HATHAWAY, J.

At issue is whether a municipality such as a township can be held responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)1 for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the township's borders. We conclude that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for,2 and required to prevent,3 the discharge when the raw sewage originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precludes a municipality from being held responsible for such a discharge. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals to address defendant's remaining arguments on appeal.4

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from the contamination of surface waters within and surrounding defendant, Worth Township, including Lake Huron and several of its tributaries. Plaintiff, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ),5 conducted surveys of water quality in the area of concern in 2003, 2006, and 2008. The DEQ collected water samples to verify and quantify the presence and levels of fecal coliform and E. coli bacteria. The DEQ also made sensory observations of privately owned septic systems6 on properties located within the borders of the township. The survey data demonstrated that the surface waters were contaminated with both fecal coliform and E. coli bacteria. The survey data also indicated that the conditions were becoming progressively worse.

There is no municipal "sewerage system"7 located within the township. The parties agree that the surface waters in the area of concern are contaminated by raw sewage of human origin.8 The parties also agree that the contamination comes from septic systems on privately owned properties located within Worth Township. The private properties at issue are located in a three- to five-mile area along the shore of Lake Huron. Most of the area was initially developed with summer cottages in mind, but the cottages have increasingly been converted into year-round residences. According to the evidence submitted to the trial court, the majority of the septic systems in the area are old, undersized, and failing. Drain fields are oversaturated with raw sewage, and raw sewage is being directed into ditches and streams leading to Lake Huron. In at least one instance, raw sewage was directly discharged over the lake bluff into Lake Huron. As a result of the contamination, this section of Lake Huron has been included on Michigan's list of impaired waters.

After the first survey was performed by the DEQ, Worth Township and the DEQ attempted to remedy the problem. In April 2004, they entered into a district compliance agreement, wherein Worth Township agreed to construct a municipal sewerage system by June 1, 2008. However, Worth Township did not construct such a system, citing a lack of funds. As a result, the DEQ filed this case seeking injunctive relief under part 31 of NREPA, MCL 324.3101 et seq., to compel the township to prevent the discharge of raw sewage into the waters of the state.

Worth Township moved for summary disposition, arguing that neither the courts nor the DEQ has the authority to hold a township liable for the discharge of raw sewage from private residences into state waters. The trial court denied the motion. The DEQ then moved for summary disposition, claiming that the undisputed facts entitled it to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the DEQ's motion for summary disposition and directed Worth Township to take necessary corrective measures in a given time frame to prevent the discharge of raw sewage and to pay fines and attorney fees.9

Worth Township appealed the trial court's decision. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded for an entry of summary disposition in favor of the township.10 The Court of Appeals majority held that under MCL 324.3109(2), a municipality cannot be required to prevent the discharge of raw sewage into state waters when the municipality itself has not discharged the raw sewage11 and the municipality has not otherwise accepted responsibility pursuant to MCL 324.3109(3).12 The Court of Appeals dissent would have affirmed the trial court's ruling and adopted the trial court's decision as its own.13

This Court granted the DEQ's application for leave to appeal.14 Our grant order framed the issue as "whether [NREPA] empowers the [DEQ] to seek, and the circuit court to grant, an order effectively requiring a township to install a sanitary sewer system when a widespread failure of private septic systems results in contamination of lake waters."15 While NREPA does not specifically authorize a circuit court to compel a municipality to install a sewerage system to remedy a widespread failure of private septic systems, NREPA does provide that "[t]he court has jurisdiction to restrain [a NREPA] violation and to require compliance"16 with NREPA. In this case, the trial court's opinion specifically states that it does not compel the construction of a sewerage system. Consistently with MCL 324.3115(1), the trial court directed Worth Township to take necessary corrective action to prevent the discharge at issue. However, the parties agree that the most practical and comprehensive method for restraining the discharge is to construct a sewerage system. Accordingly, the issue before us is whether a municipality can be held responsible under NREPA for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the municipality's borders.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.17

III. ANALYSIS

At issue is whether a municipality can be held responsible under NREPA for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the municipality's borders. MCL 324.3109 sets forth the statutory framework regarding violations of NREPA involving unlawful discharges into state waters. MCL 324.3109 provides:

When interpreting statutes, this Court must "ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature."18 The words used in the statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute.19 In interpreting a statute, this Court avoids a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.20 "As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute."21 Moreover, the statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context.22 When considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole, unless something different was clearly intended.23 Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme.24

We begin by examining the language of MCL 324.3109(1). This subsection sets forth the manner in which a "person" is deemed to have violated part 31 of NREPA. For purposes of part 31, a "person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental entity, or other legal entity." MCL 324.301(h). Thus, the term "person" includes a governmental entity such as Worth Township. MCL 324.3109(1)(a) provides that a person violates part 31 if the person "directly or indirectly discharge[s] into the waters of the state a substance that is or may become injurious to ... the public health, safety, or welfare." Accordingly, MCL 324.3109(1) is applicable to a governmental entity such as Worth Township if the governmental entity directly or indirectly discharges into state waters a substance that is or may become injurious to public safety.

