HARRELL, J.
This case comes to us through the courtesy of fairly recent advancements in the field of information technology,
The Maryland State Board of Elections (hereinafter "the State Board") certified the petition for referendum on 20 July 2012 after determining that Intervenor had gathered the required number of valid signatures. Pursuant to Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-209, Petitioners
The Circuit Court affirmed the action of the State Board, determining that the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions were unambiguous and did not support Whitley's contentions. We issued a writ of certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether petition signatures obtained through the use of a third-party website violate the statutory requirement that an individual "include" or "provide" his or her identifying information, see Md.Code, (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-203; COMAR 33.06.03.06; and (2) whether an individual can "self-circulate" a petition by signing both as the voter and as the circulator consistent with the affidavit requirements of the Maryland Constitution and Election Law Article. See Md. Const. art. XVI, § 4; Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204. On 17 August, 2012, we issued an Order affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Article XVI, Section 1 of the Maryland Constitution reserves to the people the power to petition to referendum any Act, or any part of an Act, passed by the General Assembly (if approved by the Governor) or passed over the Governor's veto. Md. Const. art. XVI, § 1. To proceed to referendum, a petition must be filed with the Secretary of State, Md. Const. art. XVI, § 2, bearing the signatures of three percent of the registered voters of the State as determined by the total number of votes actually cast in the preceding gubernatorial election.
On 20 October 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 1, chapter 1 of the 2011 Special Session, signed by Governor O'Malley that same day. SB 1 established a congressional redistricting plan for Maryland's eight congressional districts, pursuant to the results of the 2010 U.S. Census.
For a signature to be accepted as valid by the State Board, it must comply with the provisions of the Maryland Constitution and Title 6 of the Election Law Article.
In completing a signature page, each signer of a petition must "include ..., printed or typed," his or her name, address, and the date the petition was signed.
Intervenor collected petition signatures both in person and through the use of a website that allowed visitors to the site to enter relevant identifying information to generate their own copy of a referendum petition, which could then be printed, signed, and mailed to the petition sponsor. To use the petition computer software, an individual could visit MDPetitions.com, select the "redistricting petition" option, and follow a series of prompts to complete the petition. After selecting the redistricting option, the website first displayed a screen which included a picture of the new congressional districts as defined by SB 1, a summary of Intervenor's concerns regarding SB 1 and Intervenor's call to action,
An individual who elected to sign the petition would then be taken to a screen that provided instructions on how to generate a petition. On the left side of the screen was a five-step instruction process, which stated:
On the right side of the screen, a series of boxes appeared in which the individual could enter his or her identifying information, as instructed in Step 1. The screen prompted, "Fill out the following form with your information," and included the following fields for the individual to complete: first name, last name, suffix (optional), email address, phone number, zip code (5 digit), and birth date. After filling in the relevant information and clicking "Continue," the software program would search the most recent voter registration rolls made available by the Maryland State Board of Elections to identify the user's status as a registered Maryland voter. Assuming that the software was able to identify the user as a registered voter,
Once the user downloaded the petition, he or she could open the petition and print his or her signature page, the summary of SB 1 and accompanying map, the complete text of SB 1, and a foldable envelope for use in mailing the completed signature page to the sponsor, MDPetitions.com.
Intervenor submitted 28,477 signatures to the State Board on 31 May 2012, 26,763 of which were accepted as valid by the Board. Intervenor submitted an additional 36,267 signatures on 30 June. As of 18 July, the Board accepted 59,201 signatures and rejected 7,649, thus validating and verifying more than the number of signatures necessary to submit SB 1 to referendum. As a result, in a letter dated 20 July 2012,
Whitley, the State Board, and Intervenor filed cross-motions for summary judgment. A hearing was held on 10 August 2012 in the Circuit Court to consider these motions. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the State Board,
Whitley noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and filed contemporaneously a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court. Prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari. Whitley v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 427 Md. 523, 50 A.3d 9 (2012). We heard oral arguments on 16 August 2012, and the next day, on 17 August 2012, we issued a Per Curiam Order affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. We shall explain now our reasons for that action.
We are asked here to consider the following two questions:
The State Board's decision to certify the petition for referendum was made pursuant to its interpretation of Article XVI, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution and §§ 6-203-04 of the Election Law Article and therefore presents "an issue of statutory construction and consequently one of law." Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 469, 15 A.3d 798, 801 (2011); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) ("When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the construction of statutory language.").
