MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J.
We examine whether MCL 600.5821(4), which preserves state entities' rights to bring certain claims, also preserves the right to seek recovery of all damages incurred notwithstanding the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). We hold that MCL 600.5821(4) exempts the state entities it lists from the one-year-back rule. As a consequence, we overrule Liptow v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
Nicholas Morgan was severely injured in an automobile accident in March 2000. He was treated at the University of Michigan Health System for six days. Less than one year after the accident, Morgan sought personal protection insurance benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility (MACF). Because he was not covered under a no-fault insurance policy, the MACF designated Titan Insurance Company as the servicing insurer for his claims. In January 2006, the University of Michigan Health System and the university's regents filed this lawsuit against Titan, seeking payment from defendant for Morgan's medical treatment. Plaintiffs sought reimbursement of the full cost of Morgan's hospitalization, which they alleged was $69,957.19.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided decision.
An analysis of this Court's rulings on the issues implicated in this case naturally begins with Lambert v. Calhoun.
Four years later, the Court of Appeals in Rawlins v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. followed Lambert.
Shortly after, in Geiger v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch.,
In 2006, in Cameron, this Court overruled Geiger in a 4 to 3 decision. The majority held that the minority/insanity provision in MCL 600.5851(1) did not remove the plaintiff's claim from application of the one-year-back rule. The analysis stated:
Accordingly, the majority held that a statute governing when a party may bring an action does not affect the damages recoverable under the one-year-back rule.
In Liptow, the Court of Appeals examined the interplay of the one-year-back rule and MCL 600.5821(4). Relying solely on Cameron, it stated:
This case presents questions of statutory interpretation which are reviewed de novo.
No party disputes that MCL 600.5821(4) preserves plaintiffs' right to bring the instant cause of action. The question before us is whether MCL 500.3145(1) restricts plaintiffs' recovery to damages incurred one year before plaintiffs filed suit. The answer turns on the correct understanding of the interaction between MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5821(4). It is undisputed that all of plaintiffs' costs were incurred between March 18 and March 23, 2000. Thus, if the one-year-back rule applies to their claim, plaintiffs are entitled to no damages.
Defendant relies on Liptow, which held that the one-year-back rule governs actions to which MCL 600.5821(4) applies because the statute does not exempt state entities from its limitation on damages. We disagree.
Defendant's argument and the holding in Liptow rest on a fundamentally incorrect premise. Liptow reasoned that (1) MCL 600.5821(4) exempts state entities from any statute of limitations, (2) the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) is not a statute of limitations, but a damages limitation, and therefore (3) MCL 600.5821(4) does not exempt a governmental entity from the one-year-back-rule of MCL 500.3145(1).
The Cameron majority concluded that actions brought pursuant to MCL 600.5851(1) are subject to the one-year-back rule because that statute does not implicate when a plaintiff may "bring an action." We conclude that the statutory language in MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) does not command the conclusion that the Cameron majority reached.
To begin with, we conclude that the approach in Cameron was flawed because it read the statutory language in isolation. MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be read together with MCL 500.3145(1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to "bring the action" "for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits . . . for accidental bodily injury.. . ." On the basis of its language, MCL 600.5851(1) supersedes all limitations
For what purpose might a plaintiff "bring an action"? Surely not for the sole satisfaction of filing papers in court. A plaintiff brings a tort action to recover damages. Although the right to bring an action would be a hollow one indeed if a plaintiff could not recover damages, Cameron and Liptow limited a plaintiff to just that hollow right. Therefore, we restore the proper understanding of the interaction between MCL 600.5851(1) and the one-year-back rule. We hold that the "action" and "claim" preserved by MCL 600.5851(1) include the right to collect damages. As Justice CAVANAGH explained in his dissenting opinion in Cameron,
Justice CAVANAGH'S dissent is equally applicable here. The statute at issue in this case, MCL 600.5821(4), also addresses "[a]ctions." Specifically, it preserves actions brought by state entities. It also explicitly delineates that the action contemplated is one brought for the recovery for certain costs incurred. MCL 600.5821(4) lists the costs as those for the "maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals, homes, schools, and other state institutions. . . ." Thus, it is apparent from the language of the statute that the Legislature intended to preserve more than the state entities' right to file papers in court.