Next, MCL 324.3109(2) provides specific language with regard to violations by governmental entities. Its first sentence provides that the

There is no dispute that raw sewage is being discharged into state waters from within Worth Township. Nor is this discharge permitted by an order or rule of the DEQ. Thus, the phrase "shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this part by the municipality in which the discharge originated" is at the core of the dispute before us.

The Court of Appeals majority interpreted this phrase to mean that when raw sewage originating within the municipality's borders is discharged into state waters, this subsection creates a rebuttable presumption that the municipality itself discharged the sewage. And if the municipality proves that it did not cause the discharge, it avoids responsibility.25 The majority stated:

The Court of Appeals dissent opined that MCL 324.3109(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that part 31 of NREPA has been violated when raw sewage has been discharged into state waters and that the responsibility for rebutting that presumption falls on the municipality where the violation took place. The dissent stated:

The primary distinction between the two interpretations is that the Court of Appeals majority held that MCL 324.3109(2) only creates a rebuttable presumption that a discharge of raw sewage was caused by a municipality in violation of NREPA, whereas the Court of Appeals dissent would have held that the presumption is that NREPA was violated and responsibility for the violation is assigned to the municipality where the violation took place, regardless of who caused the discharge. We find the latter interpretation to be correct. When MCL 324.3109(2) is read in conjunction with the surrounding subsections and in the historical context of statutes governing raw-sewage disposal, it is clear that the Legislature intended to create a presumption that the municipality is in violation of NREPA when a discharge originates within its boundaries, irrespective of who actually caused the discharge.

The historical obligation of a municipality to oversee the proper disposal of sewage within its boundaries is reflected in former MCL 323.1 et seq. Specifically, former MCL 323.6(a), as amended by 1965 PA 328, stated, "It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to discharge into the waters of the state any substance which is or may become injurious to the public health, safety, or welfare...." Former MCL 323.6(b), as amended by that same act, stated:

As Judge O'CONNELL noted in his dissent, it is clear that, historically, the Legislature intended that a local unit of government, such as a township, be responsible for discharges into state waters involving raw sewage originating within its boundaries. It is also clear that, historically, the Legislature intended to hold a local unit of government responsible for such a discharge regardless of whether the governmental unit itself caused the discharge or whether the discharge was caused by "inhabitants or persons occupying lands from which" the raw sewage originated.

Former MCL 323.1 et seq. was repealed by 1994 PA 451. In its place, 1994 PA 451 enacted NREPA, which includes MCL 324.3109. We conclude that, when read as a whole, MCL 324.3109 continues the historical obligations of MCL 323.6 that allow local units of government to be held responsible for the discharge of raw sewage that originates within their borders into state waters, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the local unit itself.26

First, like former MCL 323.6(a), MCL 324.3109(1) prohibits a governmental entity itself from discharging injurious substances into state waters. If we were to adopt the Court of Appeals majority's holding that a municipality is responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) only when the municipality itself causes the discharge, that provision would be rendered virtually meaningless. The Court of Appeals majority failed to take into consideration that under MCL 324.3109(1), a person violates part 31 of NREPA by discharging a substance into state waters that is or may become injurious to the interests listed in MCL 324.3109(1)(a) through (e)27 and, thus, if a municipality itself causes such a discharge, it will have violated subsection (1). However, the Court of Appeals also held that under subsection (2) of MCL 324.3109, a municipality violates NREPA if the municipality itself causes the discharge. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals interpreted subsection (2) as providing little more than what is already provided in subsection (1). Though the Court of Appeals majority's interpretation does not render subsection (2) entirely nugatory, it comes close. We therefore reject the Court of Appeals majority's interpretation because the language of subsection (2) must be given full effect.