The primary goal of statutory construction is "to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision[.]" Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172, 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007). In so doing, we look first to the "normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute," read as a whole so that "`no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory[.]'" Doe, 406 Md. at 712, 962 A.2d at 351 (quoting Barbre, 402 Md. at 172, 935 A.2d at 708). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we "need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends." Barbre, 402 Md. at 173, 935 A.2d at 709. Where the language of the statute is ambiguous and may be subject to more than one interpretation, however, we look
Pursuant to § 6-203, a petition signer must:
Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-203(a). Regulations promulgated by the State Board further provide, in relevant part, that "[w]hen signing the signature page, each signer shall ... [p]rovide the following information, to be printed or typed in the appropriate spaces: (A) Date of signing, (B) Signer's name as it was signed, and (C) Current residence address...". COMAR 33.06.03.06.
We concluded previously that the provisions of § 6-203 are mandatory, not discretionary. Doe, 406 Md. at 728, 962 A.2d at 360. Thus, in order for the State Board to validate and verify properly a signature, the petition signers must have complied with the requirements in § 6-203. Section 6-203(a)(2) states, in relevant part, that "[t]o sign a petition, an individual shall ... include the [required identifying] information, printed or typed, in the spaces provided...". There is no dispute that the information required by the statutory provisions and accompanying regulations — specifically, the signer's name, address, and date of signing — appeared on the signature pages at issue. Rather, Whitley asserts that Intervenor's use of MDPetitions.com, which allows individuals to generate electronically signature pages, contravenes the requirement of § 6-203 and COMAR 33.06.03.06B(1) that the signer "include" or "provide" his identifying information, and defeats the purpose of § 6-203 by increasing the risk of voter fraud. Essentially, Whitley contends that the language of the statute and regulation requires that the signer "include" his or her identifying information, and that any signature for which a third party entered the identifying information is invalid on its face. Thus, Whitley takes exception not only to those signatures for which the individual entered the information into MDPetitions.com on behalf of himself or herself, but also for those in which an individual entered information into MDPetitions.com on behalf of another registered voter residing at the same address.
Further, Whitley claims that the State Board expressed disapproval regarding computer-generated petitions because they are the functional equivalent of pre-printed "walking" petitions.
Conversely, the State Board and Intervenor argue that the use of an online petitioning program is entirely consistent with the statutory language because neither the statute nor the regulations specify the individual or method by which such information must be included. The State Board distinguishes its disapproval of pre-printed petitions from those at issue in the instant case, contending that its prohibition is on "walking lists" of petitions, rather than the type of household list generated by MDPetitions.com. Respondents contend that, in seeking a requirement that the signer print or type personally his or her identifying information, Whitley attempts to add additional, "unduly burdensome" elements to the petitioning process. See Fire-Rescue, 418 Md. at 476 n. 14, 15 A.3d at 805 n. 14 (2011) (noting that this Court has determined that statutes defining the referendum petition process "are viable if not unduly burdensome on the constitutionally protected right to referendum").
The Circuit Court, in considering Whitley's argument, rejected the contention that the plain meaning of the words "include" and "provide" necessitate that the petition signer print or type personally his or her identifying information. The court stated that, "[w]hile it might well be the case that a process like the one implemented by Intervenor was not contemplated by the legislature when the statute was written," there is no legal support in either Subtitle 6 of the Election Law Article or the State Board's accompanying regulations from which to conclude that the process employed here violates the law. Consequently, the Circuit Court affirmed the State Board's decision to certify the signatures submitted via electronically-generated petition.
We conclude that the language of § 6-203(a) and COMAR 33.06.03.06(B) is unambiguous. Section 6-203(a)(2) requires the petition signer to "include" his or her identifying information together with his or her signature as provided in (a)(1). The plain meaning of the word "include" is "to take in or comprise as part of a whole." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 588 (10th ed.1999).
Similarly, we do not impute a requirement that an individual type or print personally information from the State Board's use of the word "provide," which means "to supply or make available." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 940 (10th ed.1999). Whitley asks us to find that there is a personal completion requirement on the basis simply of these two words. Because our role in interpreting a statute does not include reading language into a statute, we decline to find that an individual must print or type personally his or her identifying information in order to comply with § 6-203. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 387 Md. 1, 14, 874 A.2d 439, 447 (2005) ("We may not read language into a statute that is not there").
