YOUNG, C.J. While hearsay is generally inadmissible, 1 the Michigan Rules of Evidence permit certain prior out-of-court statements to be admitted into evidence when a witness is unavailable. 2 MRE 804(a) enumerates five situations when a witness is unavailable, including when the witness is unable to testify because of a then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. 3 We hold that when a child attempts to testify but, because of her youth, is unable to do so because she lacks the...
YOUNG, C.J. Our common law has long imposed the same duty of care on landlords and merchants to remedy physical defects in premises over which they exert control. This consistency is premised on the similar degree of control both landlords and merchants exercise over the premises. Where third parties commit criminal acts against tenants and invitees in these controlled areas, landlords and merchants share a similar, albeit lesser, degree of control because of the inherent unpredictability of...
ZAHRA, J. At issue in this case is whether the four-year period of limitations in 2725 of article 2 of Michigan's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 1 MCL 440.2725, is applicable to actions on either an open account or an account stated when the underlying debt stemmed from the sale of goods. Because actions on an account stated and actions on an open account are distinct and independent from the underlying transactions giving rise to the antecedent debt, neither action is governed by the four-...
Opinion of the Court PER CURIAM. The significant question in this case is whether a person claiming personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under MCL 500.3114(5)(a) for injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident may also recover an award for those same injuries under a health insurance policy that contains a provision titled, "Care and Services That Are Not Payable," which provides, "[w]e do not pay for the following care and services: Those for which you legally do not have to pay...
VIVIANO, J. In these consolidated cases, we consider the proper assessment of points under offense variable (OV) 7 (aggravated physical abuse). 1 Specifically, our focus is on what type of conduct under OV 7 constitutes "conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense." 2 In both cases, the circuit courts concluded that the defendants' respective conduct supported assessing 50 points for OV 7 pursuant to MCL 777.37(1)(a). We conclude that...
PER CURIAM. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it improperly applied the last antecedent rule. We reinstate the opinion and order of the Wayne Circuit Court that granted summary disposition in favor of defendant. The facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1994 plaintiff, Hurticene Hardaway, was appointed to the position of "principal attorney" in the Office of Corporation Counsel for defendant, Wayne County. Importantly, her appointment did not require confirmation...
MARY BETH KELLY, J. In this case, we decide whether a civil contempt petition that seeks indemnification damages under MCL 600.1721 imposes "tort liability" within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(1) of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. Given the Legislature's use of the common-law term "tort," we hold that "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA encompasses all legal responsibility for civil wrongs, other than a breach of contract, for which a...
MARKMAN, J. We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by admitting defendant's confession to a parole officer. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of defendant's confession violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), because Evans was a "law enforcement officer" for purposes of Miranda. We respectfully disagree because this is not a...
MARKMAN, J. Defendant's first trial was declared a mistrial because of a hung jury. Following defendant's second jury trial, he was convicted of assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, concluding inter alia that defendant had been improperly impeached with his silence when the prosecutor made repeated references to his failure to testify at his first trial. We granted leave...
VIVIANO, J. In these consolidated cases, we address the application of Michigan's statutory apportionment formula for individuals with flow-through business income under the Michigan Income Tax Act (ITA). 1 In both cases, the individual taxpayers received income from in-state and out-of-state, flow-through businesses. The Michigan Department of Treasury (Department) refused the taxpayers' attempts to combine the flow-through income from their respective businesses and then apportion the...
MARY BETH KELLY, J. This case concerns "absolute" governmental immunity. Specifically, we consider whether a village chief of police, the highest appointive executive official of a level of government, acted within the scope of his "executive authority" when he performed the duties of an ordinary police officer and is, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity under MCL 691.1407(5) of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. We hold that the term "executive...
McCORMACK, J. In this case, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. It did so on the grounds that the circuit court erred by admitting hearsay testimony on the theory that defendant's conduct amounted to forfeiture by wrongdoing under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. 1 We agree that the circuit court erred by admitting the challenged statements, because the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendant had the specific...
Opinion of the Court YOUNG, C.J. The public employment relations act (PERA) 1 requires public employers to bargain with their employees' designated representatives concerning the "terms and conditions of employment," including the calculation of retirement benefits. Failure to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice. The unfair labor practice complaints at issue in this case arise out of the Macomb County Retirement Commission's decision to change the actuarial table used to calculate...
MARKMAN, J. This case concerns whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund plaintiff Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS). Because that claim falls within the scope of MCL 205.731(a) as a "proceeding for direct review of a final decision ... of an agency relating to ... rates ... under...
ZAHRA, J. At issue in this case is whether Michigan's no-fault insurance act 1 requires defendant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, to pay the entire cost of a van modified to accommodate the plaintiff's wheelchair, including both the base price of the van and the separately introduced modifications. We conclude that defendant is only required to pay for the modifications because only the modifications are allowable expenses "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation" under MCL...
PER CURIAM. The Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA) 1 prohibits the prosecution of registered patients who internally possess marijuana, but the act does not protect registered patients who operate a vehicle while "under the influence" of marijuana. The Michigan Vehicle Code 2 prohibits a person from driving with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance, a list that includes marijuana, in his or her system. This case requires us to decide whether the MMMA's protection supersedes the...
MARY BETH KELLY, J. This case involves the proper interpretation of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), 1 which protects an employee against an employer's retaliatory employment actions, including discharge, when the employee is engaged in protected activity. Specifically, we address whether this Court's decision in Shallal v. Catholic Social Services of Wayne County 2 requires an employee engaging in protected conduct to have, as his or her primary motivation for engaging in that...
MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff developed a neurological disorder as a result of injuries sustained in a 2007 motor vehicle accident. Subsequently, in 2008, while driving a motorcycle, he experienced a seizure consistent with that disorder, lost control of the motorcycle, crashed into a parked car, and sustained a severe spinal cord injury that left him quadriplegic. Plaintiff did not assert that he was entitled to no-fault benefits for the spinal cord injury as a result of the 2008 crash. 1...
MARKMAN, J. The issues presented here are (1) whether the lower courts properly exercised equitable jurisdiction with regard to this case and, if so, (2) whether the Drain Code requires 5 or 50 signatures for a drainage-district consolidation petition, and (3) whether the notice given regarding a drainage "board of determination" hearing satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process. We conclude that the lower courts improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over the signature-...
MARKMAN, J. The issue in this case is whether noneconomic damages are recoverable for the negligent destruction of real property. No Michigan case has ever allowed a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages resulting solely from the negligent destruction of property, either real or personal. Rather, the common law of this state has long provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is simply the cost of replacement or repair of the...
