LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.
On July 25, 2018, pro se plaintiff Tracy Riley ("Riley") filed the above-captioned matter against over 100 individuals and entities.
A court "shall dismiss" an in forma pauperis case "at any time" if the court determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Consequently, a court may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte in a lawsuit filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Fasola v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 02-31161, 2003 WL 21016905, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2003). "[W]here it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly dismissed pursuant to § 1915(d)." Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 256.
On December 27, 2018, the Court issued an order explaining that plaintiff Tracy Riley's federal law and state tort law claims appear to be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Riley asserts federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. "Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against those who, under color of law, deprive a citizen of the United States of `any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,'" Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and a § 1985 claim alleges a conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985; see also Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the "essence" of a claim under either § 1983 or § 1985 is the deprivation of a person's constitutional rights).
"The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is `the forum state's personal-injury limitations period,' which in Louisiana is one year." Smith v. Reg'l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998)). "In applying the forum state's statute of limitations, the federal court should also give effect to any applicable tolling provisions." Id. (quoting Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993)). Courts apply the same standard for § 1985 claims. Helton, 832 F.2d at 334; Green v. Grampre, 388 F. App'x 437, 438 (5th Cir. 2010). Section 1986 explicitly provides for a one-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 ("[N]o action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued."). Accordingly, the limitations period for Riley's federal law claims is one year.
"Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257. "As a result, the limitations period begins `when the plaintiff is in possession of the `critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.'" Smith, 827 F.3d at 421 (quoting Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 257); see also Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 ("[A]ny cause of action against the defendants accrued as soon as plaintiff knew or should have known of the overt acts involved in the alleged conspiracy.").
To determine when Riley's federal law claims accrued, the critical inquiry is when Riley knew or had reason to know of the injuries forming the basis of her amended complaint. Knowledge in this context has two components: awareness of the injuries and the connection between the injuries and the defendants' actions. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 2015). "`[A]wareness' for accrual purposes does not mean actual knowledge; rather, all that must be shown is the existence of `circumstances [that] would lead a reasonable person to investigate further.'" Id. (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)). Furthermore, Riley need not have known that a legal cause of action exists for her claims; she only needed to be aware of the facts that support such claims. Id.
Generally speaking, Riley alleges that dozens of individuals, organizations, and government officials conspired to prevent her from successfully running her business, the Rouge House.
More specifically, Riley alleges that, in June 2013, she entered into a lease agreement so that she could open the Rouge House.
Riley's allegations of obstructionist conduct and unsubstantiated accusations extend into August 2013, during which time she alleges that organizations in the French Quarter launched a racially discriminatory campaign to prevent her from obtaining an alcohol permit and operating the Rouge House.
At a hearing held to afford Riley an opportunity to provide additional information in support of her applications, ATC agents and their associates allegedly yelled at Riley, directed accusations at her, and accused her of having a behavior disorder.
Riley has not argued that she only learned about the facts underlying her claims years after they happened, and nothing in the amended complaint suggests that it was not until after January 2014 that Riley become aware that her rights under federal law were allegedly being violated. Furthermore, nothing in the amended complaint indicates that Riley did not understand the connection between the harm she allegedly suffered and the defendants' alleged conduct. Riley either knew or should have known of the injuries that form the basis of her federal law claims by no later than January 2014, and her federal law claims are time-barred by more than three years.
In her memorandum, Riley argues that "[t]he Defendants' actions and publications against [her] consecutively occurred during the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018."
The continuing tort doctrine acts as an exception to the one-year prescriptive period under Louisiana law. "For the purpose of determining when prescription starts to run, Louisiana distinguishes between injuries resulting from continuous operating causes and those that result from discontinuous operating causes." Young v. United States, 727 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 2013).
Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-2632, p. 16 (La. 7/6/10); 45 So.3d 991, 1003 (citation omitted). When the face of the complaint establishes that a plaintiff's claims have prescribed, and she attempts to avail herself of the continuing tort theory, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing its applicability. In re Med. Review Panel for Maria Moses, 00-2643, p. 6 (La. 5/21/01); 788 So.2d 1173, 1177.
Riley offers several facts in support of this argument, none of which are availing. First, she notes that the defendants' "defamatory statements have been published and republished each year through 2017."
Additionally, Riley has included in her memorandum a timeline of events to demonstrate that her claims are not time-barred.
A review of the myriad of filings Riley has submitted demonstrates that Riley's claims stem from what she purports was a conspiracy to deprive her of the alcohol permits necessary to sustain her business. Even if some or all of the 100-plus defendants in this case have engaged in other, unlawful behavior since January 2014, that behavior would not affect the untimeliness of the claims currently before the Court.
As to Riley's claim for attorney's fees under § 1988, "the purpose of section 1988 is not to compensate a worthy advocate but to enable and encourage a wronged person to retain a lawyer." De Mino v. Achenbaum, 136 F. App'x 695, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981)). As a pro se litigant, Riley is not entitled to recover attorney's fees under § 1988. Id. For the foregoing reasons reasons, the Court finds that Riley's federal law claims are prescribed or without merit, warranting their dismissal.
Similarly, Riley's state law tort claims are barred by Louisiana's prescription laws. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492; La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5111. Article 3492's one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions bars Riley's claim for trespassing. See Hirstius v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 12-2104, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/14/13); 123 So.3d 276, 279 (explaining that a lawsuit seeking damages for trespass is a tort action subject to article 3492); Estate of Patout v. City of New Iberia, 97-1097, p. 2, 9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98); 708 So.2d 526, 526, 530 (noting that article 3492 applies to a trespassing claim). It also bars her claim for "unlawful touching," or battery. See Hazlett v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, No. 18-5266, 2018 WL 4386104, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2018) (Zainey, J.) (applying Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period to several state law claims, including a claim for battery); Cacioppo v. Alton Ochsner Found. Hosp., 01-808, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/01); 806 So.2d 803, 805 (explaining that claims for battery are subject to article 3492).
Riley's amended complaint does not explain the basis for her takings claim. However, any such claim is subject to a three-year prescriptive period. La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5111. Pursuant to § 5111, "[a]ctions for compensation for property taken by the state, parish, municipality, or other political subdivision or any one of their respective agencies shall prescribe three years from the date of such taking." Assuming that Riley has a takings claim, she was evicted from the property in which the Rouge House was doing business in January 2014; therefore, any possible takings claim prescribed in 2017.
To the extent that Riley has also asserted claims under the Louisiana Constitution, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . ."). None of the factors of judicial economy, convenience, or fairness weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the remaining claims. A scheduling order has not been issued yet— meaning a trial date has not been set. Some of the defendant have not even been served. The case has been pending in federal court for less than six months, and the Court is not yet invested in Riley's state constitutional claims. See Batiste v. Island Records, 179 F.3d 217, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly,
Finally, although Riley references a "false citation" claim, the Court is not aware of such a cause of action, and Riley does not elaborate further. Count three alleges that the ATC unjustly issued Riley citations. See R. Doc. No. 6, at 29-30. But Riley alleges that the citations violated her constitutional rights, id. at 30-31, claims that the Court has already addressed.
