WATTS, J.

The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denied the motion of appellant, Shelia Murphy, Personal Representative of the Estate of Dorothy Mae Urban,1 to stay and dismiss a foreclosure action that had been instituted by appellees, Jeremy K. Fishman, Samuel D. Williamowsky, and Erica T. Davis Ruth, Substitute Trustees. Appellant noted an appeal raising five issues, which we rephrase and consolidate into one:2

We answer the question in the affirmative, and shall, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2010, appellees filed with the circuit court an Order to Docket a foreclosure action for real property located at 229 Dale Road, Pasadena, Maryland ("the Property"), naming as defendants, appellant and Robert Street, Sr., Urban's son. The foreclosure action concerned a refinance of the Property by Street, the mortgagor, of an existing mortgage in Urban's name. In the Order to Docket, appellees stated that the foreclosure was based on a Deed of Trust that Street had executed on February 18, 2008, in closing on a loan of $91,350 from 1st Chesapeake Home Mortgage, LLC ("the Street Deed of Trust").3 Acting on behalf of the owner of the Street Deed of Trust — MidFirst Bank ("the Lender") — appellees instituted the foreclosure proceedings against the Property, alleging that the mortgage had been in default since May 1, 2010, because of the "mortgagor(s)['] and/or grantor(s)['] failure to make the regular monthly mortgage payment[s.]"

On December 20, 2010,4 appellant filed a Motion to Stay and Dismiss the foreclosure action, alleging that Urban's Estate ("the Estate") was the Property's lawful owner. Appellant asserted that Street had no ownership interest in the Property because, in a separate civil action ("the Estate Lawsuit"), the circuit court allegedly "invalidat[ed a] May 30, 2007 Deed [from Urban to Street] and impose[ed] a constructive trust over the Property[.]" Appellant argued that the complaint filed in the Estate Lawsuit created a lis pendens,5 and that the lien upon which appellees sought to foreclose was invalid.

In support of the Motion to Stay and Dismiss, appellant attached copies of documents that had been filed in the Estate Lawsuit, alleging the following: (1) on May 30, 2007, Urban, as grantor, conveyed the Property to Street, as grantee, by deed for zero monetary consideration ("the 2007 Deed"); (2) on May 31, 2007, the 2007 Deed was recorded; (3) on June 5, 2007, Urban died; and (4) on June 11, 2007, the Estate was opened, appointing appellant as its personal representative.

On January 3, 2008, appellant filed a Complaint to Nullify or Declare [the 2007] Deed Null and Void in the Estate Lawsuit in the circuit court, seeking to invalidate the 2007 Deed. In the complaint, appellant alleged that at the time of execution of the 2007 Deed, Urban was seventy-three-years-old, "in declining physical and mental condition, was deemed to not be competent and died six days later ... from breast cancer." According to appellant, Street influenced Urban to change her will and to deed the Property to him. In the complaint, appellant sought to: (1) impose a constructive trust on the Property, (2) have the Property returned to the Estate to be distributed according to Urban's will, and (3) nullify and void the 2007 Deed "on the grounds of breach of confidential relationship, lack of capacity, lack of due execution, undue influence, and fraud." On February 18, 2008, Street obtained the Street Deed of Trust from 1st Chesapeake Home Mortgage.

Litigation continued in the Estate Lawsuit. On March 15, 2010, the circuit court issued the following Order ("the Estate Order"), stating:

On May 25, 2010, appellant, by deed, conveyed the Property to the Estate ("the 2010 Deed"). On June 1, 2010, the 2010 Deed was recorded in the Land Records of Anne Arundel County.

On January 7, 2011, in the foreclosure action, appellees filed an Opposition to the Motion to Stay and Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Opposition. In the Opposition, appellees contended that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211, a motion to stay and dismiss must be filed under oath or supported by affidavit, and that the Motion to Stay and Dismiss filed by appellant failed to satisfy the requirement, as it was not filed under oath or supported by affidavit. As to the merits, appellees argued that appellant misconstrued the effect of the Estate Order, alleging:

Appellees argued that Street retained an ownership interest in the Property until the execution of the 2010 Deed. Appellees pointed out that the Estate Order granted only one of appellant's requests for relief — namely, the establishment of a constructive trust over the Property — and did not grant other requests for relief, including a declaration that Urban owned the Property at the time of her death (thereby making it an asset to be distributed to the Estate) or a declaration that the 2007 Deed was null and void. Appellees argued that the Street Deed of Trust had not been declared null and void or vitiated in the Estate Lawsuit. Accordingly, appellees requested that the Motion to Stay and Dismiss be denied.

