WILLIAM D. QUARLES, Jr., District Judge.
Nicole Rena McCrea, pro se, sued Johns Hopkins Universities ("JHU"), and others
McCrea is an African American female enrolled in JHU's Engineering for Professionals
From the spring of 2010 to the spring of 2011, McCrea's "application," "acceptance," and "filing of [her] program plan/course of study" were "sabotage[d]" or "mishandl[ed]"; McCrea believes the conduct was because of her race "because of the negative and malicious intent displayed whenever [she] complained about the treatment." Id. ¶ 3.
In the spring of 2011, McCrea received an "F" grade in her Medical Sensors and Devices class; she challenged the grade, which "was finally changed." Id. ¶ 4. McCrea believes she received the "F" grade because she was the only African American student in the class and timely submitted her work; white students were permitted to untimely submit their work "without reprisal." Id.
In the fall of 2011, McCrea received an "F" grade in her Psychology class. Id. ¶ 5. Though performing poorly on the first test, McCrea "felt [she] had done extremely well" on the second test — well enough to receive an "A" grade — which would have earned her a "C" overall. Id. McCrea believes her overall "F" grade was because of her race and in retaliation for her complaint about Haase's role in her receipt of an "F" grade for her Medical Sensors and Devices class. Id.
In the spring of 2012, McCrea took Physiology II, which was taught by Haase. Id. ¶ 6. According to McCrea, she was given a different first test than other students, which she believes was because of her race and sex, and in retaliation for complaints against Haase. Id.
In May 2013, McCrea was assaulted; she was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). Id. ¶ 7. In August 2013, she was ready to return to JHU. Id.
In the fall of 2013, McCrea registered for three classes: Mathematical Methods, Cell and Tissue Engineering, and Biomaterials; however, she "dropped all but . . . Biomaterials." Id. ¶ 8.
In February 2014, McCrea received instructions about timely completing her Biomaterials class. Id. ¶ 9. McCrea began complying with the requirements; however, the class professor — Dr. Richard Potember — and Haase told her "not to bother" because it would be unfair to students who had timely submitted their work. Id. The "I" was changed to an "F" grade. Id. McCrea challenged the grade; however, Doug Schiller, with JHU Student Services, "interrogate[d]" her about her PTSD, and "refused to process [her] . . . grade appeal." Id. ¶ 10. McCrea believes this was because of her PTSD and in retaliation for complaints against Potember and Haase. Id.
In April 2014, McCrea filed an "equity compliance complaint" with JHU's Office of Institutional Equity. Id. ¶ 12. Later that month, the Office told her that she had not "establish[ed] a causal connection between respondents' actions/conduct and harassment or discrimination based on a protected class," and she had not "identif[ied] how the actions taken by the respondents are related to a protected class or how [she] was treated differently than others not in my protected class." Id. ¶ 14. In June 2014, Smith dismissed McCrea from the Applied Biomedical Engineering program. Id. ¶ 18.
On February 27, 2015, McCrea sued the Defendants for discrimination. ECF No. 1.
On June 30, 2015, the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, or for more definite statement. ECF No. 8. On July 16, 2015, in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975), a "Rule 12/56" letter was mailed to McCrea, explaining that she had a right to respond to the motion, and that failure to respond may result in the entry of judgment of against her or dismissal of her case. ECF No. 10.
On July 20, 2015, McCrea opposed the motion. ECF No. 11. On July 28, 2015, McCrea moved to amend her opposition. ECF No. 12. On August 3, 2015, the Defendants replied. ECF No. 13. On August 10, 2015, McCrea again moved to amend her opposition. ECF No. 14.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), an action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b) (6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but does not "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Court bears in mind that Rule 8(a) (2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001). Although Rule 8's notice-pleading requirements are "not onerous," the plaintiff must allege facts that support each element of the claim advanced. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 2003). These facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
This requires that the plaintiff do more than "plead[] facts that are `merely consistent with a defendant's liability;'" the facts pled must "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must not only allege but also "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Whe[n] the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown — that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e):
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A motion for more definite statement focuses on whether a party has "enough information to frame an adequate answer." Streeter v. SSOE Sys., No. WMN-09-CV-1022, 2009 WL 3211019, at *10 (D. Md. Sept.29, 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for a more definite statement challenges the intelligibility or ambiguity of the complaint, not whether the allegations state a claim. Smith v. McGraw, No. 10-CV-02310-AW, 2011 WL 1599579, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2011); Frederick v. Koziol, 727 F.Supp. 1019, 1020-21 (E.D. Va. 1990).
Whether to grant a motion for a more definite statement is "generally left to the district court's discretion." Hodgson v. Va. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 482 F.2d 821, 824 (4th Cir. 1973). However, this motion is disfavored because of the liberal pleading standard. Frederick, 727 F. Supp. at 1021. If the movant seeks information that is available or properly sought through discovery, the motion should be denied. Id.
The Defendants contend that McCrea's complaint must be dismissed because she has failed to identify "any constitutional, statutory, or common law cause of action for her claims." ECF No. 8-1 at 4. Although they "do not take issue with [McCrea's] facts," ECF No. 13 at 3, the Defendants contend that they lack "adequate notice of the basis for [] McCrea's claims." because there are several "federal and state civil rights provisions that [she] could be seeking to enforce, each of which may have different standards for liability, available damages, and defenses," ECF No. 8-1 at 4-5.
McCrea contends that she has adequately alleged "harassment, disparate treatment, adverse treatment, disparate impact, violation of procedural due process, hostile environment, [race] discrimination . . ., [sex] discrimination . . ., [disability] discrimination . . .[,] and retaliation during protected activity." ECF No. 11-1 at 4. She further contends that her complaint should be "seen and assessed in whole as a continuous violation of discrimination and harassment leading to acts of retaliation through adverse treatment, deliberate indifference[,] and negligence[,] creating a hostile academic environment . . . resulting in deprivation of a protected interest in property or liberty." Id. at 5.
Even construing McCrea's complaint liberally,
At this stage, however, dismissal would be premature. Cf. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S.Ct. 346, 347, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2014) (per curiam) (district court erred in granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs for failure to cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their complaint as the basis for the claims).
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants' motion for a more definite statement will be granted. McCrea's first motion to amend her opposition will be denied as moot; her second motion, construed as a motion for leave to file a surreply, will be granted.
