Opinion

YOUNG, C.J.

This case requires us to consider whether a plaintiff who seeks to establish an adverse possession claim that would affect property in a recorded plat must file a claim under the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq., if the plaintiff is not expressly requesting that the plat be vacated, corrected, or revised. We hold that an action that seeks to establish a substantive property right arises independently of an LDA action to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat. It is only after such a property right has been recognized that the need arises under the LDA to revise a plat that does not reflect the newly recognized property right. Until that property right is legally recognized, the LDA is inapplicable. The language of the LDA and our cases analyzing the LDA demonstrate that an LDA action is appropriate when a party's interest arises from or is traceable to the plat or the platting process.

An action to quiet title by adverse possession confers judicial recognition that the possessor acquired marketable title of record to the property at issue. A successful quiet title action also establishes a substantive property right that was not previously shown within the plat. Without possessing record title to the property, no one, including plaintiffs, had a basis on which to request an alteration of the plat under the LDA. Therefore, plaintiffs were not required to proceed under MCL 560.221,1 which allows a circuit court to vacate, correct, or revise a plat but does not "enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right."2 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However, we order the circuit court to strike the portion of its order that corrected the plat to reflect plaintiffs' successful quiet title action because plaintiffs did not request that relief.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The dispute in this case arises from a disagreement between plaintiff Florence Beach3 and defendant Lima Township (the township) over property rights to areas of land shown as platted streets on the Harford Village plat. The Harford Village plat, which was made and recorded in 1835, has remained unaltered since its execution. It consists of six blocks arranged in two rows of three. Blocks I, II, and III, which are the relevant blocks here, are bordered to the south by Jackson Road, a county road that runs east to west. Block I is bordered to the west by West Street, a county road that runs north and south. The other relevant streets shown on the plat, North Street, East Street, and Cross Street, have never been developed or used as roads.

Through several conveyances that occurred in 1854, 1881, and 1897, the Beach family acquired the area of land now known as the Beach Family Farm. In particular, the Beach Family Farm consists of all of the lots in Blocks II and III of the plat. In 1954, the township purchased lots in Block I, which is currently the site of a community hall. In 2004, the township purchased several more lots in Block I, intending to build a fire department substation. The township also intended to use and develop part of North Street and part of Cross Street as roads for ingress and egress to the substation.

Plaintiffs disputed the township's right to use the undeveloped property designated as streets on the plat and filed the instant action to quiet title to the areas platted as North, East, and Cross Streets based on adverse possession. The township filed a counterclaim to quiet title with regard to its right to the platted streets. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary disposition.

The township moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that plaintiffs' action should be dismissed because they were required to file an action under the LDA to vacate portions of the plat. Plaintiffs contended in their motion for summary disposition, filed under MCR 2.116(C)(8), (9), and (10), that there was no genuine question of material fact that they had acquired title by adverse possession.

The circuit court denied the township's motion but ordered an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motion. Following the hearing, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition. The circuit court found that large trees, at least 100 years old, were growing in the middle of the areas platted as streets and that the Beach family had adversely possessed the disputed property by farming, as well as by maintaining private trails and fences on the disputed property. The circuit court held that plaintiffs had established the elements of adverse possession and that plaintiffs were not required to proceed under the LDA. Although plaintiffs had not requested such relief, the court ordered that "[t]o the extent that it is necessary the Harford Plat shall be corrected to remove Cross, North, and East Street[s]...."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.4 In response to the township's argument that plaintiffs were required to file their claim under the LDA, the Court of Appeals held that "because plaintiffs did not expressly seek in this action `to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat,'" an action under the LDA was not required.5 The Court of Appeals construed our decisions in Martin v. Beldean6 and Tomecek v. Bavas7 as supporting the proposition that "akin to quieting title, resolution of underlying disputes regarding the nature, character, and scope of existing property rights that could potentially lead to plat revisions may be undertaken in the context of an LDA action, but it is not mandatory."8 The Court of Appeals also concluded that Martin and Tomecek permit "a bifurcated approach, involving, first, a determination regarding the nature, character, and scope of the existing property interests being disputed by the parties and, second, an alteration of the plat map, if necessary, so that it is consistent with the property interests as determined by the court."9 The township subsequently sought leave to appeal, which we granted.10

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a decision on a motion for summary disposition.11 We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.12 In addition, whether plaintiffs were required to bring their action under the LDA is a question of law that we review de novo.13 An action to quiet title is an equitable action that we also review de novo.14

III. ANALYSIS

This Court has long recognized the common law doctrine of adverse possession,15 which the Legislature has since codified.16 To establish adverse possession, the party claiming it must show "clear and cogent proof of possession that is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 years, hostile and under cover of claim of right."17 After the statutory period ends, the record owner's title is extinguished18 and the adverse possessor acquires "legal title" to the property.19 Acquisition of title in this manner includes "the right to defend the possession and to protect the property against the trespass of all others."20 However, the title acquired by adverse possession is neither record title nor marketable title until the adverse possessor files a lawsuit and obtains a judicial decree.21 Thus, until an adverse possessor obtains the necessary judicial decree, there is no record of the adverse possessor's ownership interest to verify whether the possessor actually satisfied the elements of adverse possession. The circuit court ruled that the Beach family had established the elements of adverse possession and acquired title to the land before 1907.22 Consequently, the judicial decree quieting title in plaintiffs settled any ownership claims of the township and conferred marketable title of record to the disputed property on plaintiffs.

The question posed by this case is whether a nonrecord property holder seeking to establish marketable title by proof of adverse possession must bring such an action under the LDA, rather than solely as an action to quiet title.

The LDA became effective on January 1, 1968. This act and the amendments to it are the most recent manifestations of the Legislature's regulation of platting.23 In particular, the LDA provides a process for surveying and marking subdivided property, as well as for recording with the local municipality the information compiled on a plat.24 The LDA also permits a circuit court to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat,25 which the LDA defines as a "map."26 A land plat describes underlying property interests in conformity with record ownership as nearly as practicable.27

For the purposes of this case, the most pertinent portion of the LDA, MCL 560.222, provides:

In addition, MCL 560.223 requires that the complaint set forth "[t]he part or parts, if any, sought to be vacated and any other correction or revision of the plat sought by the plaintiff" and "[t]he plaintiff's reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision." MCL 560.224a sets forth the parties that must be joined in actions under the LDA.29 And MCL 560.229 requires a plaintiff to record the judgment after the entry of an order for vacation, correction, or revision of a plat.30

The creation, termination, and vacation of plats are controlled by the statutory authority of the LDA. Consequently, "the exclusive means available when seeking to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat is a lawsuit filed pursuant to MCL 560.221 through 560.229."31 Requiring a lawsuit that seeks to alter any part of a plat to be filed under the LDA ensures that the plats on file remain accurate.32 However, "[t]he LDA was never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right. Rather, the act allows a court to alter a plat to reflect property rights already in existence."33

We conclude that plaintiffs, who filed an action to quiet title based on adverse possession, were not required to proceed with an action under the LDA. Plaintiffs' quiet title action was the appropriate action to establish their entitlement to hold record title to the property at issue. Because plaintiffs' quiet title action established a substantive property right that was not reflected in the plat or traceable to the platting process, their action involved more than merely correcting the plat to reflect a preexisting interest in land. Plaintiffs' claim to the property developed more than a century ago; however, public recognition of that right depended on plaintiffs' ability to prove the elements of adverse possession in a present-day quiet title action.

