MARY BETH KELLY, J.

In this case, we decide whether a civil contempt petition that seeks indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 imposes "tort liability" within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(1) of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. Given the Legislature's use of the common-law term "tort," we hold that "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA encompasses all legal responsibility for civil wrongs, other than a breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages. We further hold that MCL 600.1721 imposes "tort liability" because it authorizes an award of indemnification, or compensatory, damages to remedy a noncontractual civil wrong. Consequently, MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA provides governmental agencies with immunity from civil contempt petitions seeking indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721. Because the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the probate court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of respondent.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the summer of 2004, petitioner, Nancy Mick, became increasingly concerned about the mental health of her brother, Stephen Bradley. She noticed that Bradley had grown "more agitated and violent," and he had admitted to her that he was suicidal. Petitioner feared that if Bradley did not receive help "he could kill himself and his family." As a result, in August 2004, she petitioned the Kent County Probate Court for Bradley's hospitalization, averring that Bradley was a danger to himself and his family. She accompanied her petition with a supplemental petition for examination and hospitalization, requesting a court order directing a peace officer to take Bradley into protective custody.

The probate court granted the petitions that same day and issued an order requiring that Bradley submit to psychiatric examination and requiring his hospitalization. The order specified that a "peace officer shall take [Bradley] into protective custody and transport him ... to [Cornerstone Community Mental Health or any community mental health contract facility]." Petitioner immediately submitted the order to respondent, the Kent County Sheriff's Department, for execution and provided additional details to the sergeant on duty concerning how petitioner expected Bradley to react to being taken into custody and the fact that Bradley possessed several firearms.

Respondent, however, did not timely execute the probate court's order. In the days that followed, petitioner contacted respondent twice in regard to Bradley's situation, and each time respondent assured her that the pickup would take place as soon as possible. Ultimately, respondent never attempted to take Bradley into protective custody and, nine days after the probate court entered its order, Bradley committed suicide.

After Bradley's suicide, petitioner wrote to Kent County Sheriff Lawrence A. Stelma, requesting an internal investigation, which ultimately concluded that the failure to execute the order was "an obvious case of simple neglect in that this petition was not executed in the manner that mental health petitions normally are handled."1 Stelma informed petitioner by letter of the investigation's findings, confirming that the order had not been executed and describing respondent's failure as "an unusual occurrence" that did "not reflect any policy or procedure on the part of the Sheriff's Department...."

More than two years later, petitioner, acting as personal representative of Bradley's estate, filed a wrongful death suit against respondent and Stelma, alleging that they were grossly negligent in their failure to execute the probate court order and that their negligence was the proximate cause of Bradley's death. The circuit court dismissed the case on governmental immunity grounds, opining that respondent was not a legal entity that could be sued and that Stelma was individually immune from suit under the GTLA.

Petitioner did not appeal the circuit court's dismissal. Instead, she filed a petition for civil contempt in the probate court against respondent. The petition alleged that respondent's violation of the probate court's order constituted contempt of court, entitling her to indemnification damages pursuant to MCL 600.1721. The petition replicated the contents of petitioner's wrongful death complaint and sought damages "including, but not limited to, all of those damages set forth in the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute, MCL 600.2922, et seq."2

Respondent moved for summary disposition, arguing that it was immune from liability under MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA because petitioner sought to impose tort liability in the guise of a civil contempt petition.3 The probate court denied respondent's motion reasoning that "[g]overnmental immunity does not insulate a contemnor from the contemnor's refusal or negligence to obey a court order." The probate court acknowledged an "overlap of remedies between a court['s] power of contempt and a compensation that may be argued under tort," but concluded that this overlap did not impede a court's inherent authority to punish contempt.

Respondent appealed the probate court's ruling to the circuit court, which reversed and remanded the case to the probate court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of respondent. Relying on the definition of "tort liability" articulated in Tate v. Grand Rapids,4 the circuit court concluded that petitioner's civil contempt petition was based in tort because the petition sought damages under the wrongful death statute. The circuit court, therefore, held that petitioner's claim was barred by the GTLA. While cognizant of courts' inherent authority to punish contempt, the circuit court concluded that the scope of that inherent authority is limited to the power to punish by fine or imprisonment. Because petitioner did not invoke the probate court's inherent power to punish contempt by either fine or imprisonment, but instead sought indemnification damages pursuant to MCL 600.1721, the court did not consider its holding — that petitioner's claim is barred by the GTLA — as infringing on courts' inherent contempt powers.

The Court of Appeals granted petitioner's application for leave to appeal and, in a published opinion per curiam, reversed the circuit court's decision.5 The Court of Appeals held that the GTLA does not immunize governmental agencies from "tort-like" damages sought pursuant to MCL 600.1721.6 Relying on Tate7 and Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing),8 the Court of Appeals opined that whether a "contempt claim can survive a governmental immunity challenge is controlled not by the nature of the damages sought, but by whether [the] contempt action is a cause of action that is separate and distinct from one that is grounded in tort liability."9 The Court of Appeals explained:

We granted respondent's application for leave to appeal to consider whether "petitioner's claim for civil contempt indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 is barred by the [GTLA]."11

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a decision on a motion for summary disposition.12 Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is appropriate when a claim is barred by governmental immunity.13 A party filing suit against a governmental agency bears the burden of pleading his or her claim in avoidance of governmental immunity.14

We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.15 When construing a statute, we consider the statute's plain language and we enforce clear and unambiguous language as written.16 While terms must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning, words and phrases "as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning."17 Moreover, when the Legislature chooses to employ a common-law term without indicating an intent to alter the common law, the term will be interpreted consistent with its common-law meaning.18

III. ANALYSIS

Since Michigan became a state in 1837, Michigan jurisprudence has recognized the preexisting common-law concept of sovereign immunity, which immunizes the "sovereign" state from all suits to which the state has not consented, including suits for tortious acts by the state.19 This common-law concept of sovereign immunity has since been replaced in Michigan by the GTLA and is codified by MCL 691.1407(1), which limits a governmental agency's exposure to tort liability.

