GREENE, J.
In this case, we address whether a completed Case Information Report ("CIR")
Lisy Corp. ("Petitioner") filed suit against McCormick & Co., Inc., Mojave Foods Corp. ("Respondents"), and Barry A. Adams ("Adams")
Rule 2-325(a) specifies the procedure for invoking a jury trial in civil cases, and explicitly states that jury demands are to be made in a "pleading" or separate "paper." In the Circuit Court, Petitioner argued in its response to the motion to confirm a bench trial that Duckett was distinguishable. According to Petitioner, this Court held in Duckett that an unserved CIR will not satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 2-325(a). Therefore, because the opposing parties were served with a CIR containing a reference to a jury demand, Petitioner maintained, in the present case, it was entitled to a trial by jury. The Circuit Court disagreed. That court found, consistent with Duckett, that the CIR was neither a "pleading" nor a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325, and that failure to comply with the Rule resulted in the waiver of Petitioner's right to a jury trial. The case proceeded to a bench trial and a final judgment was entered.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. For the reasons explained below, we hold that a CIR, whether served or unserved, does not constitute a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325, and that ordinarily failure to comply timely with the Rule will result in a waiver of the right to a jury trial in a civil case.
Petitioner and Respondent McCormick & Co., Inc. are direct competitors in the Hispanic marketplace with each manufacturing and distributing consumer food products. Respondent Mojave Foods Corp. is a subsidiary of McCormick and also competes against Petitioner. Petitioner filed suit against its former employee Adams and Respondents alleging, among other things, that Adams violated the terms of his employment contract by working with Respondent McCormick, a direct competitor, and both misappropriated Petitioner's confidential trade secrets and tortiously interfered with Petitioner's contracts and business relations.
On February 28, 2011, Petitioner filed its complaint, including a request for a temporary restraining order, and a completed CIR in the Circuit Court for Howard County. Petitioner checked "yes" in the Jury Demand section of the CIR. All parties were served.
On April 11, 2012, Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint adding an additional claim. Neither the complaint nor the amended complaint asserted a jury demand. Notwithstanding the omission, on July 25, 2012, the Office of Calendar Management notified the parties that it was scheduling a trial date and ordering a jury
In early September, Respondents and Adams objected to the scheduling of a trial by jury, and moved separately to confirm a bench trial in lieu of a jury trial. In their motions, Respondents and Adams argued that Petitioner did not properly demand a jury trial, because the only reference to a jury demand was in the CIR, which, by itself, was insufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 2-325. In ruling on the pending motions, the Circuit Court determined that our opinion in Duckett held that a completed CIR is neither a "pleading" nor a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325(a), and therefore Petitioner did not comply with the Rule. Acknowledging that the issue in Duckett involved an unserved CIR containing a reference to a jury demand, and the instant case involved a CIR where the Jury Demand box was similarly checked "yes," but was served on the Defendants, the motions judge, in the present case, explained:
Finding that no valid jury demand existed, the motions judge ordered that the case proceed as a bench trial. Petitioner filed a motion to postpone the trial and requested time to obtain appellate review.
We granted certiorari, Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., 441 Md. 217, 107 A.3d 1141
For the reasons stated below, we shall answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed.
This Court revisits the issue of what constitutes a separate "paper" under Rule 2-325, and whether a served CIR meets the definition. In doing so, we rely on the principles of statutory interpretation:
Duckett, 428 Md. at 476-77, 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004)). "Because an interpretation of the Maryland Rules is appropriately classified as a question of law, we review the issue de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters." Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 77, 775 A.2d 1218, 1223 (2001). "This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2-325(a) without giving deference to [the circuit court's or] the intermediate appellate court's interpretation." Duckett, 428 Md. at 477, 52 A.3d at 87 (citing Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 80-81).