In construing a statute, we must keep in mind also the purpose of the provisions at issue. Barbre, 402 Md. at 172, 935 A.2d at 708 (noting that the Court's primary goal in statutory construction is to "discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision"). Interpreting the words "include" and "provide" to require affirmative action on the part of the individual does little to further the purpose of the requirements of § 6-203(a)(2). As we described in Fire-Rescue, the provisions of § 6-203 are designed to assist the State Board in the two-step validation and verification process in Subtitle 6 of the Election Law Article. 418 Md. at 478-80, 15 A.3d at 807-08. Specifically, while the purpose of the signature requirement of § 6-203(a)(1) is to "provide a personal attestation, as a signature is often used, to evidence support for the petition and to provide a unique identifier," the printed or typed information is used not only to validate the signature on the petition, but also to "verify the eligibility of the petition signer to support the petition," as required by § 6-207. Id. at 479-80, 15 A.3d at 807-08. Thus, the statutory requirement that the individual provide his name, address, and date of signing "pertain only to the identification of the signer." Barnes, 236 Md. at 571, 204 A.2d at 791 (emphasis added) (discussing the statutory predecessor to § 6-203, Md.Code (1964 Supp.), Art. 33, § 169).
Whitley contends that to read § 6-203 in this way is contrary to the Legislature's intent because it opens the door to voter fraud. While preventing voter fraud was indeed a concern of the General Assembly in enacting the provisions of Subtitle 6, see, e.g. Fire-Rescue, 418 Md. at 473, 15 A.3d at 804 ("Plainly, the overarching goal of the entire Petition Subtitle is to ensure that only eligible voters sign petitions...."), Whitley fails to point to any actual or persuasive indicia that allowing electronically-generated petitions contradicts this purpose. Regardless of whether a voter completes a paper or an electronic petition, the information required to be included by statute is the same. Moreover, there is no evidence that completing electronically a petition makes voter registration information any more readily available to an individual intent on committing voter fraud. See id. at 492 n. 6, 15 A.3d at 815 n. 6 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (noting the common practice of using a telephone book directory to commit circulator and petition fraud).
Allowing a voter to complete a computer-generated petition prioritizes citizen convenience. See Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 1-201(5). Registered voters need not wait for a petition sponsor or circulator to find or stumble upon them, but may participate in the political process on their own initiative. Further, because the software confirms electronically that the information entered by a voter matches the information on the voter registration rolls, the process permits individuals to avoid many common errors, such as entering a nickname (instead of a full name), that result frequently in the invalidation of petition signatures. An individual for whom a household member enters the information onto MDPetitions.com has the opportunity to inspect and verify the accuracy of the information before submitting the petition to the election authority. Whitley provides no persuasive evidence, or even conjecture, that any of these advances in citizen convenience will result in increased fraud.
Moreover, this interpretation is supported by the legislative history of § 6-203 of the Election Law Article. See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131, 756 A.2d 987, 993 (2000) ("[E]ven when the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, in the interest of completeness we may ... explore the legislative history of the statute under review ... [T]he resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The predecessor of § 6-203, Md.Code (1964 Supp.), Art. 33 § 207, repealed by 2002 Md. Laws ch. 291, § 3 stated:
Hence, by requiring only that the signer's identifying information "be appended," the predecessor of § 6-203 contained no requirement that the signer print or type personally the information.
In 1998, the General Assembly directed the formation of a Commission to revise and recodify Maryland's election law "to remove[] archaic provisions, resolve[] omissions and contradictions, and incorporate[] substantive, structural changes in the current law that the Commission considers necessary to meet the needs of modern election administration." 1996 Md.
We turn now to whether a self-circulated petition, in which both the affidavit and petition are signed by the same individual, violates Md. Const. art. XVI, § 4 or the Election Law Article. Article XVI, § 4 of the Maryland Constitution requires that "there shall be attached to each paper of signatures filed with a petition an affidavit of the person procuring those signatures that the signatures were affixed in his presence and that, based upon the person's best knowledge and belief, every signature on the paper is genuine and bona fide and that the signers are registered voters at the address set opposite or below their names." The Maryland General Assembly provided further that "[e]ach signature page shall contain an affidavit made and executed by the individual in whose presence all of the signatures on that page were affixed and who observed each of those signatures being affixed." Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204(a).
