SULLIVAN, J.

This is an appeal from an abuse prevention order issued on an ex parte basis, and extended after notice and a hearing by a judge of the Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court Department. The defendant contends that the Worcester Probate and Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders, and that the plaintiff failed to establish that she was in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm. We affirm.

1. Background. This case has a complex procedural history which we set forth in some detail to provide context for the issues raised on appeal.1

The parties separated in August of 2011, and M.B. moved from the marital home in Worcester County to a second home on Cape Cod. The divorce action was filed on November 9, 2011, in the Worcester Probate and Family Court. Beginning on November 11, and continuing until December 9, 2011, J.B., then age 53, sent M.B. multiple electronic mail (e-mail) and text messages, called M.B. repeatedly, had her cable and internet service cut off, appropriated her bank password, took money out of her bank account, took two of her cellular telephones, changed her telephone service provider account password, and attempted to access her telephone records.

On December 9, 2011, the parties agreed to a stipulation in the divorce case which included an order restricting all communication except e-mail related to visitation of their teenage son. The probate judge entered the stipulation as a temporary order. However, J.B. continued to text and call M.B.2 The judge orally ordered him to cease contact in February of 2012, and issued a written order on March 19, 2012. J.B. continued to contact M.B. M.B. filed an application for an abuse prevention order on May 10, 2012 in the Worcester Probate and Family Court. On May 14, 2012, the judge again issued a no contact order and imposed monetary sanctions of $500 for each contact in violation of the no contact order.

On May 21, 2012, the probate judge heard evidence on M.B.'s complaint for contempt, and began to hear evidence on the application for an abuse prevention order. At the conclusion of the court day, and after ascertaining that the no contact order had not been violated between May 10 and May 21, the probate judge continued the evidentiary hearing on the abuse prevention order. She stated that the order would not be issued at that time, and that a further hearing would be scheduled.3 She emphasized that the no contact order remained in full force and effect.

Between May 30 and June 20, 2012, M.B. received more than forty text messages. Several came directly from J.B.'s telephone number, while others came from unknown telephone numbers. J.B.'s bank statement showed that J.B. had purchased a "Spoof" card with his credit card in November of 2011. M.B. testified that the Spoof card made the text messages appear to come from another telephone, and that based on their content, she believed they came from J.B. The content of the texts permitted the inference that they came from J.B., and also indicated that he was following and watching her.4 Between May 10 and June 19, M.B. also received approximately thirty telephone calls from an unknown or private number.5

M.B. then filed a new application for an abuse prevention order in the Falmouth District Court on June 13, 2012. An ex parte order issued. Later that day, M.B. brought her car to be inspected, and a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device was found on the underside of her car. M.B. promptly reported this to the police, who initiated an investigation. Meanwhile, the ex parte restraining order expired on June 22, 2012. A judge of the Falmouth District Court held a hearing on that date at which M.B. appeared pro se. J.B. appeared through counsel, who filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, stating that the judge of the Worcester Probate and Family Court had denied a request for a restraining order on May 21, 2012, that judgment had entered, and that the affidavit in support of the June 13 application referenced events which had been before the probate judge in Worcester in May. Although the affidavit filed by M.B. in the Falmouth District Court in support of the application for an abuse prevention order did reference events occurring in April, it also described, among other things, the numerous text messages she received between June 8 and June 12, messages that strongly suggested M.B. was being followed. She attached a timeline to the affidavit detailing the date, source, and content of scores of text messages and calls from J.B.'s telephone number and other telephone numbers between May 26 and June 12, 2012. She stated, "[J.B.] uses the Spoof [card] to terrorize me," and that "he appears to be escalating and I am afraid."

At the hearing on June 22, 2012, in Falmouth, J.B.'s counsel further represented to the court that there had been a full evidentiary hearing before the Worcester Probate and Family Court judge and that the current application was an example of forum shopping. He did not inform the judge, either orally or in writing, of the existence of the no contact order. In fact, the evidentiary hearing in Worcester had been continued, the no contact order was extant, and the application for an abuse prevention order remained pending.6 M.B. told the judge that the evidentiary hearing in Worcester had been continued, and that she was relying on events that occurred after May 21, 2012.7 She stated she was "petrified and didn't know what to do." The judge allowed J.B.'s motion, and sua sponte ordered the plaintiff to return to Worcester, stating, "You should go back to the Worcester Court and have — bring that all up up there." The temporary order was then vacated. The Falmouth District Court docket stated, "Prior 209A order denied in Worcester Probate and Family Court."