Moreover, this Court's caselaw predating Cameron also does not support the Cameron majority's holding. The only authority cited for Cameron's interpretation was in Justice MARKMAN'S concurring opinion, which relied on dicta from Justice BRICKLEY'S lead opinion in Howard v. Gen. Motors Corp.
In sum, for more than 20 years before Cameron, the majority in all of the Court's relevant opinions saw no basis for treating any of the provisions of MCL 500.3145(1) differently. In Welton v. Carriers Ins. Co., we made a distinction among the provisions only to the extent of noting that the section contains "two limitations on time of suit and one limitation on period of recovery[.]"
Thus, we conclude that Cameron erroneously held that MCL 600.5851(1) does not protect a plaintiff's claim from the one-year-back rule. We also hold that this understanding of the interaction between the statutes is equally applicable to the interaction between MCL 600.5821(4) and MCL 500.3145(1). Therefore, the provisions of MCL 600.5821(4) preserving a plaintiff's right to bring an action also preserve the plaintiff's right to recover damages incurred more than one year before suit is filed. The one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) is inapplicable to such claims.
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that Cameron was wrongly decided. However, despite the fact that a previous decision was wrongly decided, we must be mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis when deciding whether to overrule it.
In determining whether a compelling justification exists to overturn precedent, the Court may consider numerous evaluative criteria, none of which, standing alone, is dispositive. Historically, courts have considered (1) whether the precedent has proved to be intolerable because it defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance on it is such that overruling it would cause a special hardship and inequity, (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed since the precedent was pronounced that no more than a remnant of it has survived, (4) whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the precedent of significant application or justification, (5) whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner, (6) whether upholding the precedent is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests,
These factors may or may not be applicable in a given case. Nor is there a magic number of factors that must favor overruling a case in order to establish the requisite compelling justification. Rather, this conclusion should be reached on a case-by-case basis.
Here, we first consider whether Cameron has proved intolerable because it defies practical workability. Indeed it does. Cameron left MCL 600.5851(1) and similar provisions void of effect in many cases while ostensibly protecting an injured party's right to file suit. This created an indefensible paradox and, as such, an unworkable and confusing legal landscape. Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a boy injured in a car accident at age 12 and fully recovered by age 15. Upon reaching 18, he retains an attorney to file suit to recover the costs associated with the treatment of his injuries, relying on MCL 600.5851(1). The defendant also retains counsel, who responds by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that none of the plaintiff's damages are recoverable. The trial court parses the parties' filings and determines that none of the plaintiff's costs were incurred in the year before suit was filed.
Under Cameron, the plaintiff in this hypothetical case was indisputably entitled to file suit, because MCL 600.5851(1) preserved his right to do so. Yet Cameron gutted his suit of any practical worth because, under its interpretation of MCL 600.5851(1), the plaintiff had no chance to recover any damages. Thus, the plaintiff was denied the legal recourse the Legislature provided him, which is, after reaching his majority, to recover the damages he incurred more than a year earlier. Accordingly, we conclude that Cameron is frequently innately unworkable.
Second, we consider whether reliance interests weigh in favor of overruling Cameron. We conclude that they do. Cameron is of recent vintage, having been decided a mere four years ago. Hence, reliance on its holding has been of limited duration. Moreover, Cameron represented a sea change in one area of the law and toppled settled interpretations of the no-fault act that had existed almost since the adoption of MCL 600.5851.
We recognize that there exists a competing reliance interest in the continuing validity of Cameron: that of the defendants in no-fault cases. Yet Cameron's evisceration of the crux of a plaintiff's claim—the potential to recover damages—effectively removed altogether the incentive to file suit as permitted by MCL 600.5851(1). We conclude that, while no-fault defendants' reliance on this interpretation is reasonable, it is not itself sufficient to preclude overruling Cameron given the extent of Cameron's prejudice to no-fault plaintiffs.
Third, we consider whether related principles of law have developed since Cameron's interpretation of MCL 600.5851(1) was pronounced. This factor is inapplicable to our stare decisis analysis in this case, as we are aware of no intervening change in the law that further supports or undermines Cameron's continuing legitimacy.