Specifically, MCL 691.1407(1), which is at the center of this litigation, broadly provides that "a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function."20 Under the statute, all suits that seek to impose "tort liability" for an agency's discharge of a governmental function are barred by the GTLA, subject to several exceptions that the Legislature has expressly provided for in the GTLA and in other statutes authorizing suit against governmental agencies.21 While conceding that none of these exceptions applies to the instant case, petitioner asserts that the immunity afforded by the GTLA is inapplicable because a civil contempt petition seeking indemnification damages does not seek to impose tort liability.

Whether a contempt order imposing indemnification damages imposes tort liability is not readily apparent; the GTLA does not define the phrase "tort liability" and our caselaw has not offered a definition of the phrase. Moreover, the contempt statutes under which petitioner brings suit include no express reference to the imposition of "tort liability." The civil contempt petition in the instant case is based on the general contempt statute of MCL 600.1701, a provision of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), MCL 600.101 et seq., that identifies potentially punishable contemptuous conduct. This provision, which is a codification of courts' power at common law to punish contemptuous conduct,22 states in relevant part:

By its plain terms, MCL 600.1701 allows courts to exercise their inherent contempt powers for the purpose of either coercing a contemnor to comply with the court's order (civil contempt) or punishing a contemnor for contemptuous conduct (criminal contempt) by imposing a "fine or imprisonment, or both...."24

In addition to the coercive and punitive sanctions permitted for civil and criminal contempt under MCL 600.1701, a court, in a civil contempt proceeding, may also order indemnification of those persons who have sustained losses as a result of contemptuous conduct under MCL 600.1721.25 This statute, on which petitioner relies, provides that "[i]f the alleged misconduct has caused an actual loss or injury to any person the court shall order the defendant to pay such person a sufficient sum to indemnify him...."26

The contemptuous misconduct referred to in these contempt statutes, however, does not clearly constitute tortious action such that petitioner's civil contempt petition would necessarily impose tort liability for purposes of the GTLA. Whether petitioner's claim is barred by the GTLA thus requires two related inquires. First, we must determine the meaning of the phrase "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA; and, second, we must decide whether a civil contempt petition seeking indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 seeks to impose tort liability, such that the GTLA would prohibit petitioner's claim.

A. TORT LIABILITY

As noted, the GTLA does not define the phrase "tort liability," nor has this Court previously determined the meaning of that phrase. The lower courts applied the definition of "tort liability" articulated by the Court of Appeals in Tate, a case involving a statute that imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries resulting from dog bites.27 In Tate, the plaintiff sought to avoid application of the GTLA by arguing that strict-liability actions fell outside the scope of tort liability.28 In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the Court of Appeals explained, "The GTLA unambiguously grants immunity from all tort liability, i.e., all civil wrongs for which legal responsibility is recognized, regardless of how the legal responsibility is determined, except as otherwise provided in the GTLA."29

We do not necessarily disagree with Tate's general understanding of the phrase "tort liability." However, in our judgment, Tate's definition is incomplete and fails to acknowledge the historical underpinnings of the word "tort" as that word has been used in our common law for more than a hundred years. Mainly, a "tort" is an act that has long been understood as a civil wrong that arises from the breach of a legal duty other than the breach of a contractual duty.30 For example, English common-law courts have for centuries recognized a civil wrong as an infringement on private rights belonging to individuals and divided civil wrongs into two categories: those sounding in contract and those sounding in tort.31 The Queen's Bench has acknowledged this division in a case involving a bailee's liability for injury to the plaintiff's horse, in which it concluded that the legal basis for the plaintiff's claim was a tort and that damages to compensate for the injury should be allowed. Lord Justice Smith explained:

The Queen's Bench, then, recognized only two types of civil wrongs, those involving contractual wrongs and those involving the breach of some other legal duty, the latter of which is a tort and is remedied through an award of compensatory damages.33

Michigan common law, which has its roots in English common law, has likewise recognized this distinction between torts and contracts as the two types of civil wrongs.34 For example, in Churchill v. Howe,35 this Court considered whether a debtor's liability was limited to the parties' contractual relations. In concluding that the creditor's allegations of fraud sounded in tort, we acknowledged the general principles that a tort requires a "wrong independent of a contract" and that "the distinguishing feature of a tort [is] that it consists in the violation of a right given or neglect of a duty imposed by law, and not by contract."36 Stated differently, and as this Court has repeatedly recognized in the nearly one hundred years since Churchill, when a party breaches a duty stemming from a legal obligation, other than a contractual one, the claim sounds in tort.37

Our common law likewise incorporates the concept that a tort necessarily involves compensation to an injured party for the wrong committed by a tortfeasor.38 As we explained in Wilson v. Bowen,39 a case involving an award of damages for malicious prosecution, "the purpose of an action of tort is to recover the damages which the plaintiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant; that compensation to the plaintiff is the purpose in view...."

