Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge.
In April of 1999 and January of 2000, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued Notices of Charge of Discrimination to Baltimore County on behalf of two Baltimore County correctional officers who alleged that Baltimore County's employee pension plan, and employee plan contribution rates, discriminated against them based on their ages. See EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., et al., 747 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir.2014), cert. denied sub nom. Baltimore Cty. v. EEOC, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 436, 190 L.Ed.2d 328 (2014). The County timely denied these charges and provided the EEOC with all requested information, including its actuary's cost justification for the employee contribution rates. With no further inquiry from the EEOC, five and one half years passed until March of 2006 when the EEOC issued a notice that the County's pension plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Another year and one half passed before the EEOC brought this action against Baltimore County ("Defendant" or the "County") in September of 2007, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 57. Specifically, the EEOC has alleged that "[since] at least January 1, 1996, [the] County has engaged in unlawful employment practices by requiring Wayne A. Lee, Richard J. Bosse, and a class of similarly situated [County employees at least forty years of age] to pay higher contributions than those paid by younger individuals to Defendant's pension plan," in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1) & (i)(1). Id. at ¶ 14.
There is no dispute in this case that the Union Defendants have bargained for the County's pension plan contribution rates from the 1970s through the present and in fact "acquiesce[d]" to "or even support[ed]" those rates. Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 16, ECF No. 241-1. Additionally, as discussed infra, the parties and all six Union Defendants have approved a plan for the gradual equalization of contribution rates under the County's pension plan. The terms of that plan have since been incorporated into a Joint Consent Order Regarding Injunctive Relief, signed by this Court on April 26, 2016 (ECF No. 238).
Currently pending before this Court is the EEOC's Motion for Determination on Availability of Retroactive and Prospective Monetary Relief (ECF No. 241). The parties' submissions have been reviewed, and a hearing on the pending Motion was held before this Court on July 29, 2016. At that hearing, counsel for the EEOC acknowledged to this Court that the EEOC's delay of eight years in filing this action "trouble[d]" him. Hearing Tr., at M-72. This Court finds that the EEOC's eight-year delay in prosecuting this case and its present position on the issue of damages are more than "troubl[ing]" and are in fact untenable. Counsel for the County have represented that the County's retroactive liability alone could total $19 million. County Response, p. 24, ECF No. 243. The EEOC has conceded "that the amount of an award of monetary relief in this case could be substantial, that `[r]etroactive liability could be devastating for pension funds,' and that the `harm would fall on innocent third parties,' including county tax payers, as well as current and retired employees." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 20, ECF No. 241-1 (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 722-23, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978)). For the reasons stated herein, the EEOC's Motion for Determination on Availability of Retroactive and Prospective Monetary Relief (ECF No. 241) is DENIED. Neither retroactive nor prospective monetary relief is mandatory under the Age Discrimination in Employment
The facts of this case are set forth fully in EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., 747 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir.2014); EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., No. L-07-2500, 2012 WL 5077631, at *1 (D.Md. Oct. 17, 2012); and EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., 593 F.Supp.2d 797, 799 (D.Md.2009).
In 1945, Defendant Baltimore County ("Defendant" or the "County") established a mandatory Employee Retirement System (the "pension plan" or "ERS") for all "general" County employees, under which employees were eligible to retire and receive pension benefits at age 65, regardless of their length of employment. EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., 747 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir.2014). The County planned to fund half of the ERS on its own and relied on employee contributions to fund the other half. Id. The County required employees to contribute to the ERS over the course of their employment at contribution rates calculated by the County's actuarial firm, Buck Consultants. Id.
To ensure that employee contributions were sufficient to fund the Plan, Buck Consultants "based its calculations for employee contribution rates on the number of years that an employee would contribute to the plan before being eligible to retire at age 65." Id. "Using the retirement age of 65, Buck ultimately concluded that older employees who enrolled in the plan should contribute a higher percentage of their salaries, because their contributions would earn interest for fewer years than the younger employees' contributions." Id. The County adopted the Buck Consultants calculations and, accordingly, "the older that an employee was at the time of enrollment [in the ERS], the higher the rate that the employee was required to contribute." Id.
The County modified the terms of the ERS several times. Most notably, in 1973 "[t]he County ... added an alternative term of retirement eligibility that permitted general employees to retire after 30 years of service irrespective of their age."
"In 1999 and 2000, two County correctional officers, Wayne A. Lee and Richard J. Bosse, Sr., aged 51 and 64, respectively, filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that the County's plan and disparate contribution rates discriminated against them based on their ages." Id. The County has indicated that it "denied the charges and supplied EEOC with all the information it requested, including the cost justification from its actuary for the employee contribution rates." County Response, p. 5, ECF No. 243 (citing Joint Appendix 321-403). However, "[a]fter an unexplained hiatus of 5 and ½ years, on March 6, 2006, the EEOC issued Determination Letters finding that the County's retirement system violated the ADEA." Id. (citing Joint Appendix 72-75).