On May 16, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on the Motion to Stay and Dismiss and Opposition.6 At the beginning of the hearing, appellant introduced a transcript of the March 15, 2010, hearing in the Estate Lawsuit into evidence.7 During the hearing, appellant argued that, in the Estate Lawsuit, the circuit court "found" that Urban owned the Property at the time of her death. Appellant contended that the Estate Order, permitting the constructive trust, was retroactive dating back to the 2007 Deed.

Appellees contended that, in the Estate Lawsuit, the circuit court did not declare the 2007 Deed null and void, but rather merely established a constructive trust. As to the issue of notice and lis pendens, appellees argued:

Appellees contended that because the Street Deed of Trust paid off Urban's original loan in the amount of $59,000 at the time of settlement, the Lender was "in the position of the prior Deed of Trust through equitable subrogation." As to whether the constructive trust in the Estate Lawsuit was prospective or retroactive, appellees argued that the constructive trust was prospective and that, had "the [Estate] Order [been] done to nullify and void the initial deed, as was requested in the Complaint, th[e] subsequent deed out of the constructive trust [the 2010 Deed] would not have been necessary."

At the end of the hearing, the circuit court requested that counsel submit case law — only "citations" — by the close of business on May 17, 2011, on the issue of whether a confidential relationship rendered the 2007 Deed void.8

On May 19, 2011, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion denying the Motion to Stay and Dismiss. In the Opinion, the circuit court stated:

DISCUSSION

(1) Contentions

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying the Motion to Stay and Dismiss because the Lender "has no claim to the Property, legal or equitable, [that] allow[s] it to seek to foreclose on the Property[.]" Appellant argues that the Estate Order had the "effect" of declaring the 2007 Deed void ab initio. Appellant maintains that the filing of the complaint in the Estate Lawsuit acted as lis pendens, providing constructive notice of the lawsuit to the Lender. According to appellant, because the doctrine of lis pendens applies, the Lender is not a bona fide purchaser and should not be afforded the protections to which a bona fide purchaser is entitled.

Appellant argues that a foreclosure is an equitable remedy requiring "clean hands," and, in this case, the Lender does not have an equitable claim to the Property because the constructive trust was imposed as a result of Street's fraud and dishonesty. Appellant maintains that the equities involved in the case favor granting the Motion to Stay and Dismiss. Appellant maintains that the Lender is not entitled to equitable subrogation based on the circumstances of the case.

Appellant contends that, in the Estate Lawsuit, the circuit court found that Street was in a confidential relationship with Urban and exercised undue influence to obtain the 2007 Deed. Appellant argues that this determination was the equivalent of "finding the [2007] Deed to be null and void and of no legal effect." According to appellant, where the grantee fails to demonstrate the validity of the conveyance and a trial court finds the existence of a confidential relationship, "the end result must be that the conveyance is not valid as it was not the `free, voluntary, and independent act' of the grantor." Appellant asserts that the establishment of the constructive trust was the appropriate remedy given the fraud finding. In sum, appellant maintains that the circuit court erred in denying the Motion to Stay and Dismiss, and that the Lender is unable to proceed with foreclosure because it is not a bona fide purchaser.

Appellees respond that appellant's Motion to Stay and Dismiss was properly denied as it was not under oath or supported by affidavit as required by Maryland Rule 14-211. Appellees argue that this deficiency alone provides a "sufficient basis for the denial of relief."