Given the foregoing, it is clear that our common law has defined "tort" to be a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of compensatory damages. Accordingly, because the word "tort" has "acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning" in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term "tort" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.40

Our analysis, however, requires more. MCL 691.1407(1) refers not merely to a "tort," nor to a "tort claim" nor to a "tort action," but to "tort liability." The term "tort," therefore, describes the type of liability from which a governmental agency is immune. As commonly understood, the word "liability," refers to liableness, i.e., "the state or quality of being liable."41 To be "liable" means to be "legally responsible[.]"42 Construing the term "liability" along with the term "tort," it becomes apparent that the Legislature intended "tort liability" to encompass legal responsibility arising from a tort. We therefore hold that "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) means all legal responsibility arising from a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.43

In reaching this holding, we are cognizant of our decision in Ross, on which the Court of Appeals relied in concluding that "tort-like damages are recoverable in a contempt action" against a governmental entity.44 Our opinion in Ross actually concerned nine cases, including Rocco v. Department of Mental Health. In that case, the plaintiffs' decedent was murdered while he was a patient at a hospital administered by two state agencies. The plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint alleging both negligence and breach of an implied contract. We held that the GTLA barred the plaintiffs' negligence claim, but that the plaintiffs' second claim, breach of an implied contract, was not barred. The defendants had argued that the plaintiffs' contract claim should be dismissed because "most of the allegations contained in Counts I and II are identical...."45 In rejecting that argument, we stated:

Petitioner and the Court of Appeals interpret this passage from Ross to mean that the label of the action controls in determining whether an action imposes tort liability and that, if the claim is not a traditional tort, then the GTLA is inapplicable and "tort-like" damages are recoverable. Ross, however, made no such pronouncement and did not consider the meaning of "tort liability," which is the question that is now before this Court. Instead, consistent with our holding in this case, Ross merely recognized that the GTLA does not bar a properly pleaded contract claim.47

In addition, our holding clarifies that Ross's pronouncement, that "non-tort cause[s] of action" are not barred by the GTLA, should not be interpreted as limiting the GTLA's application to only traditional tort claims.48 The Legislature's express decision to use the word "liability" in describing the governmental immunity available under MCL 691.1407(1), rather than "action" or "claim," indicates that our focus must be on the nature of the liability rather than the type of action pleaded. For this reason, we decline to limit the GTLA's application to suits expressly pleaded as traditional tort claims, as petitioner would have us hold.49 Further, because the nature of the liability will often be reflected in the remedy available, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' statement that "[t]he nature of the damages being requested has no role in determining whether the action is barred by the GTLA."50 Instead, because a tort, by definition, encompasses an award of compensatory damages, the nature of the damages is precisely relevant in determining whether the type of liability imposed is tort liability.51 Accordingly, regardless of how a claim is labeled, courts must consider the entire claim, including the available damages, to determine the nature of the liability imposed.52

In summary, several principles emerge from our explication of the phrase "tort liability" that will guide courts charged with the task of determining whether a cause of action imposes tort liability for purposes of the GTLA. Courts considering whether a claim involves tort liability should first focus on the nature of the duty that gives rise to the claim. If the wrong alleged is premised on the breach of a contractual duty, then no tort has occurred, and the GTLA is inapplicable.53 However, if the wrong is not premised on a breach of a contractual duty, but rather is premised on some other civil wrong, i.e., some other breach of a legal duty, then the GTLA might apply to bar the claim. In that instance, the court must further consider the nature of the liability the claim seeks to impose. If the action permits an award of damages to a private party as compensation for an injury caused by the noncontractual civil wrong, then the action, no matter how it is labeled, seeks to impose tort liability and the GTLA is applicable.54

B. CIVIL CONTEMPT INDEMNIFICATION DAMAGES

The civil contempt petition in this case alleges that respondent's contemptuous misconduct, prohibited by MCL 600.1701, caused Bradley's suicide and seeks indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721. Because petitioner's civil contempt petition seeks indemnification under MCL 600.1721, we must construe the language of that provision to determine whether such petitions impose tort liability. The provision states:

Although we have not previously considered whether this language imposes "tort liability," this Court has implicitly recognized that the elements necessary to establish entitlement to relief under this provision are essentially the same elements necessary to establish a tort, i.e., a legal duty, breach of that duty, causation, and injury. In Holland v. Weed,56 for example, we explained that the predecessor of MCL 600.1721

Stated differently, the plain language of MCL 600.1721 requires a showing of contemptuous misconduct that caused the person seeking indemnification to suffer a loss or injury and, if these elements are established, requires the court to order the contemnor to pay "a sufficient sum to indemnify" the person for the loss.

A closer examination of the statutory language confirms that it contains all the elements of a tort claim in the guise of a contempt claim. Under the first sentence of the statute, the "alleged misconduct," which is a necessary element of any contempt claim, stems from the "neglect or violation of [a] duty" under MCL 600.1701 or the "omission to perform an act or duty" under MCL 600.1715. Thus, the "alleged misconduct" is synonymous with the legal duty and breach of that duty recognized in traditional tort law. Clearly, this misconduct, which arises from the relevant contempt statute — not a contractual relationship between the parties — is a noncontractual civil wrong.