The parties were unsuccessful in reaching a conciliation agreement, and the EEOC filed the present action in 2007 — eight years after the first charge of discrimination was filed.
On January 21, 2009, Judge Benson E. Legg
The EEOC argued that the contribution scheme was invalid under the Supreme
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently vacated Judge Legg's ruling, holding that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the County's "contribution rates [were] justified by permissible financial considerations." EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., 385 Fed.Appx. 322, 325 (4th Cir.2010). The Court reasoned as follows:
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded this case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 326. On remand, Judge Legg proceeded to grant partial summary judgment for the EEOC on the issue of liability. EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., No. L-07-2500, 2012 WL 5077631, at *1 (D.Md. Oct. 17, 2012). He characterized "[t]he problem identified by the Fourth Circuit" as "an unintended consequence, resulting from the interaction of two separate and independently lawful provisions of the County Code enacted decades apart." Baltimore Cty., 2012 WL 5077631 at *3. Judge Legg observed the following:
Judge Legg concluded that "after the County adopted the early retirement option, the different contribution rates charged to different employees are explained by age rather than pension status." Id. at *5. Therefore, he reasoned, "[p]ension status ... cannot be the driving factor behind the disparate treatment, which is directly linked to an employee's age." Id. Judge Legg held that "because age [was] the `but-for' cause of the disparate treatment, the ERS violated the ADEA." Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)). However, Judge Legg granted the County leave to file an interlocutory appeal on the issue of liability, concluding that "the question presented [was] a novel one," and that "the magnitude of the effort [related to the damages phase of the case] counsel[ed] in favor of making certain that the effort is necessary before it is undertaken." Dec. 7, 2012 Letter Order, p. 4, ECF No. 206. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Legg's ruling on appeal and remanded this case "for further proceedings to address the issue of damages." EEOC v. Baltimore Cty., et al., 747 F.3d 267, 274-75 (4th Cir.2014).
The parties and all six unions ("Union Defendants") representing the County employees participating in the ERS have since agreed to a Joint Consent Order (ECF No. 238), which includes a plan for equalization of pension plan contribution rates over the next two years. That Joint Consent Order, with respect to the injunctive portion of this case and the equalization of member contribution rates, has now been entered by this Court. However, the Order indicated that the "EEOC intend[ed] to seek retroactive monetary relief from the County for individuals harmed by the pension practice found to be unlawful by this Court, and also intend[ed] to seek prospective monetary relief from the County for employees who may be harmed by the phase-in of age-neutral contribution rates...." Joint Consent Order, p. 6, ECF No. 238. This Court subsequently directed the parties to brief the "question of any damages to be awarded either retroactively or prospectively," and a hearing on that question was held before this Court on July 29, 2016. Letter Order, ECF No. 237.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") argues that this Court "must award retroactive relief to Wayne A. Lee, Richard J. Bosse, and the class of similarly situated aggrieved individuals." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 3, ECF No. 241-1. Specifically, the EEOC requests an award of "amounts owing," i.e. "the amounts of contributions of employees age 40 or over, who were required to participate in [Baltimore County's Early Retirement System ("ERS")], in excess of the amounts they would have contributed
Section 626 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the ADEA's enforcement provision, provides the following:
29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Additionally, Section 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), incorporated into the ADEA's enforcement provision supra
The EEOC contends that "[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as depriving the courts of discretion in awarding compensation for monetary harm resulting from an ADEA violation." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 3, ECF No. 241-1. The EEOC relies primarily on Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that "in a private action under the ADEA a trial by jury [is] available where sought by one of the parties." Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 585, 98 S.Ct. 866. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court in Lorrilard compared the plain language of the ADEA's enforcement provisions to the enforcement provisions of
The Supreme Court identified "significant differences" between "the remedial provisions" of Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 584, 98 S.Ct. 866. While "Congress specifically provided for both `legal and equitable relief' in the ADEA, "legal" relief was "not authorize[d] ... in so many words under Title VII." Id. Additionally, the Court observed that "the ADEA incorporates the FLSA provision that employers `shall be liable' for amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, while under Title VII, the availability of backpay is a matter of equitable discretion." Id. at 584, 98 S.Ct. 866. Finally, "rather than adopting the procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that course in favor of incorporating the FLSA procedures even while adopting Title VII's substantive prohibitions." Id. at 584-85, 98 S.Ct. 866. Therefore, the Court concluded that "even if [Lorrilard] is correct that Congress did not intend there to be jury trials under Title VII, that fact sheds no light on congressional intent under the ADEA." Id. at 585, 98 S.Ct. 866.