The township's challenge to plaintiffs' claim required the circuit court to resolve the merits of plaintiffs' adverse possession claim before considering any claims regarding the plat's accuracy. If plaintiffs had failed to prove adverse possession by clear and cogent evidence, the township's interest in the land would have been paramount and the plat would have remained accurate. Revising a plat ensures that the plat accurately reflects existing substantive property rights; a revision does not, however, establish rights that did not exist previously.34 Rather, when a claimant challenges title to land through adverse possession, substantive property rights are established through a quiet title action.35 Therefore, plaintiffs could not have obtained the relief they sought by merely filing a claim under the LDA.36

Our conclusion finds support in the plain language of the LDA. The LDA defines a plat as a "map or chart of a subdivision of land."37 This Court has also described plats as "a description of the physical property interests on a particular area of land."38 When a party files an LDA action to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat, MCL 560.223(b) requires the plaintiff to set forth the "reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision of the plat." However, without a judicial decree showing that plaintiffs validly obtained record title to the property, there is no legal or record basis for plaintiffs to seek a vacation, correction, or revision of the plat. Thus, the plat accurately reflected the underlying substantive property rights until the change in ownership rights was established by plaintiffs' adverse possession action.39

Our conclusion is also supported by this Court's caselaw addressing the LDA. We previously discussed the scope of LDA actions in Martin v. Beldean and Tomecek v. Bavas. In Martin, the plaintiffs were landowners in a recorded plat consisting of 21 lots and three outlots who filed a quiet title action to have a provision of the plat language regarding an outlot declared "null and void."40 The plaintiffs owned a lot in the plat that bordered the outlot in question and also had an ownership interest in the outlot itself. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction regarding use of the outlot had expired and claimed that they were entitled to have the plat language removed. The Court of Appeals agreed.41

We reversed and held that the plaintiffs' efforts to have a plat dedication of an outlot declared "null and void" required the filing of an LDA action.42 This was because the Martin plaintiffs' requested order sought relief that only the LDA could afford.43 The plaintiffs had improperly filed a quiet title action because the removal of plat language constituted an action to vacate, correct, or revise the plat and a lawsuit under the LDA is "the exclusive means available" for a party to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat.44

The dissent incorrectly concludes that Martin requires plaintiffs in the instant case to file under the LDA. Martin presents the very opposite situation from the one this case presents. Unlike plaintiffs here, the Martin plaintiffs had a preexisting substantive property right—reflected in the plat and documented by a deed—in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void. Thus, the issue in Martin concerned whether the plat's language accurately reflected the parties' preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself. Furthermore, the relief sought by the Martin plaintiffs' quiet title action was to conform the plat at issue to those preexisting property rights. In this case, plaintiffs had no recognized, recorded, preexisting property rights in the disputed land. Plaintiffs' sole claim to the land required establishing legally cognizable substantive property rights that were not recognized within the plat, which plaintiffs could only accomplish by proving, for the first time in more than 100 years, that they and their predecessors in interest had satisfied the elements of adverse possession. Finally, unlike the action in Martin, plaintiffs' successful quiet title action leaves the plat unchanged, but inaccurate. However, because plaintiffs have now successfully established their rights to the property, they have a basis on which to request that the plat be corrected.45

In Tomecek, we considered a dispute over the meaning of a restrictive covenant running with a plat, which prevented the plaintiffs from erecting a building on their lot until that lot had access to a municipal sanitary sewer line.46 Because the lot at issue was landlocked, the plaintiffs had an easement over two other lots through which they accessed their property, but upon which no utilities were located. The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to use their easement to access the municipal sewer line.47 A second easement existed on the plat where plaintiffs' lot was located, and both easements were labeled "drive easement" on the plat. At the time of platting, the second easement was used as a right of way and had utilities located on it as well. Four justices concluded that the original grantor intended both easements to be used for right-of-way access and for utility access.48 Thus, the plaintiffs were permitted to access utilities through their easement.

Tomecek also addressed whether the LDA permitted a court to affect underlying substantive property rights by vacating, correcting, or revising a recorded plat. Five justices concluded that "[t]he LDA cannot be used to create substantive property rights"49 and set forth the following principles regarding the parameters of an action under the LDA:

Thus, the LDA cannot establish substantive property rights by redrawing the lines in a plat because the plat, as a map, merely reflects preexisting substantive property rights.

The lead opinion in Tomecek also concluded that, when the trial court altered the plat at issue, the plaintiffs' LDA action did not "create" a property right:

Because the right to use the easement in question for utility access existed at the time of platting, the LDA did not create a property right. Thus, the issue in Tomecek concerned the scope of the easement rights that existed in the plat. By contrast, in this case, plaintiffs' legal entitlement to the property existed independently of the plat.

Contrary to the dissent's arguments, our analysis does not draw "hypertechnical distinctions" between this case and our precedents analyzing the LDA.52 Rather, our analysis simply recognizes the limitations of the LDA and the common thread that runs through Hall, Martin, and Tomecek.53 In those cases, the disputes centered on whether a plat accurately reflected existing substantive property rights as determined by the relevant plat language. In this case, the dispute concerns the establishment of a substantive right neither reflected in the plat nor traceable to the platting process. The LDA's language, coupled with the applications of the LDA set forth earlier, highlights the crucial limitation of LDA actions to vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat. If a party's interest in land is traceable to the plat or the platting process, the LDA is the appropriate avenue for relief. If, as here, a party seeks to establish a substantive interest in land that is not traceable to the plat nor the platting process, the LDA cannot provide the necessary relief.