Fourth, we examine whether facts and circumstances have so changed, or have come to be seen so differently, that Cameron
Fifth, we consider whether other jurisdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner. This factor is likewise inapplicable to our stare decisis analysis. Michigan's comprehensive no-fault insurance scheme is unique to our state. While other states share the fundamental underpinnings of our system, judicial interpretations of the no-fault act have evolved independently of those of other states with similar insurance schemes. Thus, other jurisdictions' interpretations of similar statutes are unhelpful to our analysis in this case.
Sixth, we examine whether upholding Cameron is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. We conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favor of overruling Cameron. Cameron drastically curtailed the protection provided by the Legislature for minors and incompetents. In enacting MCL 600.5851(1), the Legislature conveyed its intention to protect individuals in those groups with unique treatment under the law. The statute represents the culmination of the Legislature's deliberative process. Cameron undermined the Legislature's decision to provide a "year of grace" to infants and incompetents in recognition of their inability to legally act until their disabilities are removed.
Moreover, Cameron set an ironic trap for minors and incompetents. As Justice CAVANAGH astutely noted in dissent:
Thus, what the Legislature intended as a provision to preserve a plaintiff's claims, Cameron rendered largely meaningless. In certain circumstances, Cameron's interpretation of the saving provision actually operates to extinguish a claim, not save it.
Finally, we consider whether Cameron represented an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. We conclude that this factor also weighs heavily in favor of overruling Cameron. Cameron overruled Geiger,
In summary, Cameron is often unworkable, has not engendered valid reliance interests, has caused serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, and represented an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent. Accordingly, we conclude that a compelling justification exists for overruling it.
We overrule our decision in Cameron and the Court of Appeals' decision in Liptow. Entities listed in MCL 600.5821(4) may bring an action and recover costs notwithstanding the limiting provisions of MCL 500.3145(1), including the one-year-back rule. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, WEAVER (except for the part entitled "Stare Decisis"), and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J.
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in and sign all of the majority opinion except the section entitled "Stare Decisis." I write separately to note that in addition to the reasons given in the majority opinion, I also believe that Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 476 Mich. 55, 718 N.W.2d 784 (2006), should be overruled for the reasons in my dissent to the Cameron decision. Id. at 104, 718 N.W.2d 784.
In Cameron, the majority failed to give proper effect to the language contained in MCL 500.3145(1).
In addition to the lack of restraint of the Cameron majority's use of the judicial power of interpretation, Chief Justice KELLY'S majority opinion in this case shows that the Cameron majority failed to exercise common sense and fairness. As noted in Chief Justice KELLY'S majority opinion in this case, Cameron resulted in the Legislature's savings provisions regarding minors and government entities becoming hollow rights when injuries occurred more than a year before a lawsuit was filed.
On the subject of stare decisis, Justice YOUNG'S dissent in this case attempts to deceive the public. It attempts to lump together the four justices who agree with parts of the majority opinion into having had some sort of previously stated fidelity to stare decisis that those justices have abandoned since former Chief Justice TAYLOR'S overwhelming defeat in the 2008 election.
Justice YOUNG'S dissent quotes various past statements, made by those justices signing portions of the majority opinion, regarding stare decisis and criticizing the former "majority of four" (former Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN). With respect to myself, the dissent quotes a statement I made in response to the improper and unfair dismantling of decades of longstanding insurance contract law by the former "majority of four" in Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 473 Mich. 562, 702 N.W.2d 539 (2005). In Devillers, I stated, "Correction for correction's sake does not make sense. The case has not been made why the Court should not adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis in this case." Id. at 622, 702 N.W.2d 539 (WEAVER, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice YOUNG'S dissent uses my Devillers statement in what appears to be an attempt to try to get people to believe that I have somehow changed my view of stare decisis since former Chief Justice TAYLOR was defeated. The dissent's misleading assertions are simply incorrect.
My Devillers statement itself shows that I was criticizing the disregard for stare decisis in that specific case. My Devillers statement is an example of my service to the rule of law and a partial expression of my view of the policy of stare decisis, which is that past precedent should generally be followed but that, in deciding whether wrongly decided precedent should be overruled, each case should be looked at individually on its facts and merits through the lens of judicial restraint, common sense, and fairness.
Justice YOUNG'S dissent cannot point to a statement where I professed some sort of position regarding stare decisis as an immutable doctrine because I have not taken that position and therefore have made no such statements. Justice YOUNG'S various dissents continue to mischaracterize my positions by making inaccurate statements, using partial quotes taken out of context, and omitting relevant information in an apparent attempt to deceive readers.