The EEOC further contends that "[t]he Fourth Circuit has likewise ruled that monetary relief under the ADEA is a mandatory legal remedy." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 5, ECF No. 241-1. The EEOC cites Loveless v. John's Ford, Inc., 232 Fed.Appx. 229, 239 (4th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (per curiam) (concluding that "a liquidated damages award [w]as mandatory ... where [the plaintiff was] a prevailing plaintiff relying on a jury finding of a willful violation of the ADEA by [his employer]."); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 (4th Cir.1985) ("The `amounts owing' under the ADEA, § 626(b) [including `job-related benefits'] are legal damages, unlike the equitable remedies directing employment, reinstatement and promotion."); and Sailor v. Hubbell, Inc., 4 F.3d 323, 325-26 (4th Cir.1993) ("[A] back pay award given under the ADEA is a legal remedy.").
Contrary to the EEOC's representations, no court has held that a retroactive award of compensation for amounts owing is mandatory under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Lorrilard does not directly support the EEOC's position. The question before the Supreme Court in Lorrilard was whether a right to a jury trial existed in private actions brought under the ADEA, not whether any remedy available under the ADEA was or was not mandatory. See Lorrilard, 434 U.S. at 585, 98 S.Ct. 866. While the Court did contrast the ADEA's enforcement provisions with Title VII's enforcement provisions, under which "backpay is a matter of equitable discretion," the Court did not hold that a retroactive award of compensation for amounts owing is mandatory under the ADEA. See id. at 584, 98 S.Ct. 866. Additionally, the Court contrasted sections of the ADEA and FLSA, under which back pay is mandatory, observing the following:
Lorillard, 434 U.S. 575, 581-82, 98 S.Ct. 866 (1978). Furthermore, the Supreme Court specifically cited the language in the ADEA's enforcement provision that the County claims grants this court discretion to award retroactive relief: "[I]n any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter." Id. at 579, 98 S.Ct. 866, n. 5. The Supreme Court has not indicated that its holding in Lorrilard invalidated, or in any way interfered with, this provision.
On the contrary, several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have subsequently confirmed that the ADEA grants courts broad discretion to award appropriate remedies for ADEA violations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir.1984) observed the following:
Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 727-28. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded as follows in Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1561 (11th Cir.1988):
Castle, 837 F.2d at 1561; see also Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 693 (8th Cir.1983) ("The ADEA provides legal and equitable remedies.... The Act affords the district court discretion to fashion appropriate relief, and its remedy can be set aside only if that discretion is abused"); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11th Cir.1985) ("[T]he selection of remedies for an ADEA violation is a matter of the trial court's discretion, so long as the relief granted is consistent with the purposes of the Act [citing Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 693]."). The EEOC has cited no case holding that this Court lacks discretion to deny retroactive relief for amounts owing, nor has the EEOC cited any case in which a retroactive award was an appropriate remedy for a discriminatory pension plan.
The parties have only cited three cases where, like here, an employer's pension plan was found to violate a federal anti-discrimination statute. See Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 108 S.Ct. 2354, 101 L.Ed.2d 206 (1988); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). Although all three cases involved violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as opposed to the ADEA violation at issue here
No court has interpreted the enforcement provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), as requiring that retroactive monetary relief be awarded for ADEA violations. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the rules governing pension funds "should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded that result." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 721, 98 S.Ct. 1370. The ADEA's enforcement provision provides that "court[s] shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate...." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). This broad grant of authority has been repeatedly confirmed by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 727-28; Castle, 837 F.2d at 1561.
Additionally, none of the three United States Supreme Court cases to consider a retroactive monetary award where an employer's pension fund violated a federal anti-discrimination statute have held that a retroactive award was mandatory. On the contrary, all three cases have held that a retroactive monetary award was not appropriate, owing to the unique burdens that retroactive awards place on pension plans. See Long, 487 U.S. 223, 108 S.Ct. 2354; Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492; Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370. For these reasons, a retroactive award of compensation for amounts owing is not mandatory under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. However, even if retroactive relief were mandatory under the ADEA, this Court would still not award retroactive relief in this case due to the EEOC's unreasonable delay in pursuing its claims. As discussed infra, the doctrine of laches authorizes a court to bar a plaintiff from recovering damages where that plaintiff has unreasonably delayed prosecution of his or her claims and has prejudiced the defending party. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has specifically held in Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) that federal courts have the power to "restrict or even deny backpay relief" where the EEOC has "inordinate[ly]" delayed filing the action.
In addition to retroactive monetary relief, the EEOC also requests that this Court "award prospective monetary relief to the class of aggrieved individuals who will continue to pay at discriminatory rates until the age-neutral rates are ultimately phased in." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 6, ECF No. 241-1. The EEOC argues that this prospective relief "must be considered `amounts owing' ... and thus an element of mandatory relief."