Additionally, plaintiffs' quiet title action did not seek to have the plat language regarding North, East, and Cross Streets declared "null and void," nor does it "vacate, correct, or revise" the plat. Rather, plaintiffs' quiet title action served a very different purpose from the purpose served by an LDA action.54 Unlike the factual situations in Hall, Martin, and Tomecek, plaintiffs' interest in the disputed property did not depend on the plat, the plat's dedication language, or whether the township abandoned the streets.55 Plaintiffs acquired their interest in the land by adverse possession, the very nature of which requires acting in a manner contrary to another person's interests, including interests that are reflected in a plat. Plaintiffs' quiet title action required plaintiffs to affirmatively establish their entitlement to the disputed land and, thus, merely revising the plat could not provide plaintiffs the necessary relief.

We agree with the township that the Legislature has expressed an intent that a plat may only be properly altered, in whole or in part, by following the procedures set forth in the LDA. We are not persuaded, however, by the township's argument that because the consequence of plaintiffs' successful quiet title action altered substantive rights created by the dedication of land in a recorded plat, they were required to bring their action under the LDA in the first instance. This position is inconsistent with the holding in Tomecek.56 If the rights indicated in the plat were superior to the underlying substantive property rights indicated in the register of deeds, the township would be correct. However, we see nothing to suggest that the LDA elevates the plat description above the underlying substantive property rights contained therein. Thus, the LDA does not require a party to proceed under its procedures unless that party is seeking to alter the plat or the dedication language of the plat to which the party has a preexisting substantive property right as the owner of the property or a person of record claiming under the owner.57

Furthermore, we reject the claim that plaintiffs' action to quiet title by adverse possession is merely a disguised action to alter a plat and the assertion that our decision encourages artful pleading or gamesmanship. Plaintiffs in this case merely pleaded what they sought to accomplish, which was to establish a substantive interest in property on the basis of adverse possession. Although we see no reason why plaintiffs could not have addressed both the adverse possession claim and the LDA claim in bifurcated proceedings—in which the court would have first addressed the quiet title claim and then, if necessary, resolved any issues regarding the plat—there is nothing in the LDA that requires a litigant to proceed in that manner. The action to quiet title was a necessary prerequisite, permitting plaintiffs to obtain the marketable title of record that is essential to supporting a subsequent claim for altering the plat under the LDA.58 Thus, a meaningful and necessary distinction exists between establishing marketable title of record by adverse possession and having that property interest accurately reflected in the plat.59

Finally, we hold that the circuit court erred when it ordered the unrequested relief that, "[t]o the extent that it is necessary[,] the Harford Plat shall be corrected to remove Cross, North, and East Street and vest[] title in favor of the plaintiffs." Because the LDA provides the exclusive means to vacate, correct, or revise a plat,60 and plaintiffs did not proceed under the LDA, the circuit court lacked the authority to order a correction of the plat. Although plaintiffs now have a basis on which to seek a revision of the plat, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to order the correction of the plat at the time plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the property. Therefore, we order the circuit court to strike that portion of its order.61

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that plaintiffs were not required to file their action under the LDA. Although plaintiffs could have filed an action under the LDA contingent on establishing their substantive right in a quiet title action, they were not required to do so because they did not expressly request the alteration of the plat and because plaintiffs' quiet title action established a substantive property right for the first time. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs were not required to bring their action under the LDA on the basis of the preceding analysis and remand the matter for the circuit court to strike the erroneous portion of its order instructing that the plat be revised.

MARILYN KELLY, DIANE M. HATHAWAY, MARY BETH KELLY, and BRIAN K. ZAHRA, JJ., concur.

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The exclusive way to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat" is to file a lawsuit pursuant to the procedures of the Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq. MCL 560.222; Martin v. Beldean, 469 Mich. 541, 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312 (2004). This rule is compelled by the explicit language of the LDA, and was explicitly recognized in Martin. Even the majority appears to acknowledge this rule. Yet, disregarding the core purpose of the LDA—to "ensure[] that plats on file remain accurate," Martin, 469 Mich. at 551 n. 24, 677 N.W.2d 312—the majority holds that plaintiffs, who filed an action to quiet title based on adverse possession, were not required to proceed with an action under the LDA because they sought to establish a substantive property right that was neither "traceable to the plat" nor to "the platting process," even though now that plaintiffs have prevailed in this action, a recorded plat will necessarily have been "vacated, corrected, or revised." By undermining the protections established by the LDA for persons who purchase property in reliance on the representations made in a plat, the majority introduces uncertainty and instability into Michigan property law. Under the majority's interpretation, Michigan plats are destined, over time, to become certainly, and increasingly, more inaccurate, defeating the fundamental purpose of the act. I would require that plaintiffs proceed with their action under the LDA, but allow them to amend their complaint and add all necessary parties.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition presents an issue of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 486 Mich. 311, 317, 783 N.W.2d 695 (2010). The interpretation of statutes also constitutes a question of law that this Court reviews de novo on appeal. Eggleston v. Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc., 468 Mich. 29, 32, 658 N.W.2d 139 (2003).

II. ANALYSIS

A. BACKGROUND

The purpose of the LDA, as suggested by its title, is "to regulate the division of land" and also to "further the orderly layout and use of land," "provide for proper ingress and egress to lots and parcels," "promote proper surveying and monumenting of land subdivided and conveyed by accurate legal descriptions," and "establish the procedure for vacating, correcting, and revising plats." Title of 1967 PA 288. In pursuit of these objectives, real property information is compiled on a plat that is recorded with the local municipality. See MCL 560.131 to 560.198. A plat consists of "a map or chart of a subdivision of land," MCL 560.102(a), and the LDA requires that the plat

A plat in Michigan is more than a mere map. Rather, it communicates the existence of property rights that are derived from the plat itself. In Kirchen v. Remenga, 291 Mich. 94, 109, 288 N.W. 344 (1939), this Court explained:

Likewise, in Little v. Hirschman, 469 Mich. 553, 564, 677 N.W.2d 319 (2004), a unanimous opinion of this Court, we held that it is well established by our caselaw that "dedications of land for private use in plats before [the LDA] took effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land." Indeed, "a private dedication is effective upon the sale of a lot because it is reasonably assumed that the value of that lot, as enhanced by the dedication, is reflected in the sale price. That is, purchasers [have] relied upon the dedications that made the property more desirable." Id. at 559, 677 N.W.2d 319.

In addition to our caselaw interpreting rights derivable from the plat, the Legislature has granted property rights to individuals solely on the basis of the plat. MCL 560.253(1) states that

Therefore, under this provision of the LDA, if a plat is duly recorded, a property right is effectively created. That property right consists of a fee simple interest in "every dedication, gift or grant ... marked or noted as such on the plat," to be used for "the purposes expressed therein and no other." Id.; see also Martin, 469 Mich. at 549 n. 19, 677 N.W.2d 312 (recognizing the fact that "purchasers of parcels of property conveyed with reference to a recorded plat have the right to rely on the plat reference and are presumed to `accept' the benefits and any liabilities that may be associated with the private dedication"). Thus, as our caselaw and statutes make plain, a plat is more than merely a map because it conveys property rights to the purchasers of platted property. With this background, we examine whether plaintiffs, who ultimately seek to have North, East, and Cross Streets struck from the Harford Village plat, should have been required to file their claim pursuant to the procedures of the LDA.