Appellees contend that the circuit court properly denied the Motion to Stay and Dismiss because the circuit court's ruling in the Estate Lawsuit did not invalidate the 2007 Deed or the Street Deed of Trust. According to appellees, the Estate Order granted only one of appellant's requests for relief — imposition of a constructive trust — and failed to provide the other requested relief, including a finding that the 2007 Deed was null and void and that the Property was owned by Urban upon her death. Appellees argue that, had the 2007 Deed been found to be invalid or void ab initio, "there would [have been] absolutely no need to order the appointment of a trustee to transfer the Property to the Estate[.] Instead, the property would, by operation of law and court order, be in the name of the Estate."

Appellees contend that, given the ruling in the Estate Lawsuit, the doctrine of lis pendens did not affect the validity of the Street Deed of Trust. Appellees argue that, pursuant to the doctrine of lis pendens, a person who acquires an interest in real property while litigation is pending is bound by the litigation's outcome, and that, in this case, the Estate Lawsuit's outcome did not affect the Lender's title. Appellees assert that, because the Estate Order required transfer of the Property to the Estate, "the Estate took the Property as is, as encumbered" by the Street Deed of Trust, and the lien created by the Street Deed of Trust remained on the Property.

Appellees contend that equity does not favor appellant over the Lender because the Estate "accepted the benefit of the payoff" of the prior deed of trust executed by Urban, as evidenced by the Certificate of Satisfaction. Appellees argue that the Lender acted with "clean hands" in the matter, giving value for the Street Deed of Trust, and that the majority of the proceeds from the Street Deed of Trust "inured to the benefit of the Estate." Appellees assert that there is no evidence suggesting that the Lender had actual notice of the Estate Lawsuit prior to taking its interest in the Property. Appellees maintain that, "[a]t a minimum, the doctrine of equitable subrogation allows the Lender to foreclose from the position of the" prior deed of trust that Urban had executed.

Appellees maintain that the "finding of a confidential relationship does not, by itself, void a transaction particularly where [a trial] court fashions an alternate remedy." Appellees contend that appellant relies upon case law that does not support the proposition that a trial court must declare a deed null and void upon finding the existence of a confidential relationship. Appellees argue that, in the Estate Order, the circuit court, by ordering that a deed be executed transferring the Property to the Estate, "gave validity to the initial transfer by [the 2007] Deed." Accordingly, appellees contend that the circuit court did not err in denying the Motion to Stay and Dismiss.

(2) Standard of Review

"When considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court is required to assume the truth of all of the well-pled facts in the complaint and attached exhibits, and the `reasonable inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.'" 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 261, 964 A.2d 662 (2009) (citation omitted).

In Bechamps v. 1190 Augustine Herman, LC, 202 Md.App. 455, 460, 32 A.3d 542 (2011), a case involving a grant of a motion to stay filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211, we stated: "We review a trial court's decision to stay a proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Whether to grant or deny a stay of proceedings is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and only will be disturbed if the discretion is abused." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Svrcek v. Rosenberg, 203 Md.App. 705, 720, 40 A.3d 494 (2012), we stated:

(Omissions and third alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

(3) Law

(a) Motions to Stay and Dismiss Pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211

Maryland Rule 14-211 provides in pertinent part:

Failure to comply with the requirements set forth in Maryland Rule 14-211 is a proper ground for denial of a motion to stay or dismiss. In Svrcek, 203 Md. App. at 721, 40 A.3d 494 this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a property owner's motion to stay the sale and dismiss the foreclosure proceedings where the motion was filed after the deadline set forth in Maryland Rule 14-211. The trial court found that the property owner failed to show good cause to excuse non-compliance with the filing deadline. Id. This Court held that, even if the trial court had found good cause for the late filing, "the [trial] court would have acted properly in denying the motion because [the motion] failed to state a legitimate defense to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument and the right of the appellees to foreclose." Id. at 722, 40 A.3d 494 (citation omitted).

