GENOVESE, JUSTICE

We granted writs in this succession case to determine whether the testament at issue is valid under Louisiana law, where the first two pages of the testament were initialed rather than signed and where the testament contains no attestation clause which meets all of the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577, nor any attestation by the notary beyond the general notarization. For the following reasons, we find the propounded testament materially deviated from the form requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577 and is thus absolutely null pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 1573.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ronnie Robert Toney, the decedent in this case, passed away on January 19, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Toney"). He was predeceased by his second wife, Jeannette Rena Toney, who died on October 18, 1999. Mrs. Toney had no children. In her will, which was executed on September 23, 1993, she bequeathed her entire estate to her husband, or, if he did not survive her, to Richie Glenn Gerding (hereinafter referred to as "Gerding" or "applicant).1 Mrs. Toney's succession was not opened immediately upon her death.

On April 13, 2015, Gerding filed a "Petition for Filing and Execution of Testaments and for Confirmation of Independent Executor," with Mrs. Toney's September 23, 1993 will attached, along with a document entitled "Last Will and Testament of Ronnie R. Toney," dated August 2, 2014. Gerding sought to file and execute both testaments and to have the court appoint him as independent executor of the couple's successions. Both testaments were probated. However, on May 6, 2015, John Huey Pierce Jenkins (hereinafter referred to as "Jenkins" or "plaintiff"), the uncle of Mr. Toney, filed a petition for annulment of the August 2, 2014 testament, alleging that "the purported notarial testament of the decedent is an absolute nullity for lack of form." Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the testament was not in compliance with the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577, because the testament was not signed on each separate page, the attestation clause was not in proper form, and the notary, witnesses, and testator were not in the presence of each other at the execution of the testament.

The August 2, 2014 testament, as submitted by Gerding, consists of three numbered pages along with an attached, though unnumbered, affidavit. Instead of a full signature, only the printed initials "RT" are found on the bottom left corner of the first two pages of the testament, which contain all but the end of the last sentence of the dispositive provisions of the will. The third page of the testament begins with the conclusion of this sentence and appears as follows:

[This clause is followed by signatures of Angela Dutel, Robert A. Davis, and William J. Orazio, Jr.]

An additional, unnumbered page entitled "Affidavit" is attached to the three-paged testament and appears as follows:

Three witnesses' signatures are found under this provision, with the third witness's signature falling on the following page. The affidavit then concludes:

Louis G. Dutel III, 66415 [signed]

[Louis Dutel's notarial stamp and Ronnie R. Toney's full signature are also found on the concluding page of the affidavit.]

After a hearing in which the parties stipulated that Jenkins was the nearest heir of Toney, the trial court judge found that the testament in question was absolutely null for lack of form, stating in oral reasons that, in his opinion, although the initials instead of a signature by itself would have been sufficient to meet the requirements of the notarial will, the attestation clause was also deficient, as it did not address whether the witnesses attested to viewing the testator sign each page, which is a requirement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the will did not substantially comply with the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577, because it failed "to state that the testator declared, in the presence of the notary, that the testament was his last will and testament or that all persons signed in the presence of each other, including the notary." Successions of Toney, 2015-1928, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 195 So.3d 672, 675, writ granted 16-1534 (La. 12/16/16), 212 So.3d 1168. Judge Higginbotham dissented, noting that no fraud was indicated or pled and finding that the clause signed by the notary substantially complies with the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577 in light of this court's holding in In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845. Jenkins subsequently appealed the First Circuit's holding, and this court granted writs.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

This case tests the limits of what constitutes compliance with the formal requirements of La. Civ.Code. art. 1577 for the purpose of confecting a valid notarial testament under Louisiana law. The notarial testament is one of only two forms of testaments currently permissible under Louisiana law — the other being the olographic, or handwritten, testament. There is a presumption in favor of the validity of testaments in general, and proof of the nonobservance of formalities must be exceptionally compelling to rebut that presumption. In re Succession of Holbrook, p.11, 144 So.3d at 853. However, the Civil Code also provides in no uncertain terms that "[t]he formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null." La. Civ.Code art. 1573 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the codal article which provides the form requirements for the notarial testament does contain an allowance that the mandated attestation clause need only be "substantially similar" to the sample declaration provided in statute:

The notarial testament was added to the Civil Code in the 1997 revision. Comment (a) to La. Civ.Code art. 1577 provides "[t]his article reproduces the substance of R.S. 9:2442. It does not change the law." Thus, case law regarding both La. Civ. Code art. 1557 and its predecessor, La. R.S. 9:2442, is instructive.