As explained supra, the EEOC has failed to demonstrate that retroactive monetary
The plaintiffs in Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc. sued their former employer, alleging that they were discharged on the basis of their age in violation of the ADEA. Duke, 928 F.2d at 1416. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina "submitted to the jury the issues of whether front pay [was] to be awarded and the amount." Id. at 1421. Two of the plaintiffs, Duke and Fox, were awarded back pay, and "the jury made separate awards of front pay for anticipated lost income and benefits from the date of trial until retirement." Id. at 1423. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the jury verdict with respect to front pay and remanded the case "for the court to reconsider the total equitable remedies available ... including the possibilities of reinstatement, front pay, a combination, or, if appropriate, no remedy." Id. at 1424-25. The Fourth Circuit instructed the trial court to "consider a host of factors, including whether reinstatement [was] practical." Id. at 1424. The Court further remarked that "[t]he appropriate method for addressing the difficult question of providing a remedy which anticipates potential future losses requires an analysis of all the circumstances existing at the time of trial for the purpose of tailoring a blend of remedies that is most likely to make the plaintiff whole. The beginning point under the ADEA for preventing future loss is reinstatement." Id. at 1423. Although the plaintiffs in this case do not allege wrongful termination and reinstatement has not been requested, this Court has followed the Fourth Circuit's guidance infra by weighing the EEOC's request for prospective monetary relief against the "total equitable remedies available" and "all the circumstances existing at the time of trial." Specifically, this Court concludes that prospective relief is not appropriate in part because the Union Defendants have bargained for the County's contribution rates on behalf of County employees since the 1970s and because the EEOC, the County, and the Union Defendants have already reached a settlement in this case with respect to injunctive relief, under which contribution rates will be equalized over the next two years. Additionally, this Court has considered infra a "host of factors" specifically relevant to pension plan cases, identified by the Supreme Court in Manhart,
The EEOC objects that the requested prospective relief is not "front pay" because it is "not a remedy for past discrimination for `potential' loss, but rather for current, on-going age discrimination that will certainly persist until July 1, 2018, by operation of the Joint Consent Order." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 6, ECF No. 241-1. The EEOC contends that "[t]he amounts owing between now and July 2018 are readily calculable, without need for speculation concerning lost future earnings or the possibility of windfall payments." Id. However, the EEOC fails to cite an authority indicating that prospective relief is mandatory, and not discretionary like front pay, simply because the amounts requested are "readily calculable" as opposed to "potential." On the contrary, front pay is not always speculative, but can be used to fill in a finite period of lost wages. The Fourth Circuit specifically observed in Duke that "front pay ... can be awarded to complement a deferred order of reinstatement or to bridge a time when the court concludes the plaintiff is reasonably likely to obtain other employment ... [i]f a plaintiff is close to retirement, front pay may be the only practical approach." Duke, 928 F.2d at 1424.
Furthermore, this Court has identified several authorities which suggest that "front pay" and "prospective relief" are one in the same. See Vergès v. Va. Highlands Cmty. College, No. 1:16CV00005, 2016 WL 3024170, at *3, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68546 at *6 (W.D.Va. May 25, 2016) ("Count II of the Complaint asserts a claim against Couch under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the ADEA. Count II seeks prospective injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement, as well as attorneys' fees, costs, and expert witness fees.") (emphasis added); 8-103E Business Organizations with Tax Planning § 103E.09 (2015) ("Front pay is a prospective monetary award of future lost earnings that applies whenever reinstatement is inappropriate or infeasible.") (emphasis added); 7-F17 Civil Rights Actions § F17.07 (2015) ("I instruct you that if the plaintiff persuades you that the defendant has violated the ADEA you may award the plaintiff prospective damages, sometimes called front pay."). For these reasons, a prospective award of compensation for amounts owing is not mandatory under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
As discussed supra, the parties have cited only three cases discussing the availability of retroactive relief where an employer's pension fund contribution scheme has been found to violate a federal anti-discrimination statute. See Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370; Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492; Long, 487 U.S. 223, 108 S.Ct. 2354.
In City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's requirement that female employees make larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704-717, 98 S.Ct. 1370. Although the Department's contribution rates were based on the simple fact that women live longer than men, the Court concluded that "[a]n employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of [Title VII]." Id. at 711, 98 S.Ct. 1370.
