RULING AND ORDER

ERIN WILDER-DOOMES, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is a Motion for Relief under FRCP 19 (the "Motion")1 filed by plaintiffs, Larry and Stacy Bigelow ("Plaintiffs"). The Motion is opposed2 by defendants, S.T.A.R. Concrete Pumping, Inc. ("STAR"), Wesco Insurance Company ("Wesco"), and Tea Unn Conner ("Conner") (collectively, "Defendants"). For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion3 is DENIED.4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs file, within seven (7) days of this Ruling and Order, a comprehensive amended complaint that adequately alleges the domiciles of Plaintiffs and Conner.5

I. Background

On October 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants for injuries allegedly sustained in a January 5, 2017 automobile accident. Plaintiffs alleged that while traveling "on Pete Manena Rd.," "a 2016 Mack CM truck owned by [Star] and operated by its employee, [Conner], struck the driver's side of plaintiff's vehicle after crossing the center of the roadway onto the plaintiff's side while traveling down Pete Manena Rd. in the opposite direction."6 Per their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged federal subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000,7 exclusive of interest and costs, and that the parties are completely diverse.8

On August 10, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion.9 Per the Motion, Plaintiffs assert that the DOTD "is a party required to be joined pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," and that "joinder of the State of Louisiana is not feasible under Rule 19(b) because said party may be immune for [sic] jurisdiction in this Court or its joinder would deprive the Court of its subject matter jurisdiction in diversity."10 Because Plaintiffs assert that the DOTD is a party which is required to be joined under Rule 19 but for which joinder is not feasible, Plaintiffs "move the Court pursuant to FRCP 19(b) to determine whether, in equity and good conscience, this action should proceed amount [sic] the existing parties or should be dismissed. . . ."11 Plaintiffs note that they have also instituted a separate state court action naming the Defendants herein in addition to the DOTD, but explain that they cannot voluntarily dismiss this suit because of issues related to prescription.12

II. Law and Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that the DOTD should be joined as a defendant pursuant to FRCP 19. FRCP 19 provides, in pertinent part:

Analyzing Rule 19 is a "highly-practical, fact-based endeavor. . . ."13 The Fifth Circuit has explained that "[d]etermining whether to dismiss a case for failure to join an indispensable party requires a two-step inquiry. First the district court must determine whether the party should be added under the requirements of Rule 19(a)."14 "While the party advocating joinder has the initial burden of demonstrating that a missing party is necessary, after `an initial appraisal of the facts indicates that a possibly necessary party is absent, the burden of disputing this initial appraisal falls on the party who opposes joinder.'"15 Second, "[i]f the necessary party cannot be joined without destroying subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must then determine whether that person is `indispensable,' that is, whether litigation can be properly pursued without the absent party" based on the factors set out in FRCP 19(b).16

Plaintiffs have not met their initial burden of establishing that the DOTD is a necessary party. Plaintiffs do not attach a proposed pleading naming the DOTD as a defendant, and the only substantive information contained in the Motion regarding why the DOTD should be named a defendant is that "[t]he accident occurred in a construction zone which, on information and belief, was supervised by" the DOTD and that "[a]fter consulting with an expert regarding the facts and circumstances of this accident, the plaintiffs believed it was necessary to join the DOTD (and its contractor, once identified)."17 Plaintiffs assert that the DOTD is a required party "because in their [sic] absence, the Court cannot afford complete relief among the existing parties or because it may leave the plaintiffs subject to a substantial risk of incurring an inconsistent obligation or result in this matter"18 and hypothesize that "the defendants may utilize an `empty chair' defense or the trier of fact may ultimately conclude that the DOTD is partially at fault in this matter, and its apportionment of fault may differ from the apportionment of fault in the state proceeding, which results may be difficult to reconcile."19 Without providing analysis or citation, Plaintiffs contend that "even though the DOTD is a required party, its joinder would deprive the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction because its joinder would destroy diversity. In addition, there are questions related to whether the state is immune from suit in federal court."20 With respect to whether DOTD is "indispensable," Plaintiffs argue that "they are not aware of any measures by which prejudice could be lessened or avoided," and explain that, although they have filed a state court petition against Defendants named herein as well as the DOTD, Plaintiffs cannot voluntarily dismiss their federal suit in light of prescription concerns.21

Although Plaintiffs have not attached a proposed pleading adding DOTD as a defendant, in opposition to the Motion, Defendants have attached the state court petition referenced by Plaintiffs, which includes the DOTD as a defendant.22 In that state court filing, Plaintiffs allege that on the date of the accident, DOTD "had a construction project underway on said road or otherwise in close proximity thereto"23 and that DOTD was negligent in

As a result of DOTD's negligence, Plaintiffs allege in their state court petition that DOTD and the Defendants named in this action "are liable jointly severally and in solido. . . ."25

The United States Supreme Court has held that joint tortfeasors, as a matter of law, are not Rule 19(a) necessary parties.26 Where a potential party is not a Rule 19(a) necessary party, "no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary."27 The Fifth Circuit has explained that "it is well-established that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint tortfeasors,"28 and the Louisiana Supreme Court long ago explained that "joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable and plaintiff may elect to sue any one of them."29 Here, in light of the allegations against DOTD as set forth in the state court petition, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs would seek to join the DOTD as a joint tortfeasor with the currently named Defendants.30 Because joint tortfeasors are not, as a matter of law, Rule 19(a) necessary parties, it is not necessary to analyze the factors set forth in Rule 19(b).31

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Relief under FRCP 1932 is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs file, within seven (7) days of this Ruling and Order, a comprehensive amended complaint that adequately alleges the domiciles of Plaintiffs and Conner.33