I agree with the sentiment recently expressed by Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court in his concurrence to the decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 920, 175 L.Ed.2d 753, 806 (2010), when he said that
Chief Justice Roberts further called stare decisis a "principle of policy" and said that it "is not an end in itself." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 920, 175 L.Ed.2d at 807. He explained that "[i]ts greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent." Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 921, 175 L.Ed.2d at 807.
I agree with Chief Justice Roberts that stare decisis is a policy and not an immutable doctrine. I chose not to sign Chief Justice KELLY'S lead opinion in Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 316-320, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), because it proposed to create a standardized test for stare decisis. Likewise, I do not sign the majority opinion's stare decisis section in this case because it applies Petersen. There is no need for this Court to adopt any standardized test regarding stare decisis. In fact, it is an impossible task. There are many factors to consider when deciding whether or not to overrule precedent, and the importance of such factors often changes on a case-by-case basis.
In serving the rule of law and applying judicial restraint, common sense, and a sense of fairness to the case at hand, I agree with and join the majority opinion's holding that Cameron is overruled.
HATHAWAY, J. (concurring).
I fully concur with Chief Justice KELLY'S analysis and conclusion in this matter and support overruling Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 476 Mich. 55, 718 N.W.2d 784 (2006). I also fully concur with Justice WEAVER'S stare decisis analysis in her concurring opinion. I write separately to express my own thoughts on the doctrine of stare decisis.
Given the debate amongst the justices of this Court concerning what constitutes the proper stare decisis analysis, I find it insightful to review how our United States Supreme Court has treated the doctrine. Stare decisis is a principle of policy that commands judicial respect for a court's earlier decisions and the rules of law that they embody. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556-557, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940). "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). However, when balancing the need to depart from precedent with the need to adhere to established precedent, it is important to bear in mind that stare decisis is neither an "inexorable command," Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), nor "a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision," Helvering, 309 U.S. at 119, 60 S.Ct. 444. "If it were, segregation would be legal, minimum wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without first obtaining warrants. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 [16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256] (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873] (1954); Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, [43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785] (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 [57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703] (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944] (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576] (1967)." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 920, 175 L.Ed.2d 753, 806 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
I do not agree with any approach to stare decisis that suggests or implies that it is a "rule" or "law" subject to a particularized test to be used in all circumstances. Any particular approach to stare decisis, such as the one taken in Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000), is not "law" or "established precedent" that would require us to overrule, reject or modify its analysis. The Robinson approach to stare decisis, just as the one taken in Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), is one among many varying approaches, and no particular approach, in and of itself, is inherently superior to another. As with any policy determination, the approach taken in any given case will depend on the facts and circumstances presented.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has utilized many different approaches to stare decisis, including such approaches as those involving a "compelling justification,"
It is also worthy to note that not only has the United States Supreme Court historically not taken one single approach to the application of stare decisis, the Court has not felt compelled to discuss stare decisis in all cases when precedent is being overturned. Many landmark cases that overruled well-established precedent did not discuss or even mention the phrase "stare decisis." For example, Brown overruled Plessy, thereby ending segregation in our public schools, without mentioning the phrase "stare decisis," much less articulating and following a particularized test. Similarly, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which established the rights of indigents to have counsel in all criminal cases, not merely capital offenses, overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942), again without mentioning "stare decisis" or a particularized test. Instead, both of these cases focused on the important policy considerations that weighed in favor of overruling precedent.
MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J. (concurring).
I authored the majority opinion in this case and therefore join it in its entirety. I write separately because Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN continue to misleadingly refer to a statement I made off the bench nearly two years ago that was published by the Detroit Free Press.
Written opinions serve an important function in the judicial process: they provide a forum in which the majority and dissenting justices debate the legal issues raised in cases. Sometimes that debate
It is no secret that the philosophical divisions among the justices on this Court are deep. For some years now, our disagreements on legal questions have erupted in occasionally heated and unpleasant personal recriminations. This case is a perfect example.
I know that, if asked, both Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN would agree with my sentiments and would deplore these outbursts. Both justices fully understand that personal recriminations reduce the public's confidence in the objectivity and wisdom of judges and in the Court as an institution.