Second, when reading MCL 324.3109 as a whole, the language in subsections (4) and (5) form a common theme, along with subsection (2), by listing specific substances that, when discharged, create a presumption that part 31 has been violated. As noted, MCL 324.3109(1) provides that a violation occurs when a substance that is or may become injurious is discharged into state waters. The language at issue in MCL 324.3109(2) provides that "[t]he discharge of any raw sewage ... into any of the waters of the state shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this part...." Likewise, MCL 324.3109(4) provides that "the discharge into the waters of this state of any medical waste ... is prima facie evidence of a violation of this part...." Additionally, MCL 324.3109(5) provides that "the discharge into the waters of this state from an oceangoing vessel of any ballast water is prima facie evidence of a violation of this part...."

Thus, subsections (2), (4), and (5) all provide specific substances that, when discharged, provide prima facie evidence that a violation has occurred. In other words, the listed substances are presumed to be injurious when discharged. As a result of these subsections, raw sewage, medical waste, and ballast water from oceangoing vessels are presumptively injurious to the interests enumerated in MCL 324.3109(1)(a) through (e). In order to rebut that presumption, the responsible entity must demonstrate that the discharge of one or more of those substances is not, or will not become, injurious to the interests enumerated in MCL 324.3109(1)(a) through (e).28

Moreover, while all three subsections identify presumptively injurious substances, only MCL 324.3109(2) goes further and identifies the party that will be held responsible for a discharge of such a substance. Subsections (4) and (5) refer to the "responsible" party, but do not identify who the responsible party is. Subsection (4) states in pertinent part:

Subsection (5) states in pertinent part:

Thus, subsections (4) and (5) state that a "responsible person" will be subject to penalties for a discharge, but they do not identify who that party may be. While subsection (2) contains similar language, it goes a step further by actually identifying the party that will be held responsible for a discharge. It states in pertinent part:

Thus, not only does MCL 324.3109(2) create a presumption that the discharge of any raw sewage is injurious, it actually identifies the party responsible for the discharge as the municipality in which the discharge originated.

Additionally, we disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeals majority because it conflicts with MCL 324.3109(3), which provides:

The Court of Appeals majority reasoned that MCL 324.3109(3) further buttressed its holding that the municipality must have actually caused the discharge. The majority stated:

We disagree because the Court of Appeals' reasoning ignores important language within subsection (3). The first phrase of subsection (3), "[n]otwithstanding subsection (2)," indicates that it is an exception to subsection (2). Thus, the language of subsection (3) creates an exception to subsection (2) under which a municipality will not be responsible for a discharge originating within the municipality's boundaries. The exception is that a municipality will not be responsible for a discharge from a sewerage system that the municipality does not own.29 "Sewerage system" is a statutorily defined term that does not include private septic systems.30 There is no sewerage system in Worth Township, and, as a result, the exception contained in MCL 324.3109(3) is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals' reliance on MCL 324.3109(3) as support for its holding was misplaced.31

Accordingly, when reading the subsections of MCL 324.3109 as a whole, we interpret subsection (2) as placing responsibility for a discharge of raw sewage on the municipality in which the discharge originated and as giving that municipality the burden of showing that the discharged raw sewage does not rise to the "is or may become injurious" standard in order to avoid being subject to the remedies contained in MCL 324.3115. It is clear that by enacting MCL 324.3109(2), the Legislature intended to leave intact the historical obligations of a municipality under former MCL 323.6. The purpose of MCL 324.3109(2) is to allow a municipality to be held responsible for any discharges of raw sewage from within its boundaries into state waters.32 By holding otherwise, the Court of Appeals frustrated that purpose.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals majority erroneously concluded that Worth Township could not be held responsible as a "municipality" under MCL 324.3109 because the state and townships are municipalities under part 31 and the state has just as much responsibility as a township to remedy the discharge of raw sewage.33 The Court of Appeals stated:

Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be incorrect to assume that the Legislature intended to allow the state to shift its own responsibility to a municipality such as a township by seeking to enforce an injunction against a township under MCL 324.3109(2) and MCL 324.3115. We disagree.

While it is correct to say that a discharge occurring in a township also "occurs" within the county and state within which the township is located, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this fact relieves a township of responsibility under NREPA. A township is within NREPA's definition of municipality, and it therefore can be held responsible as a municipality under MCL 324.3109(2).34 Moreover, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion because it overrides the intent of the Legislature by concluding that no municipalities can be held responsible simply because several municipalities are responsible under MCL 324.3109(2). This conclusion would always preclude relief under MCL 324.3109(2) because every square inch of Michigan is layered by at least several of the types of entities listed in the definition of "municipality." Such a result is not what the Legislature intended.