M.B. drove to Worcester that afternoon where she again sought a c. 209A order. A temporary abuse prevention order was allowed on an ex parte basis by the same probate judge who heard the divorce action. On June 25, 2012, after the order was issued, J.B. came to M.B.'s house and M.B.'s friend received a text message stating, "Chubby's going to be in the newspaper." M.B. understood this statement to be a threat directed at her.8

On July 6, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was held in Worcester on the extension of the ex parte order at which J.B. appeared through counsel.9 J.B. moved to dismiss the application for an abuse prevention order pursuant to Mass.R.Dom.Rel. 12(b)(3) on the grounds that the Worcester Probate and Family Court lacked jurisdiction over the application because M.B. was a resident of Barnstable County, and the matter had to be heard there. See G. L. c. 209A, § 2. The probate judge who heard the divorce and the ex parte motion denied J.B.'s motion and extended the temporary abuse prevention order for a period of one year.

2. Discussion. A. Venue. While the propriety of the ruling of the probate judge, not the District Court judge, is before us, we take this opportunity to clarify the application of the choice of venue provisions of G. L. c. 209A, § 2, with respect to both the Probate and Family and District Court departments of the trial court.

General Laws c. 209A, § 2, provides a choice of venue to the plaintiff, who may bring an application in the court of the county of her current residence, or if he or she has left a previous residence or household to avoid abuse, in the court having venue over the previous residence or household.10 The purpose of the venue provision of the statute, which is intended to facilitate a plaintiff's application for an order, and to encourage the prompt and timely resolution of the application, was derailed in this case.

M.B. applied for a restraining order in the Worcester Probate and Family Court, where she had previously resided. For reasons not apparent in the record, the case was continued for over three months. See Singh v. Capuano, 468 Mass. 328 (2014); Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings § 5:00 (2011) (Guidelines) (emphasizing the importance of prompt hearings in c. 209A cases). After the situation escalated in late May, she filed an application for a new abuse prevention order in the county in which she resided, Barnstable County, which was then allowed.11 The District Court judge declined to hear the extension motion, and vacated the temporary order, in violation of c. 209A, § 2, which granted M.B. her choice of venue, and in violation of G. L. c. 209A, § 4, which granted her an evidentiary hearing. See Guideline 2:07 (commentary) ("If the court in which a person initially seeks protection under c. 209A has jurisdiction, the person should be heard as soon as possible in that court, and should not be sent to another court"). See also Singh v. Capuano, supra (without first hearing the evidence, a judge should not, over objection, vacate any provision of a c. 209A order once issued); S.T. v. E.M., 80 Mass.App.Ct. 423, 430 (2011).12 After M.B. returned to Worcester as directed, sua sponte, by the District Court judge in Falmouth, the defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that Worcester lacked jurisdiction and that only the courts of Barnstable County had the authority to hear the case.

J.B. contends that G. L. c. 209A, § 2, barred the probate judge from hearing M.B.'s application because M.B. failed to establish that she left her residence in Worcester County to avoid abuse. This issue was presented below as a matter of venue or territorial jurisdiction. On appeal, J.B. further refines this argument, claiming that a court that lacks territorial jurisdiction is without any authority to enter an abuse prevention order. In support of this contention, J.B. relies on Guideline 3:03, which states that "[t]he requirements set forth in G. L. c. 209A, § 2, regarding where abuse prevention actions must be filed and heard should be considered jurisdictional. That is, if these requirements are not met, the court should be considered to have no authority to act on the complaint." The comments to the Guideline further state that because the venue requirements of § 2 "appear to be prerequisites to the court's authority to act, they should be considered jurisdictional," and that the defect is one that cannot be waived.13

J.B. contends that the abuse prevention order is therefore "void" and likens territorial jurisdiction or venue under c. 209A, § 2, to subject matter jurisdiction. The obvious strategic advantage of this argument is that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and may not be waived. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 457 Mass. 53, 57 (2010). However, once a broad grant of jurisdiction is given to a court to hear a class of cases, the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Ibid. Since it is clear that the Legislature has "empowered the [Probate and Family Court] to hear [this] particular `genre' of cases," the Probate and Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the application for an order. Ibid. (citations omitted). See G. L. c. 209A, §§ 1(c), 2; Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 327 (1999); Guideline 3:02 (Jurisdiction) (2011).