With these reflections in mind, I urge them to reevaluate the utility of their ad hominem attacks and eliminate them. Surely each has significant confidence in the strength of their legal arguments to allow those arguments to stand on their merits, absent distracting attack props. Moreover, their personal assaults do nothing to resolve the legal issues before us; they do not benefit the parties to a case or the citizens of Michigan whom we serve.
I sincerely regret having to address these matters in the first place and would prefer that this opinion were not necessary. But I cannot stand passively by and allow Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN to accuse me and the justices in the "new majority" of being unprincipled and driven by inappropriate motives. Their attacks wrongly accuse Justices CAVANAGH, WEAVER, HATHAWAY, and me of reaching predetermined outcomes in many, if not all, cases rather than following the law, as we are sworn to do.
People respect the judiciary only insofar as they believe that judges decide cases impartially and without ulterior motives. Justices YOUNG'S and CORRIGAN'S assertion in this and previous cases that we have an "agenda" that involves selecting and overturning certain precedents is unfair and untrue. Furthermore, it undermines respect both for the justices attacked and for those making the unwarranted accusations. Most importantly, it reduces public confidence in the judiciary as a whole.
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).
I agree entirely with Justice MARKMAN'S dissenting opinion in this case. I write separately only to note that, today, the decade-long shrill pretense of several of my colleagues' adherence to "preserving precedent" is over. The concurring opinions of Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY make clear that there is no longer any need for them to pretend that "precedent" is anything sacred for the "new majority" of this Court.
The new majority, being a majority, is now free to do as it pleases. And it pleases the new majority to honor the agenda to which our new Chief Justice pledged them after the defeat of Chief Justice TAYLOR in 2008:
The new majority has not been shy about acting on its agenda to "undo" the precedents of the "Republican-dominated court." In the 18 months of its existence, the new majority has moved muscularly in making good on this promise. Just in this term alone, the new majority has overturned the following cases recently decided by this Court:
1. In People v. Feezel, 486 Mich. 184, 783 N.W.2d 67 (2010), the new majority overruled People v. Derror, 475 Mich. 316, 715 N.W.2d 822 (2006).
2. In McCormick v. Carrier, 487 Mich. 180, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2010), the new majority overruled Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109, 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004).
In Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 487 Mich. 349, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2010), the new majority overruled (at least) the following cases:
11. In Bezeau v. Palace Sports & Entertainment, Inc., 487 Mich. 455, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2010), the new majority expressly overruled the limited retroactive effect of Karaczewski v. Farbman Stein & Co., 478 Mich. 28, 732 N.W.2d 56 (2007).
12. And in this case, the new majority now overrules Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 476 Mich. 55, 718 N.W.2d 784 (2006).
And this list is separate and distinct from those cases in which the new majority has ignored or otherwise failed to follow other recently decided precedents of this Court,
It is a touch more than ironic that Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY now argue that well-established principles of stare decisis must give way to a justice's subjective view of a case. This process produces a result whereby the parties and the public will never know what criteria or standards several justices on this Court will employ until after the decision has been made. This ad hoc, subjective process is the very antithesis of the "rule of law" and instead denotes a system hijacked by the concurring justices, who appear to be guided and constrained only by their personal beliefs. That stare decisis is a "principle of policy," as Justice HATHAWAY repeats many times, does not mean that analysis of a case pursuant to the doctrine should be driven by each judge's personal policy choices.
The rule of law, by definition, requires judges to decide cases on the basis of principles, announced in advance, rather than on a personal or subjective preference for or against a party before them. This ensures stability in the law despite the diversity of judges' personal beliefs. Whether we, as judges, "like" the outcome is, quite simply, irrelevant to whether it reflects a correct conclusion of law. It is harrowing that Justices WEAVER and HATHAWAY either do not understand this concept or refuse to subscribe to it, preferring to base their decisions on subjective "policy consideration[s]."