Additionally, we note that the most localized form of government involved, such as a township, has the authority to prevent the discharge of raw sewage. Historically, townships have been responsible for overseeing the disposal of sewage generated within the township.35 Under the Township and Village Public Improvement and Public Service Act, MCL 41.411 et seq., a township has the power to finance, construct, and maintain a sewerage system. MCL 41.411(1).36 A township also has the power to condemn individual properties that are injurious to public health,37 and a township has the authority to grant franchises to public utilities within its boundaries.38 Moreover, townships have the authority to adopt ordinances regulating public health, safety, and welfare, including ordinances that require individual property owners to hook up to a sewerage system.39 There is simply no reason why a township, as a "municipality," cannot be deemed a responsible entity under the language of MCL 324.3109(2) when a discharge occurs within its borders.40 The Court of Appeals majority erred by concluding otherwise.

Finally, as noted, we hold that the trial court's decision requiring Worth Township to take necessary corrective action to prevent the discharge was within the court's jurisdiction under part 31 of NREPA. MCL 324.3115(1) grants the trial court jurisdiction "to restrain the violation and to require compliance" with part 31. Although the trial court specifically stated that it was not requiring Worth Township to construct a sewerage system in this case, it appears that the parties agree that the most practical and comprehensive method to restrain the discharge is for a sewerage system to be constructed. In fact, in the 2004 district compliance agreement, Worth Township agreed to construct the necessary sewerage system, although the township did not ultimately construct that system.

We note, however, that a sewerage system is not the only method available to remedy a widespread discharge. As mentioned earlier, properties that produce discharge could be condemned. Another option would be to institute a pump-and-treat program requiring individual properties' septic systems to be pumped and the contents treated off-site. MCL 324.3115(1) only requires that the method chosen restrain the violation and comply with the provisions of part 31 of NREPA. The trial court's injunction in this case met those requirements.41

In sum, we conclude that under MCL 324.3109(2), a municipality can be held responsible for preventing a discharge of raw sewage that originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. Additionally, we hold that a township, as a municipality, can be held responsible for such a discharge. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that the trial court correctly interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) by granting an injunction requiring Worth Township to take necessary measures to stop the discharge of the raw sewage emanating from private septic systems within its borders. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.42

IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT

The dissent argues that MCL 324.3109(2) establishes a presumption only that a municipality caused a discharge and that the municipality can rebut the presumption and avoid responsibility by showing that the municipality itself did not cause the discharge. We have considered these arguments, and we respectfully disagree.

First, the dissent asserts that the language "by the municipality" in subsection (2) supports the argument that, when a discharge is determined to have been committed by a party other than the municipality itself, the presumption of municipal liability has been rebutted. However, the actual "discharge" itself constitutes the subject of the first clause of the first sentence of subsection (2) and is not modified by the language "by the municipality." Rather, "by the municipality" modifies "prima facie evidence of a violation of this part." Thus, a discharge under subsection (2) constitutes "prima facie evidence of a violation of this part" by the municipality. It is the "violation" that is attributed to the municipality, not the discharge.

Moreover, any municipality that actually discharges an injurious substance is already in violation of subsection (1). If the dissent's interpretation were correct, then subsection (2) would operate solely to create a presumption of liability, and only in cases in which human sewage constitutes the discharged substance. Accordingly, under the dissent's interpretation, when there has been a discharge of human sewage, there is a rebuttable presumption that the municipality in which the discharge originated was the discharging party. Though the dissent's interpretation does not render subsection (2) entirely nugatory, it comes close. Our interpretation, on the other hand, provides full effect to the language in MCL 324.3109.

Second, the dissent contends that subsection (3) provides the one situation in which a municipality can avoid a presumption of causation under subsection (2): when the discharge is caused by a sewerage system not owned by the municipality. However, evidence that a discharge was caused by another party's sewerage system would itself be sufficient to rebut the subsection (2) presumption under the dissent's reasoning because it shows that a party other than the municipality actually caused the discharge. Thus, the same evidence required to invoke the exception of subsection (3) would also seemingly rebut the dissent's interpretation of the presumption contained in subsection (2). That is, if the dissent is correct that evidence that a party other than the municipality caused the discharge rebuts the subsection (2) presumption, it would be entirely unnecessary for subsection (3) to provide that the subsection (2) presumption does not arise if the discharge is caused by a sewerage system not owned by the municipality.