(b) Constructive Trusts and Confidential Relationships

In Porter v. Zuromski, 195 Md.App. 361, 368-69, 6 A.3d 372 (2010), with Judge Robert A. Zarnoch speaking for this Court, we discussed the remedy of a constructive trust and the effect of demonstrating a confidential relationship, stating:

(Citations, internal quotation marks, and footnotes omitted). We further explained that a confidential relationship "exists where one party is under the domination of another or where, under the circumstances, such party is justified in assuming that the other will not act in a manner inconsistent with his or her welfare." Id. at 369 n. 12, 6 A.3d 372 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Porter, id. at 376, 6 A.3d 372 we upheld the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust and its declaration that each party had an undivided interest in the property. The case involved an unmarried couple who had been romantically involved for over a decade. Id. at 364-65, 6 A.3d 372. The woman had paid half of the expenses for the home that the couple shared, although only the man was named on the deed and mortgage. Id. See also Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 395-96, 410-11, 414, 942 A.2d 736 (2008) (The Court of Appeals held that-having found that a confidential relationship existed between the petitioner and her deceased father and that the petitioner failed to show that the transfer of the home was fair and not the result of her undue influence on her father-the trial court properly imposed a constructive trust on the home of the petitioner's deceased father, appointed a constructive trustee, and ordered the trustee to convey the home to the deceased father's personal representative.)

(c) Void Ab Initio vs. Voidable Deeds and Bona Fide Purchasers

In Scotch Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 570, 583, 587, 11 A.3d 801 (2011), the Court of Appeals discussed the distinction between a deed void ab initio and a voidable deed, stating:

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, "[a] deed obtained through fraud, deceit or trickery is voidable as between the parties thereto, but not as to a bona fide purchaser. A forged deed, on the other hand, is void ab initio." Harding v. Ja Laur Corp., 20 Md.App. 209, 214, 315 A.2d 132 (1974).

In Wash. Mut. Bank v. Homan, 186 Md.App. 372, 394-97, 974 A.2d 376 (2009), with Judge Arrie W. Davis speaking for this Court, we explained the concept of a bona fide purchaser, stating:

(Emphasis added) (some alterations and omissions in original) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and some citations omitted).

As to notice, we observed that "the relevant inquiry is whether the bona fide purchaser or lender has notice of an existing interest in the property when his or her own interest is acquired." Id. at 399, 974 A.2d 376 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Stated otherwise, this Court has explained the concepts of notice and the bona fide purchaser as follows:

Howard Chertkof & Co. v. Gimbel, 157 Md.App. 118, 140, 849 A.2d 1036 (2004) (omission in original) (citations omitted). "The standard for determining what facts suffice to `excite inquiry' is `notice of facts which would lead an ordinarily prudent [person] to make an examination.'" Beins v. Oden, 155 Md.App. 237, 244-45, 843 A.2d 147 (2004) (citation omitted) (This Court held that, as to an easement, it was "undisputed that the easement in question did, in fact, appear in the title abstract" and that appellants' attorney "failed to read the extract in its entirety and did not see the easement.").

In Homan, 186 Md.App. at 381, 403, 974 A.2d 376 — a case involving a deed of trust and quitclaim deed that were not recorded in the land records until over eighteen months after the deed of trust was granted to the bank and over two months after the trial court ordered the home improvement company, in the original lawsuit, to convey the property to the buyers — we remanded to the trial court for consideration of the issue of whether or not the bank was a "bona fide mortgagee or lender for value without notice[,]" as the record did not reflect whether the trial court had considered and decided the issue. In Gimbel, 157 Md.App. at 120, 140, 141-42, 849 A.2d 1036a case involving "a real estate broker's entitlement to a commission in connection with a commercial lease" — this Court observed that the trial court erred in deciding that appellees were bona fide purchasers without first determining whether appellees "knew of the claim before the transfer of title" or whether "appellees were parties to the [a]greement[.]"

(d) Lis Pendens

Maryland Rule 12-102 provides in relevant part:

In Weston, 167 Md.App. at 30-31, 35-36, 891 A.2d 430, this Court explained the "general rule of lis pendens" and attachment of the doctrine of lis pendens as follows:

(First omission in original) (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In DeShields v. Broadwater, 338 Md. 422, 436, 659 A.2d 300 (1995), the Court of Appeals discussed lis pendens and the concept of the bona fide purchaser, stating: "[A] transferee's knowledge of the pendency of litigation affecting the property acquired may very well be quite important. Because lis pendens provides constructive notice of the equity claimed by the plaintiff, the transferee's actual notice of that equitable claim prevents that transferee from being a purchaser in good faith. Indeed, it has been said that one who purchases with notice of another's equity is a mala fide purchaser."