In Davis, we discussed the development of the common law right to a jury trial, which dates back to at least the Magna Carta, if not even further. 383 Md. at 609, 861 A.2d at 83-84. "The entitlement to a trial by jury was guaranteed in writing for the first time by the Magna
"Although `inviolably preserved,' the right to have a civil jury trial may be regulated reasonably. . . .'" Duckett, 428 Md. at 478, 52 A.3d at 88 (citing Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 345, 335 A.2d 670, 675 (1975)). "It is well settled that the right to a jury trial may be subjected to reasonable regulation; indeed, it is generally acknowledged that it can, for all practical purposes, become meaningless to the individual and burdensome to the state unless the exercise of it is regulated to some extent." Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 14, 215 A.2d 192, 194 (1965). In Maryland, the right to a jury trial in civil cases is reasonably regulated by Rule 2-325(a), which specifies the procedure necessary to invoke the right. Under the Rule, either party may elect a jury trial by filing a timely written demand in the form of a "pleading" or a separate "paper."
In Duckett, this Court was confronted with the issue of whether an unserved CIR containing a reference to a jury demand constituted a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325(a). As the word "paper" is not defined in the Maryland Rules, we interpreted Rule 2-325(a) and discussed at length its legislative history and intent. Duckett, 428 Md. at 480-82, 52 A.3d at 89-90. Furthermore, we discussed the purpose of a CIR in comparison to that of a "pleading" or separate "paper." A CIR is an administrative tool designed "to assist the Clerk and the court in scheduling actions in the court promptly and efficiently. It is not intended to be an original vehicle, and, in fact, is separate from the methodology, for asserting the constitutional right to a jury trial." Duckett, 428 Md. at 480, 52 A.3d at 89. In contrast, the implicit purpose behind Rule 2-325 is to provide notice principally to an
Petitioner contends that the holding in Duckett is limited to an unserved CIR, and that a served CIR containing a checkmark in the "yes" box in the Jury Demand section does indeed constitute a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325(a), because it fulfills the purpose of the Rule, which, as explained in Duckett, is principally to give notice of a jury demand to an opposing party. As evidence of this alleged alternative holding, Petitioner cites to Footnote 7: "[i]t is, of course, an open question, and one we need not answer, whether, if the civil non-domestic case information sheet had been served successfully and timely on the petitioner, the outcome in this case would have been different." Duckett, 428 Md. at 482 n. 7, 52 A.3d at 90. Petitioner conflates our articulated distinction between a served and unserved CIR with the notion that service of the CIR transforms it into a separate "paper." This is, however, counterintuitive. As we stated in Duckett:
428 Md. at 477, 52 A.3d at 87 (citing In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 471, 906 A.2d 915, 938 (2006)).
Our articulation of the facts in Duckett, namely that the respondent waived her right to a jury trial by relying on a reference to a jury demand in an unserved CIR, rather than asserting it in a pleading or separate paper, falls within our role to decide the case before us, and not to opine on other matters. In Duckett, the issue before us was whether a properly filed CIR containing a reference to a jury demand, which was not served on the opposing party, could be a proper vehicle for demanding a jury trial under Rule 2-325(a). Accordingly, we decided the case on the facts before us. Our analysis, however, made it clear that a CIR, served or unserved, could not constitute a separate "paper." A CIR does not fall within "the common understanding of the Maryland Bar and Bench, the hearing judge notwithstanding, or the ordinary and plain-language meaning of `paper.'" Duckett, 428 Md. at 479, 52 A.3d at 88.
In addition, even within the context of the Maryland Rules, a CIR is referred to as separate from a "paper," and is regulated by separate rules. See Rule 2-112(a) (instructing the clerk, upon receipt of a complaint, to issue and deliver a summons "together with a copy of each paper filed and a blank copy of the information report form" to each defendant); Rule 2-111(b) (stating the issuance of a summons is contingent upon the filing of the "complaint, a copy of each exhibit or other paper filed with the complaint, and a copy of the information report"). Furthermore, a separate "paper" and a CIR have distinctive purposes. The target audience for the information contained in each document is key: a CIR benefits the clerk's office by facilitating case management, and a separate "paper" notifies parties of the mode of the trial, the substance of the allegations asserted and relief sought in the case. A CIR "is not intended to be an original vehicle, and, in fact, is separate from the methodology, for asserting the constitutional right to a jury trial" because the CIR is designed "to assist the Clerk and
A CIR does not constitute a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325(a). Attorneys and parties, which may include self-represented litigants, are all held to the same standard and are required to comply with the Maryland Rules. Rule 2-325(a) is explicit, unambiguous and mandatory: the proper vehicle for a jury demand is a "pleading"
If it were not clear enough in Duckett, we offer further clarity to the meaning of the word "paper" under Rule 2-325(a) based upon the common understanding of the term.