Whitley contends that both the Maryland Constitution and the Election Law Article require that an individual other than the petition signer prepare and sign the circulator's affidavit. Specifically, Whitley argues that the use of the words "procure," "presence," and "obtain" imply that more than one person was intended to be present at the time the signatures are affixed to the signature page and that, accordingly, an independent witness is required to sign the circulator's affidavit. Allowing a signer to self-circulate a petition by signing both as the signer and the circulator, Whitley claims, defeats the purpose of the affidavit requirement and increases the risk of voter fraud by removing an element of the validation and verification process. Whitley asks this Court to invalidate the signatures submitted by individuals who signed a petition as both the signer and the circulator.
By contrast, the State Board and Intervenor argue that the State Board certified properly the self-circulated signature pages because neither the Constitution nor the Election Law Article specifies the individual required to serve as circulator. Because there is no express requirement that a person other than the signer of the petition serve as a circulator, Respondents assert that the language of the statute permitted clearly and unambiguously the State Board to certify the signatures at
In granting the State Board's motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court judge determined that the language at issue was unambiguous and declined to require that a person other than the signer of the petition serve as the circulator. The court noted that, although neither the Constitution nor the Election Law Article contain an express requirement regarding the identity of the circulator, the General Assembly had the option to impose such a requirement. Therefore, because the "legislature determined that the provisions of Subtitle 6 of the Election law Article would best serve the interests of preventing fraud," the trial court affirmed the State Board's application of the law.
We agree with the decision of the Circuit Court and conclude that Article XVI, Section 4 and Election Law § 6-204 contain no ambiguity regarding the identity of the circulator. Therefore, we need not pin our reasoning on deference to the State Board's interpretation. See Fire-Rescue, 418 Md. at 469, 15 A.3d at 801 ("[W]e conclude that the particular statutory provision at issue ... is clear and unambiguous, notwithstanding the utility of judicial gloss, and therefore we do not defer to the Board's interpretation."); Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572, 873 A.2d 1145, 1155 (2005) ("When a statutory provision is entirely clear, with no ambiguity whatsoever, administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). While it may be accurate to observe that the Legislature provided for the possibility of two distinct classes of individuals, it did not require expressly that the signer and circulator be different persons. There is no support for Whitley's contention that allowing self-circulated petitions runs contrary to the purpose of the circulator's affidavit. Rather, because the Election Law Article imposes independent penalties on individuals who commit voter fraud that are designed to shield the referendum process from consideration of petitions with insufficient signatures, we decline to adopt Whitley's hypertextual view of Article XVI, Section 4 and § 6-204 of the Election Law Article.
We consider the constitutional and statutory provisions at issue in light of the purpose of the circulator's affidavit. As we stated previously, the circulator's affidavit assists in validation of the petition signatures by attesting to the genuine nature of an individual's signature and status as a registered voter. See Fire-Rescue, 418 Md. at 478-80, 15 A.3d at 807-08. "The purpose of the circulator's attestation is to `assure the validity of the signatures and the fairness of the petition process,'" id. (quoting Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204(b)), prevent fraud in the petition process, and provide an additional guarantee of trustworthiness to the signature of the voter. Id. at 479, 15 A.3d 798. The language of the Constitution and the Election Law Article is consistent with this purpose. By requiring that the affidavit attest to the authenticity of the signature and the accuracy
In accordance with this overarching purpose, we consider the meaning of the specific provisions at issue. Article XVI, Section 4 prescribes "only the form and contents of the affidavit to be signed by the person procuring the signatures," Howard Cnty. Citizens for Open Gov't v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 201 Md.App. 605, 625, 30 A.3d 245, 258-59 (2011), while the General Assembly is authorized to establish procedures to determine the authenticity of the affidavit. Md. Const. art. XVI, § 4. Although Whitley argues that Section 4 and the Election Law Article also specify the identity of the individual required to fill out the affidavit, the constitutional and statutory language contain no such specification. Indeed, the Election Law Article does not refer to the identity of the circulator, instead defining the circulator as "an individual who attests to one or more signatures affixed to a petition," Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-101(d), limited only by the requirement that the circulator be at least eighteen years of age at the time the signatures are affixed to the petition. Election Law Article, § 6-204(c). In addition to his or her signature, the circulator must provide his or her printed or typed name, address, and telephone number to aid in the validation process. COMAR 33.06.03.07. Thus, it appears that the purpose of the affidavit is to confirm that the signature of the individual appearing on the petition in fact belongs to the person that it purports to represent.