(4) Analysis

Upon review of the record, "assum[ing] the truth of all of the well-pled facts" in the Order to Docket and attached exhibits, "and the reasonable inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to" appellees, we conclude that the circuit court erred in denying the Motion to Stay and Dismiss, as the Lender was not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser.9 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP, 407 Md. at 261-62, 964 A.2d 662 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the May 19, 2011, opinion, the circuit court correctly observed that the Lender's notice of the Estate Lawsuit was an issue that needed to be resolved in order to determine whether it was entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser. Rather than addressing the issue of notice, the circuit court denied the Motion to Stay and Dismiss, stating: "Because the mortgagee bank's actual notice of the pending litigation or bad faith are disputed material fact, the Court will deny [appellant]'s Motion to Stay and Dismiss at this time."

In this case, the Lender is not entitled to the protection of a bona fide purchaser as, pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102, it had constructive notice of the Estate Lawsuit and title issues clouding the Property at the time it acquired an interest in the Property. On January 3, 2008, the complaint in the Estate Lawsuit was filed with the circuit court. At that time, the provisions of Maryland Rule 12-102 concerning lis pendens became applicable, as the complaint was filed in the circuit court and affected title to real property located within the State. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102(b), the filing of the complaint in the Estate Lawsuit created constructive notice10 of the lis pendens as to the Property. There is no indication in the record that the circuit court terminated the lis pendens at any time prior to the litigation's completion. Thus, as of January 3, 2008, the filing of the complaint provided constructive notice of the lis pendens as to the Property, and such notice existed on February 18, 2008, the date on which the Lender acquired an interest in the Property.

We are aware that Maryland appellate courts have not previously addressed directly the question of whether or not a lender charged with constructive notice pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102(b) is a bona fide purchaser. In Homan, 186 Md. App. at 395, 974 A.2d 376, however, this Court unambiguously stated that a bona fide purchaser is one who takes "without notice or knowledge of any infirmity in the title of his [or her] vendor." (Citation omitted). This Court observed that lenders may be entitled to the protections available to bona fide purchasers where such lenders are without notice and otherwise meet the qualifications of being a bona fide purchaser. See id. at 396-97, 974 A.2d 376. As to notice and the bona fide purchaser, this Court held that "the relevant inquiry is whether the bona fide purchaser or lender has notice of an existing interest in the property when his or her own interest is acquired." Id. at 399, 974 A.2d 376 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

As to the nature of the notice required, in Gimbel, 157 Md.App. at 140, 849 A.2d 1036, we stated that "if the purchaser had knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, he [or she] will be presumed to have made such inquiry and will be charged with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Beins, 155 Md.App. at 244, 843 A.2d 147, we explained "inquiry" as follows: "The standard for determining what facts suffice to `excite inquiry' is `notice of facts which would lead an ordinarily prudent [person] to make an examination.'" (Citation omitted). This precedent makes clear that notice is not confined to actual notice, but rather is much broader, and may encompass the constructive notice provided by lis pendens.

Although it is accurate, as appellees contend, that, in Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Schlossberg, 390 Md. 211, 222, 888 A.2d 297 (2005), the Court of Appeals stated: "Lis pendens has no specific separate existence apart from its basic function to advise a person who seeks to acquire an interest in property subject to a lis pendens that he will be bound by the outcome of the noticed litigation[,]" the issue before the Court in that case was not whether or not constructive notice deprives a party of the protection to which a bona fide purchaser is entitled. In Schlossberg, id. at 251, 888 A.2d 297, the Court determined that lis pendens arising from a divorce case that had been filed under one spouse's name did not effectively provide notice where the property at issue was owned by the other spouse. The Court also held that lis pendens is not applicable in a divorce case unless the trial court specifically orders it to be applicable. Id. at 216 n. 1, 888 A.2d 297. The Court's statement as to the extent of the notice provided — that lis pendens provides notice only that a person is bound by the litigation's outcome — is dicta.