However, the Supreme Court in Manhart held that an "award of retroactive relief to the entire class of female employees and retirees" was not appropriate. Id. at 718-723, 98 S.Ct. 1370. While the Department's contribution rates were ultimately found to violate Title VII, the Supreme Court acknowledged "that conscientious and intelligent administrators of pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive briefs and arguments presented to [the Court], may well have assumed that a program like the Department's was entirely lawful." Id. at 720, 98 S.Ct. 1370. "The courts had been silent on the question, and the administrative agencies had conflicting views ... [a]s commentators ha[d] noted, pension administrators could reasonably have thought it unfair-or even illegal-to make male employees shoulder more than their `actuarial share' of the pension burden." Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court interpreted the Department's failure to correct its pension fund contribution scheme as a sign "not of its recalcitrance, but of the problem's complexity." Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[t]here [was] no reason to believe that the threat of a backpay award [was] needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices to conform to [its] decision." Id. at 720-721, 98 S.Ct. 1370.
The Court further noted "the potential impact which changes in rules affecting insurance and pension plans may have on the economy" and observed the following:
Id. at 721-22, 98 S.Ct. 1370. "Although Title VII [had been] enacted in 1964 [fourteen years prior to the Manhart decision]," the Court was sensitive to the fact that "this [was] apparently the first litigation challenging contribution differences based on valid actuarial tables." The Court concluded as follows:
Id. at 722-23, 98 S.Ct. 1370. Accordingly, the Court held that retroactive relief was not appropriate. Id.
Five years later, the Supreme Court held in Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983) that the State of Arizona had violated Title VII by offering its employees the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by the State, all of which paid women lower monthly benefits than men who had made the same retirement contributions. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1075-86, 103 S.Ct. 3492. However, the Court concluded that "this finding of a statutory violation provide[d] no basis for" retroactive relief, which "would be both unprecedented and manifestly unjust." Id. at 1105, 103 S.Ct. 3492. Even though the Manhart decision had placed employers on notice that male-female disparities in pension fund contribution rates violate Title VII, the Court reiterated its position in Manhart that "a retroactive remedy would have had a potentially disruptive impact on the operation of the employer's pension plan" and concluded that the Norris case "present[ed] no different considerations." Id. at 1106, 103 S.Ct. 3492. The Court reasoned as follows:
In Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 108 S.Ct. 2354, 101 L.Ed.2d 206 (1988) the United States Supreme Court again considered whether retroactive relief was available for beneficiaries of the State of Florida's optional employee pension plan, which was nondiscriminatory as to contributions, but had provided greater benefits to male beneficiaries than female beneficiaries prior to the Court's decision in Norris. See Long, 487 U.S. at 226-28, 108 S.Ct. 2354. The Court announced the following test:
Id. at 230, 108 S.Ct. 2354. With respect to the first criteria, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's position that the Manhart decision had "placed Florida on notice that optional pension plans offering sex-based benefits violated Title VII." Id. at 230-233, 108 S.Ct. 2354. The Court concluded that its "references to contributions, as distinct from benefits payments" and recognition of "the potential for interaction between an employer-operated pension plan and pension plans available in the marketplace" in its Manhart opinion "left some doubt regarding [Manhart's] command." Id. at 231, 108 S.Ct. 2354. The Court indicated that it was "[n]ot until Norris, decided five years after Manhart," that they "address[ed] the matter of unequal benefits payments and the open market exception." Id. at 232, 108 S.Ct. 2354. "Thus, some questions left open by Manhart were answered in Norris." Id. at 233, 108 S.Ct. 2354. The Court indicated that "[o]ur close division in the later case, however, suggests that application of the earlier law to differential benefits was far from obvious." Id. "In view of the substantial departure from existing practice that Manhart ordered," the Supreme Court concluded that "pension fund administrators could rely with reasonable assurance on its express qualifications and conclude that it was confined to cases of sex-based contributions." Id. Therefore, "Florida's continuance of the optional plans until the
Next, the Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he second and third criteria of retroactivity analysis also support[ed] [its] determination that Norris, and not Manhart, provides the appropriate date for determining liability and relief." Id. The Court concluded that "retroactivity [was] not required" "to further the purposes of Title VII" because "Florida acted immediately after ... Norris and modified its optional pension plans to provide equal monthly benefits" and because "[t]here [was] no evidence that employers in general ha[d] not complied with the Title VII requirements ... announced in Manhart and extended in Norris." Id. Finally, the Court concluded, "as in Manhart and Norris, that the imposition of retroactive liability on the States, local governments, and other employers that offered sexbased pension plans to their employees [was] inequitable." Id. Quoting Manhart, the Court observed that "`the rules that apply to these funds should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded that result'" and "that Congress had, in fact, stressed the importance of `making only gradual and prospective changes' in the legal rules governing pension plans." Id. at 236, 108 S.Ct. 2354 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720-23, 98 S.Ct. 1370). The respondents in Long argued "that Florida's pension administrators had `actual notice from internal memoranda and discussions' that the continuation of the sex-based optional pension plans after Manhart violated Title VII." Id. (citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that "the question whether Manhart placed employers on notice of Title VII's requirements cannot turn on the internal debates of one pension fund's administrators ... [and that] [t]he meaning and scope of a decision do not rest on the subjective interpretations of discrete, affected persons and their legal advisers." Id. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 2354.