Additionally, the General Assembly promulgated penalties designed to safeguard the integrity of the petitioning process. Most importantly, an individual who executes a fraudulent circulator's affidavit is subject to the threat of a perjury prosecution. See Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-101(b) ("`Affidavit' means a statement executed under penalty of perjury."); Md.Code (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol.), Criminal Law Article, § 9-101(b) ("A person who [commits perjury] is guilty of [a] misdemeanor ... and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding ten years."). Further, the Election Law Article provides a broad punitive scheme for individuals who attempt to commit fraud in the petitioning process, including criminal penalties for any individual who willfully and knowingly "sign[s] the name of any other person to a petition," "falsif[ies] any signature or purported signature to a petition," or "circulate[s], cause[s] to be circulated, or file[s] with an election authority a petition that contains any false, forged, or fictitious signatures." Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 16-401. Although Whitley contends that requiring an independent signer and circulator is necessary to ensure the integrity of the petitioning process and deter fraud, he provides no persuasive evidence that the provisions adopted by the General Assembly are insufficient to accomplish that objective.
Whitley asks us to engage in a hypertextual analysis in which we parse the terms "procure," "observe," and "presence" to imply a requirement that it takes two to tango in the completion of each signature page. This suggested approach leads us nonetheless to the conclusion that a self-circulated petition is valid. The term "procure" means commonly "to get or obtain; cause" or "to get possession of." New Websterian 1912 Dictionary 651 (1912) ("to get or obtain; cause"); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 930 (10th ed.1999) ("to get possession of; obtain by particular care and effort"). Although one could employ the term "procure"
Nor does the requirement that the circulator's affidavit attest that the petition signatures were affixed "in his presence" mandate the participation of two individuals. See Md. Const. art. XVI, § 4 (requiring an attestation that the petition signatures were "affixed in his presence"); Md. Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204(a) (requiring the affidavit to be executed "by the individual in whose presence all of the signatures on that page were affixed"). At the adoption of Article XVI, Section 4, "presence" was defined commonly as "the state or quality of being present."
As support for his contrary contention, Whitley references the Estates & Trust Article's requirement that a will must be "signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator." Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.), Estates & Trusts Article, § 4-102. This attempted analogy is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the signature requirement in the context of wills is necessary to provide presumptive evidence of its validity because the testator necessarily is deceased and unavailable to testify as to his or her recollection. Van Meter v. Van Meter, 183 Md. 614, 618, 39 A.2d 752, 754 (1944). Second, although the underlying purpose of the signature requirement in both the wills and voter petition contexts is the prevention of fraud, see Slack v. Truitt, 368 Md. 2, 12-13, 791 A.2d 129, 135 (2002) (noting that the presence of the signatures on a will creates a presumption of validity); Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204(b), there is an additional safeguard
We determine that the provisions of the Maryland Constitution and the Election Law Article are unambiguous. They do not specify the identity of the circulator, and certainly contain no requirement that the circulator and signer be separate individuals. The statutory provisions already in place are adequate to meet its uncontroverted purpose of preventing voter fraud. Whitley provides no persuasive evidence or conjecture to the contrary. Indeed, Whitley does not contend that voter fraud occurred in the instant case. Therefore, we determine that self-circulating petitions are consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
BATTAGLIA, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ., dissent.
ADKINS, J., dissenting.