Finally, Chief Justice KELLY has tried on several occasions to explain away what she meant when she said the "new majority" would "undo . . . the damage [of] the Republican-dominated court," as she again attempts today. Chief Justice KELLY finds it disquieting that I quote her remarks about the "new majority's" agenda. She should. Her remarks are as disquieting as they are scurrilous. What is noteworthy is that Chief Justice KELLY has never repudiated what she said, apologized for it, or sufficiently explained why that statement doesn't mean what it plainly says. Instead, she merely prefers that I not repeat it for reasons that are obvious to all. Rare is it that a judge publicly tells the public that she has an agenda and what it is. I am glad that the Chief Justice was so candid because everyone can examine her conduct in light of her statement. Her motivations for making this dreadful remark and whether her subsequent resolution of cases is consistent with her remark are questions for the public to decide.
Moreover, after being the target of much uncivil criticism by then Justice KELLY over the years, I am nonplussed by the Chief Justice's pique at the passion of my dissent and the tone in which I have expressed it. One need only review the Chief Justice's dissenting opinions over the years to acknowledge that her views on civility have conveniently changed as quickly as the new majority's view regarding the importance of preserving precedent.
Moreover, the Chief Justice's calls for civility are especially hypocritical given the very ugly reference she made to the false "sleeping judge" ads that played so prominent a role in the campaign to defeat Chief Justice TAYLOR in 2008. Given the context that this remark was made just after the defeat of Chief Justice TAYLOR in the last election, Chief Justice KELLY'S final comment that "we will not sleep on the bench" was a particularly uncivil reference denigrating our distinguished former colleague.
The public should be just as indignant as I am—not only regarding the hypocrisy of the new majority's radically changing views on the question of preserving precedents, but also with its equally radically subjective approach to the law. I will continue to strive to bring such issues to the public's attention. The public may judge whether the former majority or this new majority's opinions provided greater predictability in the law and were more faithful to the actual language of the statutes, or whether the legislative "work product" was disregarded for the pet policies
CORRIGAN, J., concurred with YOUNG, J.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the instant decision overruling Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 476 Mich. 55, 718 N.W.2d 784 (2006), which held that the no-fault automobile insurance act's one-year-back rule, MCL 500.3145(1), is a damages-limiting provision, not a statute of limitations, and Liptow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Mich.App. 544, 726 N.W.2d 442 (2006), which held that MCL 600.5821(4) does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule.
MCL 500.3145(1), part of the no-fault automobile insurance act, provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced."
In Cameron, this Court held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA, MCL 600.5851(1), which addresses when one may "bring [an] action,"
The one-year-back rule "limits the amount of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits recoverable to those incurred within one year before the action was commenced." Cameron, 476 Mich. at 58 n. 1, 718 N.W.2d 784. As Cameron explained:
That is, the one-year-back rule by its straightforward language serves only as a limitation on the recovery of benefits; it does not define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action. Therefore, the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations, and it lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA's minority/insanity tolling provision.
The majority apparently believes that it is appropriate to overrule Cameron because Cameron overruled Geiger v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 114 Mich.App. 283, 318 N.W.2d 833 (1982).
The majority here commits the same error that Geiger committed. That is, the majority believes that it can somehow discern the purpose of the statute from something other than its actual language, despite the fact that this Court has repeatedly held that this constitutes an improper approach to statutory interpretation. As I explained in my concurring opinion in Cameron:
The majority criticizes Cameron on the basis that "[t]he only authority cited for [its] interpretation was in Justice MARKMAN'S concurring opinion, which relied on dicta from Justice BRICKLEY'S lead opinion in Howard v. Gen. Motors Corp." This statement very much illustrates the flaw in the majority's approach to statutory construction—it fails to recognize that the best indicator of the Legislature's intent is the language of the statute itself. That is, the best "authority" cited in either the majority or concurring opinions in Cameron for their interpretation is the actual language of the statutes at issue. That the majority fails to apprehend this first principle of statutory interpretation sufficiently speaks to the shortcomings in its analysis.