Like in Manhart, Baltimore County had reason to believe that its pension plan contribution scheme was entirely lawful prior to the determination of liability in the present case. When the County implemented its 30 year early retirement option in 1973, no one advised the County that adding that option would "decouple" the time value of money from the contribution rates, causing the scheme to violate the ADEA. In fact, Buck Consultants, the County's actuarial consultant, advised the County in 1988 that the contribution rates did not violate the ADEA. See Joint Appendix 17-19. Furthermore, in response to the charges of age discrimination filed against the County in 1999 and 2000, the County sought the advice of its actuary, Buck Consultants, who specifically advised the County in August of 2000 that "a bona-fide employee benefit plan does not discriminate against older employees, even if older employees must pay more for their benefit, so long as older employees do not have to bear a greater percentage of the cost of the benefit than a younger employee." Id. at 6-10. Therefore, like in Manhart, there is "no reason to believe that the threat of a backpay award is needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720-21, 98 S.Ct. 1370. While this Court ultimately held that the County's contribution rates were unlawful, the fund's administrators "did not have the benefit of the extensive briefs and arguments" presented to this Court and "may well have assumed that" their contribution scheme "was entirely lawful." Id. at 720, 98 S.Ct. 1370.
In fact, Judge Legg of this Court initially granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of liability in this case. As discussed supra, Judge Legg held that
The issue presented in this case was a novel one
The EEOC contends that the County should have been on notice of the unlawfulness of its contribution scheme following a 1999 letter from Buck Consultants, indicating concern about the impact of new regulations on its contribution rates. See August 24, 1999 Letter, ECF No. 241-2. However, the stated purpose of that letter was to review recent changes in the Internal Revenue Code, "to address several lingering issues," and to provide "a summary of statutory rights." Id. Additionally, the letter only discussed "Other Concerns-Age" in three paragraphs, out of eight pages, and never expressly indicated that the rates were illegal or should be calculated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a similar argument in Long. Long, 487 U.S. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 2354 ("the question whether Manhart placed employers on notice of Title VII's requirements cannot turn on the internal debates of one pension fund's administrators ... [t]he meaning and scope of a decision do not rest on the subjective interpretations
Finally, the Supreme Court in Manhart, Norris, and Long indicated that retroactive awards pose a grave threat to the security of public employer's pension funds. As noted supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has characterized these cases as indicating a "clear Supreme Court disapproval of retroactive relief in pension cases." Retired Pub. Employees' Ass'n of Cal. Chapter 22, 799 F.2d at 514. "Retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund. The harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722-23, 98 S.Ct. 1370. The Supreme Court in Norris observed that a retroactive award would place "unanticipated financial burdens" on state and local governments, causing injury to pension plan beneficiaries and even tax payers. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1106-07, 103 S.Ct. 3492. The Court in Long specifically made the risk of "inequitable results for the States, employers, retirees, and pension funds affected" an element of its three-part test for determining the appropriateness of retroactive relief. Long, 487 U.S. at 230, 108 S.Ct. 2354.
In all three pension cases, the Supreme Court declined to award retroactive relief. Here, counsel for the County have represented that "retroactive liability could be $19 million dollars, a potentially staggering financial blow to ERS and the estimated 9,500 active and 6,000 retired members of the system." County Response, p. 24, ECF No. 243. Additionally, the EEOC has acknowledged the following in its Motion: "The EEOC understands that the amount of an award of monetary relief in this case could be substantial, that `[r]etroactive liability could be devastating for pension funds,' and that the `harm would fall on innocent third parties,' including county tax payers, as well as current and retired employees." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 20, ECF No. 241-1 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722-23, 98 S.Ct. 1370). "There is no justification for this Court, particularly in view of" the novelty of the issue presented in this case, "to impose this magnitude of burden." See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1106-07, 103 S.Ct. 3492. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decisions in Manhart, Norris, and Long counsel against an award of retroactive or prospective monetary relief in this case.