We respectfully disagree with the dissent's interpretation. Under our holding, the actual cause of the discharge is irrelevant under subsection (2). Subsection (3) is not superfluous because it creates a single circumstance in which the actual cause of the discharge is relevant — when the discharge is caused by a sewerage system not owned by the municipality.

Finally, with regard to the dissent's hypothetical situation concerning a portable-toilet company engaging in the systematic discharge of waste into state waters, we emphasize our holding that a municipality deemed responsible under subsection (2) is only required to restrain a violation and comply with the provisions of part 31 of NREPA. When there is a single property owner actively causing a discharge in violation of MCL 324.3109(1) and the obvious solution is for the owner to stop the discharge, a municipality has options available to accomplish this. These options could include, but are not limited to, passing ordinances, fining the property owner, or obtaining a court order enjoining the discharge. Thus, we disagree with the dissent's characterization of our holding as "an extraordinary measure." Post at 668.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the arguments raised by the dissenting opinion.

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for, and required to prevent, a discharge of raw sewage that originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precludes a municipality from being held responsible for such discharge. Further, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals to address Worth Township's remaining arguments on appeal.

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, MARILYN J. KELLY, MARKMAN, MARY BETH KELLY, and ZAHRA, JJ. concurred with HATHAWAY, J.

Dissenting Opinion by YOUNG, C.J.

Dissenting Opinion by YOUNG, C.J.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's interpretation of MCL 324.3109(2). MCL 324.3109(2) prohibits the discharge of raw human sewage into state waters and states that such a discharge "shall be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this part by the municipality in which the discharge originated...." The majority interprets MCL 324.3109(2) to mean that a municipality is presumed responsible for a discharge of raw human sewage that originated within its borders, that the municipality may only rebut the presumption of liability by showing that the discharge of raw human sewage was not injurious, and that the municipality may not rebut the presumption of liability by showing that it did not cause the discharge. The majority's decision thus imposes strict liability on a municipality for every injurious or potentially injurious discharge of raw human sewage that originates within its borders, even if the municipality can conclusively establish that some other entity caused the pollutant discharge.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would conclude that the statutory presumption contained in MCL 324.3109(2) may be rebutted when a municipality shows either that the discharge of raw human sewage did not violate part 31 of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.3101 et seq., or that it was not in fact the discharging party. Because the documentary evidence from the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) indicates that Worth Township is not the actual source of the environmental contamination, and the DEQ in fact concedes that defendant would prevail if permitted to rebut causation, I believe that defendant is entitled to summary disposition of the claim brought under MCL 324.3109(2).

I. ANALYSIS

MCL 324.3109(2) contains a presumption that provides a basis for holding municipalities liable for discharges of raw human sewage:

"`Prima facie evidence is such as in the judgment of the law is sufficient to establish the fact, and, if unrebutted, remains sufficient for that purpose.'"1 Therefore, if there has been a discharge of raw human sewage into state waters, then the municipality in which the discharge originated is presumed to have violated part 31 of NREPA. The question then becomes: How can a municipality rebut that presumption?

A party can rebut a presumption by introducing evidence that refutes the supporting facts or the presumed facts.2 The majority concludes that the only way a municipality can rebut the statutory presumption is by "showing that the discharged raw sewage does not rise to the `is or may become injurious' standard" set forth in MCL 324.3109(1), thereby proving that no "violation" of MCL 324.3109(1) actually occurred.3 However, MCL 324.3109(2) does not merely presume there has been "a violation of this part." Rather, MCL 324.3109(2) unambiguously presumes there has been "a violation of this part by the municipality."4

When used as a preposition, the word "by" means "through the agency of" and "as a result or on the basis of[.]"5 Accordingly, MCL 324.3109(2) presumes that the "violation of this part" occurred as a result of or through the agency of the municipality. This presumption assumes that some action "by the municipality" caused or contributed to the violation. Therefore, under the plain language of MCL 324.3109(2), a municipality may rebut the presumption in one of two ways: it can show either that no violation of part 31 occurred or that the violation occurred, but not as a result of or through the agency of the municipality.

II. THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION OF MCL 324.3109 IS FLAWED

In concluding that a municipality may only rebut the presumption of liability by showing that no violation occurred, the majority's interpretation of MCL 324.3109(2) severs the phrase "by the municipality" from the phrases "of a violation" and "of this part." However, the phrase "by the municipality" modifies "of this part," which in turn modifies "of a violation." Each subsequent prepositional phrase gives meaning to the preceding phrase, and they cannot be read independently of each other. Thus, the majority errs by concluding that "of this part" is part of the presumption while "by the municipality" is not.

The majority attempts to find meaning in "the surrounding subsections and in the historical context of statutes governing raw-sewage disposal" to support its conclusion that "the municipality is in violation of NREPA when a discharge originates within its boundaries, irrespective of who actually caused the discharge."6 What is noticeably absent from the majority's analysis, however, is an in-depth evaluation of the actual language of MCL 324.3109(2).

The majority dutifully notes that "[t]he words used in the statute are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning"7 and that "the statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context."8 While the majority recites these canons of statutory interpretation, it fails to follow them. Rather than focusing on the plain language of MCL 324.3109(2) in its present form, the majority begins its analysis by looking at antecedent versions of the statute that required "municipalit[ies] to oversee the proper disposal of sewage within [their] boundaries...."9 As the majority implicitly recognizes by citing cases holding that the current language of a statute is the most reliable indicator of a Legislature's intent, importing the historical obligations of prior versions of a statute is completely inappropriate when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.10

Moreover, even if the language of a prior statute were a proper indication of the meaning of the current version of an unambiguous statute, the prior version of MCL 324.3109(2) undercuts the majority's analysis. Former MCL 323.6, as amended by 1965 PA 328, provided in part:

Former MCL 323.6(b) had two sentences. The first sentence created a presumption that a discharge of raw human sewage violated former MCL 323.6(a). Most significantly here, the second sentence patently imposed liability on municipalities when they merely allowed or suffered others within their borders to discharge injurious human sewage into state waters.

When the statute was repealed and recodified in NREPA in 1994,12 the Legislature removed the sentence that explicitly imposed liability on the municipalities for the actions of others and incorporated it into the rebuttable presumption. In doing so, the Legislature created a scheme in which discharges of raw human sewage are presumed to violate part 31 and be caused by the municipalities in which the discharges occurred. The prior language imposing liability on municipalities is no longer absolute in the current statute; the language that imposed absolute municipal liability in the previous statute has been incorporated into the rebuttable presumption provision of the current statute. Thus, the amended statutory language provides further support for the conclusion that the Legislature abolished municipal liability for merely tolerating the injurious discharges of others and replaced it with a rebuttable presumption of liability regarding causation. The majority opinion ignores not only the actual language of the current statute but also how it retreated from its predecessor's imposition of strict liability for simply being the locus of a discharge. Both are indications that the majority fails to give the meaning the Legislature intended by its choice of language, especially given that it retreated from language imposing absolute liability in a prior version of the statute.

The majority also errs in its contextual analysis of MCL 324.3109(2). While understanding MCL 324.3109(2) in the context of the other subsections is beneficial and appropriate,13 the majority's evaluation of the various subsections is detached from their plain meaning. The majority concludes that if "a municipality is responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) only when the municipality itself causes the discharge, that provision would be rendered virtually meaningless" because it would provide "little more than what is already provided in [MCL 324.3109(1)]."14

The majority fails to appreciate the evidentiary significance of a presumption. MCL 324.3109(1) prohibits a person from directly or indirectly discharging an injurious substance into state waters. MCL 324.3109(2) presumes that human sewage is injurious and that its discharge was caused by the municipality in which the discharge occurred. MCL 324.3109(2), therefore, shifts the evidentiary burden and requires the municipality, rather than the DEQ, to prove that the discharge was either not violative of part 31 or not caused by the municipality. While the statutory presumption requires the municipality to refute it in order to avoid the penalties and remedies articulated in MCL 324.3115, the general statutory scheme ultimately requires the DEQ to hold the actual polluters liable. This distinction appears to be deliberate, given that the DEQ is in a superior position to prosecute individual polluters.15

The majority also claims that MCL 324.3109(4)16 and (5)17 support its interpretation of MCL 324.3109(2). MCL 324.3109(4) and (5) presume that discharges of medical waste and ballast water into state waters are violations of part 31. The majority observes:

On the basis of this observation, the majority abruptly concludes that the presumptive identification of the responsible party in MCL 324.3109(2) is not rebuttable. The majority reaches this conclusion by assuming that the only material difference between these subsections is the fact that MCL 324.3109(2) identifies who is responsible for the discharges, while MCL 324.3109(4) and (5) imply that the person who actually caused the discharge is responsible. In doing so, the majority seems to import the grammatical structure of MCL 324.3109(4) and (5) into MCL 324.3109(2) and thereby interpret MCL 324.3109(2) as if it read:

In fact, the phrase "by the municipality" in MCL 324.3109(2) modifies "prima facie evidence of a violation of this part." Accordingly, the phrase "by the municipality" is part of the presumed fact and is subject to rebuttal by production of contradictory evidence. It is the majority's failure to recognize this critical grammatical fact that renders its construction fatally flawed.