I cannot endorse the Majority's disregard for our plain-meaning rule of statutory construction,
The Maryland Constitution provides that "There shall be attached to each paper of signatures filed with a petition an affidavit of
These provisions of Maryland law clearly direct a circulator to procure the required number of signatures for referendum and then attest that she personally observed those signatures being affixed in her presence. Reading these provisions would lead any ordinary person to understand that their obvious and plain meaning contemplates the involvement of two different people: a circulator and a signer. The circulator goes out and
Ignoring the plain meaning of the constitutional and statutory provisions, the Majority stretches the statute to include matters not clearly within its provisions. See State v. Christhilf, 170 Md. 586, 592, 185 A. 456, 458 (1936) ("[I]t is not the duty or province of a court so to stretch the provisions of a statute as to ... gather in objects not contemplated by the legislature or not clearly falling within its provisions."). The Majority holds that the provisions permit self-circulation because the language "did not require expressly that the signer and circulator be different persons." Maj. Op. at 159, 55 A.3d at 53. This reasoning, however, imports into the relevant provisions something that is not there. It takes the absence of an explicit distinction between circulator and signer and draws from it an inference of an affirmative right to self-circulate referendum petitions. The Majority is wrong to draw this inference from the statute and allow it to prevail over the plain meaning of the text. See Gorman v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 178 Md. 71, 75, 12 A.2d 525, 527 (1940) ("[T]he court may not allow an inference to prevail against the manifest intention of the Legislature."). Such a holding abandons this Court's "paramount objective to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature ... [by looking] first to the plain language of the statute." Schmitz, 362 Md. at 236-37, 764 A.2d at 842 (citation omitted).
Article XVI, § 6-204, and COMAR 33.06.03.08 obviously contemplate the involvement of two distinct individuals — a circulator and a signer. With this clear and unambiguous language, our inquiry would ordinarily end. See Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 188, 753 A.2d 84, 88 (2000). We may, however, go on to consider the text in light of the purpose of the statute being interpreted. Specifically, the plain meaning should be construed "as to carry out and effectuate, or aid in, the general purposes and policies" of the statute being interpreted. Johnson v. State, 75 Md.App. 621, 630, 542 A.2d 429, 433 (1988).
The purpose of § 6-204 of the Election Law Article, and the requirement of the circulator's affidavit contained therein, "is to assure the validity of the signatures" and "clearly addresses prevention of fraud." Montgomery County Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 478-79, 15 A.3d 798, 807 (2010). Likewise, interpreting the requirement of the circulator's affidavit contained in Article XVI, § 4 of the Maryland Constitution, this Court has stated: "The purpose of the requirement of the affidavit is to give a prima facie presumption of validity to the petition to which it is attached." Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397, 404, 184 A.2d 101, 104 (1962). Therefore, the purpose of the circulator's affidavit is two-fold. It is designed to prevent fraud in the first place,
This two-fold purpose of the circulator affidavit supports the plain meaning interpretation that there must be two different individuals — a circulator and a signer. Interpreting the statute to require separate circulators and signers directly carries out, effectuates, and aids the "uncontroverted purpose of preventing voter fraud." Maj. Op. at 163, 55 A.3d at 56. The existence of the separate circulator provides an independent check on the signer. The circulator is able to vouch that the signer did in fact appear before the circulator and did in fact sign the petition. Thus, the independent circulator prevents an individual from affixing multiple signatures to the petition, as each signer must personally appear in front of the circulator before her signature can be affixed to the petition.
The Majority does not deny that this plain meaning interpretation furthers the prevention of fraud. Instead, it says that it is not necessary to interpret the relevant provisions to further the purpose of § 6-204 because "the Election Law Article imposes independent penalties on individuals who commit voter fraud that are designed to shield the referendum process from consideration of petitions with insufficient signatures." Maj. Op. at 159, 55 A.3d at 53. Specifically, the Majority reasons that the signer of the affidavit "is subject to the threat of a perjury prosecution" and "the Election Law Article provides a broad punitive scheme for individuals who" commit voter fraud. Maj. Op. at 160-61, 55 A.3d at 54. Thus, the Majority holds that it is not necessary to have separate circulators and signers because these other provisions are sufficient to protect against fraud. Maj. Op. at 160-61, 55 A.3d at 54-55.
The Majority misses the mark. It is irrelevant whether the Election Law Article has additional safeguards built in that are also designed to prevent fraud. It is the duty of this Court to interpret every provision of the statute in light of its purpose. This Court cannot pick and choose among statutory provisions and decide that the threat of a perjury conviction is a better means of preventing voter fraud than requiring the circulator and signer to be different people. The Legislature provided for both provisions, and as such, both provisions must be interpreted as a means of preventing fraud. Allowing for self-circulation does nothing to carry out, effectuate, or aid the general purpose of the statute to prevent fraud. The correct interpretation, therefore, is one that requires different circulators and signers. This gives affect to the plain meaning of § 6-204 while also furthering its purpose of preventing fraud.