In Liptow, the Court of Appeals, relying on this Court's decision in Cameron, held that MCL 600.5821(4) does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule because MCL 600.5821(4) only exempts the state and its political subdivisions from a statute of limitations and the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision, not a statute of limitations. This Court denied leave to appeal in Liptow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 478 Mich. 853, 731 N.W.2d 84 (2007), and I agree with the Court of Appeals' decision. As the Court of Appeals explained in Liptow:
While the RJA, specifically MCL 600.5821(4), states that an action by the state or one of its political subdivisions "may be brought at any time without limitation,"
The majority overrules Liptow simply because it relied on Cameron. Because I believe that Cameron was correctly decided and that Liptow appropriately relied on Cameron, I would not overrule either Cameron or Liptow. As is obvious from the flood of opinions that the majority has recently overruled, the majority justices' repeated self-proclamations of adherence to stare decisis were merely a reflection of the fact that they agreed with the particular decisions that were being overruled. For a more thorough discussion of the majority justices' past expressions of fealty toward stare decisis, see my dissent in McCormick v. Carrier, 487 Mich. 180, 262-279, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2010). However, the lead opinion's reliance on Chief Justice KELLY'S opinion in Petersen v. Magna Corp., 484 Mich. 300, 773 N.W.2d 564 (2009), which only Justice CAVANAGH joined, rather than the majority opinion in Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000), should not go unnoticed. For a thorough discussion of Chief Justice KELLY'S Petersen standard for overruling precedent, see my dissent in Petersen, 484 Mich. at 350, 773 N.W.2d 564.
The majority also asserts that because "MCL 600.5821(4) lists the costs [for which recovery may be sought] as those for the `maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in hospitals, homes, schools, and other state institutions,'" it "supersedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the one-year-back rule's limitation on the period of recovery." In other words, the majority contends that MCL 600.5821(4) provides an absolute right to recover the enumerated costs. The problem with this argument, however, is that the statute says no such thing. The statute does not say that there is an unfettered right to recover the enumerated costs. Instead, MCL 600.5821(4) says only that "[a]ctions brought ... for the recovery of the [enumerated] cost[s] ... are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the
Plaintiffs also argue that Liptow was inconsistent with Univ. of Mich. Regents v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 250 Mich.App. 719, 650 N.W.2d 129 (2002), in which the Court of Appeals held that MCL 600.5821(4) in the RJA, exempts the state and its political subdivisions from the no-fault act's statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). Specifically, the Court held:
However, as the Court of Appeals explained in Univ. of Mich. Regents v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 12, 2009 (Docket No. 281917), 2009 WL 637310:
As this Court has explained, "MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action and one limitation on the period for which benefits may be recovered[.]" Cameron, 476 Mich. at 61, 718 N.W.2d 784, citing Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 473 Mich. 562, 574, 702 N.W.2d 539 (2005). First, "an action for PIP benefits must be commenced within a year of the accident unless the insured gives written notice of injury or previously received PIP benefits from the insurer." Cameron, 476 Mich. at 61, 718 N.W.2d 784. Second, "[i]f notice was given or payment was made, the action can be commenced within one year of the most recent loss." Id. Third, under the one-year-back rule, "[r]ecovery ... is limited to losses incurred during the year before the filing of the action." Id. Univ. of Mich. Regents v. State Farm concerned the statute of limitations portion of MCL 500.3145(1), not the one-year-back rule. Therefore, there is utterly no inconsistency between Univ. of Mich. Regents v. State Farm and Liptow.
The Court of Appeals dissent stated, "I believe that the holding in Liptow takes an irrationally and improperly narrow view of this statute by holding that it exempts entities like plaintiff[s] from a one-year limitation on bringing an action but not from a one-year limitation on recovering in such an action." Univ. of Mich. Regents v.
However, I concluded that, regardless of my concerns about the wisdom (or lack thereof) of the statute, a judge is bound to follow this language. The same remains true here. Although to some it may seem less than optimal to exempt entities such as plaintiffs from a one-year limitation on bringing an action, but not also from a one-year limitation on recovery in that an action, that is clearly what the Legislature has done, and it is entitled to act in a way that is viewed with disapproval by members of the judiciary.
Nor is this, assuming arguendo that such is a relevant consideration, an "absurd result." Even to the extent that an "absurd result" doctrine exists in Michigan,
That is,
"Finally, a reasonable lawmaker might have concluded that practical problems pertaining to evidence and proofs in old claims required some balance between the interests of the [claimant] and those of the insurer." Id. (emphasis in the original).
