NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

WHIPPLE, C.J.

In this construction contract dispute, defendant appeals the trial court's judgment, dismissing defendant's reconventional demand and its third-party demand on the basis of res judicata. For the following reasons, we affirm, although on a different basis.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2008, Spatz Homes, L.L.C., now Denham Homes, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as "Denham Homes"), as owner, entered into an agreement with R.J. Daigle & Sons Contractors, Inc. ("R.J. Daigle"), as contractor, for the construction of streets, drainage, water and sanitary sewer improvements for certain phases of Crystal Lakes Subdivision in Denham Springs, Louisiana ("the Crystal Lakes project").1 Thereafter, Denham Homes paid R.J. Daigle $3,163,883.75 for services rendered on the Crystal Lakes project. Contending that the actual value of the services it rendered was $3,677,408.44, R.J. Daigle filed suit against Denham Homes in June 2009, alleging that it was owed an additional $513,524.69 under the parties' agreement.2

On July 13, 2009, Denham Homes filed an answer to the petition, denying that it owed R.J. Daigle any further sums and contending that it had in fact overpaid R.J. Daigle. In its answer, Denham Homes also sought to "[reserve] the right to supplement and amend its answer and assert such affirmative defences or reconventional demands as discovery may demonstrate or warrant."

On January 28, 2010, while this construction contract suit was pending, Denham Homes filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization ("Plan of Reorganization") under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was confirmed by the bankruptcy court on April 21, 2011. The confirmed Plan of Reorganization specifically addressed this pending litigation between R.J. Daigle and Denham Homes in Article VI, section J, entitled "The Daigle Dispute," recognizing that prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Denham Homes and R.J. Daigle were in "active litigation over the amount due, if any, from [Denham Homes] to [R.J.] Daigle."3 This provision further set forth that the Daigle Dispute litigation could continue upon the "effective date"4 and the amount of the claim determined. Additionally, Article X of the Plan of Reorganization, entitled "Retention of Causes of Action," provided that Denham Homes and its bankruptcy estate reserved "all of its causes of action arising under state and federal law" and that Denham Homes "reserves all rights to bring such actions prior to June 30, 2011."

Thereafter, on July 18, 2011, Denham Homes filed, in the instant construction contract suit, a Supplemental Answer and Reconventional Demand against R.J. Daigle, contending that R.J. Daigle breached the contract by failing to complete the agreed-upon work and failing to perform the work in a workmanlike manner. Denham Homes further contended that as a result of R.J. Daigle's breach of the construction contract, R.J. Daigle was indebted to Denham Homes in the amount of $1,340,544.55, which included costs incurred in completing unfinished work and repairing or replacing defective work, as well as expenses incurred in interest charges, delays in seeking approval of infrastructure improvements, and marketing delays.

In response to the reconventional demand, R.J. Daigle filed a peremptory exception of res judicata, contending that the reconventional demand should be dismissed because Denham Homes failed to timely assert its claim in accordance with the Plan of Reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court. R.J. Daigle acknowledged that Article VI, section J of the Plan of Reorganization specifically referenced the instant litigation regarding "the amount due, if any, from [Denham Homes] to [R.J.] Daigle" and allowed the litigation to continue "and the amount of any claim determined." However, according to R.J. Daigle, this provision of the Plan of Reorganization did not make any specific reference to any claim that Denham Homes may have against R.J. Daigle and, thus, did not reserve to Denham Homes the right to assert such a claim against R.J. Daigle.

R.J. Daigle further noted that while Article X of the Plan of Reorganization purported to reserve any claim that Denham Homes may have had against it, that provision required that Denham Homes assert any claim prior to June 30, 2011. Thus, R.J. Daigle contended that because Denham Homes failed to bring any claim against it prior to June 30, 2011, the preclusive effect of the Plan of Reorganization required that the reconventional demand be dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of res judicata.