The applicant argues that the lower courts' holdings, finding no substantial compliance with La. Civ.Code art. 1577 in this case, are in direct conflict with In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So.3d 845. In Holbrook, the only flaw with the testament at issue was the failure to specify the "day" in the date contained in the attestation clause. In analyzing the validity of the testament, this court first noted that "[a]lthough [La. Civ.Code] Art. 1577, like former La.Rev.Stat. 9:2442, mandates the will be dated, it does not specify the location in the testament where the date must appear." Id. at 850. Summarizing previous case law, the court stated:

Id. at 852 (emphasis added). Importantly, in Holbrook, the full date was unambiguously referenced on each page of the testament, despite its absence in the attestation clause, and the attestation clause itself was located between two unambiguous references to the full date. Thus, the oversight of failing to mention the day within the attestation clause constituted a "minor deviation," and this court found the attestation clause was thus "substantially similar" to the form found in La. Civ.Code. art 1577(2).

The applicant rightly notes that this court in Holbrook relied heavily on our previous decision in Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366 (La. 1987). In Guezuraga, the attack on the validity of the testament at issue was based exclusively on the decedent's failure to sign the second page, which contained the conclusion of the testament's attestation clause. The applicable statutory provision in that case was La. R.S. 9:2442(B)(1)(emphasis added), which, similar to current La. Civ.Code. art. 1577, required that:

Opponents to the will in Guezuraga argued that the term "will" referred only to the dispositive provisions, but that the term "instrument" encompassed the entire document, including the attestation clause. Because the testator had not signed the second page of the will, which included the end of the attestation clause, the opponents argued the will was invalid under a strict reading of the La. R.S. 9:2442(B)(1). This court disagreed, explaining:

Guezuraga, 512 So.2d at 368.3 Relying on Guezuraga and on the fact that the trial court stated orally that it found no evidence of fraud in this case, the applicant seeks to have this court apply the guideline suggested by a law review article quoted favorably in that opinion: "When the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should not produce nullity." Id. at 368 (quoting Casenote, Donations — Imperfect Compliance with the Formal Requirements of the Statutory Will, 15 Loy. L. Rev. 362, 371 (1968-69)).4 However, as shown below, Guezeraga presented a distinguishable factual scenario in which this court faced only a slight irregularity in the placement of the testator's signature. In contrast, applying this guideline as suggested by applicant to uphold the validity of the testament at issue in this case would eviscerate the clear formal requirements of the Civil Code as put in place by the legislature.

In determining whether the will at issue was invalid for the testator's failure to sign the final page containing the conclusion of the attestation clause, the Guezuraga court carefully examined the history and statutory construction of La. R.S. 9:2442 and concluded that, under the statute as amended, "[i]t is now clear that the testator need not sign after the attestation clause[;]" thus, the lack of the signature on the second page containing only the conclusion of the attestation clause did not invalidate the will. Id. at 369 (citation omitted). In contrast, after an examination of La. Civ.Code. art. 1577's history and construction, we find no indication that the testator in this case met the legal formality requirements for the notarial will. While it is true that past Louisiana courts have validated notarial wills containing minor deviations from the statutory — and now codal — requirements, we find no error in the lower courts' conclusion that the testament in the present case, viewed in its entirety, along with the attached affidavit, does not substantially comply with the formal requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577.

The propounded testament in the present case failed to comply with the formal requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577 in a several respects. First, La. Civ.Code art. 1557(1) requires that the testator "shall sign his name of at the end of the testament and on each other separate page." (Emphasis added). In this case, the first two pages of the will are not signed, but are only initialed "R.T." Further, the initials are in print rather than cursive writing. Although signatures come in a variety of forms, and although a few appellate courts have upheld wills where some pages were initialed rather than signed,5 we note that La. Civ.Code art. 1557(1) unambiguously requires the testator to "sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page," and merely initialing undoubtedly falls short of this requirement. Particularly where, as here, the initials are written in easily imitable print rather than cursive, we are hesitant to find that this deviation from the codal requirement is merely minor or technical. Although fraud was not alleged at the trial court level, signing one's name on each page of the will undoubtedly offers more heightened protection from surreptitious replacement of pages than mere initialing, particularly when the initialing is in print rather than cursive as is found here.