B. LAND DIVISION ACT

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is "to ascertain the legislative intent that may be reasonably inferred from the words expressed in the statute." G.C. Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co., 468 Mich. 416, 420, 662 N.W.2d 710 (2003). If statutory language is clear, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed. Id. If the statute does not define a word, we may consult a dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999).

MCL 560.222 provides:

As recognized in Martin, the LDA provides the "exclusive" procedure "to vacate, correct, or revise" a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat. Martin, 469 Mich. at 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312. The LDA does not define the terms "to vacate," "to correct," or "to revise." Therefore, we may consult a dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms. "To vacate" means "to render inoperative"; "to correct" means "to set or make right; remove the errors or faults from"; and "to revise" means "to alter (something written or printed), in order to correct, improve, or update[.]" Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). These definitions make evident that plaintiffs' cause of action in this case seeks to "vacate," "correct," and "revise" part of the Harford Village plat.1

First, plaintiffs sought to "vacate" part of the plat because they desired "to render inoperative" the areas platted as North, East, and Cross Streets. Pursuant to its property rights derived from the dedication in the plat, Lima Township claims that it is entitled to use these streets. According to the township, a successful adverse-possession action by plaintiffs would render the township's use rights under the plat inoperative, and it is obviously correct in this assertion. Through the operation of adverse possession, plaintiffs are attempting to extinguish all other interests in the property, including any easement interest of the township. That is, a successful adverse-possession claim would vest plaintiffs with title to the disputed property, Gorte v. Dep't of Transp., 202 Mich.App. 161, 168, 507 N.W.2d 797 (1993), and would afford them "`the right to defend the possession, and to protect the property against the trespass of others,'" Zabowski v. Loerch, 255 Mich. 125, 128, 237 N.W. 386 (1931) (citation omitted). The majority recognizes this fact and states that "the judicial decree quieting title in plaintiffs settled any ownership claims of the township...." Ante at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, when the trial court quieted title to the disputed streets in plaintiffs, they acquired a right to defend their possession and to protect the property against the trespass of the township and all others. Plaintiffs thereafter had a fee simple interest in the platted streets, unencumbered by any remaining interest of the township. By quieting title in plaintiffs, the "part of the plat" that granted the township an easement in the depicted streets was rendered null and void, and therefore "vacated."

Second, plaintiffs sought "to correct" the plat because they desired "to set or make right" the plat to conform to the actual use of the platted streets. Plaintiffs' quiet-title action sought judicial recognition that they are the exclusive owners of the disputed streets and that their ownership interest is unencumbered by the township's easement. A declaration of exclusive ownership thus "correct[ed]" the township's claimed interest in the plat.

Third, plaintiffs sought to "revise" the plat because they desired "to alter [the plat] in order to correct, improve, or update" it to reflect the nonexistence of the township's easement in the platted streets.2 The majority again agrees that the plat has been altered, and therefore "revise[d]," when it asserts that a "consequence of plaintiffs' successful quiet title action [was to] alter[] substantive rights created by the dedication of land in a recorded plat...." Ante at 13. Accordingly, because plaintiffs' quiet-title action sought to "vacate, correct, or revise" the Harford Village plat (indeed to do all three), plaintiffs should have been required to file their claim pursuant to the LDA. Once again, the LDA provides the exclusive procedure "to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat." Martin, 469 Mich.at 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312.3

C. LDA AND ACCURACY OF PLATS

This interpretation is consistent with the underlying purposes of, and protections afforded by, the LDA. Specifically, the LDA requires a plaintiff seeking to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat," MCL 560.222, to (a) set forth the "part or parts, if any sought to be vacated and any other correction or revision of the plat sought" and "[t]he plaintiff's reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision," MCL 560.223; (b) serve with process an extensive group of parties who have a potential interest in the platted property, MCL 560.224a; and (c) if the plaintiffs action is successful, prepare "either a new plat of the part of the subdivision affected by the judgment or a new plat of the entire subdivision if the court's judgment affects a major part of the subdivision," MCL 560.229(1). These procedures ensure that every party with an interest or right in the platted property is brought before the court.4 As this Court stated in Martin:

The Court further stated:

Martin thus recognized that purchasers of property have a right to rely on a plat as an accurate reflection of the property rights received through their purchase. Ensuring that plats on file remain accurate protects those purchasers who have rightfully relied on plats as evidence of property rights received through their purchase.5 The rule adopted today by the majority contravenes this core purpose of the LDA by permitting, indeed incentivizing, the increasing inaccuracy of recorded plats. The majority agrees that a principal rationale for requiring a lawsuit under the LDA that seeks to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat" is to ensure that plats remain accurate. Yet, at the same time, it recognizes that "the practical effect of [its] analysis is to render the plat inaccurate." Ante at 14 n. 61; see also ante at 9 (stating that "the plat accurately reflected the underlying substantive property rights until the change in ownership rights was established by plaintiffs' adverse possession action") (emphasis altered). How can the majority's rule reflect the better interpretation of the LDA where, as the majority itself recognizes, its rule undermines the central purpose of the act? How can its rule reflect a consistent interpretation of the LDA where, as the majority further recognizes, its rule contradicts Martin, in which we stated unanimously that "[r]equiring lawsuits seeking to correct, alter, or amend a plat to be filed only pursuant to [the LDA] ensures that plats on file remain accurate"? Martin, 469 Mich.at 551 n. 24, 677 N.W.2d 312. And how can the majority's rule reflect a reasonable interpretation of the LDA and fundamental Michigan property law where, as the majority again recognizes, its rule will ensure, over time, that recorded plats become certainly and increasingly inaccurate?

The majority reasons that all this is acceptable because the LDA grants other persons, such as the township, the right to file a complaint to correct erroneous plats. However, the fact that the Legislature may have afforded other persons standing to file a claim to "vacate, correct, or revise" a plat does not ensure that such persons will see fit to actually file such a claim. Plats will indeed remain accurate if they do choose to file, but will become increasingly inaccurate if they do not, or if they file in a dilatory manner. This legal regime stands in contrast to that established by the LDA, under which plats will always remain accurate, without relying on the fortuitousness of what "other" persons do.6 Requiring plaintiffs to file their claim pursuant to the LDA ensures that the plat remains accurate because the Legislature has also mandated that if a plaintiff succeeds in such an action, "the court shall also direct plaintiff to prepare ... a new plat...." MCL 560.229. In this way, the "plats on file remain accurate." Martin, 469 Mich.at 551 n. 24, 677 N.W.2d 312. The fact that "other" persons may have standing to file, based on their private interests, is not the equivalent of persons being required to comply with a law designed to ensure that a particular public interest is upheld—namely, a public interest in accurate recorded plats.