As to bona fide purchaser status, notice is assessed at the time that a party acquires an interest in the property. See Julian, 414 Md. at 663, 997 A.2d 104 (Bona fide assignee status is "determined at the time of the assignment."). In the instant case, at the time that the Lender acquired its interest in the Property, there was no court order providing that the Property be returned, encumbered or otherwise, to the Estate, i.e. the Estate litigation was unresolved. The Lender took the Property subject to constructive notice of the Estate litigation and, as such, does not qualify for the protection to which a bona fide purchaser is entitled. Indeed, as discussed infra, had the outcome of the case been that the 2007 Deed were voidable, such a finding would not have automatically entitled the Lender to the protection of a bona fide purchaser. In its ruling of March 15, 2010, the circuit court found neither that the 2007 deed was void ab initio nor voidable. Nor did the circuit court explicitly order that the Property be transferred back to the appellant encumbered by the lien. In determining appellees' right to proceed with the foreclosure action, the critical question is whether or not appellees are entitled to the protection accorded bona fide purchasers.

Although appellant argues that, in the Estate Lawsuit, the circuit court's ruling had "the effect of finding the [2007] Deed void ab initio," we do not reach the issue of whether or not the Estate Order rendered the 2007 Deed either void ab initio or voidable, as such a determination is not dispositive of whether or not the Lender is a bona fide purchaser and entitled the protection of that status. Had the 2007 Deed been found void ab initio, and even had the Lender qualified as a bona fide purchaser, appellees would not have prevailed. See Matthews, 417 Md. at 583, 11 A.3d 801 ("[A] person otherwise qualifying as a bona fide purchaser under the recording act receives no protection under a void deed." (Citation omitted).). As to the establishment of the constructive trust, we observe that, in cases where a constructive trust was established as a result of finding a confidential relationship, Maryland appellate courts have not held that the deeds in question were void ab initio, and we do not do so in the instant case. See, e.g., Figgins, 403 Md. 392, 942 A.2d 736; Porter, 195 Md.App. 361, 6 A.3d 372. If the 2007 Deed were voidable, appellees would not prevail unless the Lender was found to be a bona fide purchaser without notice. See Harding, 20 Md.App. at 214, 315 A.2d 132 ("[A] deed obtained through fraud, deceit or trickery is [not] voidable ... as to a bona fide purchaser."); Homan, 186 Md.App. at 396, 974 A.2d 376 (By definition, a bona fide purchaser is without notice.). Accordingly, we address the Lender's status as a bona fide purchaser with or without notice and need not express an opinion as to whether or not the 2007 Deed is voidable.

We find unpersuasive appellees' reliance on DeShields, 338 Md. at 436, 659 A.2d 300, for the proposition that only actual notice, not constructive notice, may deprive a party of its status as a bona fide purchaser. In DeShields, id., the Court of Appeals stated: "Because lis pendens provides constructive notice of the equity claimed by the plaintiff, the transferee's actual notice of that equitable claim prevents that transferee from being a purchaser in good faith." The Court merely observed that the purchaser had actual notice and was not a bona fide purchaser. The Court did not hold that only actual notice, not constructive notice, can deprive a party of its status as a bona fide purchaser.

We see no reason to distinguish between actual and constructive notice for purposes of determining a party's status as a bona fide purchaser. Our conclusion is in line with case law from other states whose appellate courts have held that constructive notice under lis pendens deprives a party of its status as a bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Rolan v. Glass, 305 Ga.App. 217, 699 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2010), cert. denied, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 30 (Ga.2011) (The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that, "as [the purchaser] had constructive notice of the lis pendens, she was not a bona fide purchaser[.]"); Dyer v. Martinez, 147 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 907 (Cal.Ct.App.2007) (The Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of California held that a purchaser was a bona fide purchaser because — although a lis pendens had been filed — the recorder's office had not yet indexed the lis pendens, and, therefore, the purchaser lacked constructive notice.).