The actions of the Defendant Unions in this case further weigh in favor of denying retroactive and prospective monetary relief. There is no dispute that the Union Defendants have bargained for the County's pension plan contribution rates from the 1970s through the present and in fact "acquiesce[d]" to "or even support[ed]" those rates. Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 16, ECF No. 241-1. Additionally, the parties and all six Union Defendants have approved a plan for the gradual equalization of contribution rates under the County's pension plan. The terms of that plan have since been incorporated into a Joint Consent Order Regarding Injunctive Relief, signed by this Court on April 26, 2016 (ECF No. 238). At this Court's hearing on the pending Motion, counsel for the County noted the difficulty it faced in reaching any settlement in this case due to the negotiations that had to occur between the County and the six unions representing affected County employees. See Hearing Tr., at M-51. Counsel for the County also noted that "as part of a negotiation with the union, when unions give up something, they get something back, and that's how it works, and that's what took place here." Id. at M-55. "[T]o the extent that there
The EEOC contends it is not relevant that the unions, on behalf of their County employee members, have negotiated the County's employee plan contribution rates since the 1970s and have, subsequently, entered into a settlement agreement in the present action that they represent is beneficial to their members. The EEOC relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the EEOC is "the master of its own case [and] may pursue a claim on [an] employee's behalf even after the employee has disavowed any desire to seek relief." Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291, 122 S.Ct. 754. The EEOC contends that "[t]his decision makes plain that the EEOC may seek victim-specific relief for all individuals harmed by Defendant's pension plan — both retroactively and prospectively — regardless of whether the labor unions consented to the discriminatory rates, whether four of the labor unions find it acceptable that the age discriminatory rates will continue for their members until July 2018, or whether any of the labor unions believe compensation is necessary." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 16, ECF No. 241-1.
Contrary to the EEOC's representations, the Waffle House case stands only for the proposition that a mandatory arbitration agreement between an employee and his employer does not restrict the EEOC from later seeking "victim specific" relief on behalf of that employee for his employer's ADA violations. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297, 122 S.Ct. 754. The Waffle House case involved a single employee rather than a class of union members who had benefitted from negotiated union contracts and a settlement agreement, negotiated by the unions, as we have in this case. In fact, the Supreme Court in Waffle House specifically observed that it was "an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgment would affect the validity of the EEOC's claim or the character of relief the EEOC may seek." Id. Here, County employees have benefitted from contracts negotiated each year by their unions since the 1970s. Additionally, the County correctly notes that by entering into the Joint Consent Order, "the EEOC has already accomplished the public policy goal of eliminating age discrimination in the Baltimore County pension system." See County Response, p. 42, ECF No. 243. The EEOC has cited no authority indicating that the Defendant Unions' actions on behalf of their employee members cannot or should not be considered by this Court in determining the availability of additional retroactive and prospective monetary relief. On the contrary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Duke v. Uniroyal, discussed supra, has specifically indicated with respect to prospective relief that courts considering a prospective remedy should analyze "all the circumstances existing at the time of trial for the purpose of tailoring a blend of remedies" and should consider "the total equitable remedies available ... including the possibilities of ... a combination [or] no remedy." Duke, 928 F.2d at 1423-25. Here, in light of the Union Defendants' bargaining for the County's contribution rates on behalf of County employees since the 1970s and the fact that the Union Defendants have already entered into a settlement agreement in this case providing for injunctive relief, no additional monetary award — whether retroactive or prospective — is warranted.
Even if retroactive monetary relief were mandatory under the ADEA, this Court would still decline to award retroactive relief in this case due to the EEOC's unreasonable delay in bringing this suit. Laches is an affirmative defense to equitable claims, allowable under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.1990). "Laches imposes on the defendant the ultimate burden of proving `(1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.'" Id. (quoting Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961)). "[W]hether laches bars an action depends upon the particular circumstances of the case ... the equitable balancing of a plaintiff's delay with prejudice to a defendant is primarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. Even if a defendant "has not been sufficiently prejudiced by [a] delay to warrant the sanction of dismissal of the action," courts "reserve[ ] the discretion to reduce any excessive back pay liability attributable to the period of unreasonable delay." EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications, Inc., 514 F.Supp.2d 797, 805-806 (D.Md.2007).
A "lack of diligence ... exists where the plaintiff delayed inexcusably or unreasonably in filing suit." White, 909 F.2d at 102 (quotation omitted). "Prejudice... is demonstrated by a disadvantage on the part of the defendant in asserting or establishing a claimed right or some other harm caused by detrimental reliance on the plaintiff's conduct." Id. "However, the defendant is aided by the inference of prejudice warranted by the plaintiff's delay." Id. "The plaintiff is then to be heard to excuse his apparent laggardness and to prove facts manifesting an absence of actual prejudice." Id. (quotation omitted). "Clearly the greater the delay, the less the prejudice required to show laches, and vice versa." Id. However, "the defendant is ultimately required to prove prejudice (given the defendant's burden to plead and prove laches under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)) and may either rest on the inference alone or introduce additional evidence." Id. (quotation omitted).