The majority's decision effectively allows private litigants to alter plats, with no assurance that any of the persons who must be informed of this under the LDA will be apprised of such changes in the plat, be made aware of possibly antagonistic property interests, or be enabled to assert and defend their property rights. Allowing plaintiffs to dispense with the procedures of the LDA, including notice to the municipality and other governmental entities, also undermines the ability of local governments to rely on plats for these same purposes.

D. CASELAW

Requiring plaintiffs to file their quiet-title action pursuant to the LDA would be consistent with the guidance of Martin, and with Hall v. Hanson, 255 Mich.App. 271, 664 N.W.2d 796 (2003), a case that is on all fours. In Martin, the plaintiffs purchased a parcel of property that was one of 21 platted parcels in the Tan Lake Shores Subdivision plat. The plaintiffs also purchased the northerly part of an adjoining outlot referred to as outlot A. When the plaintiffs applied for a permit to build a home on their parcel and a portion of outlot A, they learned that the plat had dedicated outlot A for the use of all lot owners in the subdivision. The plaintiffs filed a quiet-title action to have the plat language "`[o]utlot A is reserved for the use of the lot owners'" declared null and void. Martin, 469 Mich.at 544-545, 677 N.W.2d 312. The trial court granted the plaintiffs the requested relief in an order stating that the plaintiffs "shall hereinafter have the exclusive right and use of the portion of Outlot A...." Id. at 545 n. 11, 677 N.W.2d 312. This Court reversed. First, we held that the LDA clearly authorizes private dedications and that the dedication in the Tan Lake Shores Subdivision plat that outlot A "`is reserved for the use of lot owners'" constituted a private dedication that conveyed a fee simple to the purchasers of lots in the plat. Id. at 549, 677 N.W.2d 312 (citation omitted). Second, we held that the plaintiffs, "who ultimately were seeking to have the plat conveyance of outlot A declared `null and void,'" were "required to file their claim under [the LDA]." Id. at 550, 677 N.W.2d 312. In addition to the rationales discussed earlier, we reasoned that allowing the plaintiffs' action to proceed as one to quiet title rather than pursuant to the LDA deprived parties or interested persons of "`substantial right[s] or privilege[s].'" Id. at 551-552, 677 N.W.2d 312 (citation omitted). Specifically, we stated:

There is no relevant difference between this case and Martin. The Harford Village plat's dedication language states that the plat shall be used "for the uses and purposes therein contained." Therefore, according to the Harford Village plat, North Street, East Street, and Cross Street were to be used as streets. Although these streets were never developed, by platting them, the purchasers of the platted property obtained "at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land." Little, 469 Mich.at 564, 677 N.W.2d 319. See also Martin, 469 Mich. at 548 n. 18, 677 N.W.2d 312 (stating that "[a]s we explain[ed] in Little, a private dedication made before [the LDA] took effect conveyed an irrevocable easement, whereas MCL 560.253[1] now indicates that a private dedication conveys a fee interest"). Thus, all purchasers of lots in the Harford Village plat had a right to rely on the dedications contained in the plat itself, each of which presumably affected (for the better) the value of their property.

In their quiet-title action, plaintiffs, just as the plaintiffs in Martin, sought, although not explicitly, to have a plat conveyance declared "null and void." That is, through their quiet-title action, plaintiffs sought to extinguish the irrevocable easement in North Street, East Street, and Cross Street that the plat conveyed to purchasers of lots in the Harford Village plat. Now that plaintiffs have succeeded in this, purchasers will no longer be capable of using the streets for the purposes for which they were granted, and any rights that are incident to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement will also be extinguished. These facts are indistinguishable from those of Martin, in which the plaintiffs sought to exclude other purchasers of lots in the platted property from using a portion of outlot A. Plaintiffs in the instant case also sought to exclude other purchasers of lots in the platted property from exercising their rights in the platted streets. Thus, as this Court held in Martin, plaintiffs, who ultimately sought to have the plat conveyance of North Street, East Street, and Cross Street declared "null and void," should have been required to file their claim pursuant to the LDA.

As the majority correctly points out, unlike the plaintiffs in Martin, plaintiffs did not "expressly" seek to alter a recorded plat. But the majority's reasoning that Martin is distinguishable on this basis is troublesome and misdirected. Allowing plaintiffs to nullify the protections, and to undermine the purposes, of the LDA solely because their pleadings did not "expressly" request that the Harford Village plat be altered elevates form over substance and incentivizes artful pleading and gamesmanship in an area of law—the law of real property—in which there should be little tolerance for such conduct.

Plaintiffs' complaint in this case sought the following relief:

The only potential "right, title, claim, or interest" that the township has in the undeveloped, but platted, streets is derived from the plat itself. Plaintiffs were not, as the majority claims, merely seeking judicial recognition of title to protect their lands, but were seeking recognition that usage rights derived from the plat were no longer in existence and could no longer be relied upon by the township. According to the majority, plaintiffs should be relieved from the imperative of filing their claim under the LDA because they did not incant the magic words "plat," "vacate," "correct," or "revise" in their prayer for relief. Apparently, if plaintiffs' complaint had sought a decree that title to the land was held by plaintiffs, and that the township's interest in the property pursuant to the plat must be "vacated," they would have been required to file their claim under the LDA.

However, there is no meaningful difference between such a hypothetical complaint and plaintiffs' actual complaint, which requested that title be vested in them "free and clear of any right, title, claim, or interests" of the township. The certainty and stability of property rights in this state, and compliance with the Legislature's mandate, should not be allowed to rest upon so flimsy, and irrelevant, a distinction, one that effectively allows the plaintiffs themselves to determine the application of one of the foundational property laws of our state and the extent to which the property rights of other persons will be protected. The majority's distinction not only erodes the protections of the LDA, but is in tension with Michigan's fact-pleading system, which only requires a complaint to contain a statement of the facts and the allegations reasonably necessary to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims against that party. See MCR 2.111(B).

Whether a plaintiff labels a claim as an action to quiet title or an action to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat" cannot be allowed to control whether the action is, in fact, treated as a traditional action to quiet title or as an action to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat."