The consequence of not complying timely with Rule 2-325 ordinarily results in waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial whereas failure to comply with Rule 2-111(a), the filing of the CIR, has an altogether different effect. Rule 2-325 is
We reaffirm Duckett and hold that a CIR, served or unserved, is not a proper vehicle for the election of a jury trial because service of the CIR on the opposing party does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 2-325(a) for the reasons explained above. As such, Petitioner was not deprived unjustly of its right to a trial by jury. Rule 2-325 is a "precise rubric," which is to be strictly followed, and Petitioner's failure to comply, whether intentional or unintentional, resulted in a waiver of that right under Subsection (b).
In support of its argument that it made a valid jury demand, Petitioner maintains that the federal courts' interpretations of FED. R. CIV. P.38 should be persuasive in this Court's interpretation of Rule 2-325(a). In the past, we have looked to federal caselaw for guidance, when necessary:
Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 695, 887 A.2d 564, 572 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Both Rule 2-325 and FED. R.CIV.P. 38 establish the procedural mechanisms in their respective courts to assert the constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil case. In Duckett, we recognized Rule 2-325 originated from its federal counterpart and both rules emphasize the importance that "service or notice of a jury demand be made on, or given to, the opposing party or parties. . . ." 428 Md. at 481, 52 A.3d at 90. "Rule 2-325(a) derives from Rule 343(a) and the 1966 version of the Federal Rule of Procedure 38(b)." Id. The 1966 version of FED.R.CIV.P. 38(b) delineated the proper procedure in federal court:
FED.R.CIV.P. 38(b) (1966).
Maryland appellate courts have interpreted the Maryland Rules as precise rubrics that are mandatory. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 344, 879 A.2d 1049, 1051 (2005) ("As we have often said, the Maryland Rules are `precise rubrics' which are to be strictly followed."). As the rules differ in scope, the intermediate appellate court properly rejected Petitioner's argument that the federal courts' interpretations of FED.R.CIV.P. 38(b) is persuasive. Lisy Corp., 219 Md.App. at 602, 101 A.3d at 536. In Maryland, the assertion of a jury demand must be stated in a "pleading" or separate "paper."
Not unlike the present case, in Seay, the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 2-532, which regulates the procedure for filing motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and we were asked to reinterpret the applicable Maryland Rules based on the more flexible FED.R.CIV.P. 50. 388 Md. at 350-51, 879 A.2d at 1054. There, however, we also declined the opportunity "to depart from our state court jurisprudence of strict compliance with the procedural requirements of Rules 2-519 and 2-532. . . ." Seay, 388 Md. at 360, 879 A.2d at 1060.
Lastly, Petitioner argues that it did not voluntarily and intentionally relinquish its constitutional right to a jury trial. Rule 2-325(b) is mandatory and unambiguous: "[t]he failure of a party to file the demand within 15 days after service of the last pleading filed by any party directed to the issue constitutes a waiver of trial by jury." Again, failure to comply with the precise rubrics of this Rule is outcome-determinative: Petitioner waived its right to a jury trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Petitioner's jury demand was procedurally defective, because a CIR is not a separate "paper" within the meaning of Rule 2-325(a). Therefore, failure to comply with the Rule resulted in a waiver of the right to a jury trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.
McDONALD, J., dissenting.
In Duckett v. Riley, 428 Md. 471, 52 A.3d 84 (2012), this Court held that a party in a civil case did not make a proper jury demand under Maryland Rule 2-325 simply
428 Md. at 482 n. 7, 52 A.3d 84 (emphasis added). We granted a writ of certiorari in this case to answer the unanswered question in Duckett.
