HARRELL, J.
"[Jeremy] Bentham stated the case against retroactivity most succinctly when he likened it to `dog law.' He was referring to the age-old method of training dogs by waiting until they do what they are to be forbidden to do, and then kicking them." NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.02 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]; see JEREMY BENTHAM, Truth versus Ashhurst, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (1863) ("They won't tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do—they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it. What way, then, has any man of coming at this dog-law?"). This case presents the question of whether Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-117—enacted in 2003 expressly to extend from three years to seven years the statute of limitations for civil
James Doe challenges here the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Calvert County, the latter having reasoned that the Legislature intended § 5-117 to apply "partially retroactively" to sexual abuse claims filed against him that, as of the effective date of the extended limitations enactment, had not been barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period. We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that, assuming arguendo application of § 5-117 to the claims in the present case represents a retrospective application of the statute, § 5-117 is a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it may be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the extended period's effective date, 1 October 2003.
Mary Roe
At the time Roe reached the age of majority, the limitations period on the civil claims stemming from the alleged sexual assaults was governed by Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-101, which provided that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues.. . ." Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, effective 1 October 2003, however, added § 5-117 to the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, establishing the statute of limitations "for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor" as "7 years [from] the date that the victim attains the age of majority." Section 2 of Chapter 360, which remains uncodified, provides that "[t]his Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003."
On 3 September 2008, Roe filed a five-count complaint against Doe, alleging (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligence. Doe responded with a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Hearing," arguing that all of the claims were time-barred because Roe filed her complaint after 28 September 2004, one day shy of three years from the date on which Roe reached the age of majority. Doe asserted that the seven-year statute of limitations did not apply to Roe's claims against Doe, asserting that "[t]he [L]egislature made it clear that the new legislation was prospective only."
The Circuit Court, on 22 January 2009, heard oral argument on Doe's motion to dismiss and Roe's opposition, and took the matter under advisement. On 3 February 2009, the Circuit Court issued a three-page memorandum opinion, holding that all of Roe's claims
Alternatively, the Circuit Court held that even "[i]f the Court were to apply CJ § 5-117 retrospectively, [Doe]'s due process rights would be infringed because he has a vested right to be free from a suit where the statute of limitations has run."
Roe noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. A panel of our appellate brethren reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, explaining that:
Roe v. Doe, 193 Md.App. 558, 565, 998 A.2d 383, 387-88 (2010). Such a conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals explained, was consistent with § 5-117's legislative history and its pre-history. See Roe, 193 Md. App. at 566-69, 998 A.2d at 388-390. Finally, the intermediate appellate court held that:
Roe, 193 Md.App. at 579, 998 A.2d at 395.
Doe filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Doe v. Roe, 416 Md. 272, 6 A.3d 904 (2010), to consider whether "§ 5-117 [may] be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of § 5-117, and which is barred by the prior statute of limitations."
As we explained in Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 747-48, 12 A.3d 153, 157 (2011):
Recently, in Ali v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 416 Md. 249, 257, 258, 6 A.3d 890, 894, 895 (2010), we explained that although "[i]n Maryland the general rule is that `[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues'" (quoting Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101), such a "`one-size-fits-all' approach does not always serve to further the policies underlying the three-year limit," and, accordingly, "the Legislature [has] enacted numerous exceptions to § 5-101's three-year statute of limitations." One such exception, § 5-117, is at the heart of the present matter.
In Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 212, 808 A.2d 508, 522 (2002), we explained that "the principle that statutory time limits for a minor to bring an action do not begin running until the age of majority has been firmly established in our law for a long time." See Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-201 ("When a cause of action. . . accrues in favor of a minor or mental incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed."). Accordingly, before § 5-117 was enacted, victims of child sexual abuse had until the day prior to their twenty-first birthday to file a civil action for damages relating to such abuse. See Mason v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 375 Md. 504, 826 A.2d 433 (2003).
Concerned that a three-year statute of limitations may effectuate a unique injustice in cases of child sexual abuse, the
By 2003, Maryland's failure to address anew this issue since 1994 apparently reached critical mass. See Baltimore-Washington Conference Council on Ministries, Letter in Support of Senate Bill 68 (2003) (stating that, at the time Senate Bill 68 was being considered, "Maryland [wa]s one of only ten states that ha[d] not extended the statute of limitations in recognition of the special reporting difficulties often encountered in child sexual abuse and other serious crimes committed against children"). Numerous individuals and organizations renewed their support for an extension of the three-year statute of limitations for child sexual abuse cases. One organization expounded upon the unique circumstances inherent to child sexual abuse cases:
Maryland Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Inc., Testimony in Support of Senate Bill 68 (25 February 2003); see also Letter From Eileen King, Regional Director, Justice for Children, to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (24 February 2003) ("Child abuse victims may not know or understand the harm that has occurred as a result of the abuse; many problems may only develop gradually. A twenty-one year old victim will not have had the time to see the impact of abuse on his or her relationships, parenting, work, or studies."); Citizens' Review Board for Children, Statement to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (25 February 2003) ("A sexually abused child may have a variety of psychological reactions to his or her victimization. . . . In many cases, the child seeks to avoid thinking about the abuse. . . . In addition, children may experience serious mental health problems caused by the sexual abuse. These may divert attention from adult business affairs such as law suits.").