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explicitly decided whether the doctrine of laches may be asserted as an affirmative defense to claims brought by the federal government. See, e.g., National Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) ("Nor do we have occasion to consider whether the laches defense may be asserted against the EEOC...."). However, the EEOC concedes that "[i]n some cases, the Fourth Circuit has assumed without deciding that the defense may be asserted against the EEOC." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 18, ECF No. 241-1 (citing EEOC v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397 (4th Cir.2005)). In Navy Federal Credit Union, the EEOC brought a retaliation claim against the Defendant Credit Union in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Navy, 424 F.3d at 404. Subsequently, the Credit Union moved for summary judgment both on the merits and on the grounds that laches barred the EEOC's claim. Id. at 404-405. The district court granted the Credit Union's motion on both grounds, but the Fourth Circuit vacated that judgment. Id. at 411. As to the Credit Union's laches argument, the Fourth Circuit did not hold that the doctrine of laches could not be raised against the EEOC, but rather that the district court had improperly attributed a delay by the Fairfax County Human Rights Commission to the EEOC in that case. Id.
As discussed supra, charges of age discrimination were initially filed against the County in 1999 and 2000. The County timely denied these charges and provided the EEOC with all requested information, including its actuary's cost justification for the employee contribution rates. The County's actuary, Buck Consultants, had advised the County in 1988 that its employee plan contribution rates did not violate the ADEA. See Joint Appendix 17-19. Furthermore, in response to the charges of age discrimination filed against the County in 1999 and 2000, Buck Consultants issued a letter expressing its understanding that "a bona-fide employee benefit plan does not discriminate against older employees, even if older employees must pay more for their benefit, so long as older employees do not have to bear a greater percentage of the cost of the benefit than a younger employee." Id. at 6-10. With no further inquiry from the EEOC, five and one half years passed until March of 2006 when the EEOC issued a notice that the County's pension plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Another year and one half passed before the EEOC brought this action against Baltimore County.
The EEOC's eight-year delay in bringing this suit constitutes an unreasonable delay, far exceeding periods of delay previously deemed unreasonable by this Court and others. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin, 514 F.Supp.2d at 802-803 (30 month delay between end of conciliation and filing of suit); EEOC v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir.1982) (five year and eight month delay between the charge and complaint); EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corporation, 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.1978) (two year and two month delay before determination). The EEOC has conceded that "an unreasonable delay occurred during [its] investigation of the charges from which this lawsuit emanates." Mem. Supp. EEOC Mot., p. 17, ECF No. 241-1. Additionally, at this Court's hearing on the EEOC's pending Motion, counsel for the EEOC admitted to this Court that the EEOC's delay of eight years in filing this action "trouble[d]" him. Hearing Tr., at M-72. The EEOC has offered no convincing explanation for its delay. While the EEOC delayed prosecution of this suit, the County continued to accrue retroactive liability.
The EEOC objects that the equitable doctrine of laches does not authorize this Court to bar retroactive relief at this stage in the proceedings and is not applicable to its ADEA, as opposed to Title VII, claims or to the legal remedy of back pay that it seeks. Again, the EEOC fails to cite authority holding that laches is inapplicable in this case. On the contrary, Judge Legg of this Court has specifically held that "[t]he amount of any damages to be assessed against Baltimore County, and any amount to be disallowed due to the EEOC's delay in filing suit, is to be determined if the EEOC prevails on its claims after the development of a full factual record." Mem., p. 9, ECF No. 78. Furthermore, at this Court's hearing on the pending Motion, counsel for the EEOC characterized it as a "difficult question" and an "open question" whether laches applied. Hearing Tr., at M-70, 71. However, even if the doctrine of laches is inapplicable to the EEOC's claims in the present case, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) provides an alternative grounds for reducing the County's retroactive liability in light of the EEOC's unreasonable delay. At this Court's hearing, counsel for the EEOC "concede[d] ... that, even if laches doesn't apply ... the Supreme Court's Occidental decision" provides an alternative grounds for relief. Hearing Tr., at M-71. The Supreme Court in Occidental announced the following:
Occidental, 432 U.S. at 373, 97 S.Ct. 2447 (emphasis added); see also Lockheed Martin, 514 F.Supp.2d at 805 ("a court may use its equitable power to `[ ] located a just result in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case' if the EEOC ultimately prevails on the merits.") (quoting Occidental). In accordance with the Occidental decision, this Court now "den[ies]" retroactive relief based on the EEOC's unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action and the prejudice that delay caused the County in the form of substantially increased retroactive liability.
For the reasons stated above, the EEOC's Motion for Determination on Availability of Retroactive and Prospective Monetary Relief (ECF No. 241) is DENIED. Neither retroactive nor prospective monetary relief is mandatory under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and, under the circumstances of this case, neither form of relief is appropriate. Even if retroactive monetary relief were mandatory, a closer question than prospective relief, this Court would still decline to award retroactive relief due to the EEOC's unreasonable delay in pursuing its claims. Accordingly, neither retroactive nor prospective monetary relief is available in this case.
A separate Order follows.