.5/5/15), 169 So.3d 328, 336.

Instead of employing this interpretive principle, the court of appeal references the legislative history of La. R.S. 38:2247 to support its holding. Before 1985, La. R.S. 38:2247 provided, in pertinent part: "Nothing in this Part shall be construed to deprive any person or claimant ... of his right of action on the contractor's bond...." 14-669, p. 8, 169 So.3d at 585. Then, in 1985 La. Acts 244, § 1, the legislature amended the provision to state: "Nothing in this Part shall be construed to deprive any claimant ... who has complied with the notice and recordation requirements of R.S. 38:2242(B), of his right of action on the bond...." Id. (emphasis added). The court of appeal opinion implies that the amendment was intended to overrule Honeywell, Inc. v. Jimmie B. Guinn, Inc., 462 So.2d 145, 148 (La.1985), in which this Court commented (in dicta) that "an unpaid subcontractor having a direct contractual relationship with the contractor may sue on the contractor's bond without filing and recording a sworn claim or giving written notice to the contractor." Honeywell, 462 So.2d at 148.

However, an examination of 1985 La. Acts 244, § 1 does not support the court of appeal's assumption that the legislature intended to modify or otherwise limit La. R.S. 38:2242 in amending La. R.S. 38:2247. First, Honeywell stands only for the proposition that La. R.S. 38:2247 contains a prescriptive period governing the claims of subcontractors, as well as those of materialmen or laborers. 462 So.2d at 148. Second, the amendment of La. R.S. 38:2247 was not the only change caused by 1985 La. Acts 244, § 1. The Act also revised La. R.S. 38:2241, 38:2242, 38:2244, and 38:2247, but, despite these changes, the legislature did not alter the use of the permissive "may" in La. R.S. 38:2242(B). If the legislature had intended La. R.S. 38:2247 to have the effect ascribed to it by the court of appeal, it would have altered the permissive "may" in La. R.S. 38:2242 to the mandatory "shall." Compare, e.g., La. R.S. 48:256.5(B) ("Public Contracts of the Department of Transportation and Development," providing: "Any claimant shall, after the maturity of his claim and within forty-five days after the recordation of final acceptance of the work by the [governing authority]....") (emphasis added).4

Further, the court of appeal's interpretation of La. R.S. 38:2247 to essentially trump the permissive language in La. R.S. 38:2242(B) overlooks that La. R.S. 38:2247 is first and foremost a prescription provision, providing an additional year to parties filing suit after the acceptance of work or default notice is filed.5 In this case, Pierce filed suit over a year before the acceptance was filed, the parties litigated the claims through discovery and motions, and Ohio Casualty was no doubt on notice of Pierce's suit. Requiring additional notice under these unique circumstances is futile and merely duplicative.

We acknowledge that La. R.S. 38:2242 and La. R.S. 38:2247 use confusing — even conflicting — language. But favoring the permissive ("may") language of La. R.S. 38:2242 rather than the restrictive ("requirements") language of La. R.S. 38:2247, as we do here, best comports with the purpose of the act, which is to "protect those performing labor and furnishing materials for public works" rather than protecting the sureties on the bond. Wilkin, 561 So.2d at 70. In other words, the Act creates an additional remedy to persons contributing to the construction, alteration, or repair of public works — a "privilege against the unexpended fund in the possession of the authorities with whom the original contract ha[d] been entered into." Id. The Act is not intended to — and does not — affect rights between parties proceeding directly in contract and is, in fact, silent on the question of parties that are in contract and, as here, file suit well before the notice of acceptance or default is filed. See, e.g., James S. Holliday, et al., La. Prac. Series: La. Constr. Law, § 13:14 (2015 ed.) ("[C]laimants have a direct right of action against the contractor and the surety on the bond. This action can be filed any time after maturity of the claim, rather than requiring that the claimants wait for forty-five days after acceptance of the entire project, which in many cases could occur long after the claim matures."). See also, e.g., La. C.C. art. 3045 ("A surety... is liable to the creditor ... for the full performance of the obligation of the principal obligor, ... even in the absence of an express agreement of solidarity."); Id. cmt. (c) ("The creditor may include in the same suit both the principal obligor and the surety or he may sue the surety without joinder of the principal obligor."). The court of appeal's holding has the effect of foreclosing the exercise of preexisting contractual rights, which exist outside the parameters of the Act and are expressly preserved in the Act, between a subcontractor and the general contractor's surety.6