Because the nature of the duty that gives rise to a civil contempt claim is clearly premised on a noncontractual civil wrong, we must further consider the nature of the liability imposed. The first sentence of MCL 600.1721 also requires that this misconduct "cause[]" the petitioner's "actual loss or injury," thus paralleling the other two elements recognized in a traditional tort claim: causation and damages. Because the first sentence of MCL 600.1721 authorizes a court to order a contemnor to "indemnify" the petitioner for the loss caused by the contemptuous misconduct, the statute clearly sanctions legal responsibility, or liability, in the form of compensatory damages.58 Plainly, the first sentence of MCL 600.1721 contemplates what is, in essence, a tort suit for money damages.59

Additional support for this conclusion is found in the second sentence of MCL 600.1721, which provides that "[t]he payment and acceptance of this sum is an absolute bar to any action by the aggrieved party to recover damages for the loss or injury." That is, the Legislature expressly recognized that a civil contempt claim seeking indemnification damages functions as a substitute for any underlying claim and, thus, bars monetary recovery that could have been achieved in a separate cause of action. As the Legislature acknowledged, the statutory remedy, then, is effectively a proxy for a tort claim.60

Given that the statutory language of MCL 600.1721 clearly permits the payment of compensatory damages to a petitioner for a noncontractual civil wrong, we thus hold that a civil contempt petition seeking indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 seeks to impose "tort liability."61 It follows that a party that elects to pursue the statutory remedy available under MCL 600.1721 will be barred from obtaining relief against governmental agencies because those entities are entitled to immunity from "tort liability" under MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA. The logical result of this conclusion is that courts are prohibited from exercising their contempt powers by punishing a governmental agency's contemptuous conduct through an award of indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721.

Our holding, however, should not be interpreted as constraining courts' inherent contempt powers. While our holding does constrain a court's statutory authority to order punishment in the form of compensation in a civil contempt proceeding against a governmental entity,62 our holding does not infringe on those powers of contempt that are inherent in the judiciary, as recognized in our Constitution and codified by the Legislature.63 Inherent in the judicial power is the power to prescribe acts that are punishable as contempt through fine or imprisonment, or both.64 This inherent judicial power to punish contempt, which is essential to the administration of the law, does not include the power to mete out certain punishments for contemptuous acts beyond those contempt powers inherent in the judiciary.65 Clearly, the punishment the Legislature authorized in MCL 600.1721, compensation for contemptuous misconduct, is not encompassed by the judiciary's inherent power to punish contempt. Because our holding only involves the GTLA's application to civil contempt petitions that seek indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721, it does not infringe on courts' inherent power to punish contempt by fine or imprisonment, or both.66 Moreover, our definition of "tort liability" does not encompass contempt proceedings that seek to invoke courts' inherent contempt powers; although those proceedings undoubtedly involve a noncontractual civil wrong, the sanction sought does not impose legal responsibility in the form of compensation for the harm done.67

C. APPLICATION

The civil contempt petition at issue here alleges that respondent negligently failed to execute the probate court's order, constituting contemptuous misconduct under MCL 600.1701. The petition alleges that this misconduct caused Bradley's suicide and seeks indemnification damages for his death under MCL 600.1721. Notably, the damages petitioner seeks in her contempt petition are exactly the same damages that petitioner sought under the wrongful death statute68 in her previous lawsuit, which was dismissed on governmental immunity grounds. Indeed, the petition substantively replicated petitioner's prior complaint and sought damages "including, but not limited to, all of those damages set forth in the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute." (Citation omitted.) Through her civil contempt petition, then, petitioner plainly seeks compensatory damages for Bradley's death. Thus, her civil contempt petition seeks to impose tort liability.69

Had petitioner sought to invoke the probate court's inherent contempt powers, i.e., to fine or imprison a contemnor, or had petitioner otherwise established the applicability of an exception to governmental immunity, then petitioner's claim might have survived summary disposition. However, petitioner's civil contempt petition did not invoke the court's inherent powers of contempt, and she concedes that none of the GTLA's exceptions are applicable. Consequently, because a civil contempt petition seeking indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 seeks to impose tort liability, and respondent is immune from tort liability, petitioner's claim is barred by governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(1). Respondent is therefore entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

IV. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the Legislature's intent, our decision clarifies that the phrase "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) encompasses all legal responsibility arising from noncontractual civil wrongs for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages. We further recognize that the plain language of MCL 600.1721 authorizes an award of indemnification damages to remedy a noncontractual civil wrong and, thus, falls squarely within the meaning of "tort liability." Because MCL 691.1407(1) immunizes governmental agencies from tort liability, governmental entities are immune from civil contempt petitions seeking indemnification damages. Petitioner has pleaded such a claim here and because she has not otherwise established the applicability of an exception to the GTLA, respondent is entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1407(1). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the probate court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of respondent.

YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN, ZAHRA, and VIVIANO, JJ., concurred with MARILYN J. KELLY, J.

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

At issue in this case is whether an order imposing a compensatory contempt sanction under MCL 600.17211 imposes "tort liability" for the purposes of MCL 691.1407(1) of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. The majority holds that the Legislature intended to grant governmental defendants immunity from such orders, reasoning that MCL 600.1721 has a compensatory purpose and that a petition for a compensatory contempt sanction under MCL 600.1721 is essentially a tort claim. Although the majority provides an insightful summary of the legal history of tort actions, the majority fails to provide an equally insightful explanation of the nature of civil contempt, which, in my view, leads the majority to its erroneous conclusion that an order imposing a compensatory contempt sanction imposes "tort liability" for the purposes of the GTLA. Rather, I would hold that a compensatory contempt sanction does not impose tort liability, primarily because that sanction is based on the contemptuous act itself. Thus, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.

I. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

In In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich. 81, 104-107, 413 N.W.2d 392 (1987), we considered whether "anticipatory contempt" was a proper use of the court's contempt power, holding that the future intent to violate a court order was not subject to the court's contempt power. That issue is not present in this case; however, In re Contempt of Dougherty is helpful because it provides an excellent analysis of the sui generis nature of contempt proceedings. Id. at 90-91, 413 N.W.2d 392. Specifically, In re Contempt of Dougherty recognized that "contempts are `neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal....'" Id. at 91, 413 N.W.2d 392, quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). Further, we explained that it is often necessary to characterize a contempt proceeding as criminal or civil and that the determining difference is the character and purpose of the punishment imposed on the contemnor. Id. at 92-93, 413 N.W.2d 392, quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441, 31 S.Ct. 492 ("`If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.'").

To aid courts in characterizing civil and criminal contempt proceedings, In re Contempt of Dougherty explained that the process is civil if the contemnor refuses to do an act ordered by the court, whereas the process is criminal if the contemnor commits a forbidden act. Id. at 94-96, 413 N.W.2d 392, quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. 492, and People ex rel. Attorney General v. Yarowsky, 236 Mich. 169, 171-172, 210 N.W. 246 (1926). The purpose of criminal contempt is to penalize and "operate[] in terrorem ... to prevent a repetition of the offense in similar cases," and the purpose of civil contempt is to coerce the contemnor to comply with the court's order for the benefit of the opposing party. In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich. at 95-96, 413 N.W.2d 392 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In re Contempt of Dougherty acknowledged, however, that "there are two types of civil contempt sanctions, coercive and compensatory." Id. at 97, 413 N.W.2d 392. The purpose of the compensatory fine in a civil contempt proceeding is to compensate the complainant. Id. at 98, 413 N.W.2d 392. The complainant's "`right, as a civil litigant, to the compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the basic controversy.'" Id., quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich. at 98, 413 N.W.2d 392, concluded that

II. A COMPENSATORY CONTEMPT SANCTION IS NOT "TORT LIABILITY"

I agree with the majority that a proper analysis of this case should begin by defining "tort liability" for the purposes of MCL 691.1407(1), and, next, it must be determined whether a compensatory sanction for civil contempt constitutes tort liability. Further, I appreciate the majority's thoughtful approach to providing a common-law definition of "tort" as "a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of compensatory damages." Ante at 554. Most importantly, I agree with the majority that "our focus must be on the nature of the liability rather than the type of action pleaded," ante at 556, and the first focus should be "on the nature of the duty that gives rise to the claim," ante at 557.

Under MCL 600.1721, "any person" who suffers "actual loss or injury" caused by the defendant's "alleged misconduct" may file a petition or motion seeking remedial relief in the form of a compensatory contempt sanction. As the majority acknowledges, the reference in MCL 600.1721 to "alleged misconduct" illustrates that such a petition or motion is based on the general contempt statute, MCL 600.1701. Thus, without an act of contempt, there is no basis for liability under MCL 600.1721. At its core, a contemptuous act is an "act of disobedience" to the court's "ordinary exercise of its duties," and, "[w]ithout authority to act promptly and independently the courts could not administer public justice or enforce the rights of private litigants." Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450, 31 S.Ct. 492, citing Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997 (1904). Despite the fact that a compensatory sanction based on civil contempt is primarily remedial in nature,2 i.e., it "is for the purpose of protecting the civil rights and remedies of the party, and to compensate him for the injury or loss by the misconduct alleged," Holland v. Weed, 87 Mich. 584, 587-588, 49 N.W. 877 (1891), the liability imposed nevertheless arises from the party's disobedience to a court order.

As a result, I disagree with the majority that the "alleged misconduct," which serves as the basis for liability under MCL 600.1721, is "synonymous" with a traditional tort duty and its breach. Ante at 558. This is because, generally stated, liability arising from tortious conduct stems from a breach of one's duty to another, not the breach of an obligation owed to the court.3 Additionally, as Justice McCORMACK astutely explains, there may be civil wrongs that are neither a tort nor a contract. See post at 564. Indeed, a "civil wrong" may be defined as "[a] violation of noncriminal law, such as a tort, a breach of contract or trust, a breach of statutory duty, or a defect in performing a public duty; the breach of a legal duty treated as the subject matter of a civil proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.), p. 1751 (emphasis added). A petition or motion for a compensatory contempt sanction could be classified as a claim based on a civil wrong in that it is based on a breach of a legal duty owed to the court; however, I disagree with the majority that the fact that a noncontractual civil wrong is at issue means that tort liability is imposed. See ante at 561-62. Rather, I think that the nature of the legal duty is relevant. In other words, I do not think that simply because a civil legal duty exists and is not a contractual duty, that a breach of that duty necessarily imposes tort liability.

Because the "alleged misconduct" under MCL 600.1721 is distinguishable from tortious conduct, the compensatory quality of tort damages and of a contempt sanction imposed under MCL 600.1721 is the only potentially relevant similarity shared by the two types of liability.4 While I agree with the majority that the purpose of the relief sought may be a relevant inquiry when determining whether a type of liability is tort liability for the purposes of the GTLA, the nature of the remedy sought should not be dispositive when analyzing a claim for purposes of MCL 691.1407(1).5 Thus, I do not think that a compensatory contempt sanction imposes tort liability simply because it may serve a similar remedial purpose as tort damages.