Quieting title to the disputed streets in plaintiffs established plaintiffs as the sole owners of the property, to the exclusion of all others in the platted area. See Lawson v. Bishop, 212 Mich. 691, 699, 180 N.W. 596 (1920) (noting that when title is established by adverse possession, the "rights of all others claiming any interest in the land have been extinguished"). This was done outside the confines of the LDA, which requires that an extensive group of parties be served and afforded an opportunity to participate in the litigation, including everyone owning property located within 300 feet, utility companies, the municipality, and others.8 As a result, the fundamental purpose of the LDA, that "plats on file remain accurate," has been circumvented. Martin, 469 Mich. at 551 n. 24. We did not permit this in Martin, and we should not permit it in this case. Martin properly compels the conclusion that plaintiffs were required to file their action pursuant to the LDA because that act constitutes "the exclusive means available when seeking to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat...." Id. at 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312.9

Requiring plaintiffs' lawsuit to be filed in accordance with the LDA would also be consistent with Hall v. Hanson. In Hall, the plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the defendants had interfered with their right to use a publicly platted boulevard. The defendants counterclaimed, "seeking, among other things, to quiet title to the disputed property in themselves and to enjoin plaintiffs from doing anything other than accessing the surface of the lake for reasonable activities." Hall, 255 Mich.App. at 274, 664 N.W.2d 796. As in this case, the plaintiffs argued in the trial court that the defendants' quiet-title action was improper because the exclusive way to "vacate, correct, or revise" the plat was through an action under the LDA. Id. at 278-279, 664 N.W.2d 796. Nevertheless, the trial court quieted title to the disputed boulevard in the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that, because the defendants "sought to vacate or otherwise alter the plats dedicating the boulevard to the public, they should have brought their [counterclaim] pursuant to the LDA." Id. at 286, 664 N.W.2d 796. The instant case is essentially indistinguishable from Hall,10 Plaintiffs, as with the defendants in Hall, sought to quiet title to the disputed streets free and clear of any claim of right or interests that the township had pursuant to the Harford Village plat, and the outcome here should be no different.11 Because plaintiffs for all practical purposes sought to vacate or otherwise alter the plat, they should have been required to bring their complaint under the LDA.12

III. HARMONIZATION OF STATUTES

The majority asserts that there is a relevant distinction for purposes of compliance with the LDA between quieting title by adverse possession in a manner that would alter a plat and requesting the alteration of that plat.13 As a result, because plaintiffs here only sought to do the former, they were relieved of any obligations under the LDA. The majority is, of course, correct that our law recognizes a distinction between actions to quiet title, MCL 600.2932, and actions to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat," MCL 560.222. But what the majority fails to acknowledge is that, while under ordinary circumstances these actions serve different purposes and do not impinge on one another, under somewhat less ordinary circumstances, the actions overlap and do impinge on one another, as in this case, in which a quiet-title action has directly and necessarily altered a plat. This overlap, or tension, will not arise in every quiet-title action, and it will not arise in every adverse-possession action, but it has arisen in this case. Under these specific circumstances, the quiet-title action must be brought under the auspices of the LDA because, necessarily and indisputably, if successful, it will cause a recorded plat to be "vacated, corrected, or revised," and the "exclusive" means of doing so is through the LDA.14

Because the majority sees no tension between these statutes—the majority views it as of little moment whether a plaintiff avails himself of the quiet-title statute or the LDA—it engages in no effort to harmonize these statutes. On the other hand, because I believe that there is tension between these statutes under the instant circumstances, and because I believe that it is of considerable moment—in terms of the procedural rights of affected persons, the public interest in accurate platting, and regard for the Legislature's intentions in enacting the LDA—an effort to harmonize these statutes is required, in my judgment, and such harmonization compels the conclusion that plaintiffs must file under the LDA.

First, it is axiomatic that the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Jones v. Enertel, Inc., 467 Mich. 266, 270-271, 650 N.W.2d 334 (2002). "[T]o determine which provision is truly more specific and, hence, controlling, we consider which provision applies to the more narrow realm of circumstances, and which to the more broad realm." Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 Mich. 601, 613, 751 N.W.2d 463 (2008). The quiet-title statute provides that "[a]ny person ... who claims any right in, title to, equitable title to, interest in, or right to possession of land, may bring an action in the circuit courts against any other person who claims or might claim any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff...." MCL 600.2932(1). This statute, which applies to any person claiming any interest in property, seemingly applies to plaintiffs' action seeking to establish title to the land free and clear of the township's interest. On the other hand, MCL 560.222 provides the exclusive means available to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat...." This statute is applicable only to a much smaller subset of property actions. Thus, because MCL 600.2932 applies to all property actions and MCL 560.222 applies only to a limited subset of property actions, it would seem that the latter, the more specific provision, would tend to control.

Second, there are relatively few quiet-title actions under MCL 600.2932 that also seek to "vacate, correct, or revise" a plat, while nearly all actions that seek to "vacate, correct, or revise" under MCL 560.222 also seek to quiet title. See, e.g., Martin, supra; Hall, supra. That is, actions to quiet title are rarely accompanied by a claim to "vacate, correct, or revise," while actions to "vacate, correct, or revise" are often accompanied by a claim to quiet title. Not only does this suggest that the more efficient means of proceeding in cases in which these claims coexist would be through an LDA action, but it underscores that the likely legislative intention when these statutes overlapped was that the more specific statute would control. If, after all, in a relatively high proportion of "vacate, correct, or revise" cases there would exist an alternative quiet-title action, it would seem that this would create a reasonably high likelihood that the Legislature's intention to render plats increasingly accurate over time through the LDA could well be undermined. By contrast, there would be a relatively small proportion of quiet-title cases in which there would be the alternative of a "vacate, correct, or revise" action, and therefore a reasonably small likelihood that the LDA could interfere in any significant way with the Legislature's intentions in enacting the quiet-title statute.

Third, the potential harm that might arise if plaintiffs proceeded with their cause of action pursuant to the LDA, rather than in an action to quiet title, is inconsequential in comparison with the harm that might arise if plaintiffs proceeded with their cause of action as one to quiet title. Specifically, if plaintiffs proceed with their quiet-title action under the LDA, the only apparent harm is that a greater burden would be placed on plaintiffs to apprise persons with a potential interest in litigation of the pendency of such litigation. By contrast, the potential harm of not bringing an action to "vacate, correct, or revise" under the LDA is that persons with a potential property interest in ongoing litigation would not be apprised at all of such litigation and, as a result, would either be prejudiced in later asserting their interests or compelled to file new lawsuits, or that later property transactions would be thrown into confusion as a result of inaccurate plats and affected persons compelled to file new lawsuits. Of these respective harms, I believe that the latter is far more potentially injurious to the integrity of the law, which again argues in favor of resolving the tension between these statutes in favor of compliance with the LDA.