A court of appeal case, "K" Construction, Inc. v. Burko Construction, Inc., 93-1338 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/16/93), 629 So.2d 1370, authored by former Chief Justice John Dixon sitting pro tempore, is instructive in its analysis of the relationship between La. R.S. 38:2242(B) and 38:2247 (post-1985 amendment). In Burko — a case, like this one, in which the claimant filed a lawsuit before the public body filed its notice of acceptance or default — the court considered and rejected the same arguments made by the surety (and adopted by the court of appeal) in this case. The court noted that the case was unique, because the notice of default was filed long after the plaintiffs had sent notice of nonpayment to the general contractor and after the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit. In reasoning we find compelling, Chief Justice Dixon wrote:

Burko, 629 So.2d at 1372.

We agree with the Burko court that any other interpretation of La. R.S. 38:2242 and 38:2247 would undermine the stated purpose of the Act: to protect those contributing to the construction, alteration, or repair of public works, not to foreclose preexisting contractual rights between parties. Here, as in Burko, Pierce filed suit against the surety long before the event occurred that triggers the 45-day period during which a claimant may file and record his sworn statement under La. R.S. 38:2242, as well as the prescriptive period of one year during which suit may be filed in accordance with La. R.S. 38:2247. As noted by Chief Justice Dixon in Burko, the provisions of the Act simply do not address the situation where suit is filed prior to these triggering events. Id. at 1374 ("Simply put, the Public Works Act does not appear to envision a situation where suit is filed before the notice of default [or acceptance of the work by the governing authority] is recorded.").7

Because the statutory language at issue is ambiguous, and because the purpose of the Act is to assist laborers in recovery — not to immunize sureties where parties may proceed in contract — the purpose of the Act is effectuated by this decision.

DECREE

Pursuant to the foregoing, we hold that Pierce's lawsuit was timely filed against the general contractor and its surety, Ohio Casualty, and that the failure of the plaintiff to perfect its privilege against the public authority (as found by the trial court) does not defeat its right of action against the surety. The decision of the court of appeal is reversed and the decision of the trial court is reinstated.

REVERSED.

KNOLL, Justice, dissenting.

I disagree with the majority's finding failure to comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2247 does not affect the right of a subcontractor to proceed directly against the surety on the bond.1 For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent. Indeed, to the contrary, I find the surety is immune from suit unless the subcontractor gives notice and recordation as required under the Public Works Act ("PWA"), the provisions of which must be strictly construed. The majority clearly errs as a matter of law and reaches its result by broadly construing, notwithstanding it recognizes the statute requires strict construction, and misinterpreting the PWA.

As the majority correctly notes, the issue in this case concerns a subcontractor's direct right of action on the bond against the surety to which La. R.S. 38:2247 provides:

Clearly, La. R.S. 38:2247 expressly reserves as well as grants the claimant (subcontractor) a direct right of action on the bond against the surety, provided he first complies with the notification and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B).

The recognition of this direct action has been in the PWA since its inception, providing in Section 3 of Act 224 of 1918: "nothing in this act shall be so construed as to deprive any person or claimant within the terms of this act of his right of action on the [bond], which right shall accrue any time after the maturity of his claim."2 Notably in Act 16 of 1962, the Legislature amended La. R.S. 38:2247, imposing the one-year prescriptive period for suits on the bond:

The Legislature stated its purpose in enacting Act 16 was "[t]o amend and re-enact Section 2247 ... to define the rights of persons or claimants to have or bring a right of action against a contractor or the surety." By expressly defining and limiting the right of action, the Legislature brought the claimant's direct action on the bond against the surety squarely within the protection of the PWA.

The LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES: LOUISIANA CONSTRUCTION LAW § 13:14 provides:

It further provides:

Id. at § 13.11.

