WRIGHT, J.
On July 26, 2006, the appellant, Daniel C. Hayes, and the appellee, Darien J.
In proceedings before the circuit court, the parties agreed to present a joint statement of facts, which provided as follows:
On December 22, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on Pratchett's motion for summary judgment. At the end of the hearing, the court granted Pratchett's motion concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and "that on the basis of the facts of this case ... there is a nondelegable duty that the employer has and ... the Plaintiff['s] exclusive remedy here is under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Statute." Important to the court's decision was that the accident took place in the BJ's parking lot, and that the supervisor was driving a customer's car, not his own.
In granting a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court must determine "that there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Laing v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 180 Md.App. 136, 152, 949 A.2d 26 (2008) (citing Md. Rule 2-501). "In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts focus on whether the trial court's grant of the motion was legally correct." Id. at 152-53, 949 A.2d 26 (citation omitted). See also Logan v. LSP Marketing Corp., 196 Md.App. 684, 703, 11 A.3d 355 (2010), cert. denied, 418 Md. 588, 16 A.3d 978 (2011).
Hayes argues that he is entitled to a reversal because the duty to safely operate a motor vehicle is personal to each driver and not a nondelegable duty of the employer. He asserts that as the facts demonstrated, Pratchett was operating a motor vehicle at the time of the accident and was not acting as a supervisor or in a supervisory capacity with regard to Hayes. According to Hayes, because his complaint alleged breach of due care and not negligent entrustment or failure to provide a safe environment, it is irrelevant that Pratchett was driving a customer's vehicle, as Pratchett's direct act of negligence caused the collision.
Pratchett responds that, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, he was responsible for providing a safe work environment for his employees at the time of the underlying accident. According to Pratchett, the safety of the workplace was a nondelegable duty on the part of each party's employer, BJ's Wholesale Club. In other words, if Pratchett was negligent in moving a customer's vehicle as alleged, then he was negligent in the performance of the employer's nondelegable duty to maintain a safe work environment for Hayes and other subordinate employees. Pratchett contends that, because routine work assignments and supervision are aspects of the nondelegable duty of providing employees a safe place to work, he is entitled to immunity as he was working within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the circuit court erred in determining that Hayes's sole remedy for his injuries arising from the accident with Pratchett
"The Maryland Workers' Compensation Statute was enacted in 1914 to compensate employees who were injured in the course of their employment." Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 496, 520 A.2d 717 (1987). The Statute "embodies a comprehensive scheme to withdraw all phases of extra-hazardous employments from private controversy and to provide sure and certain relief for injured [workers], their families and dependents regardless of questions of fault." Hastings v. Mechalske, 336 Md. 663, 672, 650 A.2d 274 (1994) (citation omitted). It was intended to replace the common law tort system, which had previously been an injured employee's sole means of obtaining compensation for work related injuries, and had proven to be inadequate for this purpose. Brady, 308 Md. at 496, 520 A.2d 717. Moreover, the Statute was intended to strike a balance between the interests of workers and employees. Id. As the Court of Appeals noted in Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 250, 503 A.2d 708 (1986):
Maryland's Workers' Compensation Statute requires that employers of covered employees provide compensation for accidental personal injuries sustained by the covered employee regardless of the employer's fault. LE § 9-501.
Although LE § 9-901 does not preclude tort actions between coemployees, it does exclude an action in tort by an employee against his employer. Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md. 700, 711, 914 A.2d 1193 (2007); Suburban Hosp. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140, 145-46, 763 A.2d 185 (2000); Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 137, 476 A.2d 710 (1984); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 232, 249 A.2d 449 (1969). This immunity from suit can extend to supervisory coemployees when the supervisor is performing a nondelegable duty of the employer:
Hastings, 336 Md. at 673, 650 A.2d 274. Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis.2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973),
Athas, 300 Md. at 145-46, 476 A.2d 710 (quoting Kruse, 213 N.W.2d at 67-68).
In Athas, the Court of Appeals thoroughly discussed the liability of a supervisory coemployee under the Workers' Compensation Statute. There, Athas, a restaurant employee at a country club, was attacked with a knife by a coemployee. Athas, 300 Md. at 134, 476 A.2d 710. Athas sued the supervisors at the country club asserting that they negligently discharged their duty to provide a safe place to work by hiring Athas's attacker despite knowing of the attacker's violent disposition. Id. at 135, 476 A.2d 710. The Court of Appeals held that the Workers' Compensation Statute prevented Athas from recovering from the supervisors because the supervisors were performing the nondelegable duty of their employer to provide a safe place to work. Id. at 149, 476 A.2d 710. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated as follows:
Id. at 148-49, 476 A.2d 710.
Thus, the Court in Athas recognized the established rule that § 58 allows an employee to sue a coemployee whose negligence caused an injury. The Court concluded that in performing managerial and personnel functions, such as providing Athas a safe place to work and retaining only non-violent employees, the supervisors discharged only a nondelegable duty of the country club, their employer, and had no duty to Athas. Id. at 149, 476 A.2d 710. Nor did the Court find evidence that the supervisors committed any direct act of negligence by failing to reveal or inquire into the chef's criminal record. Id. The Court, therefore, found no duty of care owed by the supervisor to Athas.
In reaching this conclusion, the Athas Court adopted the "Wisconsin approach"
The Athas Court further illustrated the Wisconsin approach by making reference to the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973).
Id. Thus, the Athas Court concluded that "[t]he duty of proper supervision is a duty owed by a corporate officer or supervisory employee to the employer, not to a fellow employee." 300 Md. at 147, 476 A.2d 710 (citation omitted). Therefore, a supervisory coemployee is not liable for injuries to a covered employee when the supervisor is delegating work assignments or supervising others in the performance of these assignments because such conduct is an aspect of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe place to work.