MCL 324.3109(3) lends additional support to the conclusion that causation is incorporated into the rebuttable presumption. MCL 324.3109(3) provides:

MCL 324.3109(3) creates an exception to MCL 324.3109(2). In situations in which there has been an unauthorized discharge from a certain type of sewer within a municipality, the municipality is liable if it agreed to be responsible for the system, even if the municipality can establish that it did not cause the discharge. Moreover, the municipality is subject to the civil fines and penalties enumerated in MCL 324.3115 if it received proper notice from the DEQ. If MCL 324.3109(3) did not exist, a discharge from the sewer system would "be considered prima facie evidence of a violation of this part by the municipality in which the discharge originated" pursuant to MCL 324.3109(2) and the municipality could rebut its presumed liability by showing that it did not cause the discharge.

The Court of Appeals held that MCL 324.3109(2) "merely creates the presumption that ... a discharge [of raw human sewage] originated with the municipality."20 The Court of Appeals held that a municipality could rebut this presumption by showing that the municipality did not cause the discharge. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[i]f the purpose of subsection (2) were to impose liability on a municipality merely because a discharge occurred within its boundaries, then subsection (3) would be contradictory."21

In critiquing the Court of Appeals' analysis, the majority states that MCL 324.3109(3) "creates an exception to subsection (2) under which a municipality will not be responsible for a discharge originating within the municipality's boundaries. The exception is that a municipality will not be responsible for a discharge from a sewerage system that the municipality does not own."22 The majority reasons that because there is no sewerage system in Worth Township, MCL 324.3109(3) is inapplicable and the Court of Appeals should not have relied on it.

The problem with the majority's analysis is that it ignores the second half of MCL 324.3109(3).23 The majority seems to assume that the sole purpose of MCL 324.3109(3) is to create one specific circumstance in which the presumption does not arise: when the discharge is caused by a private sewer. If the second half of MCL 324.3109(3) did not exist, I would agree with the majority. This, obviously, is not the case. The second half of MCL 324.3109(3) imposes liability on the municipality for a discharge it did not cause — but only if it has accepted responsibility in writing and been notified of its responsibility.

A brief illustration may clarify my interpretation of MCL 324.3109(3). Suppose a private entity owns a sewerage system as defined in MCL 324.4101 and there is an unauthorized discharge from that system. If the discharge was of raw human sewage, the municipality in which the discharge occurred is presumed liable under MCL 324.3109(2). However, the municipality could rebut this presumption and avoid liability by showing that it did not cause the discharge. In the absence of MCL 324.3109(3), this would be the end of the matter for the municipality. However, MCL 324.3109(3) continues to impose liability on the municipality notwithstanding its ability to rebut the presumption of MCL 324.3109(2) if the municipality had accepted responsibility in writing for the sewerage system and been notified in writing by the DEQ of its responsibility. Therefore, interpreting MCL 324.3109(2) to mean that a municipality can rebut the presumption created by that subsection by showing that the discharge was not injurious or that it was not the actual discharging party is perfectly consistent with MCL 324.3109(3), and the majority errs by concluding otherwise.

In its response to this opinion, the majority recognizes:

This analysis renders the majority's position internally inconsistent. The majority seems to imply that "by the municipality" is not part of the rebuttable presumption because that phrase does not modify "discharge." However, if the majority's implication were correct, then "of a violation" would also not be part of the presumption because that phrase, like "by the municipality," modifies "prima facie evidence" and not "discharge." This cannot be.