As authority, the authors cite to La. R.S. 38:2247 and Honeywell, Inc. v. Jimmie B. Guinn, Inc., 462 So.2d 145, 148 (La.1985) in which this Court, with Justice Marcus as organ, interpreted a previous version of La. R.S. 38:2247, which provided:

The Court concluded:

Honeywell, 462 So.2d at 148.

In what can only be logically explained as action taken in response to the Honeywell holding, the Legislature immediately enacted Act 244 of 1985, amending La. R.S. 38:2247 to provide, as it presently does, that "Nothing in this Part shall be construed to deprive any claimant ... who has complied with the notice and recordation requirements of R.S. 38:2242(B), of his right of action on the bond." It follows, therefore, where compliance with the notice requirements had not been necessary in order to proceed on the bond, the amendment evidences a specific as well as explicit legislative intent requiring compliance with the notice requirements in order to do so, effectively "legislatively overruling" Honeywell.

Read this way, the specific language of La. R.S. 38:2247 requires compliance with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) in order to proceed via ordinaria against the surety "on the bond." Thus, a subcontractor/claimant to preserve his direct right of action on the bond against the surety must: (1) "after the maturity of his claim and within forty-five days after the recordation of acceptance of the work by the governing authority or of notice of default of the contractor or subcontractor, file a sworn statement of the amount due him with the governing authority having the work done and record it in the office of the recorder of mortgages for the parish in which the work is done," and (2) file suit "against the surety or contractor or both within one year from the registry of acceptance of the work or of notice of default of the contractor." La. R.S. 38:2247.

The Legislature went one step further in Act 244 by adding a provision to La. R.S. 38:2241(C), providing as it still does today: "Sureties and contractors executing payment bonds for public works contracts under this Part shall be immune from liability for or payment of any claims not required by this Part." Reading the term "claim" in pari materia with the definition of "claimant" contained in La. R.S. 38:2242 leads to the most reasonable conclusion that claim means "money ... due pursuant to a contract ... in the construction ... of any public works." Clearly, if a claimant is seeking money due pursuant to his public work contract from the surety bond, his direct right of action against the surety on the bond is governed exclusively by the PWA and its notice/recordation requirements, otherwise the surety is "immune from liability ... or payment of any claims." La. R.S. 38:2241(C).

Nowhere does the majority opinion address this key provision in the PWA — the immunity granted the surety under La. R.S. 38:2241(C) —, which renders the majority's analysis clearly erroneous. A proper statutory analysis would address the immunity provision, which the surety, Ohio Casualty, is urging in this case. The immunity provision clearly grants Ohio Casualty immunity because Pierce Foundation did not follow the notice and recordation requirements before (or even after) it filed suit against Ohio Casualty. By failing to address the immunity provision in the PWA, the majority reaches a flawed interpretation.

The majority randomly dismisses the mandatory requirements of notice and recordation and states: "We disagree with this holding, and find that where the subcontractor fails to comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B), the subcontractor loses his privilege against the funds in the hands of the public authority, but the failure to comply does not affect the right of the subcontractor, in contractual privity with the general contractor, to proceed directly against the contractor and its surety." Op. at p. 304. This new twist in misinterpreting the PWA is nothing more than legislating from the bench by declaring "the subcontractor loses his privilege against funds" for failing to comply with the PWA. Nowhere does the PWA proclaim this. Moreover, the statement as to the subcontractor's privity of contract with the general contractor is misplaced. The contract between these two is not at issue. Importantly, there is no contract between the subcontractor and the surety. The issue before us does not concern contractual obligations, but rather how a subcontractor can make a claim for payment on the bond under the PWA directly against a statutory surety when the general contractor has gone "belly-up."

The majority opinion further fails to address the strong policy consideration of ensuring proportional payment of all claimants, which is the primary purpose of the PWA, by requiring the queuing of claimants through recordation and preventing depletion of the bond until all claimants have an opportunity to notify and record their claims.

In its analysis, the majority summarily dismisses the appellate court's examination of legislative history in its search for legislative intent. However, by not addressing the steady and consistent changes made by the Legislature in direct correlation to misinterpretations rendered by this Court, I find the majority mistakenly focuses on its interpretation of the specific words used by the Legislature without examining why the Legislature employed those very words — its purposeful intent to rectify this Court's repeated attempts to expand the PWA beyond its terms. This jurisprudential history and later legislative amendments "overruling" this Court's opinions are very telling and important to a correct statutory interpretation of the PWA.