I also think that, in certain circumstances, characterizing a compensatory contempt sanction as serving a compensatory purpose to the exclusion of any other purpose may oversimplify the nature of the contempt proceeding itself. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. 492 (recognizing the "incidental effect[s]," i.e., the overlapping purposes, of civil and criminal contempt). Specifically, I think that when a party subject to a court order has the present obligation and ability to comply, the prospect of a compensatory sanction may work hand-in-hand with coercive monetary sanctions.6 "When the purpose of the sanction is to make a party or person comply, the trial court, in exercising its discretion, must `consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.'" In re Moroun, 295 Mich.App. 312, 337, 814 N.W.2d 319 (2012), quoting In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 Mich. at 98, 413 N.W.2d 392, quoting United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. at 304, 67 S.Ct. 677 (quotation marks omitted). In my view, the compensatory contempt sanction, which is measured by the actual loss caused by the contemptuous conduct, serves a similar purpose as a coercive contempt sanction; the primary difference is that the former is retrospective, whereas the latter is prospective. A coercive contempt sanction attempts to avoid actual loss altogether by sanctioning present noncompliance, while a compensatory contempt sanction reimburses a petitioner's actual loss. Practically speaking, the possibility that the contumacious party may still be sanctioned after his or her ability to comply with the order has expired, will encourage the contumacious party to comply with the court order before his or her ability to do so has expired.7

To conclude, I would hold that the contemptuous act itself is an integral part of imposing liability under MCL 600.1721, and the duty one owes to a court is distinguishable from a tort duty. While the common-law definition of "tort" is admittedly broad, holding that a compensatory contempt sanction amounts to "tort liability" unreasonably stretches the traditionally understood concept of a "tort" claim by not appreciating that a tort duty is not simply any noncontractual civil duty imposed by the law. Thus, I would conclude that the Legislature, when granting immunity from tort liability under the GTLA, did not intend that governmental defendants would be immune from compensatory contempt sanctions.

McCORMACK, J. (dissenting).

The majority holds that the governmental tort liability act's (GTLA)1 grant of immunity to governmental agencies from "tort liability," as referred to in MCL 691.1407(1), applies to civil contempt. The majority's analysis rests entirely on two closely related propositions. First, the GTLA grants immunity from legal responsibility arising from a tort. I agree. Second, all noncontractual civil wrongs, including civil contempt, are torts. I respectfully disagree. Civil contempt does not sound in tort, and contempt sanctions of any kind simply do not impose tort liability. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the GTLA does not provide any basis for concluding that our Legislature intended to grant immunity for contempt of court. Nor does the contempt statute, MCL 600.1701, provide any basis for concluding that governmental actors are not subject to all of its remedies. Because I believe that the majority confuses legal categories, and in light of the plain meaning of both the GTLA and the contempt statute, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY

A. AN ABBREVIATED TAXONOMY OF "CIVIL WRONGS"

Very generally speaking, there are two categories of legal wrongs that may result in civil liability. One category encompasses acts that violate a personal right, which includes the common-law subjects of property, tort, contract, trust, and restitution. A second category encompasses acts not against the person, but rather against the sovereign, or acts against interests the sovereign deems worthy of protection. These acts are the subject of environmental law, securities law, and consumer law, to name a few. These examples are hardly exhaustive. But they suffice to show that the legal system imposes liability in a wide variety of contexts, either to address harms committed against citizens or, instead, to enforce rules imposed by the state or its subdivisions.

The majority begins its analysis by examining caselaw and legal dictionaries in search of a definition of the term "tort." It ultimately articulates this one: "a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of compensatory damages."2 But this definition offers little guidance, first because "civil wrong" is itself a term of art and, moreover, because, as noted in the previous paragraph, there are many noncontractual civil wrongs that are not torts.

The English legal tradition recognized courts of "law," the Court of Queen's Bench, and "equity," the Court of Chancery. Though complementary, the two operated separately and independently.3 Our modern system has abolished these distinctions, but has adopted aspects of and rules from both.4 Civil liability sounding in neither contract nor tort is not uncommon. Breach of trust, for example, has its roots in the rules of equity and the Court of Chancery, separate and distinct from both contract and tort.5 A trustee relationship imposes fiduciary duties, the breach of which results in liability.6 Though trust law can well be understood as a half sibling of contract law, it cannot be reduced to contract. A breach of trust stems not from the violation of a bargained-for-exchange, but rather from duties arising out of the special relationship of the parties. That is, it was not considered a tort, and at common law the only available remedy was in equity. Another example is provided by the law of restitution and unjust enrichment. It is based on principles of equity; it sounds in neither contract nor tort, yet it shares characteristics of both. Restitution recognizes the need for compensation in instances when the receipt and retention of a benefit by a person without payment made to the person providing that benefit would result in injustice.7 Consider also easements by prescription. An action to establish a prescriptive easement certainly cannot be recognized as based in contract because permissive use destroys the claim.8 Nor is it based in tort. Like actions to quiet title, actions for a prescriptive easement are equitable in nature.9 State and governmental entities are immune from prescriptive easements not because of the broad language of the GTLA. Rather, that immunity is conferred by an exception to the statute of limitations for actions for recovery or possession of real property.10

Our legal system imposes liability in many other contexts as well, even apart from the criminal justice system. A familiar example would be civil infractions. A parking ticket results in a legal obligation to pay money. But a parking infraction is not a tort, a breach of contract, or a crime. It is simply a municipal ordinance violation.11 And perhaps the most essential power of any government — the power to tax — imposes legal obligations. Yet, again, tax liability does not sound in either tort or contract.12 A comprehensive discussion of these two subjects is beyond the scope of this dissent. But both civil infractions and tax law impose civil liability in ways different from tort or contract. The obligations they impose serve to vindicate the interests of the sovereign. They do not serve to vindicate personal rights; they are not mechanisms for righting private wrongs or securing compliance to a mutual obligation.