Finally, although the Legislature has provided plaintiffs with two avenues to assert their interests in the disputed property, the "doctrine of last enactment" also supports the position that plaintiffs' quiet-title action must yield to the mandate that an action seeking to "vacate, correct, or revise" a plat be brought under the LDA.

Section 222 of the LDA was substantially altered in 1978 to state that a party seeking to "vacate, correct, or revise" a recorded plat "shall" file a complaint pursuant to the LDA. MCL 560.222, as amended by 1978 PA 367. On the other hand, MCL 600.2932 has not been substantively altered since its enactment in 1961. Compare 1961 PA 236, § 2932 and MCL 600.2932, as amended by 1964 PA 8. The fact that the LDA is the most recent statement of the Legislature again argues in favor of compliance with the requirements of the LDA.

IV. FURTHER RESPONSE TO MAJORITY

A. ESTABLISHING TITLE IN LDA ACTIONS

The majority concludes that in this case establishing title is a necessary prerequisite to the alteration of the plat. I agree.15 If the plat had been simply altered without a judicial decree that plaintiffs were the true owners of the property, the LDA would have served as the vehicle to "establish an otherwise nonexistent property right," which would be contrary to our holding in Tomecek v. Bavas, 482 Mich. 484, 496, 759 N.W.2d 178 (2008) ("The LDA was never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right.").16 But that does not mean that plaintiffs should be relieved from filing their cause of action pursuant to the LDA. MCL 560.223 requires the plaintiff in an LDA action to set forth the "reasons for seeking the vacation, correction, or revision" of a plat, which in this case would obviously be that the plaintiff acquired an interest in the platted property by adverse possession.17 The trial court would then proceed with the case as with any other adverse-possession action, and the plaintiff would be required to show "clear and cogent proof of possession that [has been] actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 years, hostile and under color of claim of right." Burns v. Foster, 348 Mich. 8, 14, 81 N.W.2d 386 (1957). If the plaintiff is able to meet this burden of proof, the trial court would then "vacate, correct, or revise all or a part of a recorded plat," as provided in sections 222 to 229 of the LDA. MCL 560.221. In this way, persons who purchase property in reliance on the representations made in a plat, as well as future purchasers of platted property, are protected by the requirements of the LDA, and the plat remains accurate because a new plat must then be prepared in whole or part. MCL 560.229(1).18

Indeed, the majority itself sees "no reason why plaintiffs could not have addressed both the adverse possession claim and the LDA claim in bifurcated proceedings... in which the court would have first addressed the quiet title claim and then, if necessary, resolved any issues regarding the plat[.]" Ante at 13. However, it simply believes that "there is nothing in the LDA that requires a litigant to proceed in that manner." Ante at 13. To me, what compels a litigant to proceed in that manner is, equally simply, that the LDA constitutes the exclusive manner by which to "vacate, correct, or revise" a plat. The township's easement is a "part of the plat," and when that interest is altered—or in this case entirely terminated—outside the scope of the LDA, the mandate that actions seeking to "vacate, correct, or revise" must be undertaken in a particular manner is disregarded. Although plaintiffs could establish title in a quiet-title action, if the LDA and the quiet-title statutes are to be harmonized, plaintiffs must file such an action under the LDA. If nothing requires a litigant to proceed in that manner, and if a litigant can proceed in a piecemeal fashion by bringing only a quiet-title action, and then—and only if he so chooses—a subsequent action to alter the plat under the LDA, then why did this Court reverse in Martin, in which the plaintiffs proceeded in the identical manner now deemed acceptable by the majority? Our analysis in that case answers this question, and it merits reiteration:

B. MARTIN v. BELDEAN

The majority errs in its understanding of Martin v. Beldean, both factually and legally. As already discussed, Martin held that a plaintiff "seeking to vacate, correct, or revise a dedication in a recorded plat" must file a lawsuit pursuant to the LDA. Martin, 469 Mich. at 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312. This precedent is now made the subject of hypertechnical distinctions that have no grounding in either the LDA or in Martin itself. Given the importance of Martin to this case, the majority's analysis warrants further response.

The majority states that this dissent "incorrectly concludes that Martin requires plaintiffs in the instant case to file under the LDA," because

The majority's points are straightforward, but its asserted distinctions fail. First, the Martin plaintiffs did not have a "preexisting substantive property right ... reflected in the plat," because the plat reflected only that the disputed property, outlot A, was "`reserved for the use of the lot owners.'" Martin, 469 Mich. at 545, 677 N.W.2d 312. Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion, the plat granted absolutely no rights to the plaintiffs in outlot A, but instead, just as the plat in this case, granted use rights to someone other than the plaintiffs.19 In Martin, the plat granted use rights to the other 21 lot owners; in this case, the plat granted use rights to assorted other persons, including the township. Thus, the Martin plaintiffs had no preexisting substantive property right reflected in the plat.

Second, just as in Martin, plaintiffs here "had a preexisting substantive property right"—the right of title which passed upon the expiration of the statutory period of limitation—"in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void." The majority might better explain why the Martin plaintiffs, whose claimed title to the disputed property was established by a deed, were required to bring their quiet-title action pursuant to the LDA while plaintiffs in this case, whose title to the disputed streets was established by adverse possession, are not.20 Any putative distinction based on the method of acquiring title lacks statutory support and suggests, without any apparent basis in the law, that title acquired by deed constitutes a legally superior method of acquiring title for purposes of an LDA action. In any event, plaintiffs here did acquire title to the disputed streets by deed. The trial court found that North and East Streets were included in a deed to General William G. Beach (plaintiffs' predecessor) in 1853, and that Cross Street was included in a deed to the Beach family in 1897. Accordingly, even under the majority's interpretation of Martin, because plaintiffs did have a "preexisting substantive property right ... in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void," they are required to file their action pursuant to the LDA.

Third, the majority repeatedly emphasizes that the Martin plaintiffs' deed "preexisted" the filing of the plat. This purported distinction is again without merit for two reasons: (1) MCL 560.222 contains no requirement that only claims based on property rights that "predated" or "preexisted" the filing of a plat must be brought under the LDA and (2) Martin itself did not rely on this distinction, or even allude to it, in holding that the plaintiffs' action had to be filed under the LDA. Presumably, this is because the Martin plaintiffs and their predecessors received a deed to outlot A after the subdivision was platted, not before, as asserted by the majority. See Martin v. Redmond, 248 Mich.App. 59, 61, 638 N.W.2d 142 (2001).