Concededly, the direct right of action of a subcontractor in direct contractual privity with the general contractor and his surety most likely first arose from our suretyship provisions. La. C.C. art. 3035.3 However, over time, the Legislature brought the surety bond within the exclusive parameters of the PWA and, in doing so, transformed the direct right of action from contractual to statutory.4 An in depth examination of the legislative history of the PWA — the actions taken by the Legislature in direct response to interpretations of this Court — clearly reveals this transformation. The Legislature said as much in Act 16 of 1962.

Likewise, this Court has over time revised its interpretation of the limits of a surety's liability on the bond, starting from a statutory limitation then moving to a contractual expansion, returning to its statutory position, and now with the majority opinion resurrecting its contractual approach. And each time the Legislature has responded, with its last amendment expressly limiting the liability on the bond only to "claims ... required by this Part."

Early on this Court held the bond was statutory and therefore limited by the statute:

Long Bell Lumber Co. v. S.D. Carr Const. Co., 172 La. 182, 187-88, 133 So. 438, 439-40 (1931). Then in Construction Materials, Inc. v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 388 So.2d 365, 366-67 (La.1980), with Justice Dennis as organ, this Court contrarily held a surety could contractually extend his liability:

Construction Materials, Inc., 388 So.2d at 367. Through its enactment of the 1985 amendments, discussed supra, the Legislature codified this Court's earlier position on the bond's statutory nature. Then in State v. McInnis Brothers Const., 97-0742 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, this Court once again adopted the interpretation of the bond as statutory:

McInnis Brothers Const., 97-742 at pp. 9-10, 701 So.2d at 944.

Our role as civilian jurists is to interpret the laws in search of the Legislature's intent. In this matter, the Legislature has made clear its intent to limit the liability of the surety on the bond to only those claims provided for in the PWA. Under the facts herein, the only right of action on the bond the PWA recognizes and provides for is that of a claimant "who has complied with the notice and recordation requirements of R.S. 38:2242(B)." The majority's reading of the statutory language authorizes a right of action on the surety bond arising from the "contractual privity" between the general contractor and the subcontractor not provided for by the PWA in direct contravention of the immunity provisions set forth in La. R.S. 38:2241(C). In so doing, the majority once again adopts the position of this Court in Honeywell and Construction Materials, Inc., which ironically prompted the very amendments we are now charged with interpreting. Therefore, in my view, the only interpretation that will give effect to all the statutory provisions and comply with the Legislature's expressed intent is one that requires compliance with the notice and recordation requirements before a subcontractor may proceed directly against the surety on the bond.

Much is also made by the majority herein of "K" Construction, Inc. v. Burko Construction, Inc., 629 So.2d 1370 (La. App. 4th Cir.1993), authored by former Chief Justice Dixon, then sitting pro tempore, in which the court held:

"K" Construction, Inc., 629 So.2d at 1372-74 (emphasis added). This interpretation is flawed, however, in its complete failure to recognize as well as preserve the notice to other claimants, which the recordation requirement of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) is meant to ensure. Further, in holding La. R.S. 38:2247 is merely prescriptive, the question from where does the right of action arise is left unanswered. The logical resolution of this inquiry is ultimately fatal to "K" Construction's conclusion because if the right does not arise from the PWA, the subcontractor's action is preempted by the surety's statutory immunity.

Guided by the Legislature's intent expressed in its 1962 and 1985 amendments to the PWA, I find a claimant, in order to maintain its direct action against the surety on the bond under La. R.S. 38:2247, must first satisfy the notice and recordation requirements of La. R.S. 38:2242(B) as well as file suit within the one-year prescriptive period; otherwise, its action on the bond prescribes. This interpretation ensures the primary purpose of the PWA — the proportional payment of all claims — is both met and satisfied.

Finally because its holding is contrary to this interpretation, I would overrule "K" Construction. And I would strongly discourage reliance on any statement in the LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES, which likewise does not conform to the Legislature's clear intent recited above.