B. THE NATURE OF TORTS

William Prosser once observed that "a really satisfactory definition of a tort is yet to be found. The numerous attempts which have been made to define the term have succeeded only in achieving language so broad that it includes other matters than torts, or else so narrow that it leaves out some torts themselves."13 Fundamentally, a tort action protects a person's interest in a range of personal interests: physical security and autonomy;14 emotional security and other intangible interests, such as privacy and reputation;15 and personal economic security and opportunity.16 While tort liability may lead to relief in the form of compensatory money damages, this is not the only remedy available for tortious conduct. A tortfeasor may be restrained by an injunction, and may be liable for restitution, punitive, or nominal damages.

Moreover, compensatory damages are not unique to tort law. Compensatory damages are a common remedy in actions based in contract, for example, as expectation or consequential damages. Or for an example closer to contempt, our Legislature has even provided for compensatory damages for victims of crime in the Crime Victim's Rights Act.17 In short, tort liability does not hinge on an award of compensatory damages, and the availability of compensatory damages is not unique to tort law.

Rather, the sine qua non of a tort is the breach of a duty owed to a fellow citizen. And, although tort liability has been extended to some extent in recent decades with increased reliance on doctrines like public nuisance, classic tort liability is rooted in the common-law duties all citizens owe to one another.18

C. CONTEMPT OF COURT

Contempt of court is altogether different. It stems from a violation of an obligation owed not to any person, but to the court itself. Contempt does not serve to protect private rights; it serves to protect the power of the courts. Contempt has been described as a "power of self-defense," intended to sanction "those who interfere with the orderly conduct of [court] business or disobey orders necessary to the conduct of that business...."19 This purpose — to protect the power of the judiciary — is evidenced not only by modern cases, but also by contempt's historical roots. It comes as no surprise that contempt of court is not discussed in any leading tort treatise, nor is it discussed within the comprehensive framework of tort law by the Restatement, two observations which further reveal the majority's error.20 The common law did not consider contempt a tort, and the Queen's Bench would not have understood it as such. Rather, contempt of court was viewed at common law as criminal in nature.21 While modern cases distinguish civil contempt,22 and though indemnification damages in a contempt proceeding may resemble tort damages in certain respects, labeling contempt a tort is to ignore fundamental differences between the two.

Implicit in the majority's analysis is that all legal wrong fits neatly into one of three categories: criminal, contractual, or tortious. The law is not so neat. Modern Michigan cases have recognized contempt proceedings as "quasi-criminal" in nature.23 Nor is Michigan alone. The United States Supreme Court has described contempt proceedings as "sui generis — neither civil actions nor prosecutions for offenses, within the ordinary meaning of those terms — and exertions of the power inherent in all courts to enforce obedience, something they must possess in order properly to perform their functions."24 They "are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal."25 Rather, an act of contempt "may partake of the characteristics of both."26

As this discussion demonstrates, courts have often struggled to classify contempt as anything but sui generis. While modern cases label contempt as either "civil" or "criminal," this distinction does not lead to the conclusion that civil contempt is a tort. The distinction between criminal and civil contempt has not always been clear,27 but the dividing line has focused on the nature of the punishment or sanction.28 But no matter the label, even "if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's authority."29 Though different labels may be applied, at its core a contempt action is fundamental to a court's power to effectuate its orders.30

D. A TORT BY ANY OTHER NAME?

A more apt comparison for contempt of court can be found not in tort law, but instead in the various legal sanctions provided by our court rules. Like the contempt power, these sanctions serve to enforce the orderliness of court proceedings. Sometimes, courts may impose the equivalent of compensatory damages for a violation of the court rules, such as when a party who files vexatious pleadings or makes vexatious discovery demands is sanctioned by having to pay the other party's costs. But these are not tort damages, nor are they unavailable against municipal litigants under the GTLA.

The majority cites several cases in which courts have drawn analogies between civil contempt and tort in support of its conclusion that civil contempt is a tort.31 These cases do not support the majority's conclusion; they suggest only that a civil contempt petition is analogous to a tort claim. But the majority offers these cases in support of the separate proposition that civil contempt is a tort.32 Analogies are by definition comparable, but not interchangeable. They are related, but they are not equivalent. The majority is correct that one analogous feature of these two distinct civil wrongs is that both can result in compensatory liability. But the similarity ends there. Tort law imposes a duty to avoid harmful conduct deemed tortious. Contempt law imposes a duty to obey the court. These duties are fundamentally different, as are their origins, and the purposes they serve.

Even assuming, purely for argument's sake, that a similarity to tort were sufficient to subject civil contempt to the same immunity rules as tort, I believe that the Legislature has foreclosed that immunity here. For while I agree with the majority that contempt sanctions are not among the five statutory exceptions to the GTLA's grant of immunity, the GTLA does not apply in cases in which a separate statute gives rise to direct evidence that the Legislature intended to waive the state's immunity to liability.33 The contempt statute specifically includes "[a]ll attorneys, counselors, clerks, registers, sheriffs, coroners, and all other persons in any manner elected or appointed to perform any judicial or ministerial services"34 as those subject to the court's contempt power. By specifically including these governmental actors as among those who may be deemed contemnors, the Legislature has waived any claim that they are immune from contempt liability. Further, the contempt statute does not distinguish among those parties to which its various sanctions, including indemnification damages, apply.