The Court of Appeals later stated:
Hastings, 336 Md. at 676, 650 A.2d 274. With regard to the first prong,
Under the Workers' Compensation Statute, as well as the common law, the supervisory employee will not be held liable for breaching a duty such as providing a safe place to work. Athas, 300 Md. at 149, 476 A.2d 710. "On the other hand, if a supervisory employee commits an affirmative, direct act of negligence towards an employee, and therefore negligently breaches a personal duty of care which is reasonably owed by him to the fellow employee, then he would not be immune from liability." Id.
In this case, the essence of Hayes's argument is that Pratchett was not performing the nondelegable duty of his employer to provide a safe place to work because he was not acting in a supervisory capacity when moving the customer's car. Rather, Hayes asserts that because Pratchett moved the car himself, he was acting in his capacity as a coemployee, and he owed Hayes a personal duty to exercise due care when operating a motor vehicle. Therefore, Hayes avers that Pratchett is not protected by the Workers' Compensation Statute because Pratchett committed a direct act of negligence in breach of his personal duty to exercise care when operating a motor vehicle and not his employer's duty to provide a safe workplace. Hayes argues that, unlike in Hastings, where the supervisory coemployee did not perform the act that caused the injuries to the employee but rather failed to ensure that the employee operating the equipment that caused the injury was properly trained, Pratchett performed the negligent act that resulted in Hayes's injuries.
In response, Pratchett argues that because he was a supervisor who was performing a specific job function in moving the customer's car, while he was on the job and at his place of employment, his duty to operate the customer's car in a safe manner was part of his employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace. Therefore, because Pratchett was performing a nondelegable duty of his employer within the scope of his employment, he claims that he is entitled to immunity from suit under the Workers' Compensation Statute. Pratchett's argument hinges on the proposition that the performance of routine work assignments by a supervisor is an aspect of the nondelegable duty of providing employees with a safe place to work. Pratchett relies on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.1989), to support his argument, but a close reading of Ramey reveals that a supervisory co-employee performs his employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace where he delegates work assignments or supervises other employees in the performance of their assignments, but not where he performs the assignments himself.
Ramey and his wife sued Martin-Baker, McDonnell Douglas, Rix, and Waller in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County seeking damages for Ramey's injuries and for harm to their marital relationship. Id. at 948. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of McDonnell Douglas holding that it was immune from suit under Maryland's Workers' Compensation Statute. Id. The remaining defendants removed the suit to the federal district court. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rix and Martin-Baker finding that Rix was immune from suit under the Statute because he was a supervisory employee acting in furtherance of a nondelegable duty of his employer and that Martin-Baker was immune from suit under the military contractor defense. Id.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of both defendants. As to the judgment in favor of Rix, the Fourth Circuit held that Rix's actions "were in furtherance of McDonnell Douglas's nondelegable duty to Ramey, and created no personal duty of care on Rix's part." Id. at 952. In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated that under the Wisconsin approach to coemployee liability, which the Court of Appeals adopted in Athas, "routine work assignments and supervision are aspects of the nondelegable duty of providing employees a safe place to work." Id. However, in Ramey, the supervisory coemployee was not performing the routine work assignment himself, instead he was "performing McDonnell Douglas's duty of selecting and assigning workers to tasks" and supervising those workers in the performance of their tasks. Id. Thus, it is not the performance of routine work assignments that is part of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace but the selection of which employees will perform which assignments and the supervision of employees in the performance of their assignments that is part of the employer's nondelegable duty. Here, Pratchett was not assigning tasks or supervising employees in the performance of their tasks; rather Pratchett was performing the task himself in moving the customer's car.
In Ramey, the Fourth Circuit faced a similar fact pattern as the Court of Appeals in Athas. In Ramey, the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor was negligent in assigning him to remove the ejection seat from an F-18, while in Athas, the plaintiff alleged that his supervisors were negligent in hiring the employee who attacked him. In both cases, the allegedly negligent act involved supervisory tasks such as the distribution of work assignments or the hiring of employees. However, here, Pratchett was not assigning a task, but performing the task himself. This is a key distinction because in performing the task himself, Pratchett is no longer acting in his role as a supervisor, but instead he is acting as a coemployee. As a coemployee, he is not performing his employer's duty to provide a safe workplace. Rather, as the driver of a motor
The circuit court erred in its granting of the motion for summary judgment. The brief statement of facts indicates that Pratchett, while working, was in the process of moving a customer's 1999 Honda Accord from a parking space when the vehicle collided with a vehicle Hayes was driving. There is no indication in the record that this was the duty of a supervisor rather than a coemployee in the tire service center. The driving of the vehicle by Pratchett would be the "additional factor" or "something extra" which caused the injury to Hayes. That duty is different from the duty of proper supervision that is owed to the employer by a corporate officer or a supervisory employee. A supervisory employee's affirmative act of negligence goes beyond the scope of the nondelegable duty of the employer to "provide his employees with a safe place to work, i.e. safe conditions." Athas, 300 Md. at 146, 476 A.2d 710 (citation omitted). Pratchett's actions at the time of the accident, on the facts as agreed, would not have entitled him to immunity from suit under the Workers' Compensation Statute.
300 Md. at 140-41 (internal citations omitted). The current edition of Larson's Workers' Compensation Law states that "[e]xceptions to coemployee immunity for intentional wrongs now exist in 34 states. Wyoming, Minnesota, Iowa and Florida have an exception for gross negligence." Lex K. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 111.03(6) (2011).