Fourth, the majority states that because the plaintiffs had a preexisting property right reflected in the plat whose language they sought to have declared void, the issue in Martin concerned "whether the plat's language accurately reflected the parties' preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself," ante at 10. Again, I disagree. The Martin plaintiffs did not claim that the plat's dedication of outlot A was in error21—that is, they did not claim that the plat inaccurately dedicated outlot A for the use of all owners in the subdivision because that would have been inconsistent with their deed. Instead, the plaintiffs in Martin only claimed that the dedication had expired pursuant to the terms of the plat itself, which limited all restrictions, conditions, covenants, and rights to 25 years; by laches or estoppel, as the trial court had held; or because the dedication was invalid, as the Court of Appeals had held. See Martin, 248 Mich.App. at 62-63, 638 N.W.2d 142. This Court then addressed only the following issues: (1) the Court of Appeals' holding that a private dedication in a recorded plat is invalid under Michigan law, and (2) whether the plaintiffs, who ultimately sought to have the plat conveyance of outlot A declared "null and void," were required to file their claim under the LDA. Martin, 469 Mich. at 542-543, 677 N.W.2d 312. From all of this, it seems clear that the issue in Martin was not, as the majority claims, whether the plat language "accurately" reflected the "parties preexisting rights as outlined in the plat itself," but only whether the dedication was valid in the first place and, if it was, whether plaintiffs could alter that dedication outside the confines of the LDA. Nothing in Martin concerned the "accuracy" or "scope" of existing rights under a recorded plat, and thus the majority's purported distinctions are inapt.

Fifth, the majority states that "the relief sought by the Martin plaintiffs' quiet title action was to conform the plat at issue to those preexisting property rights." Ante at 10 (emphasis added). I fail to see how the Martin plaintiffs, who filed suit to declare their interest obtained by deed superior to the interests of those who claimed an interest in the property as a result of the plat's dedication language, sought to "conform the plat at issue," but plaintiffs here did not. Did not both sets of plaintiffs file suit to quiet title to establish their respective preexisting titles as superior to those who claimed an interest in the property stemming from the plat's dedication language? Did not both sets of plaintiffs file suit to declare "null and void" that very dedication language? Yet according to the majority, only the Martin plaintiffs sought to "conform" the plat to their preexisting property rights. The distinctions are invisible.

Sixth, under the majority's holding, if a party is only required to file a cause of action pursuant to the LDA "[i]f [his] interest in land is traceable to the plat or the platting process," ante at 12, then it must follow that Martin, a recent and unanimous decision of this Court, was wrongly decided. As already noted, the Martin plaintiffs' interest in the platted property arose from a deed conveyed after the property was platted. Their interest was neither "traceable to the plat" nor to "the platting process." Consequently, under the majority's holding, our decision in Martin, requiring the plaintiffs' quiet-title action to proceed under the LDA, was in error because the LDA could not have provided the necessary relief. Yet the majority does not overrule Martin. This leads to the second practical question arising from the majority's opinion, in addition to how plats are to remain as accurate depictions of the realities of property boundaries in Michigan: If the majority cannot reconcile its holding in this case with the Court's holding in Martin, how are the bench and bar to comprehend the nuances of difference apparently recognizable to the majority that justify the disparate treatment of these cases? The majority leaves in place alternative, and incompatible, formulations of the law, each of which will be invoked as convenient by different plaintiffs, defendants, and judges.

In the final analysis, the majority, in attempting to justify its holding that plaintiffs are not required to file their claims under the LDA, deeply misunderstands Martin, both factually and legally. The Martin plaintiffs had neither a "preexisting substantive property right ... reflected in the plat" nor a deed that "preexisted" the filing of the plat, and their case did not concern the "accuracy" or "scope" of the plat at issue. In addition, the Martin plaintiffs' interest in the land was not "traceable to the plat or the platting process," as now required by the majority in order for the LDA to apply. What the Martin plaintiffs did have was a deed that reflected their interest in the property, and they did seek to "conform the plat at issue" to that deed, but, as discussed, those are similarities rather than differences. Thus, just as in Martin, "plaintiffs, in seeking to vacate, correct, or revise the plat, [are] required to file their lawsuit under the Land Division Act." Martin, 469 Mich. at 552, 677 N.W.2d 312.22

C. THRESHOLD QUESTION

According to the majority, the "basic disagreement" between our respective analyses is that this dissent views LDA and quiet-title actions as sometimes "overlap[ping]" and in tension with each other, and thus concludes that it is necessary to harmonize the relevant statutes, while the majority views those actions as separate and distinct, and thus concludes that it is unnecessary to harmonize. Ante at 13 n. 57. However, the disagreement between our opinions is even simpler and more fundamental, in my judgment. The question is simply whether plaintiffs' quiet-title action seeks to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat." If answered in the affirmative, plaintiffs must file this action pursuant to the LDA, and only then would the statutes have to be harmonized. If answered in the negative, plaintiffs may proceed with their action as one to quiet title only, without the need to comply with the LDA. Thus, the critical question once again is whether this particular quiet-title action seeks to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat."

On this note, it is worth reflecting again on the majority's approach to answering this question. According to the majority, plaintiffs only seek to establish a substantive interest in property and are unconcerned with "vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat." This analysis is straightforward, but straightforwardly wrong. A plaintiff's subjective and self-characterized interest cannot be the determining factor in assessing whether an action seeks to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat," for, as discussed, other persons may also have affected property interests in the plat, and the fundamental premise of the LDA is that each of these is entitled to be heard in actions "vacat[ing], correct[ing], or revis[ing] the plat." Each is entitled to notice, to participate fully in the lawsuit, and to have his or her interests accurately depicted on the plat. By focusing exclusively upon a plaintiffs subjective and selfcharacterized interests, the majority: (1) fails to take other persons, and other interests, into account, as required by the LDA, (2) fails to adhere to the express language of the LDA, which requires that an LDA action be undertaken whenever the "vacat[ion], correct[ion], or revis[ion]" of a plat is sought—not merely when it has been stated that it is sought—and instead substitutes its own "crucial limitation," limiting the LDA to cases in which the plaintiff has a property interest "traceable to the plat or the platting process," and (3) substantially undermines the LDA as a means for ensuring the accuracy of plats in this state.

V. CONCLUSION

The Land Division Act mandates that the exclusive way to "vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat" is to file a lawsuit pursuant to the LDA. In this case, plaintiffs' quiet-title action necessarily sought to "vacate, correct, or revise" the Harford Village plat, and thus plaintiffs should have been required to bring their cause of action pursuant to the LDA. In my judgment, if plaintiffs wish to proceed under the LDA, they should be allowed to amend their complaint and to add all necessary parties. The majority's contrary interpretation undermines the primary purpose of the LDA, which is to ensure that plats on file remain accurate. The majority's holding will introduce greater uncertainty and instability into this state's property law, while incentivizing artful pleadings and gamesmanship. Under the law of this case, Michigan plats are destined over time to become increasingly more inaccurate and increasingly less reflective of actual property interests in this state. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J., agrees.