We also are unpersuaded by appellees' reliance on G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 234-37, 657 A.2d 1170 (1995), for the contention that the doctrine of equitable subrogation bars dismissal of the foreclosure action.11 In Levenson, id. at 231-32, 657 A.2d 1170, the Court of Appeals stated:

(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The holding of the Court of Appeals in Levenson predates this Court's holdings as to notice in Homan, Gimbel, and Beins. Significantly, Levenson, 338 Md. at 227, 657 A.2d 1170, is a post-foreclosure sale case in which the refinance lender purchased the property at foreclosure. The holding of the Court of Appeals addressed two questions, both of which involved the foreclosure sale.12 Id. at 237, 657 A.2d 1170. In Levenson, id. at 233, 235, 657 A.2d 1170, after the foreclosure sale had been ratified, Levenson, a creditor, filed a petition in the foreclosure action seeking a determination that his three previously obtained confessed judgments had priority over the lender's deed of trust. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, the lender, had refinanced an existing deed of trust and successfully bid for the property at the foreclosure sale. Id. at 234-35, 657 A.2d 1170. The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the creditor's "actual knowledge in advance of the foreclosure sale that the sale would be held, his opportunity to bid, and his opportunity to litigate the applicability of equitable subrogation before distribution of the sale proceeds fully satisfied the requirements of due process under the facts of this case." Id. at 246-47, 657 A.2d 1170. Read appropriately, Levenson applies to refinance lenders who, after a foreclosure sale, obtain a position of priority for a refinanced deed of trust over other judgment holders. Levenson is not dispositive where, as here, a refinance lender invokes the doctrine of equitable subrogation prior to the foreclosure sale, against a party, such as appellant, who claims to have been wrongfully deprived of title.13

In the instant case, on February 18, 2008 — over a month after the filing of the complaint in the Estate Lawsuit — Street executed the Street Deed of Trust in the Lender's favor. At that time, pursuant to the doctrine of lis pendens, the Lender was on constructive notice that title to the Property was in question, and that Street may have obtained the Property through means of a breach of a confidential relationship, undue influence, and fraud. Constructive notice is "presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and is thus imputed to that person." Black's Law Dictionary 1090 (8th ed.2004). Despite the constructive notice, however, the Lender extended the Deed of Trust to Street for execution. Applying the guidance set forth in Gimbel and Beins — that the contemplated notice exceeds the circumstance of actual notice — we hold that, because the Lender had constructive notice of the Estate Lawsuit pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102(b) at the time it acquired an interest in the Property, it was not entitled to the protections to which a bona fide purchaser is entitled, and was not entitled to foreclose on the Property. In sum, the lis pendens provided constructive notice, at the time the mortgage was acquired, of the existing interest in the Property, thereby precluding the Lender from protection as a bona fide purchaser.

In addition to constructive notice provided by lis pendens, appellant contends that the Lender would have gained notice of the existence of the Estate Lawsuit by the title search conducted before settlement or recordation of the Street Deed of Trust on April 2, 2008, and that the Lender had actual, or at a minimum, inquiry notice of the matter. Although the Lender's actual notice of the Estate Lawsuit may be a disputed material fact between the parties, as explained above, whether or not the Lender had actual notice of the Estate Lawsuit is not dispositive of the determination of the Lender's status as a bona fide purchaser. The existence of actual notice or, indeed, the Lender's knowledge of circumstances "which would lead an ordinarily prudent [person] to make an examination[,]" Beins, 155 Md. App. at 244, 843 A.2d 147, are interesting questions that we need not have the circuit court answer. The record makes clear that the Estate Lawsuit-filed on January 3, 2008 — created constructive notice pursuant to Maryland Rule 12-102(b) of the existence of the Estate's claims. At the time the Lender gained an interest in the Property, it was "presumed by law" to have had notice of appellant's claim of ownership.14

For all of the reasons stated above, the circuit court erred in finding that the Lender's actual notice was a disputed material fact that prevented granting the motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211(e), "if the [circuit] court finds that the moving party has established that the lien or the lien instrument is invalid or that the plaintiff has no right to foreclose in the pending action, it shall grant the motion and, unless it finds good cause to the contrary, dismiss the foreclosure action." As the record demonstrates that: (1) the Lender is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser for value, and (2) there is no indication of "good cause to the contrary" prohibiting dismissal of the foreclosure action, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.