RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CLAIMS
JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims (R.Doc. 43) filed by Defendants, the Town of Clinton, James Cook, Don Reason, and Eddie Stewart (collectively, the "Defendants"). Oral argument was heard on February 6, 2015.1
Considering the law and facts in the record, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. All claims against Defendant Don Reason are dismissed. Plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Clinton is dismissed. Further, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution as to all Defendants are also dismissed. In all other respects, Defendants' motion is denied.
A. Section 1983 Claims
The law concerning probable cause and qualified immunity was well briefed by the Defendants and need not be repeated here. Similarly, the parties each extensively detailed their version of the facts, and this also does not warrant restating.
As noted at oral argument, the issue to be decided for this motion is not whether there was probable cause for the arrest of the Plaintiffs Carol Shirley and Alice Kent. The issues are whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to probable cause and whether reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was probable cause.
The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment as to James Cook on the § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for arrest without probable cause. Specifically, the Court finds the following issues of material fact: (1) the extent of oversight, control, and approval the Town of Clinton exercised over the Clinton Main Street Association ("Main Street") and the Board of Friends of Clinton Main Street ("Friends");2 (2) the payment of expenses and whether that was done properly and in lieu of a salary, as Plaintiff claimed;3 (3) Greg Phares and Tracy Richard's statements that there was no probable cause;4 and (4) Mary Sue Stage's testimony that she conducted an audit, that she found no illegitimate expenses, and that there was nothing which Main Street did not approve.5 Further, for all of these reasons, the Court finds that reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was probable cause for Cook to arrest the Plaintiffs.
The Court also finds that there are issues of fact as to the issue of qualified immunity. All of the above reasons related to probable cause weigh equally against a finding of qualified immunity. Additionally, Stewart's testimony concerning Cook also weighs against a finding of qualified immunity. Stewart testified that he met with Cook about the investigation over coffee and said that he might want to talk to the District Attorney, Sam D'Aquilla, before he swore out an arrest warrant to ensure he had enough probable cause. (R.Doc. 48-2, p. 59-60). Cook apparently ignored this "order" from his superior officer. (Id.). Further, after the October 10, 2012, meeting with Phares, Reason, and the various Alderman, Stewart left the meeting with the thought that, "as far as I was concerned, based on what I knew, that the case still needed to be investigated . . ." (R.Doc. 48-2, p. 63). Yet Cook arrested Kent and Shirley one month later. Finally, Stewart said that Cook went "rogue" in this investigation. (R.Doc. 48-2, p. 65-66). All of this demonstrates, not that Cook was a "bad guy," as Defendants contend, but that there are issues of fact as to the reasonableness of his conduct as the investigating officer.6
In sum, the Court finds that there are issues of fact concerning Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest as to James Cook. Further, reasonable minds could differ on this issue. Accordingly, Defendants' motion on this claim is denied.
The Court denies summary judgment on this claim as to Eddie Stewart as well. Don Reason testified that Eddie Stewart "was running the whole investigation." (R.Doc. 48-2, p. 52). Further, Cook reported to Stewart from time to time relative to the progress of the investigation and even gave the order to consult with the District Attorney. (Id., p. 59-60). This is sufficient to create an issue of fact to preclude summary judgment.
However, summary judgment is granted as to Don Reason and the Town of Clinton for this § 1983 claim. There is no vicarious liability under § 1983, and the Plaintiff has failed to produce adequate evidence that the Town and Reason were sufficiently involved in the investigation to warrant the finding of liability. Further, a "supervisor or municipality may be liable for failure to supervise or train if: (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference." Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps, 825 F.Supp.2d 730, 745 (E.D.La. 2011). Here, the Plaintiff has also failed to produce any evidence satisfying any of these elements as to the Town of Clinton. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims as to Don Reason and the Town of Clinton are dismissed.
Finally, Defendants point to Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003), which concluded that "no . . . freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists." Id. at 945. Defendants are correct; there is no § 1983 action for malicious prosecution. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs have pled a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, this claim is dismissed as to all Defendants.
B. State Law Claims
The Court also denies summary judgment as to all state law claims against Eddie Stewart and James Cook.7 First, because the Court denies summary judgment on the § 1983 claim for false arrest, the Court will also deny summary judgment on the state law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims as to these Defendants. For the same reasons, the Court finds that there are issues of fact as to whether these Defendants acted reasonably under the circumstances, thereby precluding summary judgment on the negligence claim. Further, reasonable minds could differ as to whether "the conduct of [Stewart and Cook] was extreme and outrageous," as required for a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969 F.Supp.2d 493, 516 (M.D.La. 2013).8 Accordingly, summary judgment is denied on this claim as well.
Further, one of the requirements for a claim for defamation is "an unprivileged publication to a third party." Henry v. Lake Charles American Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009). In Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 05-1418, p. 9 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669, 682, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the following standard for privilege:
First, it must be determined whether the attending circumstances of a communication occasion a qualified privilege. The second step of the analysis is a determination of whether the privilege was abused, which requires that the grounds for abuse-malice or lack of good faith-be examined. "While the first step is generally determined by the court as a matter of law, the second step of determining abuse of a conditional privilege or malice is generally a fact question for the jury `[u]nless only one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence.'"
(citations omitted). Here, because of the facts outlined above, the Court finds that there are issues of fact as to whether Officer Cook and Eddie Stewart abused their privilege by acting in bad faith.
Finally, the Court believes that the Plaintiffs failed to show an issue of fact as to Don Reason with respect to their state law claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Further, while the Plaintiffs demonstrated that Reason may have uttered defamatory words,9 they failed to present any evidence that he acted maliciously or in bad faith to vitiate the above privilege. Accordingly, all state law claims against Don Reason are also dismissed.
C. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims (R.Doc. 43) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against Defendant Don Reason are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Town of Clinton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983 as to all Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in all other respects, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