GUIDRY, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

I disagree with the majority's holding that failure to comply with the notice and recordation requirements of La.Rev.Stat. 38:2247 does not limit the right of a subcontractor, in contractual privity with the general contractor, to proceed directly against the surety on the statutory bond. I do not disagree that there is arguably some ambiguity at first glance in the permissive language used in La.Rev.Stat. 38:2242 and the language used in La.Rev. Stat. 38:2247. However, in my view the interpretation of the two statutes made by the court of appeal best follows the intent of the legislature and the Public Works Act, La.Rev.Stat. 38:2241 et seq.

I agree with the majority that the Act is intended to protect those contributing to the construction, alteration, or repair of public works, rather than to foreclose preexisting contractual rights between parties. In enacting the subject version of La.Rev.Stat. 38:2247, the legislature sought to define the rights of persons or claimants to have or bring a right of action against a contractor or a surety. Acts 1962, No. 16. In my view, one purpose of the notice requirements of La.Rev.Stat. 38:2242 is to ensure the governing authority and the statutory surety are not subject to claims long after a project is completed. See "K" Construction, Inc. v. Burko Construction, Inc., 629 So.2d 1370, 1374 (La. App. 4th Cir.1993), However, I do not believe that is the only purpose. The notice to the governing authority, together with recordation in the public records as required in La.Rev.Stat. 38:2242(B), also alerts other claimants and interested persons to the subcontractor's claim against not only the contractor, but also any claims on the statutory bond. As the majority opinion notes, the Act, in lieu of a lien against the public work itself, gives claimants a privilege against the unexpended funds in the possession of the public entity, including certain claimants like materialmen and laborers who do not enjoy contractual privity with the general contractor or the governing authority. Op. at 301, citing Wilkin v. Dev. Con Builders, Inc., 561 So.2d 66, 70 (La.1990). The governing authority, however, is also protected if it complies with the Act. Id. The bond itself, deemed a statutory bond, need only be at least 50% of the contract price. La. Rev Stat. 38:2241(A)(2). Importantly, sureties and contractors executing payment bonds for public works contracts under this Act "shall be immune from liability for or payment of any claims not required by this Part." La.Rev.Stat. 38:2241(C). Ultimately, because the pool of funds established by the statutory bond may be finite, the Act is intended to provide proportional payment to all eligible claimants.

To that end, I believe La.Rev.Stat. 38:2247 is intended to put all of the claimants, whether in contractual privity with the general contractor or not, on relatively equal footing when it comes to asserting their statutory liens, or privileges, against the surety on the bond. The subcontractor who enjoys contractual privity with the general contractor may nonetheless exercise his right of action directly against the contractor, and most assuredly so, but he may also proceed directly against the surety on the statutory bond, so long as he first establishes his statutory lien or privilege as required by La.Rev.Stat. 38:2242(B). I see no unreasonable intrusion into the contractual rights of the subcontractor in such a situation, as he may still proceed against the contractor, in any case, but he may also proceed against the surety without waiting until after the recordation of acceptance of the work by the governing authority. The only condition for proceeding against the surety on the statutory bond is compliance with the notice and recordation requirements of La. Rev.Stat. 38:2242. In my view, this reading of the two statutes in pari materia gives effect to all of the language in both. Accordingly, I would find that a claimant to maintain his direct action against the surety on the statutory bond under La. Rev.Stat. 38:2247, must first establish his privilege thereon through the notice and recordation requirements set forth in La. Rev.Stat. 38:2242(B), as well as file suit within the time limitations of La.Rev.Stat. 38:2247.

HUGHES, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by GUIDRY, J., and assigns additional reasons.

The courts are supposed to follow the law, not make it.

Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2241(C) provides, in pertinent part: "Sureties and contractors executing payment bonds for public works contracts under this Part shall be immune from liability for or payment of any claims not required by this Part." (Emphasis added.)

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kimball, stated that:

State Division of Administration v. McInnis Brothers Construction, 97-0742 (La. 10/21/97), 701 So.2d 937, 944.

In the present case the claimant intentionally chose not to comply with the Public Works Act and did not comply with the notice and recordation requirements of this Part. The statutory surety is therefore immune.