II. STATUTORY INTENT

I believe the majority's premise that contempt is a tort leads it to gloss over the relevant statutory texts too quickly. The express language of both the GTLA and the contempt statute undermines the majority's conclusion that the GTLA is intended to grant governmental agencies immunity from compensatory contempt sanctions. The GTLA does not refer to contempt explicitly or implicitly, and, likewise, the contempt statute does not refer to governmental immunity in any way. Given that contempt remedies are not generally understood to be "tort" damages, surely the Legislature would have made its intentions clear if it had sought to include contempt remedies in the immunity statute. As previously noted, certain governmental actors are specifically included as within the scope of the contempt statute,35 establishing that governmental actors can be held in contempt. Further, the compensatory remedy of the contempt statute does not limit against whom indemnification damages apply.36

The GTLA itself demonstrates that the Legislature knew how to use different language when it intended to grant immunity beyond tort liability. MCL 691.1407(1), which the majority relies on, states that "a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function."37 In MCL 691.1407(6), however, the GTLA does not use the term "tort liability," but instead states that "[a] guardian ad litem is immune from civil liability for an injury to a person or damage to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority as guardian ad litem."38 Because "liability for an injury to a person or damage to property" encompasses tort liability, the Legislature's use of the term "civil liability" in § 1407(6) suggests a broader scope of immunity than that found in § 1407(1). When the Legislature uses different words in the same statute, they should be assigned different meanings whenever possible.39

The codification of the contempt power underscores the same conclusion. The Legislature did not use the word "tort" to describe the conduct it prohibits in the contempt statute. It did not use the word "tort" to describe the available sanctions. And there is more support: The Legislature did not include contempt in chapter 29 of the Revised Judicature Act, "Provisions Concerning Specific Actions,"40 a chapter codifying miscellaneous tort actions including malpractice,41 defamation,42 and damage or waste to land.43 Rather, contempt is given its own chapter, in keeping with its unique nature.44

Further, refusing to apply the GTLA here will not negatively impact the functioning of governmental agencies because governmental actors, I believe, generally avoid behavior "directly tending to interrupt [court] proceedings,"45 do not habitually engage in "willful neglect or violation of duty,"46 and generally refrain from "disobeying any lawful order, decree, or process of the court."47 Even given the egregious facts of this case, respondent vigorously contests whether a contempt finding was proper. Respondent argues that there was no willful violation of the probate court order and, assuming there was, that indemnification damages were nevertheless improper because there was no causal link between the contempt and Bradley's suicide.48 These would be issues worthy of consideration on remand if my position prevailed and they provide additional hurdles that might prove fatal to petitioner's claim for indemnification damages.

III. THE INHERENT POWER OF THE JUDICIARY

Finally, the majority's analysis concludes that the GTLA's immunity grant to contemnors is not an infringement on the court's inherent contempt power because the GTLA only applies to the contempt remedies provided by the Revised Judicature Act,49 but not to the judiciary's "inherent contempt power," which the majority concludes is limited to coercive fines and imprisonment. While my analysis does not rest on this distinction, I believe the majority fails to satisfactorily explain why any particular remedy, and indemnification damages in particular, is somehow outside the Court's inherent contempt power, except, perhaps, because this sanction is codified in the Revised Judicature Act.50 That codification would render the remedy not part of the court's inherent power is inconsistent with both this Court's past pronouncement that contempt statutes are "merely declaratory of what the law was before its passage,"51 and, as the majority concedes,52 with the fact that indemnification damages have been recognized by Michigan contempt statutes dating back well before adoption of the 1963 Constitution.53 And while it has been recognized that the Legislature can regulate the court's exercise of the contempt power, that regulation cannot abridge or, crucially, curtail the power.54 An intrusion of that nature into the courts' inherent powers would violate the separation-of-powers principle.55 But the majority fails to acknowledge this principle, or explain how the removal of an entire class of sanctions is merely regulatory and not instead a curtailment.56 If, counterfactually, the GTLA expressly prohibited indemnification damages as a remedy for contempt of court, that restriction would be, at the least, constitutionally questionable. The very fact that legislative restrictions on judicial powers raise constitutional questions is another reason not to interpret the GTLA as having done so. It is well established that courts should construe acts of the Legislature to avoid constitutional questions whenever possible.57

IV. CONCLUSION

I agree with the majority's basic premise that "tort liability" refers to "legal responsibility arising from a tort."58 Because I conclude that contempt of court is not a tort, no matter what remedy for contempt is imposed, I would not interpret the GTLA as granting immunity to governmental agencies from contempt sanctions under MCL 600.1721. Whether petitioner here can demonstrate that respondent's conduct was a legal cause of Stephen Bradley's death, whether his death constitutes an "actual loss or injury" to petitioner within the meaning of MCL 600.1721, or, as a threshold matter, whether a finding of contempt here was proper, are issues not before us.

The practical import of this case is probably limited, given that civil contempt is fairly rare and that the facts of a case giving rise to the possibility of indemnification damages for civil contempt are rarer still. But the underlying principles are important. As a matter of good doctrinal bookkeeping, civil contempt is not the same as tort, and civil contempt penalties are not the same as tort liability. Although the majority is correct that, as it happens, petitioner seeks indemnification under the contempt statute after having been denied a claim for wrongful death, the majority's holding will also apply to future cases in which, unlike here, a governmental actor's contemptuous conduct has no obvious tort analogue simply because the sanction can be viewed as compensatory.

But even beyond getting the basic legal categories here correct, this Court should be hesitant to cede the judiciary's power to impose exceptional remedies in those exceptional cases in which they may be warranted for failure to heed judicial orders. This Court should, instead, safeguard the power of the judicial branch. No other branch will.

I would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the probate court for further proceedings.