At First Reading, Senate Bill 68 provided:
Between the First and Third Readings of the Bill, Senator Brian E. Frosh, then-and-now Chairperson of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, wrote to Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe regarding (1) "whether the application of the [initial version of the] bill to apply retroactively to cases that were barred prior to the effective date of the law would violate due process"; and (2) "what the effect would be if the bill is passed without any provision as to whether it is to be given retroactive or prospective effect."
Rowe Letter, at 4. Regarding the second inquiry, Ms. Rowe opined that it was her "view that in the absence of a specific provision, the statute could be interpreted to have prospective effect, and that most likely would mean that it would apply only to causes of action based on abuse occurring after the effective date." Rowe Letter, at 5.
Less than two weeks after Ms. Rowe responded to Senator Frosh's inquiries, a revised version of the bill surfaced. This version provided, as § 5-117(a) and (b) do currently:
As codified, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-117, provides:
Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 360 of the Acts of 2003, however, are not codified.
Generally speaking, "[t]he legislative
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 362 Md. 535, 555, 766 A.2d 98, 109 (2001); see Rawlings, 362 Md. at 556, 766 A.2d at 110 (stating that "if the Rule only [a]ffects procedure, and not substantive rights, and is therefore remedial in nature . . . [it] may be applied retrospectively unless a contrary intention is expressed"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 376 Md. 276, 289, 829 A.2d 611, 618 (2003) (stating that a "statute governing procedure or remedy" will be given retrospective effect, even "to cases pending in court when the statute becomes effective"); State v. Stowe, 376 Md. 436, 454, 829 A.2d 1036, 1047 (2003); Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 144, 36 A.2d 544, 545 (1944). We address "Rule No. 2" first to determine whether a statute acting to extend the
In Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408-09, 754 A.2d 389, 395-96 (2000), we expressed our view of what constitutes a "remedial" statute:
(Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
We think that § 5-117 is remedial. The extended limitations period "improves remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries," as an extended period of time during which alleged victims of child sexual abuse may seek redress in the courts "improves" the child's right to seek compensation for the alleged wrongs committed against him or her. Further, it may be said fairly that § 5-117 is "designed to correct [then-]existing law," and to "introduce regulations conducive to the public good," as the legislative history of the statute reflects that the extended limitations period—both in Maryland
It would be an oversimplification of the law, of course, to say that every application of a statute expanding a statute of limitations period is remedial or procedural. See Lujan v. Regents of the Univ. of
In the present case, however, § 5-117 is not a limitations period that "is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action." Stated differently, the remaining "live" counts brought by Roe against Doe—(1) battery; (2) false imprisonment; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress —were viable claims prior to the enactment of § 5-117. Additionally, the placement of § 5-117 within Subtitle 1 ("Limitations") of Title 5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article supports further our view that the Legislature intended to extend the limitations period in cases of child sexual abuse, and nothing more (i.e., no new cause of action was created thereby).
We would be faced with a different situation entirely had Roe's claim been barred under the three-year limitations period as of 1 October 2003, the effective date of § 5-117.
Because we deem § 5-117—at least as applied to those claims not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year limitations period as of the effective date of § 5-117 —a procedural and remedial statute, and because we see no indication in the record
To be sure, "[o]ur cases, for the most part. . . have not considered in any depth the definition of, or developed an analytical paradigm for determining in the first instance, what constitutes retroactive application of a statute." Evans, 382 Md. at 389, 855 A.2d at 375 (Harrell, J., dissenting); see also John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Reliable Tractor, Inc., 406 Md. 139, 147, 957 A.2d 595, 599 (2008) ("[T]his Court has only provided limited analysis of what constitutes a retrospective application of a statute."). Yet, a sizeable number of cases hold that applying a statute extending a limitations period to claims—predating the new period's enactment—not yet barred by the prior limitations period is not a retrospective application of that new limitations period—"because the suit was filed after the effective date of the statutory amendment." Atlanta Country Club, Inc. v. Smith, 217 Ga.App. 515, 458 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1995); see United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir.2008), vacated on other grounds, 550 F.3d 377 (2008) (noting the "line of cases hold[ing] that applying an amended statute of limitations to a suit filed after the amendment is not a `retroactive' application at all"); Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 889 (2d Cir.1995) ("As courts presented with the issue have recognized, applying a new or amended statute of limitations to bar a cause of action filed after its enactment, but arising out of events that predate its enactment, generally is not a retroactive application of the statute."); United States ex rel. Milam v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 912 F.Supp. 868, 882 (D.Md.1995) (same); State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 