The Majority opinion makes the best argument that can be mustered for answering "no." But, in my view, that argument is not persuasive. The language, history, and purposes of Rule 2-325—and, indeed, some of the Majority opinion's reasoning—all support the opposite conclusion.
This Case
As the Majority opinion accurately recounts, in early 2011, Lisy Corp. ("Lisy") filed a civil action against McCormick & Co., Inc. ("McCormick").
McCormick does not claim lack of notice of Lisy's jury demand. Indeed, McCormick's counsel has conceded that it had timely notice of the jury demand and suffered no prejudice. McCormick only quibbles with the format—an objection that it raised belatedly after giving every indication it was prepared for a jury trial.
Under the Maryland Constitution, a party in a civil case in a Maryland state court has a right to a jury trial when the amount in controversy exceeds $15,000. Maryland Declaration of Rights, Articles 5, 23; see also Maryland Rule 2-511(a). There is a similar right under the federal constitution for litigants in civil cases in federal court. United States Constitution, Amendment VII. In both federal and Maryland trial courts, the exercise of the constitutional right to a jury trial is regulated by court rules.
Court rules govern how and when a party is to assert the constitutional right to a jury trial. For the federal system, the United States Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. That rule provides, in pertinent part, that a party may demand a jury trial in a civil case by "serving the other parties with a
For Maryland courts, this Court has adopted a similar rule explicitly based on Federal Rule 38(b).
The requirement of a jury demand is not intended simply to burden the exercise of the jury trial right or to create hurdles to its invocation. These rules have a specific purpose, as any regulation should. Consider the common elements of the federal and Maryland rules:
1—documentation—The jury demand must be made in writing. An oral demand or a statement to the court or to an opposing party does not suffice. The jury demand must be documented in writing so that all parties will know how the case is to be tried.
2—timing of notice—The jury demand must be made early in the action—within about two weeks after the last pleading concerning the issue on which a jury trial is sought. The rules are thus designed to ensure that the trial court, and all parties, are aware early in the litigation, that a party has invoked its constitutional right and that the matter will be tried before a jury. The manner in which parties pursue discovery and other pre-trial matters may be shaped by whether the matter will be tried as a bench or a jury trial.
3—flexible format—Neither rule dictates a precise format for a written jury demand—consistent with the policy of not burdening the constitutional right. Both rules allow for a jury demand to be included in a pleading, but neither requires it. The federal rule uses the all-encompassing term "written demand" (which may be a pleading); the Maryland rule states that a written demand not contained in a pleading may be filed "as a separate paper"— i.e., a paper separate from a pleading itself. There is no indication in the language
Thus, both rules are designed to ensure that a party's invocation of the constitutional right is documented and that all parties are on notice early in the case of that invocation, but in both instances the format for providing such documentation and notice is flexible.
Rules governing trial courts in most jurisdictions require that a plaintiff file a case information form together with a complaint to provide key information about the new civil action. In federal court, this is known as a civil cover sheet.
The question before us—as articulated in Duckett—is whether a completed CIR that demands a jury trial and that is timely served on the opposing party is a separate "paper" that satisfactorily preserves the party's jury trial right under Maryland Rule 2-325.
There is, of course, no definition of "paper" in the Maryland Rules.
Apart from the prescriptions concerning size, format, and signature, the only essential requirements for a "paper" making a jury demand are that the filing convey the party's intent and that it be served on the other parties. There is no dispute that a one-page document entitled "Jury Demand" that bears a single sentence—"The Plaintiff demands a jury trial"—and that is served on the other parties would suffice for purposes of Rule 2-325. McCormick conceded at oral argument that such a document would suffice. Undoubtedly, this form of jury demand is used frequently in Maryland courts.