Denham Homes also filed a third-party demand against Forte and Tablada, Inc. ("Forte") on May 7, 2012. In its third-party demand, Denham Homes contended that the Parish of Livingston had required it to have Forte conduct construction inspections and the final inspection of R.J. Daigle's work on the Crystal Lakes project, as well as repair inspections, and that Forte breached its duties to Denham Homes by negligently conducting those inspections, thereby failing to discover numerous failures in R.J. Daigle's work on the project. Denham Homes further contended that Forte's negligence in conducting the inspections resulted in Denham Homes incurring approximately $291,189.00 in costs to repair, replace, and remediate the defective work performed by R.J. Daigle, and not timely detected by Forte, as well as consequential damages estimated at $750,000.00, including excessive interest expense, delays in seeking approval of infrastructure improvements, and marketing delays.

After answering the third-party demand, Forte filed a motion to adopt R.J. Daigle's peremptory exception of res judicata, likewise contending that Denham Homes's third-party demand against Forte should be dismissed in that it was not timely asserted in accordance with the "Retention of Causes of Action" clause contained in the Plan of Reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The trial court signed an order allowing Forte to adopt R.J. Daigle's exception.

A hearing on the exceptions raising the objection of res judicata was held on January 7, 2014, and by judgment dated January 27, 2014, the trial court granted the exceptions and dismissed with prejudice Denham Homes's reconventional demand against R.J. Daigle and its third-party demand against Forte.

From this judgment, Denham Homes appeals, contending that the trial court committed legal error in: (1) ruling that the law of res judicata precluded it from bringing its claims against R.J. Daigle and Forte; and (2) essentially holding that Denham Homes's claims have prescribed, where the Plan of Reorganization should be interpreted under Louisiana contract law and the parties did not and cannot contract to shorten the prescriptive period applicable to Denham Homes's claims.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Denham Homes contends that the trial court legally erred in concluding that its claims against R.J. Daigle and Forte were barred by res judicata because: (1) all of the requirements for the application of res judicata were not met as to either of these parties; and (2) even if the requirements were met, certain exceptions apply under the facts herein. Additionally, Denham Homes avers that the trial court's ruling on res judicata was essentially a holding that Denham Homes's claims had prescribed and that such a ruling is erroneous because the parties did not and cannot contract to shorten the prescriptive period applicable to these claims given that a juridical act purporting to make the requirements of prescription more onerous is null.

The filing of a Chapter 11 petition creates an estate comprised of all of the debtor's property, including causes of action belonging to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); In re SI Restructuring Incorporated, 714 F.3d 860, 864 (5th Cir. 2013). During the Chapter 11 case, the enforcement of these actions generally falls to the debtor-in-possession, which has most of the powers of a bankruptcy trustee to pursue claims on behalf of the estate.5 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a) & 323(a) & (b). When a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, however, the estate ceases to exist, and the debtor loses its status as debtor-in-possession along with its authority to pursue clams as though it were trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1); In re SI Restructuring Incorporated, 714 F.3d at 864.

After confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the ability of the debtor to enforce a claim once held by the estate is limited to that which has been retained in the bankruptcy plan. In re Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc., 647 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2011); In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2008). The Bankruptcy Code allows a reorganized debtor to bring post-confirmation actions by preserving them in the Plan of Reorganization itself. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3). However, the claim must be expressly reserved, and the failure to expressly retain a cause of action in a plan of reorganization is fatal to enforcement of that cause of action on several grounds, including res judicata and lack of standing. In re TXCO Resources, Inc., No. 09-51807, 2010 WL 8753253, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 2010).

With regard to res judicata, a federal bankruptcy court's order confirming a plan of reorganization is given the same effect as a district court's judgment on the merits for claim preclusion purposes. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Company, 95-0654 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624, 632. When a state court is called upon to decide the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a federal court exercising federal question jurisdiction, it is the federal law of res judicata that must be applied. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 666 So. 3d at 633. Because the confirmation of a plan of reorganization by a federal bankruptcy court in the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction, federal res judicata law is applicable herein.6 Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 666 So. 3d at 633.

The doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of claims that were or could have been asserted in an earlier proceeding. D & K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 112 F.3d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1997). A federal bankruptcy judgment, just as any judgment under federal res judicata law, bars a subsequent suit if all of the following tests are satisfied: (1) both cases involve the same parties; (2) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action is at issue in both cases. In re Howe, 913 F.2d 1138, 1143-1144 (5th Cir. 1990); see also D & K Properties Crystal, 112 F.3d at 259 (under the doctrine of res judicata, a claim is precluded where it shares three elements with an earlier action: (1) an identity of parties or privies, (2) an identity of the cause of action, and (3) a final judgment on the merits).

Exceptions do exist to the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, res judicata does not apply where the court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc., 666 So. 2d at 632, 634; D & K Properties Crystal Lake, 112 F.3d at 259-260. Nonetheless, a blanket reservation that seeks to reserve all causes of action reserves nothing. D & K Properties Crystal Lake, 112 F.3d at 261; see also In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 355.7

In recent years, however, the Fifth Circuit has analyzed the issue of whether a bankruptcy plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court contains an effective reservation of claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3) by addressing "the more fundamental question" of standing, i.e., whether the reorganized debtor has standing to bring the claim.8 See In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 354. Indeed, in In re United Operating, LLC, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue of res judicata raised by the parties, but instead raised the issue of standing on its own motion, holding that because standing is a jurisdictional requirement, the court is obliged to ensure it is satisfied regardless of whether the parties have raised the issue. In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 354. Similarly, Louisiana law provides that a court may raise the issue of a party's standing to bring an action on its own motion. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(B); State v. Draughter, 2013-0914 (La. 12/10/13), 130 So.3d 855, 864; Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 2007-2224 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, 59; see also In re United Operating, 540 F.3d at 354-355. As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, because courts are without power to render advisory opinions on abstract questions, a party must have standing to sue or, more comprehensively, the action must present a justiciable controversy. Howard, 986 So. 2d at 54 n.6.

In the seminal case of In re United Operating, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that to reserve a cause of action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3), "the plan must expressly retain the right to pursue such actions. The reservation must be specific and unequivocal." In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added; citations omitted). A blanket reservation of any and all claims is insufficient to preserve rights to pursue claims of the estate by the reorganized debtor. If a debtor has not made an effective reservation, the debtor has no standing to pursue a claim that the estate owned before it was dissolved.9 In re Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc., 647 F.3d at 550; In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 355.

This is a logical consequence of the nature of a bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is designed to secure prompt, effective administration and settlement of all of a debtor's assets and liabilities within a limited time. Thus, a debtor must put its creditors on notice of any claim it wishes to pursue after confirmation, in that proper notice allows creditors to determine whether a proposed plan resolves matters satisfactorily before they vote to approve it. Absent specific and unequivocal language in a plan, creditors lack sufficient information regarding their benefits and potential liabilities to cast an intelligent vote. United Operating, 540 F.3d at 355. "Proper notice also assures that creditors will not be duped into voting for a plan only later to find out that they might be sued post-confirmation on a claim that was reserved in the same plan." In re Felt Manufacturing Co., Inc., 402 B.R. 502, 518 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2009).

As did the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re United Operating, LLC, this court, on our own motion, raises the issue of Denham Homes's standing to bring the claims asserted in the reconventional and third-party demands. Thus, as a "more fundamental question," we must determine whether the Plan of Reorganization effectively reserved to Denham Homes the right to pursue the breach of contract claim it has asserted in its reconventional demand against R.J. Daigle and the negligence claim it has asserted in its third-party demand against Forte.

Turning first to Denham Homes's reconventional demand asserting a claim for breach of contract against R.J. Daigle, Denham Homes contends that it has authority to pursue this claim pursuant to Article VI, section J of the Plan of Reorganization, entitled "The Daigle Dispute," which provides as follows:

(Emphasis added).

In reviewing the language of this clause, we note that, while the provision clearly references this litigation, it does so only in the context of R.J. Daigle's claim against Denham Homes for sums due on the contract between the parties. Nothing in the language of this clause specifically and unequivocally reserves any rights to Denham Homes to pursue a breach of contract claim against R.J. Daigle, or against any other party. Rather, the clause simply focuses on the claim for payment due from Denham Homes to R.J. Daigle.

According to the allegations of Denham Homes's reconventional demand, the alleged breach of contract by R.J. Daigle occurred when R.J. Daigle "failed to complete the construction in accord with its agreement" with Denham Homes and such failure "necessitated that [Denham Homes] hire additional contractors to perform the work not performed" by R.J. Daigle, as well as damaging Denham Homes by causing it to incur costs "to repair, replace, and remediate the defective work" by R.J. Daigle. Given that these alleged breaches occurred during the execution of the contract between the parties and, thus, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding by Denham Homes or certainly during the pendency of that bankruptcy proceeding, we must conclude that this claim was owned by the bankruptcy estate and does not constitute a claim that arose subsequent to the confirmation of the Plan of Reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) & (7). Thus, in order to preserve Denham Homes's standing to bring this breach-of-contract claim that belonged to the bankruptcy estate post confirmation, a specific and unequivocal reservation of such a breach-of-contract claim was needed in the Plan of Reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court, as per In re United Operating, LLC.

However, nothing in the Daigle Dispute provision of the Plan of Reorganization references, reserves, or retains any breach-of-contract claims to be pursued by Denham Homes. See In re SI Restructuring Incorporated, 714 F.3d at 864-865. Accordingly, the Daigle Dispute provision of the Plan of Reorganization does not preserve Denham Homes's standing to bring a breach-of-contract claim against R.J. Daigle post confirmation.

Denham Homes further contends that its right to pursue its breach-of-contract claim against R.J. Daigle was preserved by Article X of the Plan of Reorganization, entitled "Retention of Causes of Action," which provides as follows:

(Emphasis added).

However, this reservation clause is exactly the type of general reservation clause that has been held to lack the required specificity. As stated above, a general reservation of "any and all claims" is insufficient to preserve the reorganized debtor's standing to bring post-confirmation claims that belonged to the bankruptcy estate.10 See In re SI Restructuring Incorporated, 714 F.3d at 864-865, In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 356, and D & K Properties Crystal Lake, 112 F.3d at 261 (wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[a] blanket reservation that seeks to reserve all causes of action reserves nothing."). Accordingly, we conclude that the Plan of Reorganization did not preserve Denham Homes's standing to pursue a breach-of-contract claim post confirmation.11

Moreover, even if we were to determine that the "Retention of Causes of Action" provision was sufficiently specific and unequivocal to reserve Denham Homes's right to pursue a claim for breach of contract, we further note that the provision sets forth a period within which that right was reserved to Denham Homes. Thus, because the Plan of Reorganization purported to preserve Denham Homes's standing for a period of time, upon the passage of that period of time, Denham Homes no longer had standing to pursue that claim, if the reservation had indeed been effective.12

Likewise, for these same reasons, because the Reservation of Causes of Action provision is not specific or unequivocal and, thus, was an ineffective reservation of Denham Homes's standing to pursue claims post confirmation, Denham Homes also lacks standing to pursue the third-party demand against Forte. In re SI Restructuring Incorporated, 714 F.3d at 864-865, In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d at 356, and D & K Properties Crystal Lake, 112 F.3d at 261.13

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's January 27, 2014 judgment, dismissing Denham Homes's reconventional demand against R.J. Daigle & Sons Contractors, Inc. and its third-party demand against Forte and Tablada, Inc., is hereby affirmed, on the basis that Denham Homes lacks standing to bring these claims. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Denham Homes.

AFFIRMED.