In one final attempt to justify its holding, the Majority says that it would reach the same conclusion even if it decided to engage in this "hypertextual" interpretation of the statute. Maj. Op. at 161, 55 A.3d at 54-55. It quotes dictionary definitions for the terms "procure," "observe," and "presence," and reasons that none of these definitions strictly demand the existence of two individuals. Maj. Op. at 161-63, 55 A.3d at 54-56. The Majority concludes,
The inferences that the Majority draws from these dictionary definitions, however, do not comport with the commonly understood meanings of these terms. See Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 606, 573 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1990) ("To determine the most appropriate [meaning of a word] in given circumstances requires more than a glance at a dictionary. It requires careful study of the context in which the word is used."). Under the Majority's definitions, the Legislature would have intended for a circulator to procure his own signature from himself; observe himself writing his own signature; and affix his signature in his own presence. This formulation is simply not logical. No one speaks in the manner in which the Majority now attempts to define these terms. No one says that they "procure" something from themself. No one says that they "observe" themself perform an act. No one says that they are "metaphysically in his or her own presence." Maj. Op. at 162, 55 A.3d at 55. The definitions used by the Majority are not the commonly understood meanings of these words. We should examine the words "procure," "observe," and "presence" in context.
First, the Majority defines "procure" as "to get or obtain" or "to get possession of." Maj. Op. at 161, 55 A.3d at 54-55. Contrary to the Majority's interpretation, the common meaning of this definition involves two individuals. One does not "get or obtain" something from herself. She gets or obtains something from someone else. Applying this common understanding of the word procure in this context, a person does not get or obtain her own signature. She procures, or gets or obtains, the signatures of others.
Understanding the term "procure" as requiring two individuals in this context is supported by this Court's previous description of a circulator: "It is established... that the one procuring the petitions or circulating them is the agent of the signers...." Tyler, 229 Md. at 403, 184 A.2d at 104. Implicit in this Court's previous statement is that "the one procuring the petitions" is different from "the signers" of the petitions. The circulator procuring the petitions is acting as the agent for the individuals signing the petition. One does not act as an agent for herself. If she were, then she would be the principal, not the agent. An agent acts for someone else. There are two individuals: the principal and the agent. Just as in this case, there are two individuals: the circulator acting as the agent, who procures the signatures, and the signers, who are the principals.
Second, the Majority defines "observe" to mean "watch carefully" or "to take notice." Maj. Op. at 161, 55 A.3d at 54-55. Yet, dictionaries in defining this word use examples such as: to "observe a child's behavior," American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1213 (4th ed.2006) (emphasis removed); "I have observed my own children carefully," Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1558 (Philip Babcock Grove ed., 2002) (emphasis removed); "He observed the passerby in the street," "I wanted you to observe her reaction to the judge's question," and "He observed frequently that clerks were not as courteous as they used to be," The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1338 (Stuart Berg Flexuer ed., 2d ed.1987) (emphasis removed). None of these examples portray a person watching himself carefully. They portray a person watching someone
Evidently, the Majority ignores this common understanding believing that the Legislature intended for the circulator to engage in some form of "self-observation." I submit that nowhere in the law has the word "observe" been used to mean watching oneself perform some act. Further, the Majority does not offer anywhere in the law where the word "observe" means anything different than the common definitions I provide above.
Third, the Majority defines "presence" as "the state or quality of being present." Maj. Op. at 162, 55 A.3d at 55. It uses this definition to mean that one is in her own presence when she signs the circulator affidavit. It is well established, however, that this Court must construe a statute "so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory." Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Allowing an individual to sign his own affidavit reads the circulator requirement out of the statute. There is no longer a need for a person to circulate referendum petitions and procure signatures because now each individual can simply sign the petition and the affidavit. Cf. Montgomery County Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass'n, 418 Md. at 484, 15 A.3d at 810 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Majority opinion has read the signature requirement out of the [Election law] statute").
To the contrary, dictionaries defining the term explain that a person is present by "[b]eing at hand or in attendance: Thirty guests were present at the ceremony." American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1388 (emphasis removed). This makes clear that a person is not present in herself. She is present in relation to someone else. As such, applying this common understanding of the word presence in this context, a person is not in her own presence when signing the petition. She is in the presence of someone else signing the petition.