The presumption takes effect whenever there is a "discharge of any raw sewage of human origin" and shifts the evidentiary burden to the municipality. The dispute between the majority and this dissent is not whether "by the municipality" modifies "discharge," but whether the word "by" means that its object — "the municipality" — actually caused its antecedent — "a violation." As explained earlier, the ordinary meaning of the word "by" contains this causal requirement: "through the agency of" and "as a result or on the basis of[.]"25 If the municipality fails to rebut the presumption that it caused the discharge, then I agree with the majority that the "`violation' ... is attributed to the municipality...."26 However, because the majority would always subject the municipality to liability for an injurious discharge, even when the municipality proves that it did not cause the violation, it is the majority's interpretation that fails to take full account of the meaning of the word "by" and its causal meaning in relation to the evidentiary presumption.

III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION OF MCL 324.3109

The majority's interpretation of MCL 324.3109(2) renders a municipality strictly liable for the actions of others, even if the municipality has proffered evidence that conclusively establishes the identity of the polluter. Holding a municipality strictly liable for the actions of others is an extraordinary measure, especially when strict liability is not expressly provided by the language of the statute.

One example will suffice to show the broad implications of the majority's interpretation. Suppose that a portable toilet company regularly, but surreptitiously, dumps its collected human waste into state waters within a township and the township can conclusively establish that the company, and not the township, caused the discharges. Under the majority's interpretation of MCL 324.3109(2), the township may not avoid liability for the actions of polluters who are under an independent statutory obligation to refrain from discharging waste into state waters. Thus, under the majority's interpretation, the underlying municipality is always responsible for every injurious discharge of human waste into state waters, even though individuals actually responsible for the discharges have themselves violated MCL 324.3109(1) and are liable for the penalties provided by law. While the Legislature may be within its authority to enact this dual imposition of liability (as it apparently did in the predecessor version of this statute), there is no indication in the text of MCL 324.3109(2) that it intended to do so merely by imposing a rebuttable presumption that makes it easier for the DEQ to hold somebody else responsible for the violation.

The majority concludes that imposing strict liability on municipalities for discharges caused by others is not onerous because "a municipality deemed responsible under [MCL 324.3109(2) ] is only required to restrain a violation and comply with the provisions of part 31 of NREPA."27 Imposing, as the majority opinion does, a requirement that a municipality such as Worth Township stop others from polluting state waters is not inconsequential. While a municipality may have the statutory authority to stop pollutant discharges,28 a municipality may not readily possess the resources to halt illegal discharges and ensure compliance. Condemnation is not a cost-free remedy, and local ordinances designed to prohibit unlawful discharges may be no more effective than the state law that was obviously violated in this case. Further, MCL 324.3115(1) requires the imposition of a "fine of not less than $2,500.00" and gives circuit courts the authority to impose attorney fees and costs when there has been a violation of part 31.29 Because the majority reads MCL 324.3109(2) as imposing strict liability on the municipality for any injurious discharge of human waste into state waters that originates within its borders, the municipality is liable for this mandatory fine even when the municipality ensures subsequent compliance with part 31 of NREPA. Thus, the majority's unwarranted expansion of liability to municipalities will subject municipalities to mandatory statutory penalties even when municipalities take active measures to stop pollutant discharges.

IV. CONCLUSION

There is a saying that "[h]e who chooses the beginning of a road chooses the place it leads to. It is the means that determine the end."30 The majority erroneously chooses to begin its analysis with an examination of the historical context of MCL 324.3109 rather than the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. The majority's analytical approach leads it to conclude that a municipality without a proper permit is liable for every injurious or potentially injurious discharge of raw human sewage that originates within its borders, even when it can be shown that the municipality was not the cause of the environmental contamination. Accordingly, the majority's interpretation imposes strict liability on municipalities that I believe is unsupported by the text of the statute.

In this case, the DEQ submitted documentary evidence that private residences and commercial buildings in Worth Township were discharging raw human sewage into state waters. Pursuant to MCL 324.3109(2), these discharges were prima facie evidence of a violation of part 31. However, Worth Township challenged the claim that the violation occurred "by the municipality," arguing that the discharges did not occur as a result of its actions, but were caused by the private residences and commercial buildings, as indicated in the DEQ's documentation. In fact, at oral argument, the DEQ's counsel admitted that if Worth Township were permitted to rebut the statutory presumption by showing that the discharges were "caused by failing private septic systems," then Worth Township should prevail. In light of the DEQ's evidence and the Attorney General's concession, I do not believe that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Worth Township is liable pursuant to MCL 324.3109(2).

Because the majority fails to give meaning to the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 324.3109(2), I dissent. I would reverse the Court of Appeals' decision in part31 and remand this case to the circuit court to determine whether there is a basis to impose liability under the DEQ's alternative theory of liability pursuant to MCL 324.3112.