Second, we find that the various clauses contained in the testament and the affidavit, even considered in aggregate, are not substantially similar to the sample attestation clause contained in La. Civ. Code art. 1577(2), which states:

With regard to the attestation clause requirement, this court has stated:

Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 385, 242 So.2d 551, 552-3 (1970) (citations omitted).

In Succession of Brown, 458 So.2d 140, 143 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984), the First Circuit succinctly summarized the three required elements of a valid attestation clause under La. R.S. 9:2442(B)(2), La Civ. Code. art. 1577(2)'s similarly-worded counterpart, as follows:

(Emphasis in original.) In this case, none of these three requirements is fully met. As to the first requirement, although the third page of the will states it "was signed in our [the three witnesses'] sight and presence," it does not mention that the will was signed on each separate page as specified in the sample attestation clause. Additionally, neither the will nor the affidavit contains a declaration that the notary viewed the will being signed (only the affidavit is notarized). Similarly, as to the second clause, although the witnesses signed a clause affirming that the testator "declared this instrument to be his/her Last Will and Testament," the notary made no such declaration. Finally, as to the third requirement, although the witnesses declare "to the undersigned authority... that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the Testator ... and in the presence of each other, hereby signs this will, on the date of the instrument" (emphasis added), the witnesses do not mention signing the will in the presence of the notary.

Established appellate jurisprudence holds that an attestation clause is defective when the clause does not indicate the notary and witnesses signed in the presence of the testator and each other. As noted by the Court of Appeal in this case, the alleged "attestation clauses" at issue in this case are nearly identical to the ones found deficient in In re Succession of Seal, 10-0351 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/10/10), 2010 WL 3527597(unpublished), writ denied, 10-2294 (La. 1/28/11), 56 So.3d 964, in which the propounded testament was declared invalid.

In a similar case to the one at bar, In re Succession of Dunaway, 11-1747, 11-1748, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12), 92 So.3d 555, 559-560 (emphasis added), Judge Welch wrote as organ for the First Circuit:

We agree with the First Circuit's analysis, which emphasizes La. Civ.Code art. 1577(2)'s requirement that "[i]n the presences of the testator and each other, the notary and the witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially similar ..." (emphasis added).6 It is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Guillory v. Pelican Real Estate, Inc., 2014-1539, 2104-1593, 2014-1624, p. 3 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So.3d 875, 877; Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 03-0360, p. 9 (La. 12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112, 1119. If the legislature had desired that such generic notarization language suffice for purposes of the notarial will, it could have simply required notarial testaments to be formalized via authentic act.

Indeed, although Louisiana's "notarial will" — previously called the "statutory will" — may have been originally inspired by American common law, its requirement of notarization is unique.7 Louisiana's notarial testament also deviates from the requirements found in most of the rest of country in other ways, including requiring a signature on every page and requiring the witnesses expressly to sign an attestation clause indicating the testator declared the instrument signed to be his will.8 In his brief, the applicant suggests that the testament at issue originated from a form found on the internet. This hypothesis is supported by the appearance of the word "COUNTY" in the affidavit. Although we are sympathetic to the fact that a testator could errantly use such a form in ignorance, to hold the propounded testament in substantial compliance with La. Civ.Code. art. 1577 would essentially negate any value to the distinct form requirements which our legislature has chosen to put in place. Further, the legislature has provided a significant benefit for testaments which comply with these unique requirements: the notarial testament does not need to be proved, and "[u]pon production of the testament, the court shall order it filed and executed and this order shall have the effect of probate." La. C.C.P. art. 2891. Whether it is prudent to further reduce testamentary form requirements so as to more liberally encompass those commonly found in other states is a question of policy reserved to the purview of the legislature.

The standard announced in Guezuraga and applied in Holbrook emphasizes liberal interpretation of testaments in order to maintain the validity of a will if at all possible, as long as it is in "substantial compliance" with the statute. In deciding what constitutes "substantial compliance," Guezuraga and Holbrook state that the courts are to look to purpose of the formal requirements, i.e., to guard against fraud. However, as discussed above, the facts of these cases presented only minor technical omissions. Such "slight departures" or "minor deviations", where there is no indication or allegation of fraud, may support a finding of substantial compliance with the formal requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577.9 In contrast, Louisiana courts have held statutory and notarial wills invalid when they contain material deviations from form requirements, even in the absence of any indication of fraud.10 Any language in previous jurisprudence which suggested otherwise is rejected.