Requiring a second individual in the context of referendum petitions is supported by the common understanding of the term "presence" that this Court has used in other contexts. For example, the Estates and Trusts Article requires that a will should be "attested and signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator." Md.Code (2001, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 4-102 of the Estates and Trusts Article. Just like the requirement of the circulator's affidavit in this case, the purpose of attesting to the will in the presence of the testator is to prevent fraud and create a presumption of a valid will. Slack v. Truitt, 368 Md. 2, 12-13, 17, 791 A.2d 129, 135, 138 (2002). In such cases, this Court has always understood that the witnesses and the testator must be different
Additionally, Maryland Rule 15-202 defines "direct contempt" as "a contempt committed in the presence of the judge presiding in court." Md. Rule 15-202(b). In this context, this Court has always understood that the phrase "in the presence of the judge" requires two individuals: the judge, in whose presence the contempt is committed, and a second individual who commits the contemp. Likewise, Maryland law allows a police officer to make an arrest without a warrant for "[c]rimes committed in [the] presence of [the] police officer." Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 2-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article. In this context, this Court has also always understood there to be two different individuals: the police officer, in whose presence the crime is committed, and a second individual, who commits the crime.
The legislative language in these three examples is very similar if not identical to that found in the Election Law Article. In the current case, the circulator must attest that "the signatures were affixed in his presence." Md. Const. art. XVI, § 4. Similarly, the witnesses must sign the will "in the presence of the testator," the contempt must be "committed in the presence of the judge" and the crime must be "committed in [the] presence of [the] police officer." In all four cases the legislative language is nearly identical and the common understanding of all four provisions leads to the same conclusion — that the term presence contemplates the existence of two different individuals. The Majority cites no instances, and I find none in which the statutory term "in the presence of" has been judicially determined to refer to only one person.
The Majority is left with only a metaphysical notion, saying that "an individual is necessarily and metaphysically in his or her own presence." Maj. Op. at 162, 55 A.3d at 55. Under the Majority's view, each and every circulator would be a modern day Aristotle, continuously pondering his very own existence in the world.
I would hold, therefore, that Article XVI, § 4 of the Maryland Constitution, § 6-204 of the Election Law Article, and COMAR 33.06.03.08 do not permit the self-circulation of referendum petitions. The plain meaning of these provisions, interpreted in light of furthering the purpose of preventing fraud, contemplates the separate existence of both a circulator and a signer. The same individual cannot fulfill both requirements under the current constitutional and statutory law. I would hold that the petition is legally insufficient for lack of the required number of valid signatures.
Judges BATTAGLIA and BARBERA authorize me to state that they agree with the views set forth herein.
The Election Law Article further requires that "[e]ach signature page shall contain an affidavit made and executed by the individual in whose presence all of the signatures on that page were affixed and who observed each of those signatures being affixed." Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Election Law Article, § 6-204(a).
Md. Const. art. XVI, § 1. To subject a law to referendum, the Maryland Constitution requires the signatures of "three percent of the qualified voters of the State of Maryland, calculated upon the whole number of votes case for Governor at the last preceding Gubernatorial election, of whom not more than half are residents of Baltimore City, or of any one County." Md. Const. art. XVI, § 3. According to the Maryland State Board of Elections, the requisite number of signatures, based upon the 2010 Gubernatorial election, is 55,736.
This could happen for a couple of reasons:
Because Whitley has standing under the broad provisions of § 6-209(b) (and we can reach fairly and decide the dispositive questions through that vehicle), we decline to consider Intervenor's standing challenge to Whitley's request for judicial review under § 6-209(a).
Second, the Majority argues that this analogy is unpersuasive because the Election Law Article contains additional safeguards against fraud, whereas the Estates and Trusts Article does not. Maj. Op. at 162-63, 55 A.3d at 55-56. As previously explained, this argument completely misses the mark. The existence of additional safeguards in the Election Law Article is completely irrelevant to this case. The Legislature felt it necessary to provide for multiple provisions to aid in the prevention of fraud. This Court cannot choose which provisions it likes the best or which provisions it believes would be most effective in preventing fraud. Indeed, it may have been wise for the Legislature to provide multiple safeguards to prevent fraud since no one method is perfect. As such, it is improper for the Majority to disregard the purpose of the circulator's affidavit to prevent fraud merely because the threat of a perjury conviction also exists. See Maj. Op. at 162-63, 55 A.3d at 55-56.