888 A.2d 985, 1022 n. 46 (2006) ("We note that a significant number of courts have concluded that applying an amendment to a statute of limitations enlarging the unexpired period of time within which a [case] may be brought is not a retroactive application of the extended period at all."); State v. Hirsch, 245 Neb. 31, 511 N.W.2d 69, 78 (1994) ("[T]he application of [an] extended statute [of limitations] to existing causes of action is not a retroactive law."); Wschola v. Snyder, 478 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991) ("Klimmek [v. Independent School Dist. No. 487, 299 N.W.2d 501 (Minn.1980)] suggests that the application of a new statute of limitations to an existing cause of action is not a retroactive application. . . ."); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 520 Pa. 165, 553 A.2d 897, 900 (1989) (quoting United States v. Kurzenknabe, 136 F.Supp. 17, 23 (D.N.J.1955)) ("There is nothing `retroactive' about the application of an extension of a statute of limitations, so long as the original statutory period has not yet expired."); Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 401, 407 (1988) (same); Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me.1980) (holding that an extension of a statute of limitations to actions not already barred by the prior limitations period "is not `retroactive' application in any sense that would require us to presume that such application was not intended by the legislature"); Nichols v. Wilbur, 256 Or. 418, 473 P.2d 1022, 1022 (1970) ("[I]t is generally and rather consistently held by most courts that statutes enlarging the period of limitations apply to existing causes of actions that had not been barred by the previous limitation. It is held that such statutes are not retrospective in application but are merely an extension of the right to bring the action.").
We stated, on one hand, that "the weight of authority elsewhere sustains th[e] proposition" that "it is not within the scope of legislative power to pass a law which will have the effect to revive . . . a cause of action which was completely barred by limitations before its passage," and that "[b]y the current decisions in other States the right to plead the Statute of Limitations when it has once run and become a bar to a demand . . . is treated as a vested right, beyond the reach of retrospective legislation." Sehner, 37 Md. at 190. Yet, the Court held ultimately that, as a municipal government (as opposed to a private individual or private corporation), the Mayor and Council of Hagerstown enjoyed no such vested right. See Sehner, 37 Md. at 196-97.
Section 2 of Senate Bill 68 provides explicitly: "[T]his Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003." Put simply, as of 1 October 2003—the effective date of the statute—(save the assault count), Roe's claims were not yet barred by § 5-101 and thus, Section 2 is inapplicable to the present scenario. See Roe, 193 Md.App. at 565, 998 A.2d at 387-88 ("Defendant's reading would have SECTION 2 state, `That this Act may not be construed to apply retroactively to revive any action that was barred or becomes barred by the application of the period of limitations applicable before October 1, 2003.'"). Even Dr. Frankenstein would not be interested in reviving a claim that is not yet dead.
Grinder v. Nelson, 9 Gill 299, 303 (1850) (quoting Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (Conn. 1822)) (emphasis added). Invocation of the phrase "or necessary implication"—as an alternative to the statute's "explicit provision" —suggests that the express language of a statute is not the only source from which we may glean the requisite clear expression of legislative intent regarding retrospective application. Accordingly, merely because the plain language of a legislative enactment is ambiguous as to retrospectivity—which we think may be said fairly of Section 2 of Senate Bill 68—does not mean that we may not glean the necessary "clear expression" of legislative intent that an enactment be applied retrospectively. See Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 308 Md. 556, 561, 520 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1987). Therefore, recourse to legislative history to assist in ascertaining the Legislature's intent by necessary implication, vis á vis retrospective application, is entirely acceptable.
As noted supra, the First Reading of Senate Bill 68, by providing that the statute would "apply to any action commenced on or after October 1, 2003, including any action that would have been barred by the application of the [original limitations period]," would have provided for full retrospectivity. For the next piece of the puzzle, we consider that Assistant Attorney General Rowe advised Senator Frosh that "in the absence of a specific provision, the statute could be interpreted to have prospective effect, and that [that] most likely would mean that it would apply only to causes of action based on abuse occurring after the effective date." Rowe Letter, at 5. Although because, as explained supra, we hold that § 5-117 is procedural and remedial in nature and thus presumed to be retrospective —thus disagreeing with Ms. Rowe's advice —apparently in reliance on Ms. Rowe's advice, the Legislature, nevertheless, decided to keep a modified version of Section 2 (the retrospectivity provision) in the Third Reading of Senate Bill 68. If the Legislature intended for the Bill to apply prospectively only, why would it, armed with advice that becoming silent on the issue of retrospectivity would render the legislation presumed prospective, retain a retrospectivity clause? See Roe, 193 Md.App. at 565, 998 A.2d at 387. To us, it appears abundantly clear from this legislative "context," see Kim, 376 Md. at 290, 829 A.2d at 619 ("Context becomes important."), that retaining a modified version of the retrospectivity clause evinces a legislative intent that the statute be applied, as the Court of Special Appeals termed it, "partially retroactively."