The Majority opinion struggles to devise a definition of "paper" that would exclude a served CIR, but those definitions actually would encompass a served CIR and, ironically, some of those definitions would exclude the standard jury demand:
Instead of inventing a definition of "paper" to reach a particular end result in this case, we should look to the purposes of the requirement of a jury demand and assess whether a served CIR fulfills those purposes. As outlined above, the purposes that animate Maryland Rule 2-325 and its ancestor, Federal Rule 38, are to document the request for a jury trial and to
Perhaps the strongest argument that a served CIR should not serve as a jury demand—and one relied upon by the Court of Special Appeals in this case
Apart from attempting to define "paper" in a way that excludes a served CIR, the Majority opinion repeatedly states that Rule 2-325 is "unambiguous"
In Duckett, this Court considered whether a completed CIR, which indicated that the plaintiff wished to have a jury trial but which had not been served on the defendant, sufficed as a timely jury demand for purposes of Rule 2-325. This Court discussed at some length the term "paper" in the rule, noting that the inclusion of that term in the rule meant that a jury demand need not be made in a pleading. At the end of the discussion, the Court concluded that "the term `paper' ordinarily does not encompass a case information report" and identified the plaintiff's "misstep" as her failure to serve the completed CIR on the defendant. 428 Md. at 482, 52 A.3d 84 (emphasis added). As noted at the outset of this opinion, the Court explicitly did not decide whether a completed CIR that had been timely served on the defendant would have satisfied the rule. Id. at 482 n. 7, 52 A.3d 84.
The Majority opinion ignores the Duckett Court's use of the term "ordinarily" in its holding and downplays its explicit statement that it is an "open question" whether a served CIR would satisfy Rule 2-325. It is true, as the Majority opinion states, that the Duckett opinion raises questions about the status of a CIR as a "paper," but the Duckett Court did not conclusively resolve that issue. Its decision turned on the fact that the CIR in that case had not been served on the opposing party—a factor that undermined the essential purpose of giving notice—and left open whether satisfaction of that purpose, by serving the CIR, would lead to a different result.
We cannot simply say that Duckett already resolved this question. At most, one could say the Duckett opinion gave mixed signals on how it should be resolved. The Court of Special Appeals dealt with those mixed signals as best it could. But we are in a position to provide greater clarity.
Like this Court in Duckett, federal courts have held that checking off the "jury" box on an unserved civil case information sheet does not satisfy the requirements for jury demand under Federal Rule 38. However, the Second Circuit has concluded that "[a] timely served civil cover
In my view, we should answer the "open question" in Duckett in the affirmative— i.e., a completed CIR that invokes a party's constitutional right to a jury trial and that is timely served on other parties is a "paper" that makes a proper jury demand, as it is a written document satisfies the purposes of the rule: documentation and timely notice.
The result reached by the Majority opinion creates a trap that does not serve the purposes of the rule. As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion in this case, nothing in the CIR form itself—which is completed by pro se parties as well as attorneys—warns a litigant that checking "yes" on the box for "JURY DEMAND" would be ineffective to assert the constitutional right to a jury trial.
McDONALD, J., dissents.
A CIR is a standard court-produced administrative form used by the clerk's office for case management purposes. It is a three-page document composed of multiple sections pertaining to the mode of the trial. In its directions, the CIR refers parties to Maryland Rules 2-111(a) and 2-323(h), which inform plaintiffs and defendants respectively of the filing requirements of the CIR. Rule 2-111(a) also references Rule 16-202(b), which states "[t]he information contained in the information report shall not be used for any purpose other than case management." Md. Rule 16-202(b)(3). Pursuant to the Maryland Rules, parties are required to complete the CIR and provide basic information about the case by placing a checkmark in the appropriate boxes. These sections ask the party filling out the CIR to identify, among other things, whether a jury trial has been demanded, the nature of the action, and the damages and relief sought. In essence, by checking the appropriate boxes, parties are required to convey minimal information about the case in order to assist the clerk's office with scheduling matters.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), (d) (1966). The language of the federal rule has changed slightly since 1966. But, apart from extending the period for making a jury demand from 10 to 14 days, the changes are stylistic and the rule remains substantively the same, according to the advisory committee notes that accompanied the amendments to the rule.