Although the trial court stated orally that "there does not seem to be any indication of fraud," we find the deviations from required testamentary form in this case are significant and material; thus, we agree with the lower courts' finding that the will did not substantially comply with La. Civ.Code art. 1577. The first two pages of the will are merely initialed rather than signed, and it is undisputed that no attestation clause indicates that the testator declared, in the presence of the notary, that the testament was his last will and testament, or that all persons signed in the presence of each other, including the notary. The applicant asks this court to reconstruct a valid attestation clause out of parts of three separate clauses, one of which is the ordinary notarial certification attached to any authentic act; however, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the clauses at issue did not substantially comply with the codal requirements for an attestation clause. Likewise, the lower courts did not err in finding the testament invalid pursuant to La. Civ.Code. art. 1577.

In the applicant's view, the First Circuit's legal error requiring strict compliance in this case has been "metastasizing" throughout the jurisprudence. We believe, however, that it is the applicant's suggested interpretation of law which would encourage metastization of legal error through the suggestion that generic, multistate templates, which are significantly more lenient than the form prescribed by our legislature, are nevertheless substantially compliant with the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577.

In the alternative, the applicant seeks to have this court remand the case for further proceedings so the parties can put on evidence to demonstrate whether the will was in procedural compliance with La. Civ.Code art. 1577. However, as shown above, the testament itself failed to include the mandatory elements specified in La. Civ.Code art. 1577. While extrinsic evidence may be used to resolve ambiguity in a testament,11 extrinsic evidence cannot cure a testament which is materially defective on its face. The formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely null. La. Civ.Code art. 1573. As the testament propounded in this case materially deviated from the requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 1577 as described in detail above, we find the lower courts correctly held that it is absolutely null.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's finding that the testament is absolutely null.

This court has long held that courts must liberally construe and apply the statutes to maintain the validity of a will if at all possible, as long as it is in substantial compliance with La. C.C. art. 1577. See Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 385, 242 So.2d 551, 552 (1970). More recently, this court explained that "courts need not strictly adhere to the formal requirements of the statutory will, to the extent of elevating form over function." In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845, 851 (emphasis added). As we explained in Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366, 368 (La. 1987):

In this case, no fraud was indicated or pled, and it was clearly the intent of Mr. Toney that his entire estate be left to Mr. Gerding. In my view, the attestation clause in Mr. Toney's will substantially complies with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577. For these reasons, I would reverse the rulings of the lower courts and affirm the validity of Mr. Toney's will.

WEIMER, J., dissenting.

The majority presents a well-researched and balanced opinion, which addresses many of the arguments opposed to the majority's conclusion. However, while acknowledging there has been no hint of fraud regarding Mr. Toney's testament, the majority ultimately elevates form over the substance of what Mr. Toney intended.

Although Mr. Toney's testament would never be considered a textbook example of formal compliance for drafting wills, it bears mentioning that the testament clearly conveys Mr. Toney's intent to leave his estate to his brother-in-law. Not only is it undisputed that the testament itself conveys that intent, but it is also undisputed that when his wife was alive, Mr. Toney executed a previous testament bequeathing the entirety of his estate to her unless she predeceased him. Furthermore, if his wife predeceased him, Mr. Toney directed that the entirety of his estate be given to her brother, Richie Gerding, who is the same brother-in-law named as the sole legatee in the testament at issue in this case.

For all the majority's otherwise thorough legal exposition, without citation to any authority, the majority dismisses the possibility of "reconstruct[ing] a valid attestation clause out of parts of three separate clauses, one of which is the ordinary notarial certification attached to any authentic act." Succession of Toney, 16-1534, op. at 407-08 (La. 5/3/17). In the face of such clear indicators of the testator's intent, piecing together the formal aspects to give effect to the substance of the testament is precisely the sort of exercise that the law favors. See, e.g., La. C.C. art. 1611 ("The intent of the testator controls the interpretation of his testament.") and La. C.C. art. 1612 ("A disposition should be interpreted in a sense in which it can have effect, rather than in one in which it can have none.").1

Inasmuch as the majority acknowledges that giving effect to Mr. Toney's testament would require the court to "reconstruct a valid attestation clause," the majority also acknowledges that this is not a situation in which formalities are wholly lacking. Succession of Toney, op. at 407-08. Therefore, the following longstanding principles, which the majority properly reproduces, but does not heed, directly apply:

Succession of Toney, op. at 405 (quoting Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551, 552 (1970).

As this court has previously recognized, in "adopt[ing] the statutory will from the common law," the legislature sought "to avoid ... rigid formal requirements." Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So.2d 366, 368 (La. 1987). Indeed, the legislature has indicated that the "notarial testament" (formerly referred to in Guezuraga as the "statutory will")2 does not require exactitude, only that the testator, notary, and witnesses declare what is "substantially similar" to the attestation clause provided in the Civil Code. See La. C.C. art. 1577(2).

In the instant case, Mr. Toney's own attestation clause indicates the testament was signed by Mr. Toney, who declared it to be his last will and testament in the presence of the witnesses, but fails to attest that Mr. Toney or the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the notary. Additionally, the signature of Mr. Toney attests that he declares to the "undersigned authority" (i.e., the notary) that he is signing, but does not attest that he is signing in the presence of the notary. However, the notary signed an attestation clause stating that the testament was subscribed, sworn, and acknowledged by Mr. Toney and by the three witnesses. When all the attestation clauses are considered together — an approach consistent with La. C.C. arts. 1611 and 1612 and with the liberal interpretative standard described by this court in Guezuraga — there was substantial compliance with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577.

Pointing to the provision in La. C.C. art. 1577(1) that "the testator ... shall sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page," the majority also finds Mr. Toney's initials on the first two pages of the testament are insufficient, giving no effect to the witnesses' notarized attestation that Mr. Toney signed the testament. With scant analysis, the majority effectively overrules two appellate court decisions, Succession of Squires, 93-1589 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94), 640 So.2d 813, and Succession of Armstrong, 93-2385 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/28/94), 636 So.2d 1109. In both Squires and Armstrong, the testator fully signed the last page of a testament, but placed initials on the first page. The Squires court found "these are minor departures from [sic] and have nothing to do with any attempted fraud. Common sense dictates that they should not nullify the clear intent of the testator." Squires, 93-1589 at 5, 640 So.2d at 815. Similarly, the Armstrong court upheld the testament, explaining that "[t]here is little formality required for signatures which come in all shapes and sizes and are often illegible." Armstrong, 93-2385 at 5, 636 So.2d at 1111.

I find the principles just quoted from Squires and Armstrong to be compelling, especially in light of the legislature's movement away from the numerous formalistic wills previously recognized by Louisiana law. See La. C.C. art. 1574, revision cmt. (a) ("This Article changes the law by suppressing the `public and private nuncupative' and `mystic' testaments found in the Civil Code of 1870.").3 In over 20 years since they were penned, the Squires and Armstrong opinions have not been criticized in any reported decision in the jurisprudence. These opinions should not be so lightly cast aside, as the majority now does.4 Neither should no effect be given to the witnesses' sworn testimony — recorded on the testament by the notary — that it was Mr. Toney who signed all pages of the testament. See La. R.S. 35:3 ("Oaths and acknowledgments, in all cases, may be taken or made by or before any notary public duly appointed and qualified in this state."); see also In re Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181, p. 11 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845, 853 (quoting Succession of Armstrong, 636 So.2d at 1111 ("Under Louisiana law, there is a presumption in favor of the validity of testaments in general and proof of the nonobservance of formalities must be exceptionally compelling to rebut that presumption.").

In conclusion, Mr. Toney's intent to donate his estate to his brother-in-law, Richie Gerding, is unrefuted. There has been no allegation of fraud regarding the drafting or the execution of his testament. Even so, under the majority's ruling, the result for Mr. Toney's estate will be the same as if fraud had been actually proven, as this testament will be annulled and, it appears, his estate will lapse into intestacy. This result not only defeats Mr. Toney's intent, but it runs contrary to the substantial compliance standard embodied in La. C.C. art. 1577, a standard which has previously been recognized by this court's jurisprudence. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons:

I fully agree with the majority's well-reasoned and thoughtful conclusion in this case. The analysis recognizes the importance of considering a testator's intent, C.C. art. 1611, but it also makes clear that upholding the validity of this particular testament on the facts of this case would chip away at the foundations of our Civil Code's requirements. See C.C. art. 1577.

I write separately to express my concern about the proliferation of widely available and generic legal templates, which may substantially deviate from form requirements set forth in the Civil Code. The obligation to meet these requirements is critical, because the Civil Code is "the primary source of law, and precedent serves merely as an example of a prior judge's interpretation and application of legislated law." James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1 (1993). The legislature, of course, can make changes to those form requirements, but it is up to this Court to uphold the law as written and avoid what the majority aptly describes as the "metastization" of legal error in interpreting Civil Code articles.