HOTTEN, J.
Following dismissal of a proposed collective action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, appellant, Judith Adedje, filed a complaint, individually, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against appellees, Westat, Inc. ("Westat"), Westat's Senior Vice President, Renee Slobasky, Westat's Vice President, Patricia Montalvan, and Westat's Assistant Director of Survey Operations for the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys Project, Katrina Apodaca, alleging violations of Maryland's Wage and Hour Law and Wage Payment and
For the reasons outlined below, we answer the first question positively, and we need not address the second question. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The procedural history of appellant's efforts to obtain her alleged overtime wages originated with Syrja v. Westat, Inc., 756 F.Supp.2d 682 (D.Md.2010). On July 27, 2009, the plaintiff-employee, Steven Syrja ("Mr. Syrja"), filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland ("Maryland U.S. District Court"), maintaining that Westat violated the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it failed to compensate him for applicable overtime pay. Id. at 683. On August 13, 2009, Mr. Syrja filed an amended complaint, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated individuals, and further claimed a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection Law.
The Maryland U.S. District Court offered a comprehensive description of Westat and its employees as follows:
Id. at 683-85.
Appellant, an Alabama resident, was employed as a Westat field interviewer from April 2003 to May 2007. After this position ended, appellant alleged that she too was entitled to overtime wages for working in excess of forty hours per week. On September 15, 2009, in addition to other Westat employees, appellant filed written consent to join the Syrja case, stating, "I hereby consent and agree to opt-in to become a plaintiff in a lawsuit brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., to recover unpaid wages and overtime wages from my current/former employer, Westat, Inc." Thereafter, Mr. Syrja filed a motion for conditional class certification relating to his Fair Labor Standards Act claim. Id. The Maryland U.S. District Court determined that:
Id. at 688. On November 2, 2010, the Maryland U.S. District Court issued an order that denied Mr. Syrja's motion for conditional class certification. Id. at 690.
On December 2, 2010, appellant and nineteen other Syrja plaintiffs filed a new complaint in the Maryland U.S. District Court, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection Law. In response, appellees filed a motion to sever and dismiss. Following a motions hearing, the Maryland U.S. District Court issued another order on September 1, 2011, stating (emphasis in original) (capitalization in original):
Thereafter, on September 30, 2011, appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging that she "was entitled to overtime premium compensation from [appellees] of one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for hours she worked beyond the forty per week for [appellees,]" pursuant to Maryland's Wage and Hour Law and Wage Payment and Collection Law.
During a hearing on March 15, 2012, appellees submitted three "statute of limitations" charts that included all the relevant dates relating to appellant's and other Westat employees' filings and dismissals. The circuit court offered appellant the option to submit a supplemental brief and/or respond to appellees' charts. On March 30, 2012, appellant filed a supplemental memorandum and a chart to address alleged inaccuracies in appellees' charts. On April 16, 2012, appellees filed a response to appellant's supplemental brief, and averred that appellant's submission did not survive the motion to dismiss. On May 4, 2012, the circuit court issued an opinion and order, stating:
Appellant noted a timely appeal.
According to the Court of Appeals, under Md. Rule 2-322(b)(2),
North Am. Specialty Ins. v. Boston Med. Group, 170 Md.App. 128, 135, 906 A.2d 1042 (2006) (quoting Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 413-14, 823 A.2d 590 (2003)) (additional citations omitted).... We must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff.... We must confine our review of the universe of facts pertinent to the court's analysis of the motion to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.
Kumar, 426 Md. at 193, 43 A.3d 1029 (quoting Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d 200 (2011)). Similar to motions for summary judgment, we examine the circuit court's ruling to determine whether it was legally correct. Id. (quoting Parks, 421 Md. at 72, 25 A.3d 200) (quotations omitted), accord Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687, 693, 20 A.3d 787 (2011) ("`In reviewing the [c]ircuit [c]ourt's grant of a motion to dismiss, our task is confined to determining whether the [circuit] court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.'") (quotations omitted). We therefore review a motion to dismiss pursuant to the de novo standard. Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142, 46 A.3d 443 (2012) (citing Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Rds. Comm'n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 509, 880 A.2d 307 (2005)).
The Court of Appeals has traditionally concluded that "the question of accrual in [Md.Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter "Cts. & Jud. Proc.")] is left to judicial determination." Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 193, 43 A.3d 1029 (2012) (quoting Frederick Rd. Ltd. P'ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963 (2000)). Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 provides:
Therefore, on a general basis, because appellant's employment ended in May 2007, the filing deadline would have been in May 2010. Appellant filed her complaint in the circuit court on September 30, 2011. Ordinarily, the action would have been a year and four months beyond the filing deadline, and thus, time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellant acknowledges the abovementioned contention, but maintains that:
Thereby, appellant contends that her claim was timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and the class action tolling doctrine. Appellees aver that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) was appellant's exclusive means of tolling, and that the class action tolling doctrine did not apply to Syrja. Furthermore, appellees alleged that Maryland does not recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and that appellant only opted-in Mr. Syrja's Fair Labor Standards Act, not the Wage Payment and Collection Law claim.
Although some courts have often merged equitable tolling and class action tolling, we agree with the jurisdictions that have found principal differences between the two, stating:
Hess v. I.R.E. Real Estate Income Fund, Ltd., 255 Ill.App.3d 790, 195 Ill.Dec. 935, 629 N.E.2d 520, 531 (1993). See also Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc., 868 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1181 (D.Co.2012) ("Furthermore, equitable tolling applies only when a litigant's failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant's control.") (additional citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted); Hatfield v. Halifax PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir.2009) (The purpose of equitable tolling "is to toll the statute of limitations in favor of a plaintiff who acted in good faith where the defendant is not prejudiced by having to defend against a second action.") (additional citation omitted).
Most of appellant's argument is predicated on Philip Morris USA, Inc., et al. v. Christensen, et al., 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340 (2006) [hereinafter "Christensen II"]. In Christensen II, the Court of Appeals determined "whether the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." Id. at 231, 905 A.2d 340. Similar to the case at bar, the procedural history of the plaintiffs' efforts to obtain damages commenced with another case, Richardson, et al. v. Phillip Morris Inc., et al. [hereinafter "Richardson"]. See Philip Morris Inc., et al. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 701, 752 A.2d 200 (2000).
In Richardson, an injured party filed a complaint, on behalf of similarly situated individuals [hereinafter "Richardson" parties], against the defendants-cigarette manufacturers, for diseases sustained as a result of smoking the defendants' tobacco products. Christensen, et al. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., et al., 162 Md.App. 616, 620, 875 A.2d 823 (2005) [hereinafter "Christensen I"]. The Richardson parties requested a class certification, which the circuit court granted. Id.
Russell Christensen ("Mr. Christensen") was not a named party in Richardson, but was highly involved. Id. at 621, 875 A.2d 823. Mr. Christensen submitted an affidavit on behalf of the Richardson parties, and presented a de bene esse deposition, where he explained his cigarette usage and contraction of lung cancer. Id. The defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals to order the circuit court to vacate the class certification, which the Court issued. Id. (additional citation omitted). Thereafter, the Richardson parties moved for a "stipulation of dismissal" in the circuit court, where they reached an agreement that:
Id. A few months later, Mr. Christensen died of lung cancer, id. at 618, 875 A.2d 823, and his wife and children filed a survival and wrongful death action in the circuit court against the defendants. Christensen II, 394 Md. at 232, 905 A.2d 340. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, averring that the statute of limitations expired, and the circuit court agreed. Id. at 234, 905 A.2d 340.
On appeal, our Court vacated the grant of summary judgment, determining that "during the pendency of the class action lawsuit in Richardson, limitations was [sic] suspended for potential class members."
The Court of Appeals indicated that it would recognize a tolling exception if "(1) there [was] persuasive authority or persuasive
Christensen, 394 Md. at 256, 905 A.2d 340.
Thereafter, the Court determined that the requisites for the Christensen plaintiffs were satisfied. Id. at 265, 905 A.2d 340. The Court found that Mr. Christensen was a member of the Richardson putative class of persons. Id. With an exception for one cigarette manufacturer, the defendants and claims were the same from Richardson. Id. Furthermore, neither party contested that the Christensen plaintiffs' claims did not accrue prior to the circuit court's grant of the class action certification in Richardson. Id. at 266, 905 A.2d 340. Because Mr. Christensen was actively involved in Richardson, the defendants possessed sufficient notice of the action. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that class action tolling applied, and the Christensen plaintiffs' complaint was timely. Id. at 267, 905 A.2d 340.
Appellees support their contentions with Antar, et al. v. Mike Egan Ins. Agency, Inc., et al., 209 Md.App. 336, 58 A.3d 609 (2012). In Antar, the plaintiffs owned a Baltimore City building, which was destroyed by a fire. Id. at 338, 58 A.3d 609. The plaintiffs filed a claim with the defendants — insurance companies, which was denied because an inspection indicated that the plaintiffs failed to use smoke detectors. Id.
On February 4, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an action in a Pennsylvania circuit court for breach of contract and bad faith. Id. at 339, 58 A.3d 609. One of the defendants moved for a dismissal, which the court granted with leave to refile the complaint in a Maryland court. Id. Instead, however, on June 15, 2010, the plaintiffs appealed their case to Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's decision. Id. On May 18, 2011, the plaintiffs finally filed a complaint in a Maryland circuit court, averring that the defendants breached their contract and were negligent. Id. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted, holding that the claim was time-barred. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintained that the circuit court erred because "the running of the limitations period in Maryland should have been tolled for the entire length of time that the suit was pending in Pennsylvania." Id. at 340, 58 A.3d 609. Our Court stated:
Id. at 355-56, 58 A.3d 609. Accordingly, our Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. Id. at 365, 58 A.3d 609.
In addition to the abovementioned cases, our Courts have examined other issues relating to tolling the statute of limitations. See Kumar, 426 Md. at 210, 43 A.3d 1029 (The Court of Appeals determined that a mandatory arbitration proceeding did not suspend the statute of limitations because the plaintiff should have initiated arbitration before limitations expired.); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207, 216, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977) (The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute of limitations was not tolled when a motion to intervene was pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.); Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 369-70, 216 A.2d 723 (1966) (The Court of Appeals determined that the filing of an action in an improper venue tolled the statute of limitations because the defendant had notice and the Court's ruling incorporated the "spirit" of Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.).
Cross-jurisdictional class-action tolling is "`a rule whereby a court in one jurisdiction tolls the applicable statute of limitations based on the filing of a class action in another jurisdiction.'" Patterson v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 909 F.Supp.2d 116, 122 (D.R.I.2012). We acknowledge that Christensen and Antar concern class action judicial tolling and cross-jurisdictional tolling respectively. However, we have not found any Maryland cases that have analyzed these topics together, as the circuit court noted, "Christensen did not analyze [28 U.S.C.] § 1367 nor did it involve
Specifically, our sister states' cases only involve class actions. To determine the difference between these types of lawsuits, we examine them on a federal level.
McKnight v. D. Houston, Inc., 756 F.Supp.2d 794, 808 (S.D.Tex.2010) (quoting La Chapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.1975)) (internal quotations omitted).
Because the instant case concerns collective action, we limit our focus to the analysis and reasoning of other jurisdictions to assist us in determining whether the filing of a collective action in a federal court tolls the running of the statute of limitations when the federal court dismisses the action for improper collective action status, and the complainant thereafter files a complaint in the state court.
All cases concerning cross-jurisdictional class action tolling began with an analysis of American Pipe. In American Pipe, the plaintiff-state ("Utah") filed a complaint in its federal district court, against the defendants — companies, alleging that the defendants engaged in illegal price fixing concerning the sale of concrete and steel. Id. at 541, 94 S.Ct. 756. As a result of countless actions against the defendants, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ("California U.S. District Court"). Id. at 542, 94 S.Ct. 756. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion, alleging that Utah did not satisfy class action requirements, and the court agreed. Id. Several days after the court issued its order, additional parties moved to intervene as plaintiffs. Id. at 543-44, 94 S.Ct. 756. The California U.S. District Court denied the parties' motion, determining that the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 544, 94 S.Ct. 756. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and denied in part. Id. at 544-45, 94 S.Ct. 756. The U.S. Supreme
The U.S. Supreme Court examined the differences amongst the courts, as well as the purpose of the statute of limitations, which was advancing justice, ensuring equality, and judicial efficiency. Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. 756. In considering these factors, and attempting to capture the spirit of federal class action procedures, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, "the commencement of a class action suspend[ed] the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." Id. (footnote omitted).
Approximately a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened American Pipe, and determined that when an original class action certification was denied, at that moment, the statute of limitations was tolled for those class members who desire[d] to file their individual suits in federal court. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983) [hereinafter "Crown, Cork"]. Although American Pipe and Crown, Cork are the foundational analysis of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, they only involve tolling of one jurisdiction's statute of limitations, as opposed to involving two different jurisdictions, such as the federal and state level.
In One Star v. Sisters of St. Francis, Denver, Colorado, 752 N.W.2d 668, 672 (S.D.2008), the plaintiffs-siblings alleged that they were sexually abused by their secondary school's clergymen between 1960 to 1971. In 1995, the plaintiff-sister ("sister") discussed her account with another sexually abused victim, and the plaintiff-brother ("brother") drafted a letter regarding the alleged sexual abuse to a newspaper in May 2001. Id. at 672.
In April 2003, the brother was a member of a class action against the United States, which was filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 673. The claim "was filed on behalf of Native American children who were allegedly abused at Roman Catholic boarding schools." Id. In June 2004, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants, who were the secondary school and related entities. In November 2004, the class action was dismissed for procedural defects. Id. Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The circuit court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. Id. at 673-74.
On appeal, the plaintiffs averred that their claims did not accrue until 2002 because during that time, they could appreciate the effect that the sexual abuse had on their lifestyles, and thus, the statute of limitations did not expire. Id. at 674. Moreover, the plaintiffs maintained that the class action tolled the statute of limitations. Id. at 680.
The South Dakota Supreme Court examined what constituted "accrual," id. at 675, and determined that the sister and brother possessed notice of the effect by 1995 and 2001, respectively. Id. at 677-78. Consequently, because they filed their action in November 2004, their claims were barred. Id. at 680. Furthermore, the South Dakota Supreme Court indicated that class action tolling (1) offered notice to the defendants of a prospective action and (2) advanced judicial efficiency. Id. First, the defendants were not named parties in the class action, so there was no notice of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. Furthermore, "[the] [p]laintiffs [] failed to cite any authority supporting class action tolling
In Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tenn.2000), the plaintiffs-patients alleged that the defendants'-manufacturers' medical screws caused them to sustain additional injury to their backs after they were hospitalized. A few years later, parties, including the plaintiffs, initiated a class action against the defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("Pennsylvania U.S. District Court"). Id. The Pennsylvania U.S. District Court denied the class action certification. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits against the defendants in a Tennessee circuit court. Id. Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion, and the Tennessee intermediate court affirmed. Id.
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted certiorari, and determined whether "cross-jurisdictional tolling would involve the tolling of the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations during the period in which the plaintiffs sought class certification as part of the unsuccessful class[]action filed in the [Pennsylvania U.S. District Court]." Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court denoted that adopting the cross-jurisdictional class action doctrine would assist the federal courts in reviewing class actions, but that its courts lacked interest in advancing "efficiency and economy of the class action procedures of another jurisdiction[.]" Id. at 808. Furthermore, the doctrine would create "fishing expeditions" because complainants would choose Tennessee as their "hub" to file their claims "because [its] cross-jurisdictional tolling doctrine would have effectively created an overly generous statute of limitations." Id. To avoid "protective filings," in which "the plaintiffs [would] wish to preserve their right to file suit in Tennessee while they [sought] class certification elsewhere[,]" the Tennessee Supreme Court indicated that staying the proceedings would resolve this potential issue. Id. at 808-09. Lastly, if Tennessee applied the doctrine, it would grant the federal courts authorization to determine whether Tennessee's statute of limitations began to run, which was in strict contradiction to the Tennessee legislature's intent. Id. at 809. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not adopt the cross-jurisdictional class action tolling doctrine, and affirmed the grant of the summary judgment motion. Id.
In Portwood et al. v. Ford Motor Co., 183 Ill.2d 459, 233 Ill.Dec. 828, 701 N.E.2d 1102 (1998), the plaintiffs — consumers filed a class action against the defendant — car manufacturer in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the defendant manufactured defective transmissions that caused them to sustain property damage. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the class action certification, and the plaintiffs thereafter filed an action in an Illinois circuit court. Id. 233 Ill.Dec. 828, 701 N.E.2d at 1102-03. Following discovery, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, averring that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 233 Ill.Dec. 828, 701 N.E.2d at 1103. The Illinois circuit court granted the defendant's motion, and the Illinois appellate court affirmed. Id.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that, "[u]nless all states simultaneously
We also examine a federal case that has examined Maryland's doctrine regarding cross-jurisdictional class action tolling. In Thelen v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 F.Supp.2d 688, 690 (D.Md.2000), the plaintiffs-policy owners filed a class action against the defendant-insurance company, alleging that the defendant employed fraudulent and deceptive provisions in its insurance policies. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, averring that the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 691.
On appeal, the plaintiffs maintained that the pendency of two respective class actions in Mississippi and New York, id. at 694, n. 5, which occurred concurrently with their action, tolled the running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 694. The Maryland U.S. District Court stated:
Id. at 694-95. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 695. But see In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 223 F.R.D. 335, 353 (E.D.Pa.2004) (The Pennsylvania U.S. District Court determined that "the Maryland Court of Appeals would adopt cross-jurisdictional class action tolling in antitrust class actions filed in federal court" because "the Maryland General Assembly has instructed courts interpreting the [Maryland Antitrust Act] to `"be guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal [antitrust] statutes"'" and because the Maryland Court of Appeals has summoned its courts to examine other jurisdictions.)
Although Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 281 (4th Cir.1999) does not involve Maryland law, we nevertheless analyze it because the Maryland U.S. District Court discussed it in Thelen. Wade's facts are similar to Maestas, 33 S.W.3d at 807 because both involved the same class action. In 1985, the injured plaintiff underwent back surgery, and the defendant's medical
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined "whether a state court would engage in equitable tolling during the pendency of a class action in another court — in this case, a federal court in another jurisdiction." Id. at 287. The Fourth Circuit examined Portwood, and stated:
Id. at 287-88. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court would not recognize cross-jurisdictional equitable tolling, and affirmed. Id. at 288.
There are several other federal court decisions that decline to adopt the doctrine before the state's highest court has had the opportunity to consider the issue. See Patterson, 909 F.Supp.2d at 123 ("Without a "well-plotted" path showing an "avenue of relief" that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would take on cross[-]jurisdictional class[]action tolling, and with no apparent consensus among the few states that have addressed the question, this Court declines [the] [p]laintiffs' invitation and refuses to embark into an "unexplored frontier[.]"); Casey v. Merck & Co., Inc., 678 F.3d 134, 138 (2nd Cir.2012) ("The Supreme Court of Virginia has now confirmed that, under Virginia law, neither Virginia's tolling statute nor equitable principles provide for cross-jurisdictional tolling...."); Soward v. Deutsche Bank AG, 814 F.Supp.2d 272, 282 (S.D.N.Y.2011) ("In the face of these overwhelming precedents, I cannot say that New York would adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling and decline to import the doctrine into New York's law."); Ottaviano v. Home Depot, Inc., USA, 701 F.Supp.2d 1005, (N.D.Ill. 2010) ("While the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the American Pipe rule for class actions filed in state court ..., it expressly declined to extend the rule to "cross-jurisdictional tolling.") (additional citation omitted); In re Fosamax Prods. Liability Litigation, 694 F.Supp.2d 253, 258 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ("The Court has no reason to believe that Virginia would join the few states that currently recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and thus it refuses to expand Virginia law in that manner."); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 663 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (D.Kan.2009) ("[Because] Indiana courts have not considered the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling[,] ... the Court decline[d] to import a new tolling rule into
Although we relate our ruling to the abovementioned cases, we observe that other jurisdictions and courts have ruled otherwise. In Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392 (Del.2013), the plaintiff-employee joined a class action, filed in a U.S. District Court in the District of Texas ("Texas U.S. District Court") against the defendant-employer when he inhaled toxins at the workplace. The Texas U.S. District Court denied the class certification, and the plaintiff filed an individual suit in a Delaware circuit court. Id. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, averring that the plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The court ruled for the plaintiff, determining that "Delaware law recognize[d] the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling." Id.
On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, it stated:
Id. at 395. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. Id. at 399.
In Stevens v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 358 Mont. 474, 247 P.3d 244, 248 (2010), the physician prescribed the plaintiff-patient a medication regimen to combat a cancerous disease. Thereafter, the plaintiff sustained chronic pain, and attributed the defendant's-manufacturer's medication as the cause. Id. at 248-49. During this time, three class actions were filed in a U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee ("Tennessee U.S. District Court"), specifically Becker, et al. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., alleging that the defendant failed to warn its consumers of the risks of its products. Id. at 249. However, the Tennessee U.S. District Court denied class certification. Id.
A few months before the Tennessee U.S. District Court denied certification, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant in a Montana circuit court. Id. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, averring that the statute of limitations had expired. Id. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that "because the Becker class action contained a request for worldwide class certification, and contained a claim for failure to warn against the dangers of Zometa ..., the statute of limitations was tolled as to [her], along with all other potential class members, under the class action tolling rule." Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted). The defendant maintained that because
Id. at 256. Accordingly, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's complaint was filed in a timely fashion. Id. at 257.
Akin to Wade and Maestas, the plaintiffs in Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 380, 763 N.E.2d 160, 161-62 (2002), were also involved in the same class action against the defendant-manufacturer regarding excessive back pain as a result of the defendant's medical screws. The defendant moved for summary judgment, avowing that the plaintiff's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, id. at 162, but the Ohio circuit court disagreed. Id. It surmised that the class actions filed in the U.S. Pennsylvania District Court tolled the statute, and thereby denied the defendant's motion. Id. at 161-62.
On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, it stated:
Id. at 163. Accordingly, the Court determined that the plaintiff's complaint was timely filed. Id.
As previously indicated, jurisdictions are split regarding this issue, but we agree with the majority. Recognizing a tolling exception would assist in advancing the effectiveness of suits in other jurisdictions. However, this would deplete our judicial resources, and render our state the focal point for complainants whose class certifications were denied. Moreover, if we recognized an exception, our Courts would be at the mercy of other jurisdictions, waiting on them to rule on the cases. Therefore, we liken our holding to Maestas, Portwood, and Wade.
In the case at bar, we first reiterate the Phillip Morris II elements regarding when a class action tolling exception applies: (1) whether the plaintiff was a party to the prior action; (2) whether the action concerns the same facts, claims, defendants, and witnesses as the prior action; (3) whether the defendant was placed on notice of another claim being filed; (4) whether persuasive authority and policy exist that support use of the tolling exception;
It is logical to conclude that in the instant case, appellant was a member of Syrja's putative class because she filed a written consent to join the Syrja case, and became a named party. However, although appellant's action in the circuit court may have concerned the same defendants, witnesses, and evidence, it did not concern the same claim. According to Syrja, 756 F.Supp.2d at 683, Mr. Syrja "filed a [m]otion for [c]onditional [c]lass [c]ertification [], in which, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), he ask[ed] the Court to conditionally certify a class of current and former Westat employees" relating to his Fair Labor Standards Act claim only. Because appellant's complaint was predicated on an alleged violation of Maryland's Wage and Hour Law and Wage Payment and Collection Law, the second Phillip Morris II element was not met. Therefore, appellees were not placed on notice of a claim based on either of appellant's arguments, considering appellant only opted-in the Fair Labor Standards Act claim.
The two remaining questions are whether persuasive authority and policy considerations exist that support use of the tolling exception and whether recognition of the exception parallels with the General Assembly's statutes of limitation. As we formerly stated, appellant contends that her claim is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and the class action tolling doctrine. To answer the remaining questions, we discuss the purpose of statutes of limitation, as follows:
Walko, 281 Md. at 210, 378 A.2d 1100 (quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945)) (additional citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
In analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), we discuss the editor's note, which states:
In the case at bar, appellant's position ended in May 2007. On September 15, 2009, appellant filed a written consent to join the Syrja case. At this juncture, appellant had eight months to file a timely claim in Montgomery County. On November 2, 2010, the Maryland U.S. District Court issued an order that denied Mr. Syrja's motion for conditional class certification because "the multifarious factual differences among the proposed class members ma[de] the case an unsuitable candidate for class certification." Syrja, 756 F.Supp.2d at 690. Despite the obvious decision to file individual claims, on December 2, 2010, appellant and nineteen other Syrja plaintiffs executed a defiant approach to the Court's opinion and order, and filed a new complaint together as a class. On September 2, 2011, the Maryland U.S. District Court again issued an order, which included meticulous details for clear understanding, stating, "(b) the claims of [p]laintiff Judith Adedje are
Although the Court afforded appellant the opportunity to continue with her action at the federal level, for reasons not apparent to us, she elected to file a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on September 30, 2011. As we previously denoted, the editor's note of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) asserts that time should accrue at a federal district court's dismissal. Relating to the instant case, the Maryland U.S. District Court "dismissed" the action on November 2, 2010. Immediately after this, appellant could have filed a complaint in Montgomery County, and would have received a thirty day period pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and Md. Rule 2-101(b), as the filing deadline, based on three years from her Westat employment's end date, would have been tolled. However, as indicated previously, appellant elected not to avail herself of the course of action set forth in the Court's order, and was neither persuaded nor deceived by appellees for equitable tolling to apply.
Additionally, appellant's claims were not the same as the claim she opted-into, and therefore, appellees were not placed on notice. Furthermore, there were no persuasive authority or policy considerations that existed, as recognition of an equitable tolling and cross-jurisdictional class action tolling exception neither harmonized with the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) nor Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101. Accordingly, appellant's claim for overtime wages under Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection Law was barred by the statute of limitations.
Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2012 Cum. Supp.), § 3-507.2 of the Labor and Employment Article reads: