HARRELL, J.

"There's many a slip `twixt' the cup and the lip." — Old English proverb

Although the parties have spent considerable time presenting, for our benefit, the substantive law pertaining to the merits of the case, none ensured that the procedural posture of the appeal was proper. For the forthcoming reasons, this Court must dismiss the present appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The controversy giving rise to the present appeal began in the summer of 2007, when Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. ("WKA") submitted to the Maryland Department of Agriculture ("MDA") a pair of requests for certain public records. In those requests, WKA sought to obtain the specific nutrient management plans ("NMPs") of various private farming operations on Maryland's Eastern Shore, along with any supporting documentation related to the NMPs. WKA submitted the requests pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act ("PIA"), Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, §§ 10-601 to 10-628,1 which allows generally for the inspection and receipt of copies of public records. The MDA denied WKA's requests, on the basis that § 10-615(2)(i)2 of the PIA exempted disclosure of the NMP inspection records, citing Md.Code (1973, 2007 Repl.Vol.), Agriculture Art., § 8-801.1(b)(2)3 as the operative excepting statute.

On 4 February 2008, WKA and eight other environmental advocacy groups filed an action ("WKA action") against the MDA and three of its executives in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County ("Anne Arundel Circuit Court") to obtain the records WKA sought.4 WKA's Complaint alleged four legal grounds, which it labeled "Causes of Action," upon any of which the court should order the MDA to produce the records:

To remedy the alleged violations, the Complaint pressed six distinct, but at times overlapping, prayers for relief:

Following WKA's filing of the Complaint, the parties engaged in discussions as to what specific information the MDA might be required to disclose. No apparent settlement was reached, and the case remained "live." After the discussions concluded, WKA filed on 16 May 2008 a third request with the MDA for information, which the MDA approved tentatively.

On 18 July 2008, before the MDA could fulfill WKA's third PIA request, the Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc. ("MFB") and three anonymous farmers filed a related action ("MFB action I") against the MDA in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County ("Dorchester Circuit Court"). MFB alleged in its Complaint that the "[MDA] received a request pursuant to the Maryland [PIA] for the disclosure of certain [NMP] information[,] ... [including] all [NMPs], plan summaries, and records of inspection or enforcement against poultry operations located in Dorchester, Queen Anne's Somerset, Talbot, Wicomico, and Worcester Counties." The Complaint asserted two counts-one alleging grounds for a declaratory judgment as to the scope and temporal limitations of Agric. § 8-801.1(b)(2),5 and the other alleging grounds for preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin the MDA from disclosing confidential information. MFB identified four prayers for relief:

In response to the Scylla and Charybdis effect of the actions against it, the MDA filed a motion in the Dorchester Circuit Court requesting a transfer of MFB action I to the Anne Arundel Circuit Court. On 2 September 2008, the Dorchester Circuit Court granted the MDA's motion. After MFB action I was transferred to the Anne Arundel Circuit Court, the MDA filed in that court a Motion to Consolidate the WKA and MFB actions.

While the Motion to Consolidate was pending, MFB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to MFB action I, Anne Arundel Circuit Court Case No. 02-C-08-134331, stating that MFB is "entitled to summary judgment declaring the proper interpretation of Agric. § 8-801.1(b)(2)." The MDA filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in MFB action I. On 17 October 2008, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court granted the MDA's Motion to Consolidate. The court consolidated the dockets of the WKA and MFB actions, and designated MFB action I, Case No. 02-C-08-134331, as the "lead case."6 WKA filed then a Motion in Opposition to MFB's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of the MDA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The parties addressed the court on the summary judgment motions and oppositions during a hearing on 8 December 2008 ("the 2008 hearing"). Two months later, the trial judge issued a Memorandum Opinion and, on 10 February 2009, issued an Order ("2009 Order") in which it granted the MDA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, denied MFB's Motion for Summary Judgment, including the following language in the order:

No further litigation activity was reflected on the docket immediately following entry of the 2009 Order.

Over a year later, however, on 2 April 2010, the MDA received another PIA request regarding specific NMP information, this time from Assateague Coastkeeper ("Coastkeeper"), a co-plaintiff in the WKA action. Coastkeeper requested essentially the same information that WKA sought in its PIA requests and the resulting litigation.7 Unbeknownst to Coastkeeper, the MDA and MFB engaged in communications to determine which information might be disclosed to Coastkeeper. The MDA told MFB that, among other things, it intended to provide Coastkeeper with an electronic spreadsheet containing information regarding the MDA inspections and enforcement actions involving MFB members. MFB asked the MDA to delay releasing the spreadsheet so that it could "develop a legal strategy" to prevent disclosure of any confidential information within the spreadsheet.

On 13 September 2010, after the MDA informed Coastkeeper of its plans to further delay the release of information, MFB filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ("MFB action II"), along with a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, against the MDA in the Circuit Court for Worcester County ("Worcester Circuit Court") seeking to prevent the MDA from disclosing, without redactions, the spreadsheet. The following day, that court issued a Temporary Restraining Order preventing the MDA from "disclosing any information concerning nutrient management plans that identifies the person for whom the plan was prepared...." The MDA responded with a Motion for Transfer of Venue to send MFB action II to the Anne Arundel Circuit Court.

On 22 September 2010, Coastkeeper filed a "Petition for Contempt" in Anne Arundel Circuit Court Case No. 02-C-08-134331. Two weeks later, on 4 October 2010, MFB action II was transferred to the Anne Arundel Circuit Court, with MFB's consent, and assigned to the same trial judge who issued the 2009 Order in the consolidated Case No. 02-C-08-134331. On 2 May 2011, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court dismissed, with prejudice, MFB action II. On 9 May 2011, MFB filed in Anne Arundel Circuit Court Case No. 02-C-08-13433 a Motion for Clarification of Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated February 10, 2009, asking the judge to clarify the 2009 Order in light of the evolving developments in the parties' disputes arising after entry of the 2009 Order.8

On 14 July 2011, the court issued an Order ("2011 Order") granting MFB's Motion for Clarification and declaring how the 2010 PIA request was controlled by the 2009 decision. The 2011 Order read, in pertinent part:

In addition, the court issued a second Order, on 5 August 2011, stating that no further proceedings were necessary in the consolidated case and that "this case was to be considered closed for statistical purposes and no future hearings are needed."

WKA noted an appeal of the 14 July 2011 Order to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Anne Arundel Circuit Court. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of Agric., 211 Md.App. 417, 65 A.3d 708 (2013).9 WKA filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court, which we granted on 20 September 2013. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of Agric., 434 Md. 311, 75 A.3d 317 (2013).10

During oral arguments, a member of the Court raised sua sponte the question of whether the 2009 Order was an enrolled final judgment, and, consequently, whether the Anne Arundel Circuit Court's act of issuing the 2011 Order to clarify and revise its 2009 Order was in contravention of the court's revisory powers pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535.11 No party had briefed this issue prior to oral arguments. After oral argument, MFB submitted a supplemental letter-brief to the Court, arguing that the restrictions of Rule 2-535 did not apply because the 2009 Order did not qualify as a final judgment by reason of the fact that some of the issues from the WKA action remained pending.12 Additionally, MFB suggested in a supplemental brief that the 2011 Order is a final and appealable judgment because, after issuing the 2011 Order, the Circuit Court ordered that the consolidated case be closed. Therefore, according to MFB, the merits of the 2011 Order are before this Court properly.

II. ANALYSIS

To determine whether this appeal is before this Court properly, we must address first the finality of the 2009 Order in order to determine whether the Anne Arundel Circuit Court had jurisdiction to issue the 2011 Order. If the 2009 Order was a final judgment, then MFB's Motion for Clarification of that Order would have been subject to the temporal and other restrictions of post-judgment motions under Rule 2-535.13 Maryland Rule 2-535 states:

We note that Rule 2-535 is applicable only to final judgments. See Quartertime Video & Vending Corp. v. Hanna, 321 Md. 59, 65, 580 A.2d 1073, 1076 (1990) (per curiam). Thus, non-final orders are "subject to revision ... without regard to Rule 2-535." Albert W. Sisk & Son, Inc. v. Friendship Packers, Inc., 326 Md. 152, 159, 604 A.2d 69, 73 (1992). In sum, if the 2009 Order was a final judgment, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court lacked the authority to revise that Order more than two years later in July 2011, absent proof of fraud, mistake, or irregularity — none of which grounds have been alleged here. Conversely, if the 2009 Order was not a final judgment, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court had the authority in 2011 to revise the 2009 Order without regard to the restrictions of Rule 2-535.

For reasons stated infra in Part II.B., we agree with MFB that the 2009 Order was not a final judgment, and, thus, Rule 2-535 does not apply. We disagree, however, with MFB's follow-on suggestion that the 2011 Order was a final judgment. As we discuss in detail infra in Part II.C., the 2011 Order, like the 2009 Order, did not resolve all of the claims before the trial court. Because none of the immediate appealability exceptions to the requirement of a final judgment are applicable to the 2011 Order, it was not an appealable judgment. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of this appeal (as did the Court of Special Appeals), and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed, without reaching the merits.

A. Applicable Law Concerning Final Judgments.

"The appellate jurisdiction of the courts of this State is delimited by statute." Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 314, 529 A.2d 356, 358 (1987). Maryland law provides that a party has the right to seek appeal when there is entry of a final judgment.14 Md.Code (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art. § 12-301; Quillens v. Moore, 399 Md. 97, 116, 923 A.2d 15, 26 (2007). Conversely, a party cannot appeal ordinarily a judgment that is not final. Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 324, 884 A.2d 1215, 1220 (2005). Requiring cases to have reached final judgment before permitting appeal reflects Maryland's long-established policy against piecemeal appeals. See, e.g., Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Maryland v. B. Dixon Evander and Assocs. (Evander), 331 Md. 301, 313, 628 A.2d 170, 176 (1993) ("[Reviewing an order with unresolved claims] is clearly contrary to the policy against piecemeal appeals."); Frey v. Frey, 298 Md. 552, 555-56, 471 A.2d 705, 707 (1984) ("The policy underlying this rule is that piecemeal appeals are disfavored.").

An order will constitute a final judgment if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) "it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy;" (2) "it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties;" and (3) "the clerk must make a proper record of it" on the docket. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989); see also Md. Rule 2-601;15 Md. Rule 2-602(a)(1). In other words, for an order to qualify as a final judgment, it must adjudicate each and every claim and be reflected in a docket entry. Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC, 412 Md. 555, 565, 989 A.2d 210, 216 (2010); see also Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 287, 577 A.2d 78, 82 (1990) (holding that the viability or mootness of a claim bears no relevance to whether a judgment is final); Case v. Comptroller, 219 Md. 282, 288, 149 A.2d 6, 9 (1959) (requiring the court to release declarations, upon request of declaratory judgment, on each of the issues raised in the action before a final judgment could be entered). The language of Maryland Rule 2-602 emphasizes this requirement:

Md. Rule 2-602(a) (Emphasis added).

"A `claim' ... is defined as a `substantive cause of action' that encompasses all rights arising from common operative facts." Schuele, 412 Md. at 568, 989 A.2d at 218 (Citations omitted). Alternative legal theories and differing prayers for relief do not constitute separate "claims" so long as they arise from a single asserted legal right. See East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 459, 445 A.2d 343, 346 (1982); see also Cnty. Comm'rs for St. Mary's Cnty. v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 426, 903 A.2d 378, 385 (2006) (quoting Evander, 331 Md. at 313, 628 A.2d at 176) ("[O]ur cases have made it clear that the disposition of an entire count or the ruling on a particular legal theory does not mean, in and of itself, that an entire `claim' has been disposed of." (Citations omitted)). Thus, for a court to adjudicate completely a particular claim, each legal theory and non-collateral prayer for relief within that claim must be resolved. See Huber v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 347 Md. 415, 422, 701 A.2d 415, 418 (1997).

Assessing whether all claims have been adjudicated fully may be accomplished generally by comparing all of the claims raised in the complaint with all of the claims resolved in the court's order. See Lacer, 393 Md. at 426-27, 903 A.2d at 385. In certain scenarios, however, where two or more actions are consolidated into a single case, introducing various claims in multiple complaints, this assessment may not be so straightforward or the result apparent.

When multiple actions are consolidated into a single case, the trial court has discretion in determining whether "joint or separate ... judgments be entered." Md. Rule 2-503(a). Where, as in the present case, the court does not make explicit whether it intended to resolve the consolidated case in joint or separate judgments, we must determine from the record and the applicable law whether the consolidated action should be treated as one case or multiple cases. In Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 236, 503 A.2d 239, 248 (1986), we stated: "[U]nless the trial court clearly intends that a joint judgment be entered disposing of all cases simultaneously, consolidated cases are not to be treated as a single action for purposes of Rule 2-602; instead, each one of the cases is to be treated as a separate action." (Emphasis added); see also Md. Rule 2-503(a).16 In Yarema, four separate tort actions were filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County by multiple plaintiffs against Exxon Corporation and various other defendants. Yarema, 305 Md. at 221-22, 503 A.2d at 240. On a motion filed by one of the defendants, the trial court consolidated the actions into a single case, for judicial efficiency, although maintaining separate dockets and entries for each action. Yarema, 305 Md. at 222-23, 503 A.2d at 240-41. We held that, because the trial court intended to direct the entry of judgments for each action separately, an order as to one of the consolidated cases could be treated as a final judgment, despite unresolved issues in the other cases. Yarema, 305 Md. at 240, 503 A.2d at 249-50.

B. The 2009 Order Was Not a Final Judgment.

Determining the finality of the 2009 Order rests in part on the effect of the consolidation of the WKA action and MFB action I into a single case. If the actions do not require a joint disposition, then the finality of the 2009 Order would be contingent on the whether the 2009 Order resolved completely the claim in the MFB Complaint.17 See Yarema, 305 Md. at 236, 503 A.2d at 248. The circumstances of the consolidation in the present case differ significantly, however, from those in Yarema. For the purpose of analyzing the finality of the 2009 Order, we conclude not only that the trial judge intended to resolve both actions in a joint disposition, we are convinced that he was compelled to do so, given the interconnectedness of the actions, the nature of the claims, and Maryland's policy disfavoring piecemeal appeals.18

First, the trial judge recognized that the outcomes of the two actions were meaningfully interdependent. If WKA prevailed on its claim that Agric. § 8-801.1(b)(2) is unconstitutional, MFB's claim requesting a declaration interpreting that statute would be moot as the interpretation sought was not one amenable to a judicial gloss such as to save it from the unconstitutionality claim. The Anne Arundel Circuit Court judge appeared to recognize this during the 2008 hearing when he asked WKA about its constitutional claim19 and how that claim could affect his decision as to MFB's claim. Unfortunately, counsel for WKA was not prepared to address the constitutional claim at that time, and neither the judge nor the parties discussed that claim on the record again prior to the present appeal. The judge's inquiry demonstrates, however, some appreciation that a joint disposition resolving both of the claims would be necessary to put effectively the parties out-of-court. The practicality of deciding these particular actions together implores the judge to resolve both in a single disposition: it defies logic and offends greatly Maryland's policies favoring judicial efficiency to allow one claim to be appealed when later disposition of an unresolved claim in the same consolidated case could render the first adjudication moot.

Second, upon granting the motion to consolidate the actions, the judge was well aware that the respective plaintiffs in the two actions presented countervailing requests with interdependent claims that were part of the same action from the start. In Yarema, the Court consolidated multiple distinct cases for the purposes of efficiency in the discovery and trial phases of the cases. Yarema, 305 Md. at 222-23, 503 A.2d at 240-41. Unlike Yarema, and the cases on which that opinion is founded, the present case does not involve the consolidation of "two [or more] entirely separate and distinct cases." Id. at 234, 503 A.2d at 247 (quoting Coppage v. Resolute Insur. Co., 264 Md. 261, 263-64, 285 A.2d 626 (1972)). Here, the consolidated cases are what the MDA describes aptly as "flip-sides of the same coin" — the outcome of one of the cases could affect directly the outcome of the other.

Although, technically speaking, WKA and MFB are plaintiffs and the MDA is a common defendant, due to the process by which the cases were filed separately and consolidated eventually, the essence of this dispute is a disagreement between the WKA plaintiffs and MFB plaintiffs in which the MDA is an intermediary in control of the disputed property, i.e., the information regarding certain NMPs. The judge, therefore, must have understood that the adverse parties in this case were in fact the duelists WKA and MFB, and that their claims impacted directly the interests of the other party.

Lastly, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court maintained the WKA action and MFB action on the same docket, whereas the court in Yarema maintained separate dockets for each individual action. 305 Md. at 223, 503 A.2d at 241. Although this is only a formal distinction, the amalgamation of the two actions into one docket, in addition to the interdependence of the actions and the court's attempt to engage in consideration of the effect of WKA's pending constitutional claim in the same hearing in which it was addressing MFB's statutory non-constitutional claim, lends further weight to our conclusion that the trial court intended clearly to treat the actions as a singular case requiring a single disposition. One may argue that it is contradictory to conclude that the trial court intended to require a single disposition because it issued an order declaring the case "closed," without resolving the constitutional claim. A countervailing supposition may be that the court simply forgot about the pendency of the constitutional claim, when it issued the 2009 Order, after the parties failed to follow up on the court's attempt in the 2008 hearing to address that claim.20

Because the two actions required a joint disposition, the finality of that disposition would be conditioned upon a complete adjudication of all of the claims presented by both actions. Here, the MFB Complaint raised one claim, asserting two counts and four prayers for relief, concerning the degree of confidentiality to which the MDA must maintain its records in the face of a PIA request. The WKA Complaint raised an additional claim as to the constitutionality of § 8-801.1(b)(2), the statute upon which MFB based its assertions. The 2009 Order only resolved the claim from the MFB Complaint and did not address the constitutional claim from the WKA Complaint.21 Consequently, the 2009 Order could not qualify as a final judgment because it did not adjudicate every claim. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d at 773. MFB's Motion for Clarification of the 2009 Order was not subject to the thirty-day time-limit of Rule 2-535. The Anne Arundel Circuit Court retained the power to revise that Order in its 2011 Order.

C. The 2011 Order Was Not an Appealable Judgment.

Having concluded that the 2009 Order was not a final judgment, we turn our attention to whether the 2011 Order was final for purposes of appeal. When MFB submitted the Motion for Clarification of Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated February 10, 2009, the Anne Arundel Circuit Court responded by issuing the 2011 Order, which granted MFB's motion and restated, in a slightly different manner, the conclusions of the 2009 Order. The Circuit Court's language in the 2011 Order regarding the meaning of its prior Order was taken in large part word-for-word from the 2009 Order, with the addition of a sentence to emphasize further the court's conclusion (and an additional paragraph addressing specifically the electronic spreadsheet situation raised by Coastkeeper). The court made no comment about the constitutional claim raised in the WKA complaint, nor did any of the parties attempt to address that claim.

For the reasons discussed above in Part II.B., the 2011 Order cannot constitute a final judgment because the Circuit Court did not resolve WKA's pending constitutional claim.22 Because the 2011 Order is not a final judgment, we must determine whether that Order was appealable pursuant to one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.

There are three categorical exceptions to the general rule limiting appeals only from a final judgment: (1) interlocutory orders that are appealable by statute; (2) orders that are appealable by the common-law collateral order doctrine; and (3) orders that adjudicate completely one of multiple claims in an action and are certified (and certifiable) under Rule 2-602(b), or, alternatively, Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C). Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005). The first exception may be eliminated quickly in the present case because an interlocutory order resembling the 2011 Order (declaratory judgment on a statutory claim) does not fall within the types of appealable interlocutory orders enumerated in Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art. § 12-303.

Likewise, the 2011 Order is not appealable as a collateral order. Among other requirements, the collateral order doctrine applies only when the issues resolved in the appealed order do not relate to the merits of the case.23 See Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 563, 914 A.2d 783, 791 (2007) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660-61, 728 A.2d 210, 211-12 (1999)). In the present case, the interpretation of Agric. § 8-801.1(b)(2), resolved purportedly by the 2011 Order, was tied directly to the merits of the case. Thus, the 2011 Order does not fall within the subset of appealable cases permitted by the collateral order doctrine.

The final exception is also of no aid to the parties here, although it appears to be the most pertinent to the case sub judice. Rule 2-602(b)(1) permits, in certain circumstances, the trial court to certify for appeal an interlocutory order if it resolves at least one of the claims in a multi-claim action, even when other claims remain unresolved. See Shenasky v. Gunter, 339 Md. 636, 638, 664 A.2d 882, 883 (1995); see also Md. Rule 2-602(b).24 Similarly, Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C)25 allows an appellate court to certify an order before it that is otherwise not a final judgment, but only where the trial court could have exercised discretion under Rule 2-602(b)(1), but did not do so. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 670, 838 A.2d 362, 364 (2003).

The discretionary power to direct entry of final judgment under Rule 2-602(b)(1) is to be used sparingly. E.g., Smith, 386 Md. at 24, 871 A.2d at 552 (quoting Diener Enters, v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556, 295 A.2d 470, 473 (1972)). Circumstances where an appellate court may certify an order are even more limited because not only is the appellate court limited to scenarios where the trial court could have certified the order, but the appellate court may not supersede the trial court's exercise of discretion where the trial court denies certification expressly. See Gress, 378 Md. at 682, 838 A.2d at 371 (holding that an appellate court may not exercise discretion under Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) if the trial court declines expressly to certify an entry of final judgment under Rule 2-602(b)). Courts that exercise discretion to certify a non-final judgment for appeal "should balance the exigencies of the case before them with the policy against piecemeal appeals and then only allow a separate appeal in the very infrequent harsh case." Diener Enters., 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d at 473.

Certification under 2-602(b)(1) requires that: (1) the case must involve at least two distinct claims; (2) the order which is to be certified must dispose of at least one of the claims entirely; (3) there is no just reason to delay immediate appeal of the resolved claim; (4) the case must be of an extraordinary nature that would justify exercising discretion; and (5) the court must make express written notice of certification. See Md. Rule 2-602(b)(1); Schuele, 412 Md. at 568, 989 A.2d at 218; Smith v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 386 Md. [12] at 24, 871 A.2d [545] at 552 [ (2005) ]; Huber, 347 Md. at 419-20, 701 A.2d at 417; Diener Enterprises, 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d at 473. As we have stated, the conjunction of all these elements and its relationship to Rule 2-602(a) reinforce the theme of limiting interlocutory appeals and increasing judicial efficiency:

Smith, 386 Md. at 25-26, 871 A.2d at 553 (internal citations omitted).

Although the 2011 Order satisfies the first two elements listed above, this is certainly not a case where there is no just reason to delay appeal of the resolved claim. In fact, there is a very significant reason to defer its appeal — as discussed supra, the outcome of the adjudication of the constitutional claim may render moot the judgment on the statutory interpretation claim. Given that the underlying premise of any certified order is that certification would improve judicial efficiency, there exists no reason to consider directing entry of the 2011 Order as a final judgment while WKA's constitutional claim remains pending. Furthermore, choosing not to direct entry of the 2011 Order will not result in a "harsh" outcome for the parties. Diener Enterprises, 266 Md. at 556, 295 A.2d at 473. WKA has the opportunity to pursue its claim that Agric. § 8-801.1(b)(2) is unconstitutional, even as construed by the 2011 Order. After adjudication of the constitutional claim and entry of a final judgment, any party would have the right of appeal of either the 2011 Order or the order adjudicating the constitutional question. In any event, there is no hardship imposed on WKA, the petitioner here, to address first the merits of their outstanding claim in the Anne Arundel Circuit Court.

Because the 2011 Order is not a final judgment and does not fall within one of the three categorical exceptions permitting interlocutory appeals, both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals lack the jurisdiction to review the merits of this case at this time. Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal and allow the judicial carousel ride to resume in the Anne Arundel Circuit Court.

APPEAL DISMISSED. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPEAL AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.