Any jurisdictional limitations imposed by G. L. c. 209A, § 2, are those of territorial jurisdiction only. In this context, territorial jurisdiction is a matter of venue. See Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 484 (1921); Blood v. Lea, 403 Mass. 430, 435 (1988). Cf. Commonwealth v. Mannos, 311 Mass. 94, 103 (1942); Opinions of the Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 896-897 (1977). Section 2 is, in fact, entitled "Venue." See Tyler v. Michael's Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492 (2013) (construing a statute in harmony with its title). Compare ROPT Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 Mass. 601, 605 n.10 (2000) (statute which expressly uses the word "jurisdiction" is not a venue statute). Unlike a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a defect in venue does not irrevocably strip a court of all authority to hear a case. Paige v. Sinclair, supra ("A plea that the action is brought in the wrong county or wrong district is commonly matter of abatement and does not go to the jurisdiction of the court").

Venue may be waived if not timely raised. Hazard v. Wason, 152 Mass. 268 (1890); Paige v. Sinclair, supra; Carpenter v. Pomerantz, 36 Mass.App.Ct. 627, 628 n.2 (1994); Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 40, 45 (2012), quoting from Wachovia Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) ("Venue is largely a matter of the parties' convenience; venue and subject matter jurisdiction... `are not concepts of the same order'").14 Cf. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 329, 336 (1999). To the extent the comment to Guideline 3:03 regarding waiver suggests otherwise, the commentary is inconsistent with the statute, and the statute controls. See generally Morales v. Morales, 464 Mass. 507 (2013) (discussing inconsistency between Child Support Guidelines and the governing statute).

The defendant waived his objection to venue in the Worcester Probate and Family Court by his conduct. Cf. American Intl. Ins. Co. v. Seuffer GmbH & Co., 468 Mass. 109, 113-120 (2014) (defense of personal jurisdiction may be waived by conduct). He did so by participating in the May 21, 2012, evidentiary hearing on the application for an abuse prevention order without objection.15 See generally Hazard v. Wason, 152, 268 (1890) (venue waived where defendant answers to the merits); Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 484. Cf. American Intl. Ins. Co., supra (defense forfeited by active participation in litigation); LaMarche v. Lussier, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 887, 889-890 (2006) (personal jurisdiction may be waived by "dilatoriness and participation in or encouragement of judicial proceedings"). He then affirmatively relied on the Worcester proceedings to vacate the Falmouth District Court temporary abuse prevention order. By seeking to take advantage of the Worcester proceedings in the Falmouth case, J.B. "manifest[ed] an intent to submit to the [Worcester Probate and Family Court]'s jurisdiction," and forfeited any claim to lack of venue there. Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir., 1990), cited with approval in American Intl. Ins. Co., supra (quotation omitted).16

Finally, even if venue had been raised, the evidence before the judge was sufficient to permit the inference that M.B. had left the parties' home in Worcester county and moved to Barnstable County to avoid abuse. There was evidence in the record before the probate judge that before M.B.'s move to Barnstable County, J.B. had anger management issues, possessed an FID card, had been violent, and had "been physical" prior to their separation. The judge did not err in hearing the application.

B. Sufficiency. A plaintiff seeking the extension of an abuse protection order must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence[] that the defendant has caused or attempted to cause physical harm, committed a sexual assault, or placed the plaintiff in fear of imminent serious physical harm." McDonald v. Caruso, 467 Mass. 382, 386 (2014). See Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 736 (2005); G. L. c. 209A, §§ 1, 3. As is often the case, this appeal focuses on whether the plaintiff had a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm. G. L. c. 209A, § 1(b). Iamele v. Asselin, supra.17 J.B. contends that the application "was not based upon any physical harm committed or threatened by [him]," and that in the absence of testimony that he hurt or threatened M.B. after their separation, in the six months prior to the extension hearing on July 6, 2012, the evidence is insufficient to establish that harm was serious or imminent.

This argument conflates the first prong of the statutory definition of abuse, actual or threatened abuse, with the second, reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm. See G. L. c. 209A, § 1(a,) (b). The purpose of a c. 209A order is to protect a plaintiff from the likelihood of abuse. Iamele v. Asselin, supra, at 739. A plaintiff need not wait until an assault occurs to seek protection, although "[i]f the plaintiff were suffering from attempted or actual physical abuse, see G. L. c. 209A, § 1(a), ... there is no question that an extension should be granted." Id. at 740 n.3.

As noted above, M.B. provided affidavits stating that J.B. had "anger management issues," and that there had been "a past history of violence." She also testified that he had been "physical" with her prior to their separation. In light of "the totality of the circumstances," id. at 740, that is, a past history of anger and violence, coupled with the conduct which followed the filing of the divorce petition, and the ongoing escalation of contact in violation of the no contact orders, the evidence was plainly sufficient to support the issuance of the abuse prevention order. See Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 485 (2005).

Judgment affirmed.