As the majority acknowledges, "if the one-year-back rule applies to [plaintiffs'] claim, plaintiffs are entitled to no damages," because all of their losses were "incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced," MCL 500.3145(1). Indeed, all of plaintiffs' losses were incurred in 2000, and yet plaintiffs waited until 2006 to file this cause of action. Because I believe, for the reasons set forth above, that the one-year-back rule does apply to plaintiffs' claim, I conclude that plaintiffs' damages are not recoverable. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
CORRIGAN and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
We take no issue with Justice MARKMAN'S argument that the Cameron majority needed no "authority" to support its holding other than "the language of the statute itself." Post at 922. But he wrongly claims that this opinion "fails to apprehend" the principle of statutory interpretation that the actual language of the statutes is the best indicator of legislative intent. Post at 922. To the contrary, we conclude that the statutory language does not compel the interpretation reached by the Cameron majority. See pages 901-03 of this opinion. We make the additional observation that our caselaw also provides no support for the Cameron majority's interpretation.
We also decline to comment on Justice MARKMAN'S discussion of the "absurd result" doctrine, because we do not rely on it to reach our decision here.
I believe that our thoughtful and lengthy treatments of whether Cameron is entitled to stare decisis respect belie Justice YOUNG'S criticism that "today precedent is no longer an `issue.'" Post at 914. Justice YOUNG disdains our positions of the last decade regarding stare decisis as nothing but a "decade-long shrill pretense. . . ." Post at 913. But he is incorrect. Not only have our positions been put forth without vitriol and ad hominem innuendos, there has been no pretense about them.
Nor do we simply ignore precedent with which we disagree, as Justice YOUNG once again asserts. It appears that he intends to repeat himself using an identical attack in each and every case in which I vote for a different result than he does. See, e.g., Esselman v. Garden City Hosp., 486 Mich. 892, 780 N.W.2d 776 (2010). But with each repetition, his claims grow less believable.
Finally, Justice YOUNG again quotes a statement I made two years ago and applies it in an altogether different context to impugn my motives for voting as I have in this case. But he has no wisdom concerning my motives, nor do I claim any concerning his. His attack has no proper place in a judicial opinion.
Moreover, Justice MARKMAN is certainly correct that there is a general public interest in keeping no-fault insurance affordable. However, preserving claims brought by a group specifically protected by the Legislature—minors, incompetents, or state entities—is particularly compelling, given that the Legislature singled out these groups for disparate treatment.
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.
In regard to the quoted portion of my statement referring to my pledge to not sleep on the bench, Justice YOUNG does not tell the whole story. The day after I was elected Chief Justice, I was specifically asked if I had been referring to former Chief Justice TAYLOR in my statement. As the Detroit Free Press explained:
As I indicated then, I will not engage in character assassinations of my current or former colleagues.
From this term, see also Esselman v. Garden City Hosp., 486 Mich. 892, 780 N.W.2d 776 (2010), in which it again failed to follow Roberts, 470 Mich. 679, 684 N.W.2d 711.
Justice WEAVER also selectively quotes without context a passage from an extended law review article that I authored. See Robert P. Young, Jr., A judicial traditionalist confronts the common law, 8 Texas Rev L & Pol 299 (2004). The article was designed to highlight, in an arresting way, how difficult it should be for any judge committed to the rule of law to make the difficult policy choices necessary when modifying the common law. Quite simply, policy-making in the judiciary is one of least desirable and most difficult things for judges to do. This is because it is hard to assess the trade-offs that competing policies might create, especially when, unlike the Legislature, judges cannot consider the competing policy positions of interest groups affected by the issue in question. However, since Justice WEAVER is not committed to the rule of law, but instead applies her brand of "common sense," she has no qualms with judicial policy-making in any context—common law or otherwise. This fact is attested to by her concurrence here and illustrated in recent decisions handed down by the new majority that she has signed.
Although Justice WEAVER is correct that "[t]here are many factors to consider in deciding whether or not to overrule precedent," and Justice HATHAWAY is equally correct that the application of stare decisis must take place on a "case-by-case basis," this does not obviate the need to at least reasonably attempt to apprise the parties, and the citizens of this state, before the fact what these factors might be, as this Court did in Robinson and as the Chief Justice and Justice CAVANAGH did in Petersen. And whatever else can be understood of Justice HATHAWAY'S and Justice WEAVER'S "approaches" to stare decisis, the application of these "approaches" has resulted in 13 precedents of this Court being overruled during this term alone and 6 other precedents being teed up for possible overruling during the next term, doubtless a record pace for dismantling the